Currently we fail silently if there is an algorithm mismatch. To help
distinguish this failure condition.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
In the function rsa_verify_hash, if the "main" key doesn't
work, u-boot try others keys. But it searches those keys
in the FIT image instead of the u-boot device tree.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Change parameter type to avoid compilation error:
In file included from ./tools/../lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c:23:0,
from tools/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c:1:
include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h:69:18: error: unknown type name ‘u32’; did you mean ‘__u32’?
int zynq_pow_mod(u32 *keyptr, u32 *inout);
^~~
__u32
include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h:69:31: error: unknown type name ‘u32’; did you mean ‘__u32’?
int zynq_pow_mod(u32 *keyptr, u32 *inout);
^~~
__u32
Fixes: 37e3a36a54 ("xilinx: zynq: Add support to secure images")
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Commit fdf0819afb (rsa: fix alignment issue when getting public
exponent) changed the logic to avoid doing an 8-byte access to a
possibly-not-8-byte-aligned address.
However, using rsa_convert_big_endian is wrong: That function converts
an array of big-endian (32-bit) words with the most significant word
first (aka a BE byte array) to an array of cpu-endian words with the
least significant word first. While the exponent is indeed _stored_ as
a big-endian 64-bit word (two BE words with MSW first), we want to
extract it as a cpu-endian 64 bit word. On a little-endian host,
swapping the words and byte-swapping each 32-bit word works, because
that's the same as byte-swapping the whole 64 bit word. But on a
big-endian host, the fdt32_to_cpu are no-ops, but
rsa_convert_big_endian() still does the word-swapping, breaking
verified boot.
To fix that, while still ensuring we don't do unaligned accesses, add
a little helper that first memcpy's the bytes to a local fdt64_t, then
applies fdt64_to_cpu(). [The name is chosen based on the
[bl]eXX_to_cpup in linux/byteorder/generic.h].
Fixes: fdf0819afb ("rsa: fix alignment issue when getting public exponent")
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The algo name should match between the FIT's signature node and the
U-Boot's control FDT.
If we do not check it, U-Boot's control FDT can expect sha512 hash but
nothing will prevent to accept image with sha1 hash if the signature is correct.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu CASTET <castet.matthieu@free.fr>
Fixes problem for unaligned 32bit big-endian access in
lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c.
Exchanges br_i32_decode() with get_unaligned_be32().
This will keep the unaligned access for architectures capable and will do
some byte-shift magic for the not so capable ones.
Reported-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-by: Robert Reither <robert.reither@external.thalesgroup.com>
Remove unused include.
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
After allocating to pointer ctx we should check that pointer and not
another pointer already checked above.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This function will be used to implement public_key_verify_signature()
in a later patch. rsa_verify() is not suitable here because calculation
of message digest is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
rsa_verify() expects a memory region and wants to do the hashing itself,
but there may be cases where the hashing is done via other means,
like hashing a squashfs rootfs.
So add rsa_verify_hash() to allow verifiying a signature against
an existing hash. As this entails the same verification routines
we can just move the relevant code over from rsa_verify() and also
call rsa_verify_hash() from there.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
padding_pss_verify only works with the default pss salt setting of -2
(length to be automatically determined based on the PSS block structure)
not -1 (salt length set to the maximum permissible value), which makes
verifications of signatures with that saltlen fail.
Until this gets implemented at least document this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
n, rr and rrtmp are used for internal calculations, but in the end
the results are copied into separately allocated elements of the
actual key_prop, so the n, rr and rrtmp elements are not used anymore
when returning from the function and should of course be freed.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
When calculating rrtmp/rr rsa_gen_key_prop() tries to make
(((rlen + 31) >> 5) + 1) steps in the rr uint32_t array and
(((rlen + 7) >> 3) + 1) / 4 steps in uint32_t rrtmp[]
with rlen being num_bits * 2
On a 4096bit key this comes down to to 257 uint32_t elements
in rr and 256 elements in rrtmp but with the current allocation
rr and rrtmp only have 129 uint32_t elements.
On 2048bit keys this works by chance as the defined max_rsa_size=4096
allocates a suitable number of elements, but with an actual 4096bit key
this results in other memory parts getting overwritten.
So as suggested by Heinrich Schuchardt just use the actual bit-size
of the key as base for the size calculation, in turn making the code
compatible to any future keysizes.
Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.debian@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
rrtmp needs 2 + (((*prop)->num_bits * 2) >> 5) array elements.
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
The exponent field of struct key_prop gets allocated an uint64_t,
and the contents are positioned from the back, so an exponent of
"0x01 0x00 0x01" becomes 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x1 0x0 0x1"
Right now rsa_gen_key_prop() allocates a uint64_t but sets exp_len
to the size returned from the parser, while on the other hand the
when getting the key from the devicetree exp_len always gets set to
sizeof(uint64_t).
So bring that in line with the established code.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Right now in multiple places there are only checks for the full
CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY option, not split into main,spl,tpl variants.
This breaks when the rsa functions get enabled for SPL, for example to
verify u-boot proper from spl.
