This header includes things that are needed to make driver build. Adjust
existing users to include that always, even if other dm/ includes are
present
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
- Add SD secure boot target for ls1043ardb.
- Implement FSL_LSCH2 specific spl_board_init() to setup CAAM stream
ID and corresponding stream ID in SMMU.
- Change the u-boot size defined by a macro for copying the main
U-Boot by SPL to also include the u-boot Secure Boot header size as
header is appended to u-boot image. So header will also be copied
from SD to DDR.
- CONFIG_MAX_SPL_SIZE is limited to 90KB. SPL is copied to OCRAM
(128K) where 32K are reserved for use by boot ROM and 6K for secure
boto header.
- Error messages during SPL boot are limited to error code numbers
instead of strings to reduce the size of SPL image.
Signed-off-by: Vinitha Pillai-B57223 <vinitha.pillai@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
For validating images from uboot (Such as Kernel Image), either keys
from SoC fuses can be used or keys from a verified table of public
keys can be used. The latter feature is called IE Key Extension
Feature.
For Layerscape Chasis 3 based platforms, IE table is validated by
Bootrom and address of this table is written in scratch registers 13
and 14 via PBI commands.
Following are the steps describing usage of this feature:
1) Verify IE Table in ISBC phase using keys stored in fuses.
2) Install IE table. (To be used across verification of multiple
images stored in a static global structure.)
3) Use keys from IE table, to verify further images.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham.jain@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
Update the API's for transition of Security Monitor states. Instead
of providing both initial and final states for transition, just
provide final state for transition as Security Monitor driver will
take care of it internally.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@nxp.com>
[York Sun: Reformatted commit message slightly]
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
Use a pointer to pass image address to fsl_secboot_validate(),
instead of using environmental variable "img_addr".
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham.jain@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
In case of fatal failure during secure boot execution (e.g. header
not found), reset is asserted to stop execution. If the RESET_REQ
is not tied to HRESET, this allows the execution to continue.
Add esbh_halt() after the reset to make sure execution stops.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham.jain@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
For secure boot, a header is used to identify key table, signature
and image address. A new header structure is added for lsch3.
Currently key extension (IE) feature is not supported. Single key
feature is not supported. Keys must be in table format. Hence, SRK
(key table) must be present. Max key number has increase from 4 to
8. The 8th key is irrevocable. A new barker Code is used.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham.jain@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
In case of error while executing esbc_validate command, SNVS
transition and issue of reset is required only for secure-boot.
If boot mode is non-secure, this is not required.
Similarly, esbc_halt command which puts the core in Spin Loop
is applicable only for Secure Boot.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
Some images to be validated are relocated to a dynamic
address at run time. So, these addresses cannot be known
befor hand while signing the images and creating the header
offline.
So, support is required to pass the image address to the
validate function as an argument.
If an address is provided to the function, the address
field in Header is not read and is treated as a reserved
field.
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
The code for image hash calculation, hash calculation from
RSA signature and comparison of hashes has been mobed to a
separate function.
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
Separate functions are created for reading and checking the
sanity of Public keys:
- read_validate_single_key
- read_validate_ie_tbl
- read_validate_srk_table
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
The prototype and defination of function fsl_secboot_validate
has been changed to support calling this function from another
function within u-boot.
Only two aruments needed:
1) header address - Mandatory
2) SHA256 string - optional
Signed-off-by: Saksham Jain <saksham@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
LS1043ARDB Secure Boot Target from NOR has been added.
- Configs defined to enable esbc_validate.
- ESBC Address in header is made 64 bit.
- SMMU is re-configured in Bypass mode.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <yorksun@freescale.com>
The ITS bit was being read incorrectly beacause of operator
precedence. The same ahs been corrected.
Signed-off-by: Lawish Deshmukh <lawish.deshmukh@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <yorksun@freescale.com>
For the Chain of Trust, the esbc_validate command supports
32 bit fields for location of the image. In the header structure
definition, these were declared as pointers which made them
64 bit on a 64 bit core.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <yorksun@freescale.com>
1. esbc_validate command is meant for validating header and
signature of images (Boot Script and ESBC uboot client).
SHA-256 and RSA operations are performed using SEC block in HW.
This command works on both PBL based and Non PBL based Freescale
platforms.
Command usage:
esbc_validate img_hdr_addr [pub_key_hash]
2. ESBC uboot client can be linux. Additionally, rootfs and device
tree blob can also be signed.
3. In the event of header or signature failure in validation,
ITS and ITF bits determine further course of action.
4. In case of soft failure, appropriate error is dumped on console.
5. In case of hard failure, SoC is issued RESET REQUEST after
dumping error on the console.
6. KEY REVOCATION Feature:
QorIQ platforms like B4/T4 have support of srk key table and key
revocation in ISBC code in Silicon.
The srk key table allows the user to have a key table with multiple
keys and revoke any key in case of particular key gets compromised.
In case the ISBC code uses the key revocation and srk key table to
verify the u-boot code, the subsequent chain of trust should also
use the same.
6. ISBC KEY EXTENSION Feature:
This feature allows large number of keys to be used for esbc validation
of images. A set of public keys is being signed and validated by ISBC
which can be further used for esbc validation of images.
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Rana <gaurav.rana@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <yorksun@freescale.com>
