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u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c
Miquel Raynal d677bfe2f7 tpm: disociate TPMv1.x specific and generic code 
There are no changes in this commit but a new organization of the code
as follow.

* cmd/ directory:
        > move existing code from cmd/tpm.c in cmd/tpm-common.c
	> move specific code in cmd/tpm-v1.c
	> create a specific header file with generic definitions for
	  commands only called cmd/tpm-user-utils.h

* lib/ directory:
        > move existing code from lib/tpm.c in lib/tpm-common.c
	> move specific code in lib/tpm-v1.c
	> create a specific header file with generic definitions for
	  the library itself called lib/tpm-utils.h

* include/ directory:
        > move existing code from include/tpm.h in include/tpm-common.h
	> move specific code in include/tpm-v1.h

Code designated as 'common' is compiled if TPM are used. Code designated
as 'specific' is compiled only if the right specification has been
selected.

All files include tpm-common.h.
Files in cmd/ include tpm-user-utils.h.
Files in lib/ include tpm-utils.h.
Depending on the specification, files may include either (not both)
tpm-v1.h or tpm-v2.h.

Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
[trini: Fix a few more cases of tpm.h -> tpm-v1.h, some Kconfig logic]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
2018-05-25 20:12:55 -04:00

852 lines
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors.
* Coypright (c) 2013 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH
*/
#include <common.h>
#include <dm.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <u-boot/sha1.h>
#include <tpm-common.h>
#include <tpm-v1.h>
#include "tpm-utils.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
#ifndef CONFIG_SHA1
#error "TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS require SHA1 to be configured, too"
#endif /* !CONFIG_SHA1 */
struct session_data {
int valid;
u32 handle;
u8 nonce_even[DIGEST_LENGTH];
u8 nonce_odd[DIGEST_LENGTH];
};
static struct session_data oiap_session = {0, };
#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
u32 tpm_startup(enum tpm_startup_type mode)
{
const u8 command[12] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x0,
};
const size_t mode_offset = 10;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw",
0, command, sizeof(command),
mode_offset, mode))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_self_test_full(void)
{
const u8 command[10] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50,
};
return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_continue_self_test(void)
{
const u8 command[10] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53,
};
return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_nv_define_space(u32 index, u32 perm, u32 size)
{
const u8 command[101] = {
0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* parameter size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
/* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->... */
0x0, 0x18, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */
0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->TPM_NV_INDEX */
/* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */
0x0, 0x3,
0, 0, 0,
0x1f,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
/* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */
0x0, 0x3,
0, 0, 0,
0x1f,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
/* TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES->... */
0x0, 0x17, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */
0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->attributes */
/* End of TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES */
0, /* bReadSTClear */
0, /* bWriteSTClear */
0, /* bWriteDefine */
0, 0, 0, 0, /* size */
};
const size_t index_offset = 12;
const size_t perm_offset = 70;
const size_t size_offset = 77;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
index_offset, index,
perm_offset, perm,
size_offset, size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_nv_read_value(u32 index, void *data, u32 count)
{
const u8 command[22] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf,
};
const size_t index_offset = 10;
const size_t length_offset = 18;
const size_t data_size_offset = 10;
const size_t data_offset = 14;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 data_size;
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
index_offset, index,
length_offset, count))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
data_size_offset, &data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (data_size > count)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
data_offset, data, data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_nv_write_value(u32 index, const void *data, u32 length)
{
const u8 command[256] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd,
};
const size_t command_size_offset = 2;
const size_t index_offset = 10;
const size_t length_offset = 18;
const size_t data_offset = 22;
const size_t write_info_size = 12;
const u32 total_length =
TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + write_info_size + length;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddds",
0, command, sizeof(command),
command_size_offset, total_length,
index_offset, index,
length_offset, length,
data_offset, data, length))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_extend(u32 index, const void *in_digest, void *out_digest)
{
const u8 command[34] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14,
};
const size_t index_offset = 10;
const size_t in_digest_offset = 14;
const size_t out_digest_offset = 10;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
u8 response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sds",
0, command, sizeof(command),
