We have GENERATED_GBL_DATA_SIZE to tell us how large the generated
global data is, so do not use a hard-coded value of 1024 for it.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
In the places where PowerPC references CONFIG_SYS_GBL_DATA_OFFSET it
does so as (CONFIG_SYS_INIT_RAM_ADDR + CONFIG_SYS_GBL_DATA_OFFSET). And
it defines CONFIG_SYS_GBL_DATA_OFFSET in the same manner that other
architectures define CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_OFFSET. Other architectures
define CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR as (CONFIG_SYS_INIT_RAM_ADDR +
CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_OFFSET) typically. Rename things within PowerPC for
consistency with other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Currently, since we know that in the combination of
CONFIG_SYS_INIT_RAM_ADDR + CONFIG_SYS_GBL_DATA_OFFSET all of the "high"
bits are in CONFIG_SYS_INIT_RAM_ADDR and "low" bits are in
CONFIG_SYS_GBL_DATA_OFFSET we reference this separately in start.S, but
added together everywhere else. For clarity consistency, reference the
combined value here instead.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This value is only referenced by PowerPC code in a way other than
directly as CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR. Switch to CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR
directly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This value is only referenced by PowerPC code in a way other than
directly as CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR. Switch to CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR
directly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
In some cases, we define CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR differently for SPL or
full U-Boot. This case should be making use of CONFIG_SPL_STACK, as
that's what that variable is for. In a few other cases we define
CONFIG_SPL_STACK directly to CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR, but do not need to
as the code handles this correctly, normally.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
The definition of CONFIG_SPL_BOOTROM_SAVE is always a fixed
CONFIG_SPL_STACK + 4, while CONFIG_SPL_STACK is not constant. This
change will make it clear where the location is still, once
CONFIG_SPL_STACK moves to Kconfig.
Cc: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
A number of PowerPC platforms define this, for SPL. To move this to
Kconfig, it needs to be CONFIG_SPL_SYS_CCSR_DO_NOT_RELOCATE, so use
CONFIG_IS_ENABLED() to check for usage. A number of layerscape
platforms bring this logic from PowerPC, but only need a small part of
it, for the fman driver. Remove their unused portion at least.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_SPL_SYS_MALLOC_SIMPLE
The problem here is that a few platforms have been doing:
#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
#define CONFIG_SYS_MALLOC_SIMPLE
#endif
instead of defining CONFIG_SPL_SYS_MALLOC_SIMPLE directly. Correct this
and update the documentation in a few places to match usage.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_SPL_BSS_MAX_SIZE
CONFIG_SPL_MAX_FOOTPRINT
Note that the da850evm platforms were violating the "only use one" rule
here, and so now hard-code their BSS limit.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_SPL_PAD_TO
CONFIG_SPL_MAX_SIZE
CONFIG_TPL_PAD_TO
CONFIG_TPL_MAX_SIZE
Note that we need to make TPL_MAX_SIZE be hex, and so move and convert the
existing places.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_SPL_FS_LOAD_ARGS_NAME
CONFIG_SPL_FS_LOAD_KERNEL_NAME
CONFIG_SPL_FS_LOAD_PAYLOAD_NAME
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_SPL_INIT_MINIMAL
CONFIG_SPL_FLUSH_IMAGE
CONFIG_SPL_SKIP_RELOCATE
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This is only referenced in non-SPL_DM cases, of which there are
currently none. Remove this option and slightly re-organize the code is
there is now never an if/else at the start of spl_sata_load_image()
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This is always defined to 2, and referenced in two places. Move the
define to <asm/omap_common.h> and make sure the code that uses this
includes that file. Make <asm/arch-omap*/clock.h> not include that
file, as we don't need to be doing so.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Two defconfigs were missed when transitioning the SYS_FMAN_FW_ADDR
symbol to Kconfig. CONFIG_SYS_FMAN_FW_ADDR is currently initialized to
0 by default on these builds, which prevents the firmware from loading.
Add the correct symbols to these defconfigs.
Fixes: a97a071d10 ("configs: fsl: migrate FMAN/QE specific defines to Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Camelia Groza <camelia.groza@nxp.com>
UEFI:
* Fix the implementation of the firmware management protocol
* Fix the unit tests for signed update capsules
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Merge tag 'efi-2022-07-rc4-4' of https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for efi-2022-07-rc4-4
UEFI:
* Fix the implementation of the firmware management protocol
* Fix the unit tests for signed update capsules
Add support for the authentication of UEFI capsules containing FIT images.
