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It's highly recommended to start reading this page to know about the **most important parts related to Android security and the most dangerous components in an Android application**:
**ADB** allows to control devices either over **USB** or **Network** from a computer. This utility enables the **copying** of files in both directions, **installation** and **uninstallation** of apps, **execution** of shell commands, **backing up** of data, **reading** of logs, among other functions.
Sometimes it is interesting to **modify the application code** to access **hidden information** (maybe well obfuscated passwords or flags). Then, it could be interesting to decompile the apk, modify the code and recompile it.\
[**In this tutorial** you can **learn how to decompile and APK, modify Smali code and recompile the APK** with the new functionality](smali-changes.md). This could be very useful as an **alternative for several tests during the dynamic analysis** that are going to presented. Then, **keep always in mid this possibility**.
Just taking a look to the **strings** of the APK you can search for **passwords**, **URLs** ([https://github.com/ndelphit/apkurlgrep](https://github.com/ndelphit/apkurlgrep)), **api** keys, **encryption**, **bluetooth uuids**, **tokens** and anything interesting... look even for code execution **backdoors** or authentication backdoors (hardcoded admin credentials to the app).
Pay special attention to **firebase URLs** and check if it is bad configured. [More information about whats is FIrebase and how to exploit it here.](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/firebase-database.md)
The **examination of an application's _Manifest.xml_ and _strings.xml_ files can reveal potential security vulnerabilities**. These files can be accessed using decompilers or by renaming the APK file extension to .zip and then unzipping it.
**Vulnerabilities** identified from the **Manifest.xml** include:
* **Debuggable Applications**: Applications set as debuggable (`debuggable="true"`) in the _Manifest.xml_ file pose a risk as they allow connections that can lead to exploitation. For further understanding on how to exploit debuggable applications, refer to a tutorial on finding and exploiting debuggable applications on a device.
* **Backup Settings**: The `android:allowBackup="false"` attribute should be explicitly set for applications dealing with sensitive information to prevent unauthorized data backups via adb, especially when usb debugging is enabled.
* **Network Security**: Custom network security configurations (`android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/network_security_config"`) in _res/xml/_ can specify security details like certificate pins and HTTP traffic settings. An example is allowing HTTP traffic for specific domains.
* **Exported Activities and Services**: Identifying exported activities and services in the manifest can highlight components that might be misused. Further analysis during dynamic testing can reveal how to exploit these components.
* **Content Providers and FileProviders**: Exposed content providers could allow unauthorized access or modification of data. The configuration of FileProviders should also be scrutinized.
* **Broadcast Receivers and URL Schemes**: These components could be leveraged for exploitation, with particular attention to how URL schemes are managed for input vulnerabilities.
* **SDK Versions**: The `minSdkVersion`, `targetSDKVersion`, and `maxSdkVersion` attributes indicate the supported Android versions, highlighting the importance of not supporting outdated, vulnerable Android versions for security reasons.
From the **strings.xml** file, sensitive information such as API keys, custom schemas, and other developer notes can be discovered, underscoring the need for careful review of these resources.
**Tapjacking** is an attack where a **malicious****application** is launched and **positions itself on top of a victim application**. Once it visibly obscures the victim app, its user interface is designed in such a way as to trick the user to interact with it, while it is passing the interaction along to the victim app.\
In effect, it is **blinding the user from knowing they are actually performing actions on the victim app**.
An **activity** with the **`launchMode`** set to **`singleTask` without any `taskAffinity`** defined is vulnerable to task Hijacking. This means, that an **application** can be installed and if launched before the real application it could **hijack the task of the real application** (so the user will be interacting with the **malicious application thinking he is using the real one**).
In Android, files **stored** in **internal** storage are **designed** to be **accessible** exclusively by the **app** that **created** them. This security measure is **enforced** by the Android operating system and is generally adequate for the security needs of most applications. However, developers sometimes utilize modes such as `MODE_WORLD_READABLE` and `MODE_WORLD_WRITABLE` to **allow** files to be **shared** between different applications. Yet, these modes **do not restrict access** to these files by other applications, including potentially malicious ones.
1.**Static Analysis:**
- **Ensure** that the use of `MODE_WORLD_READABLE` and `MODE_WORLD_WRITABLE` is **carefully scrutinized**. These modes **can potentially expose** files to **unintended or unauthorized access**.
