Add a macro to handle manually relocating a pointer. Update the iamge code
to use this to avoid needing #ifdefs.
This also fixes a bug where the 'done' flag was not set.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
We are not guaranteed to have the padding_pkcs_15_verify symbol since
commit 92c960bc1d ("lib: rsa: Remove #ifdefs from rsa.h"), and
commit 61416fe9df ("Kconfig: FIT_SIGNATURE should not select RSA_VERIFY")
The padding_algos only make sense with RSA verification, which can now
be disabled in lieu of ECDSA. In fact this will lead to build failures
because of the missing symbol mentioned earlier.
To resolve this, move the padding_algos to a linker list, with
declarations moved to rsa_verify.c. This is consistent with commit
6909edb4ce ("image: rsa: Move verification algorithm to a linker list")
One could argue that the added #ifdef USE_HOSTCC is ugly, and should
be hidden within the U_BOOT_PADDING_ALGO() macro. However, this would
be inconsistent with the "cryptos" list. This logic for was not
previously explored:
Without knowledge of the U_BOOT_PADDING_ALGO() macro, its use is
similar to something being declared. However, should #ifndef
USE_HOSTCC be part of the macro, it would not be obvious that it
behaves differently on host code and target code. Having the #ifndef
outside the macro makes this obvious.
Also, the #ifdef is not always necessary. For example ecda-verify
makes use of U_BOOT_CRYPTO_ALGO() without any accompanying #ifdefs.
The fundamental issue is a lack of separation of host and target code
in rsa_verify. Therefore, the declaration of a padding algo with the
external #ifdef is more readable and consistent.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Function pointers from crypto_algos array are relocated, when
NEEDS_MANUAL_RELOC is set. This relocation doesn't happen if the algo
is placed in a linker list. Implement this relocation.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Crytographic algorithms (currently RSA), are stored in linker lists.
The crypto_algos array is unused, so remove it, and any logic
associated with it.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Move the RSA verification crytpo_algo structure out of the
crypto_algos array, and into a linker list.
Although it appears we are adding an #ifdef to rsa-verify.c, the gains
outweigh this small inconvenience. This is because rsa_verify() is
defined differently based on #ifdefs. This change allows us to have
a single definition of rsa_verify().
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The purpose of this change is to enable crypto algorithms to be placed
in linker lists, rather than be declared as a static array. The goal
is to remove the crypto_algos array in a subsequent patch.
Create a new linker list named "cryptos", and search it when
image_get_crypto_algo() is invoked.
NOTE that adding support for manual relocation of crypto_algos within
linker lists is beyond the scope of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Remove any ifdefs in image-sig.c that were previously used to
differentiate from the host code. Note that all code dedicated to
relocating ->sign() and ->add_verify_data)_ can be safely removed,
as signing is not supported target-side.
NOTE that although it appears we are removing ecdsa256 support, this
is intentional. ecdsa_verify() is a no-op on the target, and is
currently only used by host code.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Drop the ENABLE and SUPPORT parts of this, which are redundant.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
mkimage supports rsa2048, and rsa4096 signatures. With newer silicon
now supporting hardware-accelerated ECDSA, it makes sense to expand
signing support to elliptic curves.
Implement host-side ECDSA signing and verification with libcrypto.
Device-side implementation of signature verification is beyond the
scope of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
rsa-checksum.c sontains the hash_calculate() implementations. Despite
the "rsa-" file prefix, this function is useful for other algorithms.
To prevent confusion, move this file to lib/, and rename it to
hash-checksum.c, to give it a more "generic" feel.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Move this out of the common header and include it only where needed. In
a number of cases this requires adding "struct udevice;" to avoid adding
another large header or in other cases replacing / adding missing header
files that had been pulled in, very indirectly. Finally, we have a few
cases where we did not need to include <asm/global_data.h> at all, so
remove that include.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
The current recommendation for best security practice from the US government
is to use SHA384 for TOP SECRET [1].
This patch adds support for SHA384 and SHA512 in the hash command, and also
allows FIT images to be hashed with these algorithms, and signed with
sha384,rsaXXXX and sha512,rsaXXXX
The SHA implementation is adapted from the linux kernel implementation.
[1] Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite
http://www.iad.gov/iad/programs/iad-initiatives/cnsa-suite.cfm
Signed-off-by: Reuben Dowle <reuben.dowle@4rf.com>
Introduce new configuration, CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY which will decouple building
RSA functions from FIT verification and allow for adding a RSA-based
signature verification for other file formats, in particular PE file
for UEFI secure boot.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Previously we would store NULL in info->padding and jump to an illegal
instruction if an unknown value for "padding" was specified in the
device tree.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Doyle <pdoyle@irobot.com>
We add the support of the padding pss for rsa signature.
This new padding is often recommended instead of pkcs-1.5.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The rsa signature use a padding algorithm. By default, we use the
padding pkcs-1.5. In order to add some new padding algorithm, we
add a padding framework to manage several padding algorithm.
