Drop the Kconfigs which are not used and all references to them. In
particular, this drops CONFIG_VIDEO to avoid confusion and allow us to
eventually rename CONFIG_DM_VIDEO to CONFIG_VIDEO.
Also drop the prototype for video_get_info_str() which is no-longer used.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jason Liu <jason.hui.liu@nxp.com>
Up to now the initrddump.efi application has drained the input after
showing the prompt. This works for humans but leads to problems when
automating testing. If the input is drained, this should be done before
showing the prompt.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
initrddump.efi uses colored output and clear the screen. This is not
helpful for integration into Python tests. Allow specifying 'nocolor' in
the load option data to suppress color output and clearing the screen.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The tools dtbdump.efi and initrddump.efi are useful for Python testing even
if CONFIG_EFI_SELFTEST=n.
Don't clear the screen as it is incompatible with Python testing.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The block IO protocol may be installed on any handle. We should make
no assumption about the structure the handle points to.
efi_disk_is_system_part() makes an illegal widening cast from a handle
to a struct efi_disk_obj. Remove the function.
Fixes: Fixes: 41fd506842 ("efi_loader: disk: add efi_disk_is_system_part()")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The boot manager must support loading from boot options using a short-form
device-path, e.g. one where the first element is a hard drive media path.
See '3.1.2 Load Options Processing' in UEFI specification version 2.9.
Fixes: 0e074d1239 ("efi_loader: carve out efi_load_image_from_file()")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Let function efi_dp_find_obj() additionally check if a given protocol is
installed on the handle relating to the device-path.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
efi_dp_find_obj() should not return any handle with a partially matching
device path but the handle with the maximum matching device path.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Starting UEFI Spec 2.8 we must fill in the variable attributes when
GetVariable() returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL and Attributes is non-NULL.
This code was written with 2.7 in mind so let's move the code around a
bit and fill in the attributes EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL is returned
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
InstallProtocolInterface() is called with a pointer to the protocol GUID.
There is not guarantee that the memory used by the caller for the protocol
GUID stays allocated. To play it safe the GUID should be copied to U-Boot's
internal structures.
Reported-by: Joerie de Gram <j.de.gram@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
UEFI specification requires that 5 minutes watchdog timer is
armed before the firmware's boot manager invokes an EFI boot option.
This watchdog timer is updated as follows, according to the
UEFI specification.
1) The EFI Image may reset or disable the watchdog timer as needed.
2) If control is returned to the firmware's boot manager,
the watchdog timer must be disabled.
3) On successful completion of EFI_BOOT_SERVICES.ExitBootServices()
the watchdog timer is disabled.
1) is up to the EFI image, and 3) is already implemented in U-Boot.
This patch implements 2), the watchdog is disabled when control is
returned to U-Boot.
In addition, current implementation arms the EFI watchdog at only
the first "bootefi" invocation. The EFI watchdog must be armed
in every EFI boot option invocation.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Add a cold reset soon after processing capsule update on disk.
This is required in UEFI specification 2.9 Section 8.5.5
"Delivery of Capsules via file on Mass Storage device" as;
In all cases that a capsule is identified for processing the system is
restarted after capsule processing is completed.
This also reports the result of each capsule update so that the user can
notice that the capsule update has been succeeded or not from console log.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Since the efi_update_capsule() represents the UpdateCapsule() runtime
service, it has to handle the capsule flags and update ESRT. However
the capsule-on-disk doesn't need to care about such things.
Thus, the capsule-on-disk should use the efi_capsule_update_firmware()
directly instead of calling efi_update_capsule().
This means the roles of the efi_update_capsule() and capsule-on-disk
are different. We have to keep the efi_update_capsule() for providing
runtime service API at boot time.
Suggested-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
The general rule of accepting or rejecting an image is
1. Is the sha256 of the image in dbx
2. Is the image signed with a certificate that's found in db and
not in dbx
3. The image carries a cert which is signed by a cert in db (and
not in dbx) and the image can be verified against the former
4. Is the sha256 of the image in db
For example SHIM is signed by "CN=Microsoft Windows UEFI Driver Publisher",
which is issued by "CN=Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011", which in it's
turn is issued by "CN=Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root".
The latter is a self-signed CA certificate and with our current implementation
allows shim to execute if we insert it in db.
However it's the CA cert in the middle of the chain which usually ends up
in the system's db. pkcs7_verify_one() might or might not return the root
certificate for a given chain. But when verifying executables in UEFI, the
trust anchor can be in the middle of the chain, as long as that certificate
is present in db. Currently we only allow this check on self-signed
certificates, so let's remove that check and allow all certs to try a
match an entry in db.
Open questions:
- Does this break any aspect of variable authentication since
efi_signature_verify() is used on those as well?
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
The EFI spec allows for images to carry multiple signatures. Currently
we don't adhere to the verification process for such images.
The spec says:
"Multiple signatures are allowed to exist in the binary's certificate
table (as per PE/COFF Section "Attribute Certificate Table"). Only one
hash or signature is required to be present in db in order to pass
validation, so long as neither the SHA-256 hash of the binary nor any
present signature is reflected in dbx."
With our current implementation signing the image with two certificates
and inserting both of them in db and one of them dbx doesn't always reject
the image. The rejection depends on the order that the image was signed
and the order the certificates are read (and checked) in db.
While at it move the sha256 hash verification outside the signature
checking loop, since it only needs to run once per image and get simplify
the logic for authenticating an unsigned imahe using sha256 hashes.
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
When we have the block descriptor we can simply access the device. Drop
the unnecessary function call.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Use this function rather than following the pointers, since it is there
for this purpose.
Add the uclass name to the debug call at the end of dp_fill() since it is
quite useful.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
When loading an EFI binary via the UART we assign a UART device path to it.
But we lack a handle with that device path.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The UEFI specification concerning Uart() device path nodes has been
clarified:
Parity and stop bits can either both use keywords or both use
numbers but numbers and keywords should not be mixed.
Let's go for keywords as this is what EDK II does. For illegal
values fall back to numbers.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The printing of a file path node must properly handle:
* odd length of the device path node
* UTF-16 character only partially contained in device path node
* buffer overflow due to very long file path
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
At present we use wide characters for unicode but this is not necessary.
Change the code to use the 'u' literal instead. This helps to fix build
warnings for sandbox on rpi.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
We don't have to recalculate the image hash every time we check against a
new db/dbx entry. So let's add a flag forcing it to run once since we only
support sha256 hashes
Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
A mix of signatures and hashes in db doesn't always work as intended.
Currently if the digest algorithm is not explicitly set to sha256 we
stop walking the security database and reject the image.
That's problematic in case we find and try to check a signature before
inspecting the sha256 hash. If the image is unsigned we will reject it
even if the digest matches.
Since we no longer reject the image on unknown algorithms add an explicit
check and reject the image if any other hash algorithm