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Note that **`checksec`** might not find that a binary is protected by a canary if this was statically compiled and it's not capable to identify the function.\
However, you can manually notice this if you find that a value is saved in the stack at the beginning of a function call and this value is checked before exiting.
{% endhint %}
## Brute force Canary
The best way to bypass a simple canary is if the binary is a program **forking child processes every time you establish a new connection** with it (network service), because every time you connect to it **the same canary will be used**.
Then, the best way to bypass the canary is just to **brute-force it char by char**, and you can figure out if the guessed canary byte was correct checking if the program has crashed or continues its regular flow. In this example the function **brute-forces an 8 Bytes canary (x64)** and distinguish between a correct guessed byte and a bad byte just **checking** if a **response** is sent back by the server (another way in **other situation** could be using a **try/except**):
### Example 1
This example is implemented for 64bits but could be easily implemented for 32 bits.
Threads of the same process will also **share the same canary token**, therefore it'll be possible to **brute-forc**e a canary if the binary spawns a new thread every time an attack happens. 
Moreover, a buffer **overflow in a threaded function** protected with canary could be used to **modify the master canary stored in the TLS**. This is because, it might be possible to reach the memory position where the TLS is stored (and therefore, the canary) via a **bof in the stack** of a thread.\
As a result, the mitigation is useless because the check is used with two canaries that are the same (although modified).\
This attack is performed in the writeup: [http://7rocky.github.io/en/ctf/htb-challenges/pwn/robot-factory/#canaries-and-threads](http://7rocky.github.io/en/ctf/htb-challenges/pwn/robot-factory/#canaries-and-threads)
Check also the presentation of [https://www.slideshare.net/codeblue\_jp/master-canary-forging-by-yuki-koike-code-blue-2015](https://www.slideshare.net/codeblue\_jp/master-canary-forging-by-yuki-koike-code-blue-2015) which mentions that usually the **TLS** is stored by **`mmap`** and when a **stack** of **thread** is created it's also generated by `mmap` according to this, which might allow the overflow as shown in the previous writeup.