The choice of the padding is done in the file .its.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack
when using the verified boot feature. The function fit_config_check_sig
has a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the
stack allocated array node_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass
the signature check when using verified boot.
This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Beckmann <konrad.beckmann@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The hashed-strings signature property includes two uint32_t values.
The first is unneeded as there should never be a start offset into the
strings region. The second, the size, is needed because the added
signature node appends to this region.
See tools/image-host.c, where a static 0 value is used for the offset.
Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This adds a new config value FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, which controls the
max size of a FIT header's totalsize field. The field is checked before
signature checks are applied to protect from reading past the intended
FIT regions.
This field is not part of the vboot signature so it should be sanity
checked. If the field is corrupted then the structure or string region
reads may have unintended behavior, such as reading from device memory.
A default value of 256MB is set and intended to support most max storage
sizes.
Suggested-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So we picked the
area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it
with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry. Since then, the
Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first
line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line)
and with slightly different comment styles than us.
In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility
and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.
This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared
license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag
contents. There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag
and have introduced one.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
The DT spec demands a unit-address in a node name to match the "reg"
property in that node. Newer dtc versions will throw warnings if this is
not the case.
Fix all occurences in the tree where node names were mentioned in
comments, to not give bad examples to the reader.
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Designated initializers are more readable because we do not
have to check the order in the struct definitions.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Remove the need to explicitly add SHA/RSA pairings. Invalid SHA/RSA
pairings will still fail on verify operations when the hash length is
longer than the key length.
Follow the same naming scheme "checksum,crytpo" without explicitly
defining the string.
Indirectly adds support for "sha1,rsa4096" signing/verification.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cut down on the repetition of algorithm information by defining separate
checksum and crypto structs. image_sig_algos are now simply pairs of
unique checksum and crypto algos.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Padding verification was done against static SHA/RSA pair arrays which
take up a lot of static memory, are mostly 0xff, and cannot be reused
for additional SHA/RSA pairings. The padding can be easily computed
according to PKCS#1v2.1 as:
EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
where PS is (emLen - tLen - 3) octets of 0xff and T is DER encoding
of the hash.
Store DER prefix in checksum_algo and create rsa_verify_padding
function to handle verification of a message for any SHA/RSA pairing.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Duda <aduda@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: aduda <aduda@meraki.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The signature for this macro has changed. Bring in the upstream version and
adjust U-Boot's usages to suit.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Update to drivers/power/pmic/palmas.c:
Signed-off-by: Keerthy <j-keerthy@ti.com>
Change-Id: I6cc9021339bfe686f9df21d61a1095ca2b3776e8
Currently the hash functions used in RSA are called directly from the sha1
and sha256 libraries. Change the RSA checksum library to use the progressive
hash API's registered with struct hash_algo. This will allow the checksum
library to use the hardware accelerated progressive hash API's once available.
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@freescale.com>
CC: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
(Fixed build error in am335x_boneblack_vboot due to duplicate CONFIG_DM)
Change-Id: Ic44279432f88d4e8594c6e94feb1cfcae2443a54
commit 18b06652cd "tools: include u-boot version of sha256.h"
unconditionally forced the sha256.h from u-boot to be used
for tools instead of the host version. This is fragile though
as it will also include the host version. Therefore move it
to include/u-boot to join u-boot/md5.h etc which were renamed
for the same reason.
cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeroen Hofstee <jeroen@myspectrum.nl>
It is more common to have 0 mean OK, and -ve mean error. Change this
function to work the same way to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
add host tool "fit_check_sign" which verifies, if a fit image is
signed correct.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Add support for sha256,rsa4096 signatures in u-boot.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: andreas@oetken.name
based on patch from andreas@oetken.name:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/294318/
commit message:
I currently need support for rsa-sha256 signatures in u-boot and found out that
the code for signatures is not very generic. Thus adding of different
hash-algorithms for rsa-signatures is not easy to do without copy-pasting the
rsa-code. I attached a patch for how I think it could be better and included
support for rsa-sha256. This is a fast first shot.
aditionally work:
- removed checkpatch warnings
- removed compiler warnings
- rebased against current head
Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: andreas@oetken.name
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection
against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a
FIT with the same signed images, but with the configuration changed such
that a different one is selected (mix and match attack). It is also possible
to substitute a signed image from an older FIT version into a newer FIT
(roll-back attack).
Add support for signing of FIT configurations using the libfdt's region
support.
Please see doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt for more information.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
RSA provides a public key encryption facility which is ideal for image
signing and verification.
Images are signed using a private key by mkimage. Then at run-time, the
images are verified using a private key.
This implementation uses openssl for the host part (mkimage). To avoid
bringing large libraries into the U-Boot binary, the RSA public key
is encoded using a simple numeric representation in the device tree.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Add support for signing images using a new signature node. The process
is handled by fdt_add_verification_data() which now takes parameters to
provide the keys and related information.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