index_offset, index,
in_digest_offset, in_digest,
PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
out_digest_offset, out_digest,
PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_pcr_read(u32 index, void *data, size_t count)
{
const u8 command[14] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15,
};
const size_t index_offset = 10;
const size_t out_digest_offset = 10;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (count < PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
index_offset, index))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
out_digest_offset, data, PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_tsc_physical_presence(u16 presence)
{
const u8 command[12] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0,
};
const size_t presence_offset = 10;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw",
0, command, sizeof(command),
presence_offset, presence))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_read_pubek(void *data, size_t count)
{
const u8 command[30] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c,
};
const size_t response_size_offset = 2;
const size_t data_offset = 10;
const size_t header_and_checksum_size = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 20;
u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE + TPM_PUBEK_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 data_size;
u32 err;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
response_size_offset, &data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (data_size < header_and_checksum_size)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
data_size -= header_and_checksum_size;
if (data_size > count)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
data_offset, data, data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_force_clear(void)
{
const u8 command[10] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d,
};
return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_physical_enable(void)
{
const u8 command[10] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f,
};
return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_physical_disable(void)
{
const u8 command[10] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70,
};
return tpm_sendrecv_command(command, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_physical_set_deactivated(u8 state)
{
const u8 command[11] = {
0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72,
};
const size_t state_offset = 10;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sb",
0, command, sizeof(command),
state_offset, state))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_get_capability(u32 cap_area, u32 sub_cap, void *cap, size_t count)
{
const u8 command[22] = {
0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* TPM_CAPABILITY_AREA */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* subcap size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* subcap value */
};
const size_t cap_area_offset = 10;
const size_t sub_cap_offset = 18;
const size_t cap_offset = 14;
const size_t cap_size_offset = 10;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 cap_size;
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
cap_area_offset, cap_area,
sub_cap_offset, sub_cap))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
cap_size_offset, &cap_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (cap_size > response_length || cap_size > count)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
cap_offset, cap, cap_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_get_permanent_flags(struct tpm_permanent_flags *pflags)
{
const u8 command[22] = {
0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* subcap size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x8, /* subcap value */
};
const size_t data_size_offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
const size_t data_offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
u32 data_size;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
data_size_offset, &data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (data_size < sizeof(*pflags))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
data_offset, pflags, sizeof(*pflags)))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_get_permissions(u32 index, u32 *perm)
{
const u8 command[22] = {
0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x11,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4,
};
const size_t index_offset = 18;
const size_t perm_offset = 60;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "d", 0, command, sizeof(command),
index_offset, index))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
perm_offset, perm))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
u32 tpm_flush_specific(u32 key_handle, u32 resource_type)
{
const u8 command[18] = {
0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, /* parameter size */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* resource type */
};
const size_t key_handle_offset = 10;
const size_t resource_type_offset = 14;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
key_handle_offset, key_handle,
resource_type_offset, resource_type))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES */
#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
/**
* Fill an authentication block in a request.
* This func can create the first as well as the second auth block (for
* double authorized commands).
*
* @param request pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data)
* @param request_len0 length of the request without auth data
* @param handles_len length of the handles area in request
* @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used
* @param request_auth pointer to the auth block of the request to be filled
* @param auth authentication data (HMAC key)
*/
