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u-boot/cmd/tpm-v2.c
Miquel Raynal 2a2096ea60 tpm: allow TPM v1 and v2 to be compiled at the same time 
While there is probably no reason to do so in a real life situation, it
will allow to compile test both stacks with the same sandbox defconfig.

As we cannot define two 'tpm' commands at the same time, the command for
TPM v1 is still called 'tpm' and the one for TPM v2 'tpm2'. While this
is the exact command name that must be written into eg. test files, any
user already using the TPM v2 stack can continue to do so by just writing
'tpm' because as long as TPM v1 support is not compiled, U-Boot prompt
will search for the closest command named after 'tpm'.

The command set can also be changed at runtime (not supported yet, but
ready to be), but as one can compile only either one stack or the other,
there is still one spot in the code where conditionals are used: to
retrieve the v1 or v2 command set.

Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
[trini: In sandbox_tpm2_fill_buf() use NULL not \0 to ensure NULL
terminated string due to LLVM warning]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
2018-07-28 11:57:38 -04:00

389 lines
11 KiB
C
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Bootlin
* Author: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
*/
#include <common.h>
#include <dm.h>
#include <log.h>
#include <mapmem.h>
#include <tpm-common.h>
#include <tpm-v2.h>
#include "tpm-user-utils.h"
static int do_tpm2_startup(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
enum tpm2_startup_types mode;
if (argc != 2)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_SU_CLEAR", argv[1])) {
mode = TPM2_SU_CLEAR;
} else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_SU_STATE", argv[1])) {
mode = TPM2_SU_STATE;
} else {
printf("Couldn't recognize mode string: %s\n", argv[1]);
return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
}
return report_return_code(tpm2_startup(mode));
}
static int do_tpm2_self_test(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
enum tpm2_yes_no full_test;
if (argc != 2)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (!strcasecmp("full", argv[1])) {
full_test = TPMI_YES;
} else if (!strcasecmp("continue", argv[1])) {
full_test = TPMI_NO;
} else {
printf("Couldn't recognize test mode: %s\n", argv[1]);
return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
}
return report_return_code(tpm2_self_test(full_test));
}
static int do_tpm2_clear(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
u32 handle = 0;
const char *pw = (argc < 3) ? NULL : argv[2];
const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
if (argc < 2 || argc > 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT", argv[1]))
handle = TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT;
else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_PLATFORM", argv[1]))
handle = TPM2_RH_PLATFORM;
else
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
return report_return_code(tpm2_clear(handle, pw, pw_sz));
}
static int do_tpm2_pcr_extend(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
struct udevice *dev;
struct tpm_chip_priv *priv;
u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
void *digest = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0), 0);
int ret;
u32 rc;
if (argc != 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
ret = uclass_first_device_err(UCLASS_TPM, &dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev);
if (!priv)
return -EINVAL;
if (index >= priv->pcr_count)
return -EINVAL;
rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(index, digest);
unmap_sysmem(digest);
return report_return_code(rc);
}
static int do_tpm_pcr_read(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
struct udevice *dev;
struct tpm_chip_priv *priv;
u32 index, rc;
unsigned int updates;
void *data;
int ret;
if (argc != 3)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
ret = uclass_first_device_err(UCLASS_TPM, &dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev);
if (!priv)
return -EINVAL;
index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
if (index >= priv->pcr_count)
return -EINVAL;
data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0), 0);
rc = tpm2_pcr_read(index, priv->pcr_select_min, data, &updates);
if (!rc) {
printf("PCR #%u content (%d known updates):\n", index, updates);
print_byte_string(data, TPM2_DIGEST_LEN);
}
unmap_sysmem(data);
return report_return_code(rc);
}
static int do_tpm_get_capability(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
u32 capability, property, rc;
u8 *data;
size_t count;
int i, j;
if (argc != 5)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
capability = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
property = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0);
count = simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0);
rc = tpm2_get_capability(capability, property, data, count);
if (rc)
goto unmap_data;
printf("Capabilities read from TPM:\n");
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
printf("Property 0x");
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
printf("%02x", data[(i * 8) + j]);
printf(": 0x");
for (j = 4; j < 8; j++)
printf("%02x", data[(i * 8) + j]);
printf("\n");
}
unmap_data:
unmap_sysmem(data);
return report_return_code(rc);
}
static int do_tpm_dam_reset(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char *const argv[])
{
const char *pw = (argc < 2) ? NULL : argv[1];
const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
if (argc > 2)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
return report_return_code(tpm2_dam_reset(pw, pw_sz));
}
static int do_tpm_dam_parameters(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char *const argv[])
{
const char *pw = (argc < 5) ? NULL : argv[4];
const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
/*
* No Dictionary Attack Mitigation (DAM) means:
* maxtries = 0xFFFFFFFF, recovery_time = 1, lockout_recovery = 0
*/
unsigned long int max_tries;
unsigned long int recovery_time;
unsigned long int lockout_recovery;
if (argc < 4 || argc > 5)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (strict_strtoul(argv[1], 0, &max_tries))
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (strict_strtoul(argv[2], 0, &recovery_time))
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (strict_strtoul(argv[3], 0, &lockout_recovery))
