On ARM, the gd pointer is stored in registers r9 / x18. For this the
-ffixed-r9 / -ffixed-x18 flag is used when compiling, but using global
register variables causes errors when building with LTO, and these
errors are very difficult to overcome.
Richard Biener says [1]:
Note that global register vars shouldn't be used with LTO and if they
are restricted to just a few compilation units the recommended fix is
to build those CUs without -flto.
We cannot do this for U-Boot since all CUs use -ffixed-reg flag.
It seems that with LTO we could in fact store the gd pointer differently
and gain performance or size benefit by allowing the compiler to use
r9 / x18. But this would need more work.
So for now, when building with LTO, go the clang way, and instead of
declaring gd a global register variable, we make it a function call via
macro.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=68384
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Supported peripherals: Ethernet, eMMC, Serial.
U-Boot SPL 2021.04-00911-g5fa1e2ffeb-dirty (Apr 23 2021 - 09:11:14
+0200)
Normal Boot
Trying to boot from MMC2
U-Boot 2021.04-00911-g5fa1e2ffeb-dirty (Apr 23 2021 - 09:11:14 +0200)
CPU: Freescale i.MX8MQ rev2.1 at 1000 MHz
Reset cause: POR
Model: Ronetix iMX8M-CM SoM
DRAM: 1 GiB
WDT: Started with servicing (60s timeout)
MMC: FSL_SDHC: 0, FSL_SDHC: 1
Loading Environment from MMC... OK
In: serial
Out: serial
Err: serial
Net:
Warning: ethernet@30be0000 (eth0) using random MAC address -
42:0d:e7:78:da:53
eth0: ethernet@30be0000
Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0
u-boot=>
Signed-off-by: Ilko Iliev <iliev@ronetix.at>
instead using ls and awk to determine file size use stat instead.
This fixes an invalid size reporting for user or group names that have
spaces in them.
This adds a dependency on the stat application which is part of
the coreutils package which also includes ls.
Signed-off-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Engicam C.TOUCH 2.0 is an EDIMM compliant general purpose Carrier
board.
Genaral features:
- Ethernet 10/100
- Wifi/BT
- USB Type A/OTG
- Audio Out
- CAN
- LVDS panel connector
i.Core MX8M Mini is an EDIMM SoM based on NXP i.MX8M Mini from Engicam.
i.Core MX8M Mini needs to mount on top of this Carrier board for
creating complete i.Core MX8M Mini C.TOUCH 2.0 board.
Linux dts commit details:
commit <a142252061ff> ("arm64: dts: imx8mm: Add Engicam i.Core MX8M Mini
C.TOUCH 2.0")
Add support for it.
Signed-off-by: Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com>
Engicam EDIMM2.2 Starter Kit is an EDIMM 2.2 Form Factor Capacitive
Evaluation Board.
Genaral features:
- LCD 7" C.Touch
- microSD slot
- Ethernet 1Gb
- Wifi/BT
- 2x LVDS Full HD interfaces
- 3x USB 2.0
- 1x USB 3.0
- HDMI Out
- Mini PCIe
- MIPI CSI
- 2x CAN
- Audio Out
i.Core MX8M Mini is an EDIMM SoM based on NXP i.MX8M Mini from Engicam.
i.Core MX8M Mini needs to mount on top of this Evaluation board for
creating complete i.Core MX8M Mini EDIMM2.2 Starter Kit.
Linux dts commit details:
commit <051c08eea682> ("arm64: dts: imx8mm: Add Engicam i.Core MX8M Mini
EDIMM2.2 Starter Kit")
Add support for it.
Signed-off-by: Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Jason Liu <jason.hui.liu@nxp.com>
Cc: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Lucile Quirion <lucile.quirion@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Jason Liu <jason.hui.liu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
These boards have not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove them.
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Sebastien Bourdelin <sebastien.bourdelin@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board has not been converted to CONFIG_DM_MMC by the deadline.
Remove it.
Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This board relies on using CONFIG_LIBATA but does not enable CONFIG_AHCI. The
deadline for this conversion was the v2019.07 release. In order to
convert to using the DWC SATA driver under DM further migrations are
required.
Cc: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Acked-by: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
This board relies on using CONFIG_LIBATA but does not enable CONFIG_AHCI. The
deadline for this conversion was the v2019.07 release. The use of CONFIG_AHCI
requires CONFIG_DM. The deadline for this conversion was v2020.01. Remove
this board.
