The only error case is that a given UUID is in wrong format.
So just return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER here.
Reported-by: Coverity (CID 300333)
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Coverity detected:
Using "&opt->CheckSum" as an array. This might corrupt or misinterpret
adjacent memory locations.
The code should work as far as a structure, IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER(64) is
packed, but modify it in more logical form. Subsystem is a member next to
CheckSum.
Reported-by: Coverity (CID 300339)
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Since pkcs7_parse_message() returns an error pointer, we must not
check for NULL. We have to explicitly set msg to NULL in the error
case, otherwise the call to pkcs7_free_message() on the goto err
path will assume it's a valid object.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Wildt <patrick@blueri.se>
Add missing include linux/err.h
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
efi_variable_parse_signature() returns NULL on error, so IS_ERR()
is an incorrect check. The goto err leads to pkcs7_free_message(),
which works fine on a NULL ptr.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Wildt <patrick@blueri.se>
Reviewed-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
There is no need to call efi_get_variable() instead of
efi_get_variable_common(). So let's use the internal function.
Move forward declarations to the top of the file.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Add a couple of missing targets so that helloworld and other efi targets
are not needlessly rebuilt.
CC: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Tested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
If we want to restore variables from disk, we need to initialize block
devices before variables.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Eliminate superfluous functions efi_set_volatile_variable() and
efi_set_nonvolatile_variable().
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Eliminate superfluous functions efi_get_volatile_variable() and
efi_get_nonvolatile_variable().
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
This function will check if a given handle to device is an EFI system
partition. It will be utilised in implementing capsule-on-disk feature.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Add function description. Return bool.
Reviewed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
efi_set_secure_stat() provides the common code for each stat transition
caused by efi_transfer_secure_state().
Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Correct description of return value.
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
"if (left < esl->signature_size)" is not reachable in a while loop.
But it is still valuable in case that a given signature database is
somehow corrupted. So fix the while loop condition.
Reported-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Pkcs7_parse.h and x509_parser.h are used in UEFI subsystem, in particular,
secure boot. So move them to include/crypto to avoid relative paths.
Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Don't include include x509_parser.h twice.
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
In subsequent patches UEFI variables shalled be stored on the EFI system
partition. Hence we need to identify the EFI system partition.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
This pull request
* provides an implementation of UEFI secure booting
* fixes a problem with the rsa_mod_exp driver which stops some boards
from booting when CONFIG_RSA is enabled which is needed for UEFI
secure booting
* enables the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL if DM_RNG is enabled
* fixes some function comments
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Merge tag 'efi-2020-07-rc1' of https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for UEFI sub-system for efi-2020-07-rc1
This pull request
* provides an implementation of UEFI secure booting
* fixes a problem with the rsa_mod_exp driver which stops some boards
from booting when CONFIG_RSA is enabled which is needed for UEFI
secure booting
* enables the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL if DM_RNG is enabled
* fixes some function comments
This file is potentially useful to other architectures saddled with ACPI
so move most of its contents to a common location.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Wolfgang Wallner <wolfgang.wallner@br-automation.com>
The following variable is exported as UEFI specification defines:
SignatureSupport: array of GUIDs representing the type of signatures
supported by the platform firmware
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification
section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.
Currently we support
* authentication based on db and dbx,
so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
* following signature types:
EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images)
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.
Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables
of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by
efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.
It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process
in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as
EDK2 does.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
The following variable is exported as UEFI specification defines:
VendorKeys: whether the system is configured to use only vendor-provided
keys or not
The value will have to be modified if a platform has its own way of
initializing signature database, in particular, PK.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
UEFI specification defines several global variables which are related to
the current secure boot state. In this commit, those values will be
maintained according to operations. Currently, AuditMode and DeployedMode
are defined but not implemented.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
With this commit, EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
is supported for authenticated variables and the system secure state
will transfer between setup mode and user mode as UEFI specification
section 32.3 describes.
Internally, authentication data is stored as part of authenticated
variable's value. It is nothing but a pkcs7 message (but we need some
wrapper, see efi_variable_parse_signature()) and will be validated by
efi_variable_authenticate(), hence efi_signature_verify_with_db().