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "Changing dictionary attack parameters:\n");
log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- maxTries: %lu", max_tries);
log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- recoveryTime: %lu\n", recovery_time);
log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- lockoutRecovery: %lu\n", lockout_recovery);
return report_return_code(tpm2_dam_parameters(pw, pw_sz, max_tries,
recovery_time,
lockout_recovery));
}
static int do_tpm_change_auth(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char *const argv[])
{
u32 handle;
const char *newpw = argv[2];
const char *oldpw = (argc == 3) ? NULL : argv[3];
const ssize_t newpw_sz = strlen(newpw);
const ssize_t oldpw_sz = oldpw ? strlen(oldpw) : 0;
if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (newpw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN || oldpw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT", argv[1]))
handle = TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT;
else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT", argv[1]))
handle = TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_OWNER", argv[1]))
handle = TPM2_RH_OWNER;
else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_PLATFORM", argv[1]))
handle = TPM2_RH_PLATFORM;
else
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
return report_return_code(tpm2_change_auth(handle, newpw, newpw_sz,
oldpw, oldpw_sz));
}
static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[])
{
u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
char *key = argv[2];
const char *pw = (argc < 4) ? NULL : argv[3];
const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
if (strlen(key) != TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
return report_return_code(tpm2_pcr_setauthpolicy(pw, pw_sz, index,
key));
}
static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
int argc, char * const argv[])
{
u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0);
char *key = argv[2];
const ssize_t key_sz = strlen(key);
const char *pw = (argc < 4) ? NULL : argv[3];
const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0;
if (strlen(key) != TPM2_DIGEST_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
return CMD_RET_USAGE;
return report_return_code(tpm2_pcr_setauthvalue(pw, pw_sz, index,
key, key_sz));
}
static cmd_tbl_t tpm2_commands[] = {
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(info, 0, 1, do_tpm_info, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(init, 0, 1, do_tpm_init, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(startup, 0, 1, do_tpm2_startup, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(self_test, 0, 1, do_tpm2_self_test, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(clear, 0, 1, do_tpm2_clear, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_extend, 0, 1, do_tpm2_pcr_extend, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_read, 0, 1, do_tpm_pcr_read, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(get_capability, 0, 1, do_tpm_get_capability, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(dam_reset, 0, 1, do_tpm_dam_reset, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(dam_parameters, 0, 1, do_tpm_dam_parameters, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(change_auth, 0, 1, do_tpm_change_auth, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthpolicy, 0, 1,
do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthvalue, 0, 1,
do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue, "", ""),
};
cmd_tbl_t *get_tpm2_commands(unsigned int *size)
{
*size = ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_commands);
return tpm2_commands;
}
U_BOOT_CMD(tpm2, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm, "Issue a TPMv2.x command",
"<command> [<arguments>]\n"
"\n"
"info\n"
" Show information about the TPM.\n"
"init\n"
" Initialize the software stack. Always the first command to issue.\n"
"startup <mode>\n"
" Issue a TPM2_Startup command.\n"
" <mode> is one of:\n"
" * TPM2_SU_CLEAR (reset state)\n"
" * TPM2_SU_STATE (preserved state)\n"
"self_test <type>\n"
" Test the TPM capabilities.\n"
" <type> is one of:\n"
" * full (perform all tests)\n"
" * continue (only check untested tests)\n"
"clear <hierarchy>\n"
" Issue a TPM2_Clear command.\n"
" <hierarchy> is one of:\n"
" * TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT\n"
" * TPM2_RH_PLATFORM\n"
"pcr_extend <pcr> <digest_addr>\n"
" Extend PCR #<pcr> with digest at <digest_addr>.\n"
" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n"
" <digest_addr>: address of a 32-byte SHA256 digest\n"
"pcr_read <pcr> <digest_addr>\n"
" Read PCR #<pcr> to memory address <digest_addr>.\n"
" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n"
" <digest_addr>: address to store the a 32-byte SHA256 digest\n"
"get_capability <capability> <property> <addr> <count>\n"
" Read and display <count> entries indexed by <capability>/<property>.\n"
" Values are 4 bytes long and are written at <addr>.\n"
" <capability>: capability\n"
" <property>: property\n"
" <addr>: address to store <count> entries of 4 bytes\n"
" <count>: number of entries to retrieve\n"
"dam_reset [<password>]\n"
" If the TPM is not in a LOCKOUT state, reset the internal error counter.\n"
" <password>: optional password\n"
"dam_parameters <max_tries> <recovery_time> <lockout_recovery> [<password>]\n"
" If the TPM is not in a LOCKOUT state, set the DAM parameters\n"
" <maxTries>: maximum number of failures before lockout,\n"
" 0 means always locking\n"
" <recoveryTime>: time before decrement of the error counter,\n"
" 0 means no lockout\n"
" <lockoutRecovery>: time of a lockout (before the next try),\n"
" 0 means a reboot is needed\n"
" <password>: optional password of the LOCKOUT hierarchy\n"
"change_auth <hierarchy> <new_pw> [<old_pw>]\n"
" <hierarchy>: the hierarchy\n"
" <new_pw>: new password for <hierarchy>\n"
" <old_pw>: optional previous password of <hierarchy>\n"
"pcr_setauthpolicy|pcr_setauthvalue <pcr> <key> [<password>]\n"
" Change the <key> to access PCR #<pcr>.\n"
" hierarchy and may be empty.\n"
" /!\\WARNING: untested function, use at your own risks !\n"
" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n"
" <key>: secret to protect the access of PCR #<pcr>\n"
" <password>: optional password of the PLATFORM hierarchy\n"
);
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