2.**Dynamic Analysis:**
- **Verify** the **permissions** set on files created by the app. Specifically, **check** if any files are **set to be readable or writable worldwide**. This can pose a significant security risk, as it would allow **any application** installed on the device, regardless of its origin or intent, to **read or modify** these files.
When dealing with files on **external storage**, such as SD Cards, certain precautions should be taken:
1.**Accessibility**:
- Files on external storage are **globally readable and writable**. This means any application or user can access these files.
2.**Security Concerns**:
- Given the ease of access, it's advised **not to store sensitive information** on external storage.
- External storage can be removed or accessed by any application, making it less secure.
3.**Handling Data from External Storage**:
- Always **perform input validation** on data retrieved from external storage. This is crucial because the data is from an untrusted source.
- Storing executables or class files on external storage for dynamic loading is strongly discouraged.
- If your application must retrieve executable files from external storage, ensure these files are **signed and cryptographically verified** before they are dynamically loaded. This step is vital for maintaining the security integrity of your application.
Starting with Android 4.4 (**API 17**), the SD card has a directory structure which **limits access from an app to the directory which is specifically for that app**. This prevents malicious application from gaining read or write access to another app's files.
* **Shared preferences**: Android allow to each application to easily save xml files in the path `/data/data/<packagename>/shared_prefs/` and sometimes it's possible to find sensitive information in clear-text in that folder.
* **Databases**: Android allow to each application to easily save sqlite databases in the path `/data/data/<packagename>/databases/` and sometimes it's possible to find sensitive information in clear-text in that folder.
For some reason sometimes developers accept all the certificates even if for example the hostname does not match with lines of code like the following one:
A good way to test this is to try to capture the traffic using some proxy like Burp without authorising Burp CA inside the device. Also, you can generate with Burp a certificate for a different hostname and use it.
Some developers save sensitive data in the local storage and encrypt it with a key hardcoded/predictable in the code. This shouldn't be done as some reversing could allow attackers to extract the confidential information.
Developers shouldn't use **deprecated algorithms** to perform authorisation **checks**, **store** or **send** data. Some of these algorithms are: RC4, MD4, MD5, SHA1... If **hashes** are used to store passwords for example, hashes brute-force **resistant** should be used with salt.
According to this [**blog post**](https://clearbluejar.github.io/posts/desuperpacking-meta-superpacked-apks-with-github-actions/) superpacked is a Meta algorithm that compress the content of an application into a single file. The blog talks about the possibility of creating an app that decompress these kind of apps... and a faster way which involves to **execute the application and gather the decompressed files from the filesystem.**
The tool [**mariana-trench**](https://github.com/facebook/mariana-trench) is capable of finding **vulnerabilities** by **scanning** the **code** of the application. This tool contains a series of **known sources** (that indicates to the tool the **places** where the **input** is **controlled by the user**), **sinks** (which indicates to the tool **dangerous****places** where malicious user input could cause damages) and **rules**. These rules indicates the **combination** of **sources-sinks** that indicates a vulnerability.
An application may contain secrets (API keys, passwords, hidden urls, subdomains...) inside of it that you might be able to discover. You could us a tool such as [https://github.com/dwisiswant0/apkleaks](https://github.com/dwisiswant0/apkleaks)
> First of all, you need an environment where you can install the application and all the environment (Burp CA cert, Drozer and Frida mainly). Therefore, a rooted device (emulated or not) is extremely recommended.
You can create a **free account** in: [https://appetize.io/](https://appetize.io). This platform allows you to **upload** and **execute** APKs, so it is useful to see how an apk is behaving.
* [**Android Studio**](https://developer.android.com/studio) (You can create **x86** and **arm** devices, and according to [**this** ](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/03/run-arm-apps-on-android-emulator.html)**latest x86** versions **support ARM libraries** without needing an slow arm emulator).
* [**Genymotion**](https://www.genymotion.com/fun-zone/) **(Free version:** Personal Edition, you need to create an account. _It's recommend to **download** the version **WITH**__**VirtualBox** to avoid potential errors._)
When creating a new emulator on any platform remember that the bigger the screen is, the slower the emulator will run. So select small screens if possible.
Also, notice that in the **configuration of the Android VM in Genymotion** you can select **Bridge Network mode** (this will be useful if you will be connecting to the Android VM from a different VM with the tools).