So fix this by using the existing helpers to distinguis between
build-steps.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
While the SPL may want to do signature checking this won't be
the case for TPL in all cases, as TPL is mostly used when the
amount of initial memory is not enough for a full SPL.
So on a system where SPL uses DM but TPL does not we currently
end up with a TPL compile error of:
lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c:48:25: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type ‘struct checksum_algo’
To prevent that change the $(SPL_) to $(SPL_TPL_) to distinguish
between both. If someone really needs FIT signature checking in
TPL as well, a new TPL_RSA_VERIFY config symbol needs to be added.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Tomsich <philipp.tomsich@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
If "object=" is specified in "keydir" when using the pkcs11 engine do
not append another "object=<key-name-hint>". This makes it possible to
use object names other than the key name hint. These two string
identifiers are not necessarily equal.
Signed-off-by: Jan Luebbe <jlu@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Bastian Krause <bst@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
stdlib.h is the header for malloc since at least c89/c90.
There is no system malloc.h on OpenBSD and trying to use malloc.h here
falls back to the U-Boot malloc.h breaking the build of qemu_arm64.
Fixes: 336d4615f8 ("dm: core: Create a new header file for 'compat' features")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Gray <jsg@jsg.id.au>
To fill the exponent field of the rsa_public_key struct, rsa_mod_exp_sw
did a cast to uint64_t of the key_prop->public_exponent field.
But that alignment is not guaranteed in all cases.
This came to light when in my spl-fit-signature the key-name exceeded
a certain length and with it the verification then started failing.
(naming it "integrity" worked fine, "integrity-uboot" failed)
key_prop.public_exponent itself is actually a void-pointer, fdt_getprop()
also just returns such a void-pointer and inside the devicetree the 64bit
exponent is represented as 2 32bit numbers, so assuming a 64bit alignment
can lead to false reads.
So just use the already existing rsa_convert_big_endian() to do the actual
conversion from the dt's big-endian to the needed uint64 value.
Fixes: fc2f4246b4 ("rsa: Split the rsa-verify to separate the modular exponentiation")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Tomsich <philipp.tomsich@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
These are used in multiple places so update them to use a shared #define.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
This function, and hence rsa_verify(), will perform RSA verification
with two essential parameters for a RSA public key in contract of
rsa_verify_with_keynode(), which requires additional three parameters
stored in FIT image.
It will be used in implementing UEFI secure boot, i.e. image authentication
and variable authentication.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
In the current implementation of FIT_SIGNATURE, five parameters for
a RSA public key are required while only two of them are essential.
(See rsa-mod-exp.h and uImage.FIT/signature.txt)
This is a result of considering relatively limited computer power
and resources on embedded systems, while such a assumption may not
be quite practical for other use cases.
In this patch, added is a function, rsa_gen_key_prop(), which will
generate additional parameters for other uses, in particular
UEFI secure boot, on the fly.
Note: the current code uses some "big number" routines from BearSSL
for the calculation.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
In the next couple of commits, under new CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY,
rsa_verify() will be extended to be able to perform RSA decryption without
additional RSA key properties from FIT image, i.e. rr and n0inv.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Introduce new configuration, CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY which will decouple building
RSA functions from FIT verification and allow for adding a RSA-based
signature verification for other file formats, in particular PE file
for UEFI secure boot.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
At present dm/device.h includes the linux-compatible features. This
requires including linux/compat.h which in turn includes a lot of headers.
One of these is malloc.h which we thus end up including in every file in
U-Boot. Apart from the inefficiency of this, it is problematic for sandbox
which needs to use the system malloc() in some files.
Move the compatibility features into a separate header file.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Currently, if image verification with a required key fails, rsa_verify()
code tries to find another key to verify the FIT image. This however, is
not the intended behavior as the documentation says that required keys
"must be verified for the image / configuration to be considered valid".
This patch fixes the issue by making rsa_verify() return immediately if
the verification of a required key fails.
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@gmail.com>
There are multiple other openssl engines used by HSMs that can be used to
sign FIT images instead of forcing users to use pkcs11 type of service.
Relax engine selection so that other openssl engines can be specified and
use generic key id definition formula.
Signed-off-by: Vesa Jääskeläinen <vesa.jaaskelainen@vaisala.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
The pointer checksum were used before checking that it
isn't NULL. We move the code that use it after the check.
Reported-by: Coverity (CID: 185835)
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
We add the support of the padding pss for rsa signature.
This new padding is often recommended instead of pkcs-1.5.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The rsa signature use a padding algorithm. By default, we use the
padding pkcs-1.5. In order to add some new padding algorithm, we
add a padding framework to manage several padding algorithm.
The choice of the padding is done in the file .its.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Previous implementation of the rsa signature was using
the openssl API EVP_Sign*, but the new openssl API
EVP_DigestSign* is more flexible. So we move to this
new API.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This patch basically adds two new commands for loadig secure
images.
1. zynq rsa adds support to load secure image which can be both
authenticated or encrypted or both authenticated and encrypted
image in xilinx bootimage(BOOT.bin) format.
