Commit graph

48 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Simon Glass
7e5f460ec4 global: Convert simple_strtoul() with hex to hextoul()
It is a pain to have to specify the value 16 in each call. Add a new
hextoul() function and update the code to use it.

Add a proper comment to simple_strtoul() while we are here.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2021-08-02 13:32:14 -04:00
Breno Lima
e449e2d405 imx: hab: Fix build warnings in 32-bit targets
When building 32-bit targets with CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT and DEBUG enabled
the following warnings are displayed:

arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c:840:41: warning: format '%lx' expects argument \
of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'uint32_t \
{aka unsigned int}' [-Wformat=]
   printf("HAB check target 0x%08x-0x%08lx fail\n",
                                     ~~~~^
                                     %08x
          ddr_start, ddr_start + bytes);

arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c:845:45: warning: format '%x' expects argument \
of type 'unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'ulong \
{aka long unsigned int}' [-Wformat=]
  printf("\nivt_offset = 0x%x, ivt addr = 0x%x\n", ivt_offset, ivt_addr);
                                            ~^
                                            %lx

Fix warnings by providing the correct data type.

Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Breno Lima
58f75efeaf mx7ulp: hab: Add hab_status command for HABv4 M4 boot
When booting in low power or dual boot modes the M4 binary is
authenticated by the M4 ROM code.

Add an option in hab_status command so users can retrieve M4 HAB
failure and warning events.

=> hab_status m4

   Secure boot disabled

   HAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66
   No HAB Events Found!

Add command documentation in mx6_mx7_secure_boot.txt guide.

As HAB M4 API cannot be called from A7 core the code is parsing
the M4 HAB persistent memory region. The HAB persistent memory
stores HAB events, public keys and others HAB related information.

The HAB persistent memory region addresses and sizes can be found
in AN12263 "HABv4 RVT Guidelines and Recommendations".

Reviewed-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Breno Lima
f217470b39 imx: hab: Check if IVT header is HABv4
The HABv4 implementation in ROM checks if HAB major version
in IVT header is 4.x.

The current implementation in hab.c code is only validating
HAB v4.0 and HAB v4.1 and may be incompatible with newer
HABv4 versions.

Modify verify_ivt_header() function to align with HABv4
implementation in ROM code.

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Utkarsh Gupta
cd8355664d imx: hab: Display All HAB events via hab_status command
Add ability for hab_status command to show All HAB events and not just
HAB failure events

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Breno Lima
1d756add3c imx: hab: Enable hab.c to authenticate additional images in open configuration
Currently it's not possible to authenticate additional boot images in HAB
open configuration.

The hab.c code is checking if the SEC_CONFIG[1] fuse is programmed prior
to calling the hab_authenticate_image() API function. Users cannot check
if their additional boot images has been correctly signed prior to closing
their device.

Enable hab.c to authenticate additional boot images in open mode so HAB
events can be retrieved through get_hab_status() function.

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Ye Li
1dc295148a hab: Change calling to ROM API failsafe
Modify to use hab_rvt_failsafe function for failsafe ROM API, not
directly call its ROM address. This function will wrap the sip call for iMX8M
platforms.

Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Utkarsh Gupta
fe8acf556c imx: HAB: Validate IVT before authenticating image
Calling csf_is_valid() with an un-signed image may lead to data abort
as the CSF pointer could be pointing to a garbage address when accessed
in HAB_HDR_LEN(*(const struct hab_hdr *)(ulong)ivt_initial->csf).

Authenticate image from DDR location 0x80800000...
Check CSF for Write Data command before authenticating image
data abort
pc : [<fff5494c>]          lr : [<fff54910>]
reloc pc : [<8780294c>]    lr : [<87802910>]
sp : fdf45dc8  ip : 00000214     fp : 00000000
r10: fffb6170  r9 : fdf4fec0     r8 : 00722020
r7 : 80f20000  r6 : 80800000     r5 : 80800000  r4 : 00720000
r3 : 17a5aca3  r2 : 00000000     r1 : 80f2201f  r0 : 00000019
Flags: NzcV  IRQs off  FIQs off  Mode SVC_32
Resetting CPU ...

resetting ...