The authentication code is moved out of the function handling raw images
into a new function efi_firmware_capsule_authenticate(). The special case
for the FMP header coming from edk2 tools is preserved. There is no
functional change for capsules containing raw images.
The python test for signed capsules with raw images is renamed with no
functional change and a new test is added for signed capsules containing
FIT images.
This can be tested with sandbox64_defconfig or sandbox_flattree_defconfig,
plus CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Stehlé <vincent.stehle@arm.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Repair the python tests for authenticated EFI capsules, which can be run
with sandbox_defconfig plus CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y.
- Account for the reset changes done by commit 3e6f810006 ("efi_loader:
test/py: Reset system after capsule update on disk").
- Fix the capsule GUID typo introduced by commit 2e9c3c6965 ("test:
capsule: Modify the capsule tests to use GUID values for sandbox").
Signed-off-by: Vincent Stehlé <vincent.stehle@arm.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
The OsIndications is a 64 bit variable, and the current code expects
the value of the variable to be 64 bit. Update the documentation to
reflect this fact.
Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The GetImageInfo function of the Firmware Mangement Protocol(FMP) gets
called initially to query the size of the image descriptor array that
would have to be allocated. During this call, the rest of the function
arguments, specifically pointers might be passed as NULL. Do not
populate the descriptor_count value before it is known that the call
to GetImageInfo has been made with the allocated buffer for the image
descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
"valu" should be "value".
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <judge.packham@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Since the power domain driver default select CONFIG_CLK, so we will
meet lots failures without CLK_IMX8MQ, so default select it.
Fixes: commit 4eb82c2e56 ("imx: power-domain: Get rid of SMCCC dependency")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Add a new device tree property "u-boot,version" in the chosen node to
pass the U-Boot version to the operating system.
This can be useful to implement a firmware upgrade procedure from the
operating system.
Signed-off-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Nicolas Bidron and Nicolas Guigo reported the two bugs below:
"
----------BUG 1----------
In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of
`ip->ip_len` (IP packet header's Total Length) higher than `IP_HDR_SIZE`
and strictly lower than `IP_HDR_SIZE+8` will lead to a value for `len`
comprised between `0` and `7`. This will ultimately result in a
truncated division by `8` resulting value of `0` forcing the hole
metadata and fragment to point to the same location. The subsequent
memcopy will overwrite the hole metadata with the fragment data. Through
a second fragment, this can be exploited to write to an arbitrary offset
controlled by that overwritten hole metadata value.
This bug is only exploitable locally as it requires crafting two packets
the first of which would most likely be dropped through routing due to
its unexpectedly low Total Length. However, this bug can potentially be
exploited to root linux based embedded devices locally.
```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
static u16 first_hole, total_len;
struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
offset8 = (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
thisfrag = payload + offset8;
start = offset8 * 8;
len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```
The last line of the previous excerpt from `u-boot/net/net.c` shows how
the attacker can control the value of `len` to be strictly lower than
`8` by issuing a packet with `ip_len` between `21` and `27`
(`IP_HDR_SIZE` has a value of `20`).
Also note that `offset8` here is `0` which leads to `thisfrag = payload`.
```C
} else if (h >= thisfrag) {
/* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
*newh = *h;
h = newh;
if (h->next_hole)
payload[h->next_hole].prev_hole = (h - payload);
if (h->prev_hole)
payload[h->prev_hole].next_hole = (h - payload);
else
first_hole = (h - payload);
} else {
```
Lower down the same function, execution reaches the above code path.
Here, `len / 8` evaluates to `0` leading to `newh = thisfrag`. Also note
that `first_hole` here is `0` since `h` and `payload` point to the same
location.
```C
/* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```
Finally, in the above excerpt the `memcpy` overwrites the hole metadata
since `thisfrag` and `h` both point to the same location. The hole
metadata is effectively overwritten with arbitrary data from the
fragmented IP packet data. If `len` was crafted to be `6`, `last_byte`,
`next_hole`, and `prev_hole` of the `first_hole` can be controlled by
the attacker.
Finally the arbitrary offset write occurs through a second fragment that
only needs to be crafted to write data in the hole pointed to by the
previously controlled hole metadata (`next_hole`) from the first packet.
### Recommendation
Handle cases where `len` is strictly lower than 8 by preventing the
overwrite of the hole metadata during the memcpy of the fragment. This
could be achieved by either:
* Moving the location where the hole metadata is stored when `len` is
lower than `8`.