static u32 create_request_auth(const void *request, size_t request_len0,
size_t handles_len,
struct session_data *auth_session,
void *request_auth, const void *auth)
{
u8 hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1];
sha1_context hash_ctx;
const size_t command_code_offset = 6;
const size_t auth_nonce_odd_offset = 4;
const size_t auth_continue_offset = 24;
const size_t auth_auth_offset = 25;
if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
sha1_update(&hash_ctx, request + command_code_offset, 4);
if (request_len0 > TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len)
sha1_update(&hash_ctx,
request + TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len,
request_len0 - TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH
- handles_len);
sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data);
sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
sha1_update(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd, DIGEST_LENGTH);
sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data));
sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd);
if (pack_byte_string(request_auth, TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH, "dsb",
0, auth_session->handle,
auth_nonce_odd_offset, auth_session->nonce_odd,
DIGEST_LENGTH,
auth_continue_offset, 1))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ss",
DIGEST_LENGTH,
auth_session->nonce_even,
DIGEST_LENGTH,
2 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
request_auth + auth_nonce_odd_offset,
DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data),
request_auth + auth_auth_offset);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
/**
* Verify an authentication block in a response.
* Since this func updates the nonce_even in the session data it has to be
* called when receiving a succesfull AUTH response.
* This func can verify the first as well as the second auth block (for
* double authorized commands).
*
* @param command_code command code of the request
* @param response pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data)
* @param handles_len length of the handles area in response
* @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used
* @param response_auth pointer to the auth block of the response to be verified
* @param auth authentication data (HMAC key)
*/
static u32 verify_response_auth(u32 command_code, const void *response,
size_t response_len0, size_t handles_len,
struct session_data *auth_session,
const void *response_auth, const void *auth)
{
u8 hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1];
u8 computed_auth[DIGEST_LENGTH];
sha1_context hash_ctx;
const size_t return_code_offset = 6;
const size_t auth_continue_offset = 20;
const size_t auth_auth_offset = 21;
u8 auth_continue;
if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid)
return TPM_AUTHFAIL;
if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "d",
0, command_code))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (response_len0 < TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
sha1_update(&hash_ctx, response + return_code_offset, 4);
sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, 4);
if (response_len0 > TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len)
sha1_update(&hash_ctx,
response + TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len,
response_len0 - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
- handles_len);
sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data);
memcpy(auth_session->nonce_even, response_auth, DIGEST_LENGTH);
auth_continue = ((u8 *)response_auth)[auth_continue_offset];
if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ssb",
DIGEST_LENGTH,
response_auth,
DIGEST_LENGTH,
2 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
auth_session->nonce_odd,
DIGEST_LENGTH,
3 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
auth_continue))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data),
computed_auth);
if (memcmp(computed_auth, response_auth + auth_auth_offset,
DIGEST_LENGTH))
return TPM_AUTHFAIL;
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
u32 tpm_terminate_auth_session(u32 auth_handle)
{
const u8 command[18] = {
0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* TPM_HANDLE */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* TPM_RESOURCE_TYPE */
};
const size_t req_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
u8 request[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
req_handle_offset, auth_handle))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (oiap_session.valid && oiap_session.handle == auth_handle)
oiap_session.valid = 0;
return tpm_sendrecv_command(request, NULL, NULL);
}
u32 tpm_end_oiap(void)
{
u32 err = TPM_SUCCESS;
if (oiap_session.valid)
err = tpm_terminate_auth_session(oiap_session.handle);
return err;
}
u32 tpm_oiap(u32 *auth_handle)
{
const u8 command[10] = {
0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* parameter size */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
};
const size_t res_auth_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
const size_t res_nonce_even_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 4;
u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (oiap_session.valid)
tpm_terminate_auth_session(oiap_session.handle);
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(command, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "ds",
res_auth_handle_offset, &oiap_session.handle,
res_nonce_even_offset, &oiap_session.nonce_even,
(u32)DIGEST_LENGTH))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
oiap_session.valid = 1;
if (auth_handle)
*auth_handle = oiap_session.handle;
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_load_key2_oiap(u32 parent_handle, const void *key, size_t key_length,
const void *parent_key_usage_auth, u32 *key_handle)
{
const u8 command[14] = {
