Commit graph

7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael van der Westhuizen
e0f2f15534 Implement generalised RSA public exponents for verified boot
Remove the verified boot limitation that only allows a single
RSA public exponent of 65537 (F4).  This change allows use with
existing PKI infrastructure and has been tested with HSM-based
PKI.

Change the configuration OF tree format to store the RSA public
exponent as a 64 bit integer and implement backward compatibility
for verified boot configuration trees without this extra field.

Parameterise vboot_test.sh to test different public exponents.

Mathematics and other hard work by Andrew Bott.

Tested with the following public exponents: 3, 5, 17, 257, 39981,
50457, 65537 and 4294967297.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Bott <Andrew.Bott@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Wishart <Andrew.Wishart@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Piercy <Neil.Piercy@ipaccess.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael van der Westhuizen <michael@smart-africa.com>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2014-08-09 11:17:01 -04:00
Simon Glass
ce1400f694 Enhance fit_check_sign to check all images
At present this tool only checks the configuration signing. Have it also
look at each of the images in the configuration and confirm that they
verify.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de> (v1)
2014-06-19 11:19:02 -04:00
Heiko Schocher
21d29f7f9f bootm: make use of legacy image format configurable
make the use of legacy image format configurable through
the config define CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.

When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check
the legacy image format should be disabled. Therefore introduce
this new define and enable legacy image format if CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
is not set. If CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is set disable per default
the legacy image format.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Lars Steubesand <lars.steubesand@philips.com>
Cc: Mike Pearce <mike@kaew.be>
Cc: Wolfgang Denk <wd@denx.de>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@ti.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2014-06-05 14:44:56 -04:00
Heiko Schocher
29a23f9d6c tools, fit_check_sign: verify a signed fit image
add host tool "fit_check_sign" which verifies, if a fit image is
signed correct.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2014-03-21 16:40:38 -04:00
Heiko Schocher
646257d1f4 rsa: add sha256-rsa2048 algorithm
based on patch from andreas@oetken.name:

http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/294318/
commit message:
I currently need support for rsa-sha256 signatures in u-boot and found out that
the code for signatures is not very generic. Thus adding of different
hash-algorithms for rsa-signatures is not easy to do without copy-pasting the
rsa-code. I attached a patch for how I think it could be better and included
support for rsa-sha256. This is a fast first shot.

aditionally work:
- removed checkpatch warnings
- removed compiler warnings
- rebased against current head

Signed-off-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Cc: andreas@oetken.name
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2014-03-21 16:39:34 -04:00
Simon Glass
4d0985295b image: Add support for signing of FIT configurations
While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection
against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a
FIT with the same signed images, but with the configuration changed such
that a different one is selected (mix and match attack). It is also possible
to substitute a signed image from an older FIT version into a newer FIT
(roll-back attack).

Add support for signing of FIT configurations using the libfdt's region
support.

Please see doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt for more information.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2013-06-26 10:18:56 -04:00
Simon Glass
3e569a6b1e image: Add signing infrastructure
Add a structure to describe an algorithm which can sign and (later) verify
images.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2013-06-26 10:18:56 -04:00