* Or outright rejecting fragmented IP datagram with a Total Length
(`ip_len`) lower than 28 bytes which is the minimum valid fragmented IP
datagram size (as defined as the minimum fragment of 8 octets in the IP
Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 25).
----------BUG 2----------
In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of
`ip->ip_len` (IP packet header's Total Length) lower than `IP_HDR_SIZE`
will lead to a negative value for `len` which will ultimately result in
a buffer overflow during the subsequent `memcpy` that uses `len` as it's
`count` parameter.
This bug is only exploitable on local ethernet as it requires crafting
an invalid packet to include an unexpected `ip_len` value in the IP UDP
header that's lower than the minimum accepted Total Length of a packet
(21 as defined in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791)). Such packet
would in all likelihood be dropped while being routed to its final
destination through most routing equipment and as such requires the
attacker to be in a local position in order to be exploited.
```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
static u16 first_hole, total_len;
struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
offset8 = (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
thisfrag = payload + offset8;
start = offset8 * 8;
len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```
The last line of the previous excerpt from `u-boot/net/net.c` shows
where the underflow to a negative `len` value occurs if `ip_len` is set
to a value strictly lower than 20 (`IP_HDR_SIZE` being 20). Also note
that in the above excerpt the `pkt_buff` buffer has a size of
`CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG` which defaults to 16 KB but can range from 1KB to
64 KB depending on configurations.
```C
/* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```
In the above excerpt the `memcpy` overflows the destination by
attempting to make a copy of nearly 4 gigabytes in a buffer that's
designed to hold `CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG` bytes at most which leads to a DoS.
### Recommendation
Stop processing of the packet if `ip_len` is lower than 21 (as defined
by the minimum length of a data carrying datagram in the IP
Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 34)."
Add a check for ip_len lesser than 28 and stop processing the packet
in this case.
Such a check covers the two reported bugs.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bidron <nicolas.bidron@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
The AArch64 TCR_ELx register is a 64-bit register, and many newer
architecture features use bits in the upper half. So far U-Boot was
igorant of those bits, trying to leave them alone.
However, in an effort to set bit 31 to 1, it failed doing so, because
the compiler sign-extended "1 << 31", so that all bits[63:31] got set.
Older ARMv8.0 cores don't define anything dangerous up there, but newer
architecture revisions do, and setting all those bits will end badly:
=================
$ qemu-system-aarch64 -cpu max ....
U-Boot 2022.07-rc1 (May 09 2022 - 15:21:00 +0100)
DRAM: 1.5 GiB
================= (hangs here)
Defining TCR_ELx_RSVD to "1U << 31" avoids the sign-extension, so all
upper bits stay at a safe 0 value. This means no more surprises when
U-Boot runs on a more capable CPU core.
Reported-by: Balaji Anandapadmanaban <Balaji.Anandapadmanaban@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
If the device fails to probe - for example, when there is no
ethaddr set - then the private data is automatically freed
but the mdiobus remains registered.
Fixes: 1e354cb393 ("drivers: net: fsl_enetc: register internal MDIO bus")
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Commit b1a14f8a1c ("UBIFS: Change ubifsload to not read beyond the
requested size") added optimization to do not read more bytes than it is
really needed. But this commit introduced incorrect handling of the hole at
the end of file. This logic cause U-Boot to crash or lockup when trying to
read from the ubifs filesystem.
When read_block() call returns -ENOENT error (not an error, but the hole)
then dn-> structure is not filled and contain garbage. So using of dn->size
for memcpy() argument cause that U-Boot tries to copy unspecified amount of
bytes from possible unmapped memory. Which randomly cause lockup of P2020
CPU.
Fix this issue by copying UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE bytes from read buffer when
dn->size is not available. UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE is the size of the buffer
itself and read_block() fills buffer by zeros when it returns -ENOENT.
This patch fixes ubifsload on P2020.
Fixes: b1a14f8a1c ("UBIFS: Change ubifsload to not read beyond the requested size")
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
UEFI:
* fix a problem in loading an image from a short-path
* fix building the bootmenu command for CONFIG_EFI_LOADER=n
* correct the bootefi command syntax
* add firmware management protocol to the documentation
Others:
* bootmenu: fix bootmenu title handling
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Merge tag 'efi-2022-07-rc4-3' of https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for efi-2022-07-rc4-3
UEFI:
* fix a problem in loading an image from a short-path
* fix building the bootmenu command for CONFIG_EFI_LOADER=n
* correct the bootefi command syntax
* add firmware management protocol to the documentation
Others:
* bootmenu: fix bootmenu title handling
Tested-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org> [n900, for bootmenu working as before]