> Once you have installed the application, the first thing you should do is to try it and investigate what does it do, how does it work and get comfortable with it.\
> I will suggest to **perform this initial dynamic analysis using MobSF dynamic analysis + pidcat**, so we will be able to **learn how the application works** while MobSF **captures** a lot of **interesting** **data** you can review later on.
Developers should be cautious of exposing **debugging information** publicly, as it can lead to sensitive data leaks. The tools [**pidcat**](https://github.com/JakeWharton/pidcat) and `adb logcat` are recommended for monitoring application logs to identify and protect sensitive information. **Pidcat** is favored for its ease of use and readability.
Note that from **later newer than Android 4.0**, **applications are only able to access their own logs**. So applications cannot access other apps logs.\
Android's **clipboard-based** framework enables copy-paste functionality in apps, yet poses a risk as **other applications** can **access** the clipboard, potentially exposing sensitive data. It's crucial to **disable copy/paste** functions for sensitive sections of an application, like credit card details, to prevent data leaks.
If an application **crashes** and **saves logs**, these logs can assist attackers, particularly when the application cannot be reverse-engineered. To mitigate this risk, avoid logging on crashes, and if logs must be transmitted over the network, ensure they are sent via an SSL channel for security.
Applications often integrate services like Google Adsense, which can inadvertently **leak sensitive data** due to improper implementation by developers. To identify potential data leaks, it's advisable to **intercept the application's traffic** and check for any sensitive information being sent to third-party services.
Most of the applications will use **internal SQLite databases** to save information. During the pentest take a **look** to the **databases** created, the names of **tables** and **columns** and all the **data** saved because you could find **sensitive information** (which would be a vulnerability).\
Databases should be located in `/data/data/the.package.name/databases` like `/data/data/com.mwr.example.sieve/databases`
If the database is saving confidential information and is **encrypted b**ut you can **find** the **password** inside the application it's still a **vulnerability**.
Enumerate the tables using `.tables` and enumerate the columns of the tables doing `.schema <table_name>`
From [Drozer Docs](https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/assets/BlogFiles/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf): **Drozer** allows you to **assume the role of an Android app** and interact with other apps. It can do **anything that an installed application can do**, such as make use of Android’s Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism and interact with the underlying operating system. .\
When an Activity is exported you can invoke its screen from an external app. Therefore, if an activity with **sensitive information** is **exported** you could **bypass** the **authentication** mechanisms **to access it.**
**NOTE**: MobSF will detect as malicious the use of _**singleTask/singleInstance**_ as `android:launchMode` in an activity, but due to [this](https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/750), apparently this is only dangerous on old versions (API versions <21).
Note that an authorisation bypass is not always a vulnerability, it would depend on how the bypass works and which information is exposed.
{% endhint %}
**Sensitive information leakage**
**Activities can also return results**. If you manage to find an exported and unprotected activity calling the **`setResult`** method and **returning sensitive information**, there is a sensitive information leakage.
If tapjacking isn't prevented, you could abuse the exported activity to make the **user perform unexpected actions**. For more info about [**what is Tapjacking follow the link**](./#tapjacking).
[**Read this if you want to refresh what is a Content Provider.**](android-applications-basics.md#content-provider)\
Content providers are basically used to **share data**. If an app has available content providers you may be able to **extract sensitive** data from them. It also interesting to test possible **SQL injections** and **Path Traversals** as they could be vulnerable.
As service is basically something that **can receive data**, **process** it and **returns** (or not) a response. Then, if an application is exporting some services you should **check** the **code** to understand what is it doing and **test** it **dynamically** for extracting confidential info, bypassing authentication measures...\
You can look for deep links manually, using tools like MobSF or scripts like [this one](https://github.com/ashleykinguk/FBLinkBuilder/blob/master/FBLinkBuilder.py).\
Every time you find a deep link check that i**t's not receiving sensitive data (like passwords) via URL parameters**, because any other application could **impersonate the deep link and steal that data!**
You **must check also if any deep link is using a parameter inside the path** of the URL like: `https://api.example.com/v1/users/{username}` , in that case you can force a path traversal accessing something like: `example://app/users?username=../../unwanted-endpoint%3fparam=value` .\
Note that if you find the correct endpoints inside the application you may be able to cause a **Open Redirect** (if part of the path is used as domain name), **account takeover** (if you can modify users details without CSRF token and the vuln endpoint used the correct method) and any other vuln. More [info about this here](http://dphoeniixx.com/2020/12/13-2/).