0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parent handle */
};
const size_t req_size_offset = 2;
const size_t req_parent_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
const size_t req_key_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + 4;
const size_t res_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
u8 request[sizeof(command) + TPM_KEY12_MAX_LENGTH +
TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH];
u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (!oiap_session.valid) {
err = tpm_oiap(NULL);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdds",
0, command, sizeof(command),
req_size_offset,
sizeof(command) + key_length
+ TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH,
req_parent_handle_offset, parent_handle,
req_key_offset, key, key_length
))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command) + key_length, 4,
&oiap_session,
request + sizeof(command) + key_length,
parent_key_usage_auth);
if (err)
return err;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(request, response, &response_length);
if (err) {
if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL)
oiap_session.valid = 0;
return err;
}
err = verify_response_auth(0x00000041, response,
response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
4, &oiap_session,
response + response_length -
TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
parent_key_usage_auth);
if (err)
return err;
if (key_handle) {
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
res_handle_offset, key_handle))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
u32 tpm_get_pub_key_oiap(u32 key_handle, const void *usage_auth, void *pubkey,
size_t *pubkey_len)
{
const u8 command[14] = {
0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */
};
const size_t req_size_offset = 2;
const size_t req_key_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
const size_t res_pubkey_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
u8 request[sizeof(command) + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH];
u8 response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + TPM_PUBKEY_MAX_LENGTH +
TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 err;
if (!oiap_session.valid) {
err = tpm_oiap(NULL);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
req_size_offset,
(u32)(sizeof(command)
+ TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH),
req_key_handle_offset, key_handle
))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command), 4, &oiap_session,
request + sizeof(command), usage_auth);
if (err)
return err;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(request, response, &response_length);
if (err) {
if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL)
oiap_session.valid = 0;
return err;
}
err = verify_response_auth(0x00000021, response,
response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
0, &oiap_session,
response + response_length -
TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
usage_auth);
if (err)
return err;
if (pubkey) {
if ((response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
- TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH) > *pubkey_len)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
*pubkey_len = response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
- TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH;
memcpy(pubkey, response + res_pubkey_offset,
response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
- TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH);
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_LOAD_KEY_BY_SHA1
u32 tpm_find_key_sha1(const u8 auth[20], const u8 pubkey_digest[20],
u32 *handle)
{
u16 key_count;
u32 key_handles[10];
u8 buf[288];
u8 *ptr;
u32 err;
u8 digest[20];
size_t buf_len;
unsigned int i;
/* fetch list of already loaded keys in the TPM */
err = tpm_get_capability(TPM_CAP_HANDLE, TPM_RT_KEY, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (err)
return -1;
key_count = get_unaligned_be16(buf);
ptr = buf + 2;
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i, ptr += 4)
key_handles[i] = get_unaligned_be32(ptr);
/* now search a(/ the) key which we can access with the given auth */
for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i) {
buf_len = sizeof(buf);
err = tpm_get_pub_key_oiap(key_handles[i], auth, buf, &buf_len);
if (err && err != TPM_AUTHFAIL)
return -1;
if (err)
continue;
sha1_csum(buf, buf_len, digest);
if (!memcmp(digest, pubkey_digest, 20)) {
*handle = key_handles[i];
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_LOAD_KEY_BY_SHA1 */
#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
u32 tpm_get_random(void *data, u32 count)
{
const u8 command[14] = {
0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, /* parameter size */
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x46, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
};
const size_t length_offset = 10;
const size_t data_size_offset = 10;
const size_t data_offset = 14;
u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
u32 data_size;
u8 *out = data;
while (count > 0) {
u32 this_bytes = min((size_t)count,
sizeof(response) - data_offset);
u32 err;
if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sd",
0, command, sizeof(command),
length_offset, this_bytes))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
err = tpm_sendrecv_command(buf, response, &response_length);
if (err)
return err;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
data_size_offset, &data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (data_size > count)
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
data_offset, out, data_size))
return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
count -= data_size;
out += data_size;
}
return 0;
}
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