u-boot/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h

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/*
* Copyright (C) 2012-2015 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
*
*/
#ifndef __SECURE_MX6Q_H__
#define __SECURE_MX6Q_H__
#include <linux/types.h>
/* -------- start of HAB API updates ------------*/
/* The following are taken from HAB4 SIS */
/* Status definitions */
enum hab_status {
HAB_STS_ANY = 0x00,
HAB_FAILURE = 0x33,
HAB_WARNING = 0x69,
HAB_SUCCESS = 0xf0
};
/* Security Configuration definitions */
enum hab_config {
HAB_CFG_RETURN = 0x33, /* < Field Return IC */
HAB_CFG_OPEN = 0xf0, /* < Non-secure IC */
HAB_CFG_CLOSED = 0xcc /* < Secure IC */
};
/* State definitions */
enum hab_state {
HAB_STATE_INITIAL = 0x33, /* Initialising state (transitory) */
HAB_STATE_CHECK = 0x55, /* Check state (non-secure) */
HAB_STATE_NONSECURE = 0x66, /* Non-secure state */
HAB_STATE_TRUSTED = 0x99, /* Trusted state */
HAB_STATE_SECURE = 0xaa, /* Secure state */
HAB_STATE_FAIL_SOFT = 0xcc, /* Soft fail state */
HAB_STATE_FAIL_HARD = 0xff, /* Hard fail state (terminal) */
HAB_STATE_NONE = 0xf0, /* No security state machine */
HAB_STATE_MAX
};
enum hab_reason {
HAB_RSN_ANY = 0x00, /* Match any reason */
HAB_ENG_FAIL = 0x30, /* Engine failure */
HAB_INV_ADDRESS = 0x22, /* Invalid address: access denied */
HAB_INV_ASSERTION = 0x0c, /* Invalid assertion */
HAB_INV_CALL = 0x28, /* Function called out of sequence */
HAB_INV_CERTIFICATE = 0x21, /* Invalid certificate */
HAB_INV_COMMAND = 0x06, /* Invalid command: command malformed */
HAB_INV_CSF = 0x11, /* Invalid csf */
HAB_INV_DCD = 0x27, /* Invalid dcd */
HAB_INV_INDEX = 0x0f, /* Invalid index: access denied */
HAB_INV_IVT = 0x05, /* Invalid ivt */
HAB_INV_KEY = 0x1d, /* Invalid key */
HAB_INV_RETURN = 0x1e, /* Failed callback function */
HAB_INV_SIGNATURE = 0x18, /* Invalid signature */
HAB_INV_SIZE = 0x17, /* Invalid data size */
HAB_MEM_FAIL = 0x2e, /* Memory failure */
HAB_OVR_COUNT = 0x2b, /* Expired poll count */
HAB_OVR_STORAGE = 0x2d, /* Exhausted storage region */
HAB_UNS_ALGORITHM = 0x12, /* Unsupported algorithm */
HAB_UNS_COMMAND = 0x03, /* Unsupported command */
HAB_UNS_ENGINE = 0x0a, /* Unsupported engine */
HAB_UNS_ITEM = 0x24, /* Unsupported configuration item */
HAB_UNS_KEY = 0x1b, /* Unsupported key type/parameters */
HAB_UNS_PROTOCOL = 0x14, /* Unsupported protocol */
HAB_UNS_STATE = 0x09, /* Unsuitable state */
HAB_RSN_MAX
};
enum hab_context {
HAB_CTX_ANY = 0x00, /* Match any context */
HAB_CTX_FAB = 0xff, /* Event logged in hab_fab_test() */
HAB_CTX_ENTRY = 0xe1, /* Event logged in hab_rvt.entry() */
HAB_CTX_TARGET = 0x33, /* Event logged in hab_rvt.check_target() */
HAB_CTX_AUTHENTICATE = 0x0a,/* Logged in hab_rvt.authenticate_image() */
HAB_CTX_DCD = 0xdd, /* Event logged in hab_rvt.run_dcd() */
HAB_CTX_CSF = 0xcf, /* Event logged in hab_rvt.run_csf() */
HAB_CTX_COMMAND = 0xc0, /* Event logged executing csf/dcd command */
HAB_CTX_AUT_DAT = 0xdb, /* Authenticated data block */