### Transport Layer Inspection and Verification Failures
- **Certificates are not always inspected properly** by Android applications. It's common for these applications to overlook warnings and accept self-signed certificates or, in some instances, revert to using HTTP connections.
- **Negotiations during the SSL/TLS handshake are sometimes weak**, employing insecure cipher suites. This vulnerability makes the connection susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, allowing attackers to decrypt the data.
- **Leakage of private information** is a risk when applications authenticate using secure channels but then communicate over non-secure channels for other transactions. This approach fails to protect sensitive data, such as session cookies or user details, from interception by malicious entities.
We will focus on **certificate verification**. The integrity of the server's certificate must be verified to enhance security. This is crucial because insecure TLS configurations and the transmission of sensitive data over unencrypted channels can pose significant risks. For detailed steps on verifying server certificates and addressing vulnerabilities, **[this resource](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-10/)** provides comprehensive guidance.
SSL Pinning is a security measure where the application verifies the server's certificate against a known copy stored within the application itself. This method is essential for preventing MITM attacks. Implementing SSL Pinning is strongly recommended for applications handling sensitive information.
To inspect HTTP traffic, it's necessary to **install the proxy tool's certificate** (e.g., Burp). Without installing this certificate, encrypted traffic might not be visible through the proxy. For a guide on installing a custom CA certificate, **[click here](avd-android-virtual-device.md#install-burp-certificate-on-a-virtual-machine)**.
Applications targeting **API Level 24 and above** require modifications to the Network Security Config to accept the proxy's CA certificate. This step is critical for inspecting encrypted traffic. For instructions on modifying the Network Security Config, **[refer to this tutorial](make-apk-accept-ca-certificate.md)**.
* Automatically **modify** the **apk** to **bypass** SSLPinning with [**apk-mitm**](https://github.com/shroudedcode/apk-mitm). The best pro of this option, is that you won't need root to bypass the SSL Pinning, but you will need to delete the application and reinstall the new one, and this won't always work.
* You could use **Frida** (discussed below) to bypass this protection. Here you have a guide to use Burp+Frida+Genymotion: [https://spenkk.github.io/bugbounty/Configuring-Frida-with-Burp-and-GenyMotion-to-bypass-SSL-Pinning/](https://spenkk.github.io/bugbounty/Configuring-Frida-with-Burp-and-GenyMotion-to-bypass-SSL-Pinning/)
* You can also try to **automatically bypass SSL Pinning** using [**objection**](frida-tutorial/objection-tutorial.md)**:** `objection --gadget com.package.app explore --startup-command "android sslpinning disable"`
* If you still think that there is some traffic that you aren't capturing you can try to **forward the traffic to burp using iptables**. Read this blog: [https://infosecwriteups.com/bypass-ssl-pinning-with-ip-forwarding-iptables-568171b52b62](https://infosecwriteups.com/bypass-ssl-pinning-with-ip-forwarding-iptables-568171b52b62)
It's important to also search for common web vulnerabilities within the application. Detailed information on identifying and mitigating these vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of this summary but is extensively covered elsewhere.
* Learn how to use Frida: [**Frida tutorial**](frida-tutorial/)
* Some "GUI" for actions with Frida: [**https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security**](https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security)
* Ojection is great to automate the use of Frida: [**https://github.com/sensepost/objection**](https://github.com/sensepost/objection) **,** [**https://github.com/dpnishant/appmon**](https://github.com/dpnishant/appmon)
* You can find some Awesome Frida scripts here: [**https://codeshare.frida.re/**](https://codeshare.frida.re)
In Android the Keystore is the best place to store sensitive data, however, with enough privileges it's still **possible to access it**. As applications tends to store here **sensitive data in clear text** the pentests should check for it as root user or someones with physical access to the device could be able to steal this data.
Even if an app stored date in the keystore, the data should be encrypted.
To access the data inside the keystore you could use this Frida script: [https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/android-keystore-audit/blob/master/frida-scripts/tracer-cipher.js](https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/android-keystore-audit/blob/master/frida-scripts/tracer-cipher.js)
Using the following Frida script it could be possible to **bypass fingerprint authentication** Android applications might be performing in order to **protect certain sensitive areas:**
When you put an application in background, Android stores a **snapshot of the application** so when it's recovered to foreground it starts loading the image before the app so ot looks like the app was loaded faster.
However, if this snapshot contains **sensitive information**, someone with access to the snapshot might **steal that info** (note that you need root to access it).