To avoid such errors during authentication process, validate IVT structure
by calling validate_ivt function which checks the following values in an IVT:

IVT_HEADER = 0x4X2000D1
ENTRY != 0x0
RES1 = 0x0
DCD = 0x0       /* Recommended */
SELF != 0x0     /* Absoulute address of IVT */
CSF != 0x0
RES2 = 0x0

This commit also checks if Image's start address is 4 byte aligned.

commit "0088d127 MLK-14945 HAB: Check if IVT valid before authenticating image"
removed as this patch addresses the issue.

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Peng Fan
507da978fa imx: HAB: Update hab codes to support ARM64 and i.MX8M
There are some changes to support ARM64 i.MX8M platform in this patches:
1. The hab_rvt base and function vectors are different as i.MX6/7

2. Need to bypass an workaround for i.MX6 to fix problem in MMU.

3. The x18 register needed save & restore before calling any HAB API. According
   to ARM procedure call spec, the x18 is caller saved when it is used as
   temporary register. So calling HAB API may scratch this register, and
   cause crash once accessing the gd pointer.

   On ARMv7, the r9 is callee saved when it is used as variable register. So
   no need to save & restore it.

4. Add SEC_CONFIG fuse for iMX8M

When current EL is not EL3, the direct calling to HAB will fail because
CAAM/SNVS can't initialize at non-secure mode. In this case, we use
SIP call to run the HAB in ATF.

Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Ye Li
c428ca80c2 imx: hab: Add function to authenticate kernel image
When loading kernel image, the image size is parsed from header, so it
does not include the CSF and IVT.

Add back the authenticate_image function to wrap the imx_hab_authenticate_image
with calculating IVT offset and full image size.

Signed-off-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
2021-04-08 09:18:29 +02:00
Simon Glass
0914011310 command: Remove the cmd_tbl_t typedef
We should not use typedefs in U-Boot. They cannot be used as forward
declarations which means that header files must include the full header to
access them.

Drop the typedef and rename the struct to remove the _s suffix which is
now not useful.

This requires quite a few header-file additions.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
2020-05-18 18:36:55 -04:00
Sjoerd Simons
b4eca2d787 imx :hab: Add hab version command
THe RVT data includes a major and minor version in its header
parameter. Add a new command to print this out.

Signed-off-by: Sjoerd Simons <sjoerd.simons@collabora.co.uk>
2019-10-14 09:31:41 +02:00
Tom Rini
c76c93a3d5 configs: Rename CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY to CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT
The name CONFIG_LEGACY_IMAGE_FORMAT reads slightly better along with
allowing us to avoid a rather nasty Kbuild/Kconfig issue down the line
with CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY).  In a few places outside of
cmd/ switch to using CONFIG_IS_ENABLED() to test what is set.

Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
2019-07-11 14:11:18 -04:00
Breno Matheus Lima
5760069ae8 mx6sl: hab: Fix pu_irom_mmu_enabled address
According to hab.c code we have to notify the ROM code if the MMU is
enabled or not. This is achieved by setting the "pu_irom_mmu_enabled"
to 0x1.

The current address in hab.c code is wrong for i.MX6SL, according to ROM
map file the correct address is 0x00901c60.

As we are writing in the wrong address the ROM code is not flushing the
caches when needed, and the following HAB event is observed in certain
scenarios:

--------- HAB Event 1 -----------------
event data:
        0xdb 0x00 0x14 0x41 0x33 0x18 0xc0 0x00
        0xca 0x00 0x0c 0x00 0x01 0xc5 0x00 0x00
        0x00 0x00 0x07 0xe4

STS = HAB_FAILURE (0x33)
RSN = HAB_INV_SIGNATURE (0x18)
CTX = HAB_CTX_COMMAND (0xC0)
ENG = HAB_ENG_ANY (0x00)

Update MX6SL_PU_IROM_MMU_EN_VAR to address this issue.

Reported-by: Frank Zhang <frank.zhang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
2019-06-27 14:10:40 +02:00
Breno Matheus Lima
b2ca8907d9 imx: hab: Convert non-NULL IVT DCD pointer warning to an error
The following NXP application notes and manual recommend to ensure the
IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB API authenticate_image()
function:

- AN12263: HABv4 RVT Guidelines and Recommendations
- AN4581: Secure Boot on i.MX50, i.MX53, i.MX 6 and i.MX7 Series using
  HABv4
- CST docs: High Assurance Boot Version 4 Application Programming
  Interface Reference Manual

Commit ca89df7dd4 ("imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning")
converted DCD non-NULL error to warning due to the lack of documentation
at the time of first patch submission. We have warned U-Boot users since
v2018.03, and it makes sense now to follow the NXP recommendation to
ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null.

DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by
the SoC ROM. Starting in HAB v4.3.7 the HAB code  will generate an error
if a DCD pointer is present in an image being authenticated by calling the
HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will process and run DCD if it is
present, and this could lead to an incorrect authentication boot flow.

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
2019-01-28 12:45:45 +01:00
Parthiban Nallathambi
ea91031b22 imx: hab: extend hab_auth_img to calculate ivt_offset
Current implementation of hab_auth_img command needs ivt_offset to
authenticate the image. But ivt header is placed at the end of image
date after padding.

This leaves the usage of hab_auth_img command to fixed size or static
offset for ivt header. New function "get_image_ivt_offset" is introduced
to find the ivt offset during runtime. The case conditional check in this
function is same as boot_get_kernel in common/bootm.c

With this variable length image e.g. FIT image with any random size can
have IVT at the end and ivt_offset option can be left optional

Can be used as "hab_auth_img $loadaddr $filesize" from u-boot script

Signed-off-by: Parthiban Nallathambi <pn@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
2019-01-01 14:12:18 +01:00
Tom Rini
83d290c56f SPDX: Convert all of our single license tags to Linux Kernel style
When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from.  So we picked the
area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it
with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry.  Since then, the
Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first
line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line)
and with slightly different comment styles than us.

In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility
and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.

This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared
license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag
contents.  There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag
and have introduced one.

Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
2018-05-07 09:34:12 -04:00
Tom Rini
ebca902aeb Merge git://git.denx.de/u-boot-imx
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
2018-04-15 08:43:50 -04:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
49e6242673 imx: hab: Provide hab_auth_img_or_fail command
This patch adds hab_auth_img_or_fail() a command line function that
encapsulates a common usage of authenticate and failover, namely if
authenticate image fails, then drop to BootROM USB recovery mode.

For secure-boot systems, this type of locked down behavior is important to
ensure no unsigned images can be run.

It's possible to script this logic but, when done over and over again the
environment starts get very complex and repetitive, reducing that script
repetition down to a command line function makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
2018-04-15 11:44:13 +02:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
ca89df7dd4 imx: hab: Convert DCD non-NULL error to warning
commit 8c4037a09a ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.") makes the DCD field being NULL a
dependency.

This change though will break loading and executing of existing pre-signed
binaries on a u-boot update i.e. if this change is deployed on a board you
will be forced to redo all images on that board to NULL out the DCD.

There is no prior guidance from NXP that the DCD must be NULL similarly
public guidance on usage of the HAB doesn't call out this NULL dependency
(see boundary devices link).

Since later SoCs will reject a non-NULL DCD there's no reason to make a
NULL DCD a requirement, however if there is an actual dependency for later
SoCs the appropriate fix would be to do SoC version checking.

Earlier SoCs are capable (and happy) to authenticate images with non-NULL
DCDs, we should not be forcing this change on downstream users -
particularly if it means those users now must rewrite their build systems
and/or redeploy signed images in the field.

Fixes: 8c4037a09a ("imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior
to calling HAB authenticate function.")

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Link: https://boundarydevices.com/high-assurance-boot-hab-dummies
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-03-13 07:51:32 -04:00
Breno Lima
7b889baf29 arm: imx: hab: Define HAB_RVT_BASE according to the processor version
Currently the following devices are using a different definition for ROM
Vector Table addresses:

- i.MX6DQP =  All rev
- i.MX6DQ >= rev 1.5
- i.MX6SDL >= rev 1.2

There is no need to create a new RVT macros since the only update were the
RVT base address. Remove HAB_RVT_*_NEW macros and define a new RVT base
address.