2. zynq aes command adds support to decrypt and load encrypted
image back to DDR as per destination address. The image has
to be encrypted using xilinx bootgen tool and to get only the
encrypted image from tool use -split option while invoking
bootgen.
Signed-off-by: Siva Durga Prasad Paladugu <siva.durga.paladugu@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So we picked the
area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it
with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry. Since then, the
Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first
line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line)
and with slightly different comment styles than us.
In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility
and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.
This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared
license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag
contents. There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag
and have introduced one.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP and RSA_FREESCALE_EXP are wrapped inside:
if RSA
...
endif
So, remove the redundant "depends on RSA" from their depends expression.
In addition, move SPL_RSA into the same "if RSA ... endif" block, since
its only direct dependeny is CONFIG_RSA. This tidies up and simplifies
reading of lib/rsa/Kconfig.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The rsa_st struct has been made opaque in 1.1.x, add forward compatible
code to access the n, e, d members of rsa_struct.
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup has been removed in 1.1.x and EVP_MD_CTX_reset should be
called to reinitialise an already created structure.
The CAAM in IMX parts doesn't support public key hardware acceleration
(PKHA), so don't use RSA_FREESCALE_EXP. If you try to use it on IMX
(assuming you have the clocks enabled first) you will get back an
"Invalid KEY Command" error since PKHA isn't a valid key destination for
these parts.
Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Add support for signing with the pkcs11 engine. This allows FIT images
to be signed with keys securely stored on a smartcard, hardware security
module, etc without exposing the keys.
Support for other engines can be added in the future by modifying
rsa_engine_get_pub_key() and rsa_engine_get_priv_key() to construct
correct key_id strings.
Signed-off-by: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Remove the need to explicitly add SHA/RSA pairings. Invalid SHA/RSA
pairings will still fail on verify operations when the hash length is
longer than the key length.
Follow the same naming scheme "checksum,crytpo" without explicitly
defining the string.
Indirectly adds support for "sha1,rsa4096" signing/verification.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cut down on the repetition of algorithm information by defining separate
checksum and crypto structs. image_sig_algos are now simply pairs of
unique checksum and crypto algos.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Padding verification was done against static SHA/RSA pair arrays which
take up a lot of static memory, are mostly 0xff, and cannot be reused
for additional SHA/RSA pairings. The padding can be easily computed
according to PKCS#1v2.1 as:
EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
where PS is (emLen - tLen - 3) octets of 0xff and T is DER encoding
of the hash.
Store DER prefix in checksum_algo and create rsa_verify_padding
function to handle verification of a message for any SHA/RSA pairing.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
checksum_algo's pad_len field isn't actually used to store the length of
the padding but the total length of the RSA key (msg_len + pad_len)
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Now, arch/${ARCH}/include/asm/errno.h and include/linux/errno.h have
the same content. (both just wrap <asm-generic/errno.h>)
Replace all include directives for <asm/errno.h> with <linux/errno.h>.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
[trini: Fixup include/clk.]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
[NOTE: I took v1 of these patches in, and then v2 came out, this commit
is squashing the minor deltas from v1 -> v2 of updates to c236ebd and
2b9ec76 into this commit - trini]
- Added an additional NULL check, as suggested by Simon Glass to
fit_image_process_sig
- Re-formatted the comment blocks
Signed-off-by: Mario Six <mario.six@gdsys.cc>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
[For merging the chnages from v2 back onto v1]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
When signing images, we repeatedly call fit_add_file_data() with
successively increasing size values to include the keys in the DTB.
Unfortunately, if large keys are used (such as 4096 bit RSA keys), this
process fails sometimes, and mkimage needs to be called repeatedly to
integrate the keys into the DTB.
This is because fit_add_file_data actually returns the wrong error
code, and the loop terminates prematurely, instead of trying again with
a larger size value.
This patch corrects the return value by fixing the return value of
fdt_add_bignum, fixes a case where an error is masked by a unconditional
setting of a return value variable, and also removes a error message,
which is misleading, since we actually allow the function to fail. A
(hopefully helpful) comment is also added to explain the lack of error
message.
This is probably related to 1152a05 ("tools: Correct error handling in
fit_image_process_hash()") and the corresponding error reported here:
https://www.mail-archive.com/u-boot@lists.denx.de/msg217417.html
Signed-off-by: Mario Six <mario.six@gdsys.cc>
This allows a board to configure verified boot within the SPL using
a FIT or FIT with external data. It also allows the SPL to perform
signature verification without needing relocation.
The board configuration will need to add the following feature defines:
CONFIG_SPL_CRYPTO_SUPPORT
CONFIG_SPL_HASH_SUPPORT
CONFIG_SPL_SHA256
In this example, SHA256 is the only selected hashing algorithm.
And the following booleans:
CONFIG_SPL=y
CONFIG_SPL_DM=y
CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_FIT=y
CONFIG_SPL_FIT=y
CONFIG_SPL_OF_CONTROL=y
CONFIG_SPL_OF_LIBFDT=y
CONFIG_SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE=y
Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg@ti.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@nxp.com>