Cc: Akshay Bhat <akshaybhat@timesys.com>
Cc: Ken Lin <Ken.Lin@advantech.com.tw>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This reverts the arch/arm/mach-imx/imx_bootaux.c changes of commit
805b3cac1e. The loader function name was changed so that it does
not clash with the generically available function in lib/elf.c.
imx-bootaux loads an elf file linked for an auxilary core. Thus the
loader function requires address translation from the auxilary core's
address space to where those are mapped into U-Boot's address space.
So the elf loader is specific and must not be replaced with a generic
loader which doesn't provide the address translation functionality.
Fixes commit 805b3cac1e ("lib: elf: Move the generic elf
loading/validating functions to lib")
Signed-off-by: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Suvorov <oleksandr.suvorov@toradex.com>
The OCRAM_S is regular memory, just like the OCRAM, add it to the MMU
tables so it can be used and cached.
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Add DEK encapsulation support for imx8. The DEK blob is generated by the
SECO through the SCFW API.
Signed-off-by: Clement Faure <clement.faure@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Add DEK blob encapsulation support for IMX8M through "dek_blob" command.
On ARMv8, u-boot runs in non-secure, thus cannot encapsulate a DEK blob
for encrypted boot.
The DEK blob is encapsulated by OP-TEE through a trusted application call.
U-boot sends and receives the DEK and the DEK blob binaries through OP-TEE
dynamic shared memory.
To enable the DEK blob encapsulation, add to the defconfig:
CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT=y
CONFIG_FAT_WRITE=y
CONFIG_CMD_DEKBLOB=y
Signed-off-by: Clement Faure <clement.faure@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
It is highly recommended to set the PRIBLOB bitfield to 0x3 once your
encrypted boot image has booted up, this prevents the generation of new
blobs that can be used to decrypt an encrypted boot image. The PRIBLOB is
a sticky type bit and cannot be changed until the next power on reset.
Add the set_priblob_bitfield U-Boot command to prevent the generation of
new blobs.
Signed-off-by: Clement Le Marquis <clement.lemarquis@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Ye Li <Ye.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Since cmd_dek is using CAAM JR, so enable the CMD_DEK only when
HAS_CAAM is set
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Add some SOC level codes and build configurations to use HAB lib for
CONFIG_IMX_HAB (secure boot), like adding the SEC_CONFIG fuse, enable
fuse driver, CAAM clock function, and add CAAM secure RAM to MMU table.
The FSL_CAAM is temporally not enabled for iMX8M when CONFIG_IMX_HAB is set,
because we don't need the CAAM driver for SPL.
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
When building 32-bit targets with CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT and DEBUG enabled
the following warnings are displayed:
arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c:840:41: warning: format '%lx' expects argument \
of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'uint32_t \
{aka unsigned int}' [-Wformat=]
printf("HAB check target 0x%08x-0x%08lx fail\n",
~~~~^
%08x
ddr_start, ddr_start + bytes);
arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c:845:45: warning: format '%x' expects argument \
of type 'unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'ulong \
{aka long unsigned int}' [-Wformat=]
printf("\nivt_offset = 0x%x, ivt addr = 0x%x\n", ivt_offset, ivt_addr);
~^
%lx
Fix warnings by providing the correct data type.
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
When booting in low power or dual boot modes the M4 binary is
authenticated by the M4 ROM code.
Add an option in hab_status command so users can retrieve M4 HAB
failure and warning events.
=> hab_status m4
Secure boot disabled
HAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66
No HAB Events Found!
Add command documentation in mx6_mx7_secure_boot.txt guide.
As HAB M4 API cannot be called from A7 core the code is parsing
the M4 HAB persistent memory region. The HAB persistent memory
stores HAB events, public keys and others HAB related information.
The HAB persistent memory region addresses and sizes can be found
in AN12263 "HABv4 RVT Guidelines and Recommendations".
Reviewed-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
The HABv4 implementation in ROM checks if HAB major version
in IVT header is 4.x.
The current implementation in hab.c code is only validating
HAB v4.0 and HAB v4.1 and may be incompatible with newer
HABv4 versions.
Modify verify_ivt_header() function to align with HABv4
implementation in ROM code.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Add ability for hab_status command to show All HAB events and not just
HAB failure events
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Currently it's not possible to authenticate additional boot images in HAB
open configuration.
