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177 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
177 lines
9.1 KiB
Markdown
# macOS Keychain
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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### [WhiteIntel](https://whiteintel.io)
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1227).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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[**WhiteIntel**](https://whiteintel.io) is a **dark-web** fueled search engine that offers **free** functionalities to check if a company or its customers have been **compromised** by **stealer malwares**.
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Their primary goal of WhiteIntel is to combat account takeovers and ransomware attacks resulting from information-stealing malware.
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You can check their website and try their engine for **free** at:
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{% embed url="https://whiteintel.io" %}
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***
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## Main Keychains
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* The **User Keychain** (`~/Library/Keychains/login.keycahin-db`), which is used to store **user-specific credentials** like application passwords, internet passwords, user-generated certificates, network passwords, and user-generated public/private keys.
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* The **System Keychain** (`/Library/Keychains/System.keychain`), which stores **system-wide credentials** such as WiFi passwords, system root certificates, system private keys, and system application passwords.
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### Password Keychain Access
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These files, while they do not have inherent protection and can be **downloaded**, are encrypted and require the **user's plaintext password to be decrypted**. A tool like [**Chainbreaker**](https://github.com/n0fate/chainbreaker) could be used for decryption.
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## Keychain Entries Protections
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### ACLs
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Each entry in the keychain is governed by **Access Control Lists (ACLs)** which dictate who can perform various actions on the keychain entry, including:
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* **ACLAuhtorizationExportClear**: Allows the holder to get the clear text of the secret.
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* **ACLAuhtorizationExportWrapped**: Allows the holder to get the clear text encrypted with another provided password.
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* **ACLAuhtorizationAny**: Allows the holder to perform any action.
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The ACLs are further accompanied by a **list of trusted applications** that can perform these actions without prompting. This could be:
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* **N`il`** (no authorization required, **everyone is trusted**)
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* An **empty** list (**nobody** is trusted)
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* **List** of specific **applications**.
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Also the entry might contain the key **`ACLAuthorizationPartitionID`,** which is use to identify the **teamid, apple,** and **cdhash.**
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* If the **teamid** is specified, then in order to **access the entry** value **withuot** a **prompt** the used application must have the **same teamid**.
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* If the **apple** is specified, then the app needs to be **signed** by **Apple**.
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* If the **cdhash** is indicated, then **app** must have the specific **cdhash**.
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### Creating a Keychain Entry
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When a **new** **entry** is created using **`Keychain Access.app`**, the following rules apply:
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* All apps can encrypt.
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* **No apps** can export/decrypt (without prompting the user).
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* All apps can see the integrity check.
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* No apps can change ACLs.
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* The **partitionID** is set to **`apple`**.
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When an **application creates an entry in the keychain**, the rules are slightly different:
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* All apps can encrypt.
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* Only the **creating application** (or any other apps explicitly added) can export/decrypt (without prompting the user).
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* All apps can see the integrity check.
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* No apps can change the ACLs.
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* The **partitionID** is set to **`teamid:[teamID here]`**.
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## Accessing the Keychain
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### `security`
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```bash
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# Dump all metadata and decrypted secrets (a lot of pop-ups)
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security dump-keychain -a -d
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# Find generic password for the "Slack" account and print the secrets
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security find-generic-password -a "Slack" -g
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# Change the specified entrys PartitionID entry
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security set-generic-password-parition-list -s "test service" -a "test acount" -S
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```
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### APIs
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{% hint style="success" %}
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The **keychain enumeration and dumping** of secrets that **won't generate a prompt** can be done with the tool [**LockSmith**](https://github.com/its-a-feature/LockSmith)
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{% endhint %}
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List and get **info** about each keychain entry:
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* The API **`SecItemCopyMatching`** gives info about each entry and there are some attributes you can set when using it:
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* **`kSecReturnData`**: If true, it will try to decrypt the data (set to false to avoid potential pop-ups)
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* **`kSecReturnRef`**: Get also reference to keychain item (set to true in case later you see you can decrypt without pop-up)
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* **`kSecReturnAttributes`**: Get metadata about entries
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* **`kSecMatchLimit`**: How many results to return
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* **`kSecClass`**: What kind of keychain entry
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Get **ACLs** of each entry:
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* With the API **`SecAccessCopyACLList`** you can get the **ACL for the keychain item**, and it will return a list of ACLs (like `ACLAuhtorizationExportClear` and the others previously mentioned) where each list has:
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* Description
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* **Trusted Application List**. This could be:
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* An app: /Applications/Slack.app
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* A binary: /usr/libexec/airportd
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* A group: group://AirPort
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Export the data:
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* The API **`SecKeychainItemCopyContent`** gets the plaintext
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* The API **`SecItemExport`** exports the keys and certificates but might have to set passwords to export the content encrypted
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And these are the **requirements** to be able to **export a secret without a prompt**:
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* If **1+ trusted** apps listed:
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* Need the appropriate **authorizations** (**`Nil`**, or be **part** of the allowed list of apps in the authorization to access the secret info)
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* Need code signature to match **PartitionID**
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* Need code signature to match that of one **trusted app** (or be a member of the right KeychainAccessGroup)
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* If **all applications trusted**:
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* Need the appropriate **authorizations**
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* Need code signature to match **PartitionID**
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* If **no PartitionID**, then this isn't needed
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{% hint style="danger" %}
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Therefore, if there is **1 application listed**, you need to **inject code in that application**.
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If **apple** is indicated in the **partitionID**, you could access it with **`osascript`** so anything that is trusting all applications with apple in the partitionID. **`Python`** could also be used for this.
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{% endhint %}
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### Two additional attributes
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* **Invisible**: It's a boolean flag to **hide** the entry from the **UI** Keychain app
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* **General**: It's to store **metadata** (so it's NOT ENCRYPTED)
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* Microsoft was storing in plain text all the refresh tokens to access sensitive endpoint.
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## References
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* [**#OBTS v5.0: "Lock Picking the macOS Keychain" - Cody Thomas**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jKE1ZW33JpY)
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### [WhiteIntel](https://whiteintel.io)
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1227).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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[**WhiteIntel**](https://whiteintel.io) is a **dark-web** fueled search engine that offers **free** functionalities to check if a company or its customers have been **compromised** by **stealer malwares**.
|
|
|
|
Their primary goal of WhiteIntel is to combat account takeovers and ransomware attacks resulting from information-stealing malware.
|
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|
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You can check their website and try their engine for **free** at:
|
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{% embed url="https://whiteintel.io" %}
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
|
|
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
|
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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