This patch fixes a problem in the mvneta driver where if more than
one packet arrives between calls to mvneta_recv(), the additional
descriptors will be marked as free even though only one descriptor
has been read and processed from the receive queue. This causes
the additional packet(s) to be delayed until the next packet arrives.
>From this point on all packets will be delayed because the receive
queue will contain unprocessed packets but the hardware shows no
busy descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Jason Brown <jason.brown@apcon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Since the return value is a signed int, if the leading MSB of rdreg is a 1,
it will get signed extended and will return a negative value which is an
error even though we read the correct value.
Fixes: dfcc496ed7 ("net: mii: Changes not made by spatch")
Signed-off-by: Chris Brandt <chris.brandt@renesas.com>
Acked-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
First, this table could never be included in the build anyway because
SH_ETH_TYPE_RZ is not defined until later in the file.
Second, the register PIR was missing, so PHY MDIO never worked.
Third, after adding the PIR register, the table is EXACTLY the same as
sh_eth_offset_gigabit, so there is no value to it.
Therefore, just delete it use the gigabit one.
Signed-off-by: Chris Brandt <chris.brandt@renesas.com>
Acked-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
The macros inl and outl maybe already be defined from file
arch/arm/include/asm/io.h so there may be no reason to define them.
And if you do try defined them here, you get a redefined complier warning.
Signed-off-by: Chris Brandt <chris.brandt@renesas.com>
Acked-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
This commit allows extended Marvell registers to be read with:
foo > mdio rx FEC 3.10
Reading from bus FEC
PHY at address 0:
3.16 - 0x1063
foo > mdio wx FEC 3.10 0x1011
The above code changes the way ETH connector LEDs blink.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Majewski <lukma@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Although Xilinx Zynq SoC was using MACB similar hardware. However,
U-boot MACB driver was not supporting Xilinx Zynq SoC. This patch is
to add support for the Xilinx Zynq SoC to the existing MACB network
driver.
This patch is to add Zynq GEM DMA Config, provide callback
function for different linkspeed for case of using Xilinx Zynq
Programmable Logic as GMII to RGMII converter.
This patch convert the return value to use error codes.
Signed-off-by: Wilson Lee <wilson.lee@ni.com>
Cc: Chen Yee Chew <chen.yee.chew@ni.com>
Cc: Keng Soon Cheah <keng.soon.cheah@ni.com>
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Cc: Wenyou Yang <wenyou.yang@atmel.com>
Acked-by: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode.
This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery
mode.
=> hab_failsafe
Shows the i.MX7 appear as "hiddev0,hidraw5: USB HID v1.10 Device [Freescale
SemiConductor Inc SP Blank ULT1] " in a Linux dmesg thus allowing download
of a new image via the BootROM USB download protocol routine.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for
hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address
layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks
will just do nothing and there's definitely a TODO to implement that extra
functionality on the alternative BootROM API.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The hab_rvt_failsafe() callback according to the HABv4 documentation:
"This function provides a safe path when image authentication has failed
and all possible boot paths have been exhausted. It is intended for use by
post-ROM boot stage components, via the ROM Vector Table."
Once invoked the part will drop down to its BootROM USB recovery mode.
Should it be the case that the part is in secure boot mode - only an
appropriately signed binary will be accepted by the ROM and subsequently
executed.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export
imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in
a secure-boot context.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot
unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the existing usages
of authenticate_image() expect and rely on unlocked boards doing the
following
1. Not calling into the BootROM authenticate_image() callback
2. Returning a pass status for authenticate_image() calls anyway
A previous patch removed the necessity to call into imx_hab_is_enabled()
twice. This patch ensures the reliance on authenticate_image() returning
zero is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to
interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is
renaming the relevant function to match the previously introduced external
naming convention imx_hab_function()
The name imx_hab_is_hab_enabled() is a tautology. A more logical name is
imx_hab_is_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with
imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in
the same way to make the fact we are doing IMX HAB activities clear from
reading the code. authenticate_image() could mean anything
imx_hab_authenticate_image() is on the other hand very explicit.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally.