The snapshots are usually stored around: **`/data/system_ce/0/snapshots`**
Android provides a way to **prevent the screenshot capture by setting the FLAG\_SECURE** layout parameter. By using this flag, the window contents are treated as secure, preventing it from appearing in screenshots or from being viewed on non-secure displays.
This tool could help you managing different tools during the dynamic analysis: [https://github.com/NotSoSecure/android\_application\_analyzer](https://github.com/NotSoSecure/android\_application\_analyzer)
Developers often create proxy components like activities, services, and broadcast receivers that handle these Intents and pass them to methods such as `startActivity(...)` or `sendBroadcast(...)`, which can be risky.
The danger lies in allowing attackers to trigger non-exported app components or access sensitive content providers by misdirecting these Intents. A notable example is the `WebView` component converting URLs to `Intent` objects via `Intent.parseUri(...)` and then executing them, potentially leading to malicious Intent injections.
### Essential Takeaways
- **Intent Injection** is similar to web's Open Redirect issue.
- Exploits involve passing `Intent` objects as extras, which can be redirected to execute unsafe operations.
- It can expose non-exported components and content providers to attackers.
-`WebView`’s URL to `Intent` conversion can facilitate unintended actions.
Probably you know about this kind of vulnerabilities from the Web. You have to be specially careful with this vulnerabilities in an Android application:
* **SQL Injection:** When dealing with dynamic queries or Content-Providers ensure you are using parameterized queries.
* **JavaScript Injection (XSS):** Verify that JavaScript and Plugin support is disabled for any WebViews (disabled by default). [More info here](webview-attacks.md#javascript-enabled).
* **Local File Inclusion:** WebViews should have access to the file system disabled (enabled by default) - `(webview.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false);)`. [More info here](webview-attacks.md#javascript-enabled).
**Vulnerability assessment of the application** using a nice web-based frontend. You can also perform dynamic analysis (but you need to prepare the environment).
Notice that MobSF can analyse **Android**(apk)**, IOS**(ipa) **and Windows**(apx) applications (_Windows applications must be analyzed from a MobSF installed in a Windows host_).\
Also, if you create a **ZIP** file with the source code if an **Android** or an **IOS** app (go to the root folder of the application, select everything and create a ZIPfile), it will be able to analyse it also.
MobSF also allows you to **diff/Compare** analysis and to integrate **VirusTotal** (you will need to set your API key in _MobSF/settings.py_ and enable it: `VT_ENABLED = TRUE``VT_API_KEY = <Your API key>``VT_UPLOAD = TRUE`). You can also set `VT_UPLOAD` to `False`, then the **hash** will be **upload** instead of the file.
**MobSF** can also be very helpful for **dynamic analysis** in **Android**, but in that case you will need to install MobSF and **genymotion** in your host (a VM or Docker won't work). _Note: You need to **start first a VM in genymotion** and **then MobSF.**_\
* **Dump application data** (URLs, logs, clipboard, screenshots made by you, screenshots made by "**Exported Activity Tester**", emails, SQLite databases, XML files, and other created files). All of this is done automatically except for the screenshots, you need to press when you want a screenshot or you need to press "**Exported Activity Tester**" to obtain screenshots of all the exported activities.
From android **versions > 5**, it will **automatically start Frida** and will set global **proxy** settings to **capture** traffic. It will only capture traffic from the tested application.
By default, it will also use some Frida Scripts to **bypass SSL pinning**, **root detection** and **debugger detection** and to **monitor interesting APIs**.\
To **start** the dynamic testing press the green bottom: "**Start Instrumentation**". Press the "**Frida Live Logs**" to see the logs generated by the Frida scripts and "**Live API Monitor**" to see all the invocation to hooked methods, arguments passed and returned values (this will appear after pressing "Start Instrumentation").\
MobSF also allows you to load your own **Frida scripts** (to send the results of your Friday scripts to MobSF use the function `send()`). It also has **several pre-written scripts** you can load (you can add more in `MobSF/DynamicAnalyzer/tools/frida_scripts/others/`), just **select them**, press "**Load**" and press "**Start Instrumentation**" (you will be able to see the logs of that scripts inside "**Frida Live Logs**").
* **Trace Class Methods**: **Trace** a **whole class** (see inputs and outputs of all methods of th class). Remember that by default MobSF traces several interesting Android Api methods.