More details about RVT base address can be found on processors Reference
Manual and in the following documents:

EB803: i.MX 6Dual/6Quad Applications Processor Silicon Revision 1.2 to 1.3
Comparison

EB804: i.MX 6Solo/6DualLite Application Processor Silicon Revision 1.1
to 1.2/1.3 Comparison

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-02-22 14:36:06 +01:00
Utkarsh Gupta
20fa1dd386 imx: hab: Check if CSF contains deprecated commands
Write, Check and Set MID commands have been deprecated from the Code
Signing Tool (CST) v2.3.3 and will not be implemented in newer versions
of HAB, hence the following features are no longer available:

- Write Data
- Clear Mask
- Set Mask
- Check All Clear
- Check All Set
- Check Any Clear
- Check Any Set
- Set MID

The inappropriate use of Write Data command may lead to an incorrect
authentication boot flow. Since no specific application has been identified
that requires the use of any of these features, it is highly recommended to
add this check.

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-02-22 14:35:57 +01:00
Utkarsh Gupta
ed286bc80e imx: hab: Check if CSF is valid before authenticating image
For proper authentication the HAB code must check if the CSF is valid.
Users must call the csf_is_valid() function to parse the CSF prior to
authenticating any additional images. The function will return a failure
if any of the following invalid conditions are met:

- CSF pointer is NULL
- CSF Header does not exist
- CSF does not lie within the image bounds
- CSF command length zero

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-02-22 14:35:42 +01:00
Utkarsh Gupta
8c4037a09a imx: hab: Ensure the IVT DCD pointer is Null prior to calling HAB authenticate function.
DCD commands should only be present in the initial boot image loaded by
the SoC ROM. DCD should not be present in images that will be verified
by software using HAB RVT authentication APIs. Newer versions of HAB
will generate an error if a DCD pointer is present in an image being
authenticated by calling the HAB RVT API. Older versions of HAB will
process and run DCD if it is present, and this could lead to an incorrect
authentication boot flow.

It is highly recommended this check is in place to ensure additional HAB
verified images do not include a DCD table.

Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-02-22 14:35:32 +01:00
Breno Lima
669f2d189e imx: hab: Keep CAAM clock enabled after authenticating additional images
Currently it is not possible to run CMD_DEK on i.MX SPL targets:

=> dek_blob 0x12000000 0x12001000 128

The system hangs after running dek_blob because the CAAM clock is being
disabled by the HAB code. There is no need to disable CAAM clock after
authenticating additional boot images, thus keep CAAM clock enabled to
address this issue.

Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-02-22 14:35:20 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
9587b0d611 arm: imx: hab: Add hab_failsafe console command
hab_failsafe when called puts the part into BootROM recovery mode.
This will allow u-boot scripts to script the dropping down into recovery
mode.

=> hab_failsafe

Shows the i.MX7 appear as "hiddev0,hidraw5: USB HID v1.10 Device [Freescale
SemiConductor Inc  SP Blank ULT1] " in a Linux dmesg thus allowing download
of a new image via the BootROM USB download protocol routine.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
317956e82c arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_failsafe
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for
hab_rvt_check_failsafe for BootROM code using the older BootROM address
layout - in my test case the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks
will just do nothing and there's definitely a TODO to implement that extra
functionality on the alternative BootROM API.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
07eefaf16e arm: imx: hab: Make imx_hab_is_enabled global
It will be helpful to boot commands to know if the HAB is enabled. Export
imx_hab_is_enabled() now to facilitate further work with this data-point in
a secure-boot context.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
4467ae6c28 arm: imx: hab: Make authenticate_image() return zero on open boards
The BootROM will not successfully process a HAB image passed by u-boot
unless the board has been set into locked mode. Some of the existing usages
of authenticate_image() expect and rely on unlocked boards doing the
following

1. Not calling into the BootROM authenticate_image() callback
2. Returning a pass status for authenticate_image() calls anyway

A previous patch removed the necessity to call into imx_hab_is_enabled()
twice. This patch ensures the reliance on authenticate_image() returning
zero is maintained.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
e5b30e4ac1 arm: imx: hab: Rename is_hab_enabled imx_hab_is_enabled
Understanding if the HAB is enabled is something that we want to
interrogate and report on outside of the HAB layer. First step to that is
renaming the relevant function to match the previously introduced external
naming convention imx_hab_function()

The name imx_hab_is_hab_enabled() is a tautology. A more logical name is
imx_hab_is_enabled().