Make them all static now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even
if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling into the ROM.
This can be confusing.
This patch changes the flow of the code so that the HAB event log is only
printed out if we have called into the ROM and received some sort of status
code.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity
check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over,
prior to making the BootROM authentication callback itself.
This check is recommended by the HAB documentation so it makes sense to
adhere to the guidance and perform that check as directed.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target()
for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case
the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just have HAB_SUCCESS
as a result code. Adding support for the new BootROM callbacks is a TODO.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The hab_rvt_check_target() callback according to the HABv4 documentation:
"This function reports whether or not a given target region is allowed for
either peripheral configuration or image loading in memory. It is intended
for use by post-ROM boot stage components, via the ROM Vector Table, in
order to avoid configuring security-sensitive peripherals, or loading
images over sensitive memory regions or outside recognized memory devices
in the address map."
It is a useful function to support as a precursor to calling into
authenticate_image() to validate the target memory region is good.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
This patch enables printout of the IVT entry, dcd and csf data fields.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT gives the absolute address of the CSF. There is no requirement for
the CSF to be located adjacent to the IVT so lets use the address provided
in the IVT header instead of the hard-coded fixed CSF offset currently in
place.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Previous patches added IVT header verification steps. We shouldn't call
hab_rvt_entry() until we have done the basic header verification steps.
This patch changes the time we make the hab_rvt_entry() call so that it
only takes place if we are happy with the IVT header sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT is a self-describing structure which contains a self field. The
self field is the absolute physical base address the IVT ought to be at in
memory. Use the IVT self field to validate the calculated ivt_addr bugging
out if the two values differ.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The IVT header contains a magic number, fixed length and one of two version
identifiers. Validate these settings before doing anything with a putative
IVT binary.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The various i.MX BootROMs containing the High Assurance Boot (HAB) block
rely on a data structure called the Image Vector Table (IVT) to describe to
the BootROM where to locate various data-structures used by HAB during
authentication.
This patch adds a definition of the IVT header for use in later patches,
where we will break the current incorrect dependence on fixed offsets in
favour of an IVT described parsing of incoming binaries.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes
- addr - image hex address
- offset - hex offset of IVT in the image
but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats
the second 'offset' parameter as an image length.
Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end
of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4.
This patch fixes this situation by
1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img
- addr : image hex address
- length : total length of the image
- offset : offset of IVT from addr
2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in
arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass
addr, length and IVT offset respectively.
This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified
in the help text and should still allow existing code to work.
It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended
to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example.
Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the
BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images
made by mkimage via HAB.
This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will
focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not
mandated to live at the end of a .imx image.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
CSF_PAD_SIZE should be defined in hab.h, move it to that location now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The size of the IVT header should be defined in hab.h move it there now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
The current code disjoins an entire block of code on hab_entry pass/fail
resulting in a large chunk of authenticate_image being offset to the right.
Fix this by checking hab_entry() pass/failure and exiting the function
directly if in an error state.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
There is no need to call is_enabled() twice in authenticate_image - it does
nothing but add an additional layer of indentation.
We can check for is_enabled() at the start of the function and return the
result code directly.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
authenticate_image returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. That result
code is mapped directly to the result code for the command line function
hab_auth_img - which means when hab_auth_img succeeds it is returning
CMD_RET_FAILURE (1) instead of CMD_RET_SUCCESS (0).
This patch fixes this behaviour by making authenticate_image() return 0 for
success and 1 for failure. Both users of authenticate_image() as a result
have some minimal churn. The upshot is once done when hab_auth_img is
called from the command line we set $? in the standard way for scripting
functions to act on.
Fixes: 36c1ca4d46 ("imx: Support i.MX6 High Assurance Boot
authentication")
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Both usages of authenticate_image treat the result code as a simple binary.