The hab.c code is checking if the SEC_CONFIG[1] fuse is programmed prior
to calling the hab_authenticate_image() API function. Users cannot check
if their additional boot images has been correctly signed prior to closing
their device.
Enable hab.c to authenticate additional boot images in open mode so HAB
events can be retrieved through get_hab_status() function.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Modify to use hab_rvt_failsafe function for failsafe ROM API, not
directly call its ROM address. This function will wrap the sip call for iMX8M
platforms.
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Calling csf_is_valid() with an un-signed image may lead to data abort
as the CSF pointer could be pointing to a garbage address when accessed
in HAB_HDR_LEN(*(const struct hab_hdr *)(ulong)ivt_initial->csf).
Authenticate image from DDR location 0x80800000...
Check CSF for Write Data command before authenticating image
data abort
pc : [<fff5494c>] lr : [<fff54910>]
reloc pc : [<8780294c>] lr : [<87802910>]
sp : fdf45dc8 ip : 00000214 fp : 00000000
r10: fffb6170 r9 : fdf4fec0 r8 : 00722020
r7 : 80f20000 r6 : 80800000 r5 : 80800000 r4 : 00720000
r3 : 17a5aca3 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 80f2201f r0 : 00000019
Flags: NzcV IRQs off FIQs off Mode SVC_32
Resetting CPU ...
resetting ...
To avoid such errors during authentication process, validate IVT structure
by calling validate_ivt function which checks the following values in an IVT:
IVT_HEADER = 0x4X2000D1
ENTRY != 0x0
RES1 = 0x0
DCD = 0x0 /* Recommended */
SELF != 0x0 /* Absoulute address of IVT */
CSF != 0x0
RES2 = 0x0
This commit also checks if Image's start address is 4 byte aligned.
commit "0088d127 MLK-14945 HAB: Check if IVT valid before authenticating image"
removed as this patch addresses the issue.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
There are some changes to support ARM64 i.MX8M platform in this patches:
1. The hab_rvt base and function vectors are different as i.MX6/7
2. Need to bypass an workaround for i.MX6 to fix problem in MMU.
3. The x18 register needed save & restore before calling any HAB API. According
to ARM procedure call spec, the x18 is caller saved when it is used as
temporary register. So calling HAB API may scratch this register, and
cause crash once accessing the gd pointer.
On ARMv7, the r9 is callee saved when it is used as variable register. So
no need to save & restore it.
4. Add SEC_CONFIG fuse for iMX8M
When current EL is not EL3, the direct calling to HAB will fail because
CAAM/SNVS can't initialize at non-secure mode. In this case, we use
SIP call to run the HAB in ATF.
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
When loading kernel image, the image size is parsed from header, so it
does not include the CSF and IVT.
Add back the authenticate_image function to wrap the imx_hab_authenticate_image
with calculating IVT offset and full image size.
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Prior instantiating RNG we have to ensure if the CAAM job rings are
available. Avoid hardcoded job ring max size and use the definition at
fsl_sec.h
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Prior calling sec_in32() we have to ensure CAAM clock is enabled, the
function sec_in32() is reading CAAM registers and if CAAM clock is disabled
the system will hang.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
The CAAM output ring size register offset is currently defined in fsl_sec.h
as FSL_CAAM_ORSR_JRa_OFFSET, use this definition to avoid hardcoded value in
i.MX common code.
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
This code was originally developed by Raul Cardenas <raul.casas@nxp.com>
and modified to be applied in U-Boot imx_v2017.03.
More information about the initial submission can be seen
in the link below:
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2016-February/245273.html
i.MX7D has an a protection feature for Manufacturing process.
This feature uses asymmetric encryption to sign and verify
authenticated software handled between parties. This command
enables the use of such feature.
The private key is unique and generated once per device.
And it is stored in secure memory and only accessible by CAAM.
Therefore, the public key generation and signature functions
are the only functions available for the user.
The manufacturing-protection authentication process can be used to
authenticate the chip to the OEM's server.
Command usage:
Print the public key for the device.
- mfgprot pubk
Generates Signature over given data.
- mfgprot sign <data_address> <data_size>
Signed-off-by: Raul Ulises Cardenas <raul.casas@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
i.MX8MQ B2 is using same value in OCOTP_READ_FUSE_DATA like B1, so
we have to check the ROM verision to distinguish the revision.
As we have checked the B1 rev for sticky bits work around in
secure boot. So it won't apply on B2.
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