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
57f6548606 arm: imx: hab: Prefix authenticate_image with imx_hab
Tidy up the HAB namespace a bit by prefixing external functions with
imx_hab. All external facing functions past this point will be prefixed in
the same way to make the fact we are doing IMX HAB activities clear from
reading the code. authenticate_image() could mean anything
imx_hab_authenticate_image() is on the other hand very explicit.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
58bebfb753 arm: imx: hab: Make internal functions and data static
There is no need to export these functions and data structures externally.
Make them all static now.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
2c6c68d282 arm: imx: hab: Print HAB event log only after calling ROM
The current flow of authenticate_image() will print the HAB event log even
if we reject an element of the IVT header before ever calling into the ROM.
This can be confusing.

This patch changes the flow of the code so that the HAB event log is only
printed out if we have called into the ROM and received some sort of status
code.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
b7c3cae7d3 arm: imx: hab: Add a hab_rvt_check_target to image auth
Add a hab_rvt_check_target() step to authenticate_image() as a sanity
check for the target memory region authenticate_image() will run over,
prior to making the BootROM authentication callback itself.

This check is recommended by the HAB documentation so it makes sense to
adhere to the guidance and perform that check as directed.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
c0a55b7344 arm: imx: hab: Implement hab_rvt_check_target
This patch implements the basic callback hooks for hab_rvt_check_target()
for BootROM code using the older BootROM address layout - in my test case
the i.MX7. Code based on new BootROM callbacks will just have HAB_SUCCESS
as a result code. Adding support for the new BootROM callbacks is a TODO.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
824ef302f3 arm: imx: hab: Print additional IVT elements during debug
This patch enables printout of the IVT entry, dcd and csf data fields.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
fd15fe5f84 arm: imx: hab: Print CSF based on IVT descriptor
The IVT gives the absolute address of the CSF. There is no requirement for
the CSF to be located adjacent to the IVT so lets use the address provided
in the IVT header instead of the hard-coded fixed CSF offset currently in
place.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
04099e9ced arm: imx: hab: Only call ROM once headers are verified
Previous patches added IVT header verification steps. We shouldn't call
hab_rvt_entry() until we have done the basic header verification steps.

This patch changes the time we make the hab_rvt_entry() call so that it
only takes place if we are happy with the IVT header sanity checks.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
e59eb9e00f arm: imx: hab: Verify IVT self matches calculated address
The IVT is a self-describing structure which contains a self field. The
self field is the absolute physical base address the IVT ought to be at in
memory. Use the IVT self field to validate the calculated ivt_addr bugging
out if the two values differ.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
49b6d05882 arm: imx: hab: Add IVT header verification
The IVT header contains a magic number, fixed length and one of two version
identifiers. Validate these settings before doing anything with a putative
IVT binary.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
c5800b2541 arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters
u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes

- addr - image hex address
- offset - hex offset of IVT in the image

but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats
the second 'offset' parameter as an image length.

Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end
of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4.

This patch fixes this situation by

1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img
   - addr   : image hex address
   - length : total length of the image
   - offset : offset of IVT from addr

2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in
   arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass
   addr, length and IVT offset respectively.

This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified
in the help text and should still allow existing code to work.

It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended
to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example.

Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the
BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images
made by mkimage via HAB.

This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will
focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not
mandated to live at the end of a .imx image.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
08a81cad2f arm: imx: hab: Move CSF_PAD_SIZE to hab.h
CSF_PAD_SIZE should be defined in hab.h, move it to that location now.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
191d8bd509 arm: imx: hab: Move IVT_SIZE to hab.h
The size of the IVT header should be defined in hab.h move it there now.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
53c8a510e7 arm: imx: hab: Optimise flow of authenticate_image on hab_entry fail
The current code disjoins an entire block of code on hab_entry pass/fail
resulting in a large chunk of authenticate_image being offset to the right.

Fix this by checking hab_entry() pass/failure and exiting the function
directly if in an error state.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
d2c61800fc arm: imx: hab: Optimise flow of authenticate_image on is_enabled fail
There is no need to call is_enabled() twice in authenticate_image - it does
nothing but add an additional layer of indentation.

We can check for is_enabled() at the start of the function and return the
result code directly.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
9535b3975f arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image result code
authenticate_image returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. That result
code is mapped directly to the result code for the command line function
hab_auth_img - which means when hab_auth_img succeeds it is returning
CMD_RET_FAILURE (1) instead of CMD_RET_SUCCESS (0).