The command line usage of authenticate_image directly returns the result
code of authenticate_image as a success/failure code.
Right now when calling hab_auth_img and test the result code in a shell a
passing hab_auth_img will appear to the shell as a fail.
The first step in fixing this behaviour is to fix-up the result code return
by authenticate_image() itself, subsequent patches fix the interpretation
of authenticate_image so that zero will return CMD_RET_SUCCESS and non-zero
will return CMD_RET_FAILURE.
The first step is fixing the return type in authenticate_image() so do that
now.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
With CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_BSS_OFFSET enabled, the initial (pre-relocation)
stack is placed some distance after bss_start. The control DTB is appended
to the U-Boot binary at bss_start. If the DTB is too large, or the SP BSS
offset too small, then the initial stack could corrupt the DTB. Enhance
the Makefile to check whether this is likely to occur.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
Request that all environment variables containing hard-coded address be
calculated at boot time instead.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
In the presence of potentially fragemented memory, we cannot hard-code
addresses into environment variables such as kernel_addr_r. Instead, we
must calculate those addresses at run-time based on available memory
locations. Implement the code to perform such runtime calculation, based
on requirements described in environment variables, to allow the user
full control over the allocation.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
Tegra186 currently restricts its DRAM usage to entries in the /memory node
in the DTB passed to it. However, the MMU configuration always maps the
entire first 2GB of RAM. This could allow the CPU to speculatively access
RAM that isn't part of the in-use banks. This patch switches to runtime
construction of the table that's used to construct the MMU translation
tables, and thus prevents access to RAM that's not part of a valid bank.
Note: This patch is intended to prevent access to RAM regions which U-Boot
does not need to access, with the primary purpose of avoiding theoretical
speculative access to physical regions for which the HW will throw errors
(e.g. carve-outs that the CPU has no permission to access at a bus level,
bad ECC pages, etc.). In particular, this patch is not deliberately
related to the speculation-related security issues that were recently
announced. The apparent similarity is a coincidence.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
On this platform, there may be up to 1024 unusable chunks of memory.
Increase CONFIG_NR_DRAM_BANKS so that U-Boot can remember all the banks
required to represent such fragmented memory.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
In the future, the list of DRAM regions passed to U-Boot in the DTB may
be quite long and fragmented. Due to this, U-Boot must search through the
regions to find the best region to relocate into, rather than relying on
the current assumption that the top of bank 0 is a reasonable relocation
target. This change implements such searching.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
arch_lmb_reserve() currently assumes that the stack pointer is within DRAM
bank 0. This is not necessarily true. Enhance the code to search through
DRAM banks until the bank that does contain SP is found, and then reserve
the tail of that bank.
Fixes: 2d1916e48b ("ARM: add flat device tree support")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
Apply a few small fixes for the DTB /memory node parsing from NVIDIA's
downstream U-Boot:
- Allow arbitrary number of DRAM banks.
- Correctly calculate the number of DRAM banks.
- Clip PCIe memory in the same way as U-Boot CPU memory use.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
Enable CONFIG_LINUX_KERNEL_IMAGE_HEADER for all 64-bit Tegra boards.
cboot (the boot SW that runs before U-Boot) will eventually use this
information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
Allow placing a Linux kernel image header at the start of the U-Boot
binary. This is useful since the image header reports the amount of memory
(BSS and similar) that U-Boot needs to use, but that isn't part of the
binary size. This can be used by the code that loads U-Boot into memory to
determine where to load U-Boot, based on other users of memory.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
Enable CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_BSS_OFFSET for all 64-bit Tegra boards. Place
the stack/... 512KiB from the end of the U-Boot binary. This should be
plenty to accommodate the current DTBs (max 64 KiB), early malloc region
(6KiB), stack usage, and plenty of slack, while still not placing it too
far away from the U-Boot binary.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>