Once you have selected the auxiliary module you want to use you need to press "**Start Intrumentation**" and you will see all the outputs in "**Frida Live Logs**".
**Shell**
Mobsf also brings you a shell with some **adb** commands, **MobSF commands**, and common **shell****commands** at the bottom of the dynamic analysis page. Some interesting commands:
When http traffic is capture you can see an ugly view of the captured traffic on "**HTTP(S) Traffic**" bottom or a nicer view in "**Start HTTPTools**" green bottom. From the second option, you can **send** the **captured requests** to **proxies** like Burp or Owasp ZAP.\
To do so, _power on Burp -->__turn off Intercept --> in MobSB HTTPTools select the request_ --> press "**Send to Fuzzer**" --> _select the proxy address_ ([http://127.0.0.1:8080\\](http://127.0.0.1:8080)).
Once you finish the dynamic analysis with MobSF you can press on "**Start Web API Fuzzer**" to **fuzz http requests** an look for vulnerabilities.
{% hint style="info" %}
After performing a dynamic analysis with MobSF the proxy settings me be misconfigured and you won't be able to fix them from the GUI. You can fix the proxy settings by doing:
This tool is designed to look for several **security related Android application vulnerabilities**, either in **source code** or **packaged APKs**. The tool is also **capable of creating a "Proof-of-Concept" deployable APK** and **ADB commands**, to exploit some of the found vulnerabilities (Exposed activities, intents, tapjacking...). As with Drozer, there is no need to root the test device.
SUPER is a command-line application that can be used in Windows, MacOS X and Linux, that analyzes _.apk_ files in search for vulnerabilities. It does this by decompressing APKs and applying a series of rules to detect those vulnerabilities.
All rules are centered in a `rules.json` file, and each company or tester could create its own rules to analyze what they need.
Download the latest binaries from in the [download page](https://superanalyzer.rocks/download.html)
StaCoAn is a **crossplatform** tool which aids developers, bugbounty hunters and ethical hackers performing [static code analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Static\_program\_analysis) on mobile applications.
The concept is that you drag and drop your mobile application file (an .apk or .ipa file) on the StaCoAn application and it will generate a visual and portable report for you. You can tweak the settings and wordlists to get a customized experience.
AndroBugs Framework is an Android vulnerability analysis system that helps developers or hackers find potential security vulnerabilities in Android applications.\
**Androwarn** is a tool whose main aim is to detect and warn the user about potential malicious behaviours developped by an Android application.
The detection is performed with the **static analysis** of the application's Dalvik bytecode, represented as **Smali**, with the [`androguard`](https://github.com/androguard/androguard) library.
This tool looks for **common behavior of "bad" applications** like: Telephony identifiers exfiltration, Audio/video flow interception, PIM data modification, Arbitrary code execution...
**MARA** is a **M**obile **A**pplication **R**everse engineering and **A**nalysis Framework. It is a tool that puts together commonly used mobile application reverse engineering and analysis tools, to assist in testing mobile applications against the OWASP mobile security threats. Its objective is to make this task easier and friendlier to mobile application developers and security professionals.
It is able to:
* Extract Java and Smali code using different tools
* Extract private information from the APK using regexps.
* Analyze the Manifest.
* Analyze found domains using: [pyssltest](https://github.com/moheshmohan/pyssltest), [testssl](https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh) and [whatweb](https://github.com/urbanadventurer/WhatWeb)
From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProGuard\_\(software\)): **ProGuard** is an open source command-line tool that shrinks, optimizes and obfuscates Java code. It is able to optimize bytecode as well as detect and remove unused instructions. ProGuard is free software and is distributed under the GNU General Public License, version 2.
**DeGuard reverses the process of obfuscation performed by Android obfuscation tools. This enables numerous security analyses, including code inspection and predicting libraries.**
It is a **generic android deobfuscator.** Simplify **virtually executes an app** to understand its behavior and then **tries to optimize the code** so it behaves identically but is easier for a human to understand. Each optimization type is simple and generic, so it doesn't matter what the specific type of obfuscation is used.
APKiD gives you information about **how an APK was made**. It identifies many **compilers**, **packers**, **obfuscators**, and other weird stuff. It's [_PEiD_](https://www.aldeid.com/wiki/PEiD) for Android.
AndroL4b is an Android security virtual machine based on ubuntu-mate includes the collection of latest framework, tutorials and labs from different security geeks and researchers for reverse engineering and malware analysis.
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