HAB_CTX_ASSERT = 0xa0, /* Event logged in hab_rvt.assert() */
HAB_CTX_EXIT = 0xee, /* Event logged in hab_rvt.exit() */
HAB_CTX_MAX
};
struct imx_sec_config_fuse_t {
int bank;
int word;
};
#if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT)
extern struct imx_sec_config_fuse_t const imx_sec_config_fuse;
#endif
/*Function prototype description*/
typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_report_event_t(enum hab_status, uint32_t,
uint8_t* , size_t*);
typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_report_status_t(enum hab_config *,
enum hab_state *);
typedef enum hab_status hab_loader_callback_f_t(void**, size_t*, const void*);
typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_entry_t(void);
typedef enum hab_status hab_rvt_exit_t(void);
typedef void *hab_rvt_authenticate_image_t(uint8_t, ptrdiff_t,
void **, size_t *, hab_loader_callback_f_t);
typedef void hapi_clock_init_t(void);
#define HAB_ENG_ANY 0x00 /* Select first compatible engine */
#define HAB_ENG_SCC 0x03 /* Security controller */
#define HAB_ENG_RTIC 0x05 /* Run-time integrity checker */
#define HAB_ENG_SAHARA 0x06 /* Crypto accelerator */
#define HAB_ENG_CSU 0x0a /* Central Security Unit */
#define HAB_ENG_SRTC 0x0c /* Secure clock */
#define HAB_ENG_DCP 0x1b /* Data Co-Processor */
#define HAB_ENG_CAAM 0x1d /* CAAM */
#define HAB_ENG_SNVS 0x1e /* Secure Non-Volatile Storage */
#define HAB_ENG_OCOTP 0x21 /* Fuse controller */
#define HAB_ENG_DTCP 0x22 /* DTCP co-processor */
#define HAB_ENG_ROM 0x36 /* Protected ROM area */
#define HAB_ENG_HDCP 0x24 /* HDCP co-processor */
#define HAB_ENG_RTL 0x77 /* RTL simulation engine */
#define HAB_ENG_SW 0xff /* Software engine */
#ifdef CONFIG_ROM_UNIFIED_SECTIONS
#define HAB_RVT_BASE 0x00000100
#else
#define HAB_RVT_BASE 0x00000094
#endif
#define HAB_RVT_ENTRY (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x04))
#define HAB_RVT_EXIT (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x08))
#define HAB_RVT_AUTHENTICATE_IMAGE (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x10))
#define HAB_RVT_REPORT_EVENT (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x20))
#define HAB_RVT_REPORT_STATUS (*(uint32_t *)(HAB_RVT_BASE + 0x24))
#define HAB_RVT_REPORT_EVENT_NEW (*(uint32_t *)0x000000B8)
#define HAB_RVT_REPORT_STATUS_NEW (*(uint32_t *)0x000000BC)
#define HAB_RVT_AUTHENTICATE_IMAGE_NEW (*(uint32_t *)0x000000A8)
#define HAB_RVT_ENTRY_NEW (*(uint32_t *)0x0000009C)
#define HAB_RVT_EXIT_NEW (*(uint32_t *)0x000000A0)
#define HAB_CID_ROM 0 /**< ROM Caller ID */
#define HAB_CID_UBOOT 1 /**< UBOOT Caller ID*/
#define IVT_SIZE 0x20
#define CSF_PAD_SIZE 0x2000
/* ----------- end of HAB API updates ------------*/
arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net> Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com> Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-12 12:40:01 +00:00
int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size,
uint32_t ivt_offset);
#endif