Commit 8bc347e2ec "ARM: bootm: Allow booting in secure mode on hyp capable
systems" added the capability to select nonsec vs sec mode boot via an
environment var.
There is a subtle gotcha with this functionality, which is that the PSCI nodes
are still created in the fdt (via armv7_update_dt->fdt_psci) even when booting
in secure mode. Which means that if the kernel is PSCI aware then it will fail
to boot because it will try and do PSCI from secure world, which won't work.
This likely didn't get noticed before because the original purpose was to
support booting the legacy linux-sunxi kernels which don't understand PSCI.
To fix expose boot_nonsec (renaming with armv7_ prefix) outside of bootm.c and
use from the virt-dt code.
As well as avoiding the creation of the PSCI nodes we should also avoid
reserving the secure RAM, so do so.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Albert ARIBAUD <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@ti.com>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Generate the PSCI node in the device tree.
Also add a reserve section for the "secure" code that lives in
in normal RAM, so that the kernel knows it'd better not trip on
it.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>
The current non-sec switching code suffers from one major issue:
it cannot run in secure RAM, as a large part of u-boot still needs
to be run while we're switched to non-secure.
This patch reworks the whole HYP/non-secure strategy by:
- making sure the secure code is the *last* thing u-boot executes
before entering the payload
- performing an exception return from secure mode directly into
the payload
- allowing the code to be dynamically relocated to secure RAM
before switching to non-secure.
This involves quite a bit of horrible code, specially as u-boot
relocation is quite primitive.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>
For the KVM and XEN hypervisors to be usable, we need to enter the
kernel in HYP mode. Now that we already are in non-secure state,
HYP mode switching is within short reach.
While doing the non-secure switch, we have to enable the HVC
instruction and setup the HYP mode HVBAR (while still secure).
The actual switch is done by dropping back from a HYP mode handler
without actually leaving HYP mode, so we introduce a new handler
routine in our new secure exception vector table.
In the assembly switching routine we save and restore the banked LR
and SP registers around the hypercall to do the actual HYP mode
switch.
The C routine first checks whether we are in HYP mode already and
also whether the virtualization extensions are available. It also
checks whether the HYP mode switch was finally successful.
The bootm command part only calls the new function after the
non-secure switch.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Currently the non-secure switch is only done for the boot processor.
To enable full SMP support, we have to switch all secondary cores
into non-secure state also.
So we add an entry point for secondary CPUs coming out of low-power
state and make sure we put them into WFI again after having switched
to non-secure state.
For this we acknowledge and EOI the wake-up IPI, then go into WFI.
Once being kicked out of it later, we sanity check that the start
address has actually been changed (since another attempt to switch
to non-secure would block the core) and jump to the new address.
The actual CPU kick is done by sending an inter-processor interrupt
via the GIC to all CPU interfaces except the requesting processor.
The secondary cores will then setup their respective GIC CPU
interface.
While this approach is pretty universal across several ARMv7 boards,
we make this function weak in case someone needs to tweak this for
a specific board.
The way of setting the secondary's start address is board specific,
but mostly different only in the actual SMP pen address, so we also
provide a weak default implementation and just depend on the proper
address to be set in the config file.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
The core specific part of the work is done in the assembly routine
in nonsec_virt.S, introduced with the previous patch, but for the full
glory we need to setup the GIC distributor interface once for the
whole system, which is done in C here.
The routine is placed in arch/arm/cpu/armv7 to allow easy access from
other ARMv7 boards.
We check the availability of the security extensions first.
Since we need a safe way to access the GIC, we use the PERIPHBASE
registers on Cortex-A15 and A7 CPUs and do some sanity checks.
Boards not implementing the CBAR can override this value via a
configuration file variable.
Then we actually do the GIC enablement:
a) enable the GIC distributor, both for non-secure and secure state
(GICD_CTLR[1:0] = 11b)
b) allow all interrupts to be handled from non-secure state
(GICD_IGROUPRn = 0xFFFFFFFF)
The core specific GIC setup is then done in the assembly routine.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
While actually switching to non-secure state is one thing, another
part of this process is to make sure that we still have full access
to the interrupt controller (GIC).
The GIC is fully aware of secure vs. non-secure state, some
registers are banked, others may be configured to be accessible from
secure state only.
To be as generic as possible, we get the GIC memory mapped address
based on the PERIPHBASE value in the CBAR register. Since this
register is not architecturally defined, we check the MIDR before to
be from an A15 or A7.
For CPUs not having the CBAR or boards with wrong information herein
we allow providing the base address as a configuration variable.
Now that we know the GIC address, we:
a) allow private interrupts to be delivered to the core
(GICD_IGROUPR0 = 0xFFFFFFFF)
b) enable the CPU interface (GICC_CTLR[0] = 1)
c) set the priority filter to allow non-secure interrupts
(GICC_PMR = 0xFF)
Also we allow access to all coprocessor interfaces from non-secure
state by writing the appropriate bits in the NSACR register.
The generic timer base frequency register is only accessible from
secure state, so we have to program it now. Actually this should be
done from primary firmware before, but some boards seems to omit
this, so if needed we do this here with a board specific value.
The Versatile Express board does not need this, so we remove the
frequency from the configuration file here.
After having switched to non-secure state, we also enable the
non-secure GIC CPU interface, since this register is banked.
Since we need to call this routine also directly from the smp_pen
later (where we don't have any stack), we can only use caller saved
registers r0-r3 and r12 to not mess with the compiler.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
armv7.h contains some useful constants, but also C prototypes.
To include it also in assembly files, protect the non-assembly
part appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Adding the CPU detection suport for OMAP5430 and
OMAP5432 ES2.0 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: R Sricharan <r.sricharan@ti.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@ti.com>
Cc: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
This patch adds the minimal support for OMAP5. The platform and machine
specific headers and sources updated for OMAP5430.
OMAP5430 is Texas Instrument's SOC based on ARM Cortex-A15 SMP architecture.
It's a dual core SOC with GIC used for interrupt handling and SCU for cache
coherency.
Also moved some part of code from the basic platform support that can be made
common for OMAP4/5. Rest is kept out seperately. The same approach is followed
for clocks and emif support in the subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: sricharan <r.sricharan@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Paulraj <s-paulraj@ti.com>
- Add a framework for layered cache maintenance
- separate out SOC specific outer cache maintenance from
maintenance of caches known to CPU
- Add generic ARMv7 cache maintenance operations that affect all
caches known to ARMv7 CPUs. For instance in Cortex-A8 these
opertions will affect both L1 and L2 caches. In Cortex-A9
these will affect only L1 cache
- D-cache operations supported:
- Invalidate entire D-cache
- Invalidate D-cache range
- Flush(clean & invalidate) entire D-cache
- Flush D-cache range
- I-cache operations supported:
- Invalidate entire I-cache
- Add maintenance functions for TLB, branch predictor array etc.
- Enable -march=armv7-a so that armv7 assembly instructions can be
used
Signed-off-by: Aneesh V <aneesh@ti.com>