This patch fixes this behaviour by making authenticate_image() return 0 for
success and 1 for failure. Both users of authenticate_image() as a result
have some minimal churn. The upshot is once done when hab_auth_img is
called from the command line we set $? in the standard way for scripting
functions to act on.

Fixes: 36c1ca4d46 ("imx: Support i.MX6 High Assurance Boot
authentication")

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Bryan O'Donoghue
adbb051f08 arm: imx: hab: Make authenticate_image return int
Both usages of authenticate_image treat the result code as a simple binary.
The command line usage of authenticate_image directly returns the result
code of authenticate_image as a success/failure code.

Right now when calling hab_auth_img and test the result code in a shell a
passing hab_auth_img will appear to the shell as a fail.

The first step in fixing this behaviour is to fix-up the result code return
by authenticate_image() itself, subsequent patches fix the interpretation
of authenticate_image so that zero will return CMD_RET_SUCCESS and non-zero
will return CMD_RET_FAILURE.

The first step is fixing the return type in authenticate_image() so do that
now.

Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Cc: Albert Aribaud <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Cc: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Matheus Lima <brenomatheus@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
2018-01-14 17:26:30 +01:00
Stefano Babic
552a848e4f imx: reorganize IMX code as other SOCs
Change is consistent with other SOCs and it is in preparation
for adding SOMs. SOC's related files are moved from cpu/ to
mach-imx/<SOC>.

This change is also coherent with the structure in kernel.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Babic <sbabic@denx.de>

CC: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
CC: Akshay Bhat <akshaybhat@timesys.com>
CC: Ken Lin <Ken.Lin@advantech.com.tw>
CC: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut@gmail.com>
CC: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
CC: "Sébastien Szymanski" <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
CC: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
CC: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
CC: Patrick Bruenn <p.bruenn@beckhoff.com>
CC: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com>
CC: Nikita Kiryanov <nikita@compulab.co.il>
CC: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
CC: "Eric Bénard" <eric@eukrea.com>
CC: Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com>
CC: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com>
CC: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
CC: Adrian Alonso <adrian.alonso@nxp.com>
CC: Alison Wang <b18965@freescale.com>
CC: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
CC: Martin Donnelly <martin.donnelly@ge.com>
CC: Marcin Niestroj <m.niestroj@grinn-global.com>
CC: Lukasz Majewski <lukma@denx.de>
CC: Adam Ford <aford173@gmail.com>
CC: "Albert ARIBAUD (3ADEV)" <albert.aribaud@3adev.fr>
CC: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
CC: Soeren Moch <smoch@web.de>
CC: Richard Hu <richard.hu@technexion.com>
CC: Wig Cheng <wig.cheng@technexion.com>
CC: Vanessa Maegima <vanessa.maegima@nxp.com>
CC: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com>
CC: Stefan Agner <stefan.agner@toradex.com>
CC: Markus Niebel <Markus.Niebel@tq-group.com>
CC: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
CC: Francesco Montefoschi <francesco.montefoschi@udoo.org>
CC: Jaehoon Chung <jh80.chung@samsung.com>
CC: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
CC: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
CC: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de>
CC: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
CC: "Andrew F. Davis" <afd@ti.com>
CC: "Łukasz Majewski" <l.majewski@samsung.com>
CC: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@st.com>
CC: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org>
CC: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
CC: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
CC: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
CC: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
CC: "Álvaro Fernández Rojas" <noltari@gmail.com>
CC: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
CC: Xiaoliang Yang <xiaoliang.yang@nxp.com>
CC: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
CC: George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com>
CC: Sven Ebenfeld <sven.ebenfeld@gmail.com>
CC: Filip Brozovic <fbrozovic@gmail.com>
CC: Petr Kulhavy <brain@jikos.cz>
CC: Eric Nelson <eric@nelint.com>
CC: Bai Ping <ping.bai@nxp.com>
CC: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com>
CC: Sanchayan Maity <maitysanchayan@gmail.com>
CC: Lokesh Vutla <lokeshvutla@ti.com>
CC: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@st.com>
CC: Gary Bisson <gary.bisson@boundarydevices.com>
CC: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
CC: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
2017-07-12 10:17:44 +02:00
Renamed from arch/arm/imx-common/hab.c (Browse further)