Associated time value will be encoded in "{...,time=...}" along with
other UEFI variable's attributes.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
efi_signature_parse_sigdb() is a helper function will be used to parse
signature database variable and instantiate a signature store structure
in later patches.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
In this commit, implemented are a couple of helper functions which will be
used to materialize variable authentication as well as image authentication
in later patches.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Correct function descriptions in efi_watchdog.c.
Add the descriptions to the generated HTML documentation.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Correct function descriptions in efi_unicode_collation.c
Add the Unicode collation protocol to the generated HTML documentation.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Enable EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL by default if DM_RNG is set.
Signed-off-by: Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu@linaro.org>
Remove superfluous 'if DM_RNG'
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
'vendor' is both an input and an output parameter. So it cannot be
constant.
Fixes: 0bda81bfdc ("efi_loader: use const efi_guid_t * for variable services")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
For EFI binaries we have to provide an implementation of memmove() in
efi_freestanding.c.
Before this patch the memmove() function was copying in the wrong
direction.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
The runtime service GetNextVariable() returns the length of the next
variable including the closing 0x0000. This length should be in bytes.
Comparing the output of EDK2 and U-Boot shows that this is currently not
correctly implemented:
EDK2:
OsIndicationsSupported: 46
PlatformLang: 26
PlatformLangCodes: 36
U-Boot:
OsIndicationsSupported: 23
PlatformLang: 13
PlatformLangCodes: 18
Provide correct length in GetNextVariable().
Fixes: d99a87f84b ("efi_loader: implement GetNextVariableName()")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
This is a preparatory patch.
Those functions will be used in an implementation of UEFI firmware
management protocol as part of my capsule update patch.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Currently, if GetMemoryMap API returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, it doesn't
set valid values to other parameters, descriptor_size and
descriptor_version, except memory_map_size.
Some efi applications, however, may use those value; in particular,
xen uses descriptor_size to calculate a size of buffer to be allocated.
While UEFI specification is ambiguous in this point, it would be better
to address this issue proactively to maximize the compatibility with
existing efi applications.
With this patch, for example, xen.efi (and hence linux kernel) can be
started via bootefi without modification.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Following kernel's proposal for an arch-agnostic initrd loading
mechanism [1] let's implement the U-boot counterpart.
This new approach has a number of advantages compared to what we did up
to now. The file is loaded into memory only when requested limiting the
area of TOCTOU attacks. Users will be allowed to place the initramfs
file on any u-boot accessible partition instead of just the ESP one.
Finally this is an attempt of a generic interface across architectures
in the linux kernel so it makes sense to support that.
The file location is intentionally only supported as a config option
argument(CONFIG_EFI_INITRD_FILESPEC), in an effort to enhance security.
Although U-boot is not responsible for verifying the integrity of the
initramfs, we can enhance the offered security by only accepting a
built-in option, which will be naturally verified by UEFI Secure Boot.
This can easily change in the future if needed and configure that via ENV
or UEFI variable.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-efi/20200207202637.GA3464906@rani.riverdale.lan/T/#m4a25eb33112fab7a22faa0fd65d4d663209af32f
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
UEFI spec 2.8 errata A replaces the RuntimeServicesSupported variable
defined in UEFI spec 2.8 by the configuration table
EFI_RT_PROPERTIES_TABLE. So let's follow suit.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
At present dm/device.h includes the linux-compatible features. This
requires including linux/compat.h which in turn includes a lot of headers.
One of these is malloc.h which we thus end up including in every file in
U-Boot. Apart from the inefficiency of this, it is problematic for sandbox
which needs to use the system malloc() in some files.
Move the compatibility features into a separate header file.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
UEFI programs like GRUB make change terminal colors which requires support
for ANSI escape sequences.
Let CONFIG_EFI_LOADER=y imply CONFIG_VIDEO_ANSI.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Install the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL implementation for it's subsequent use by
the kernel for features like kaslr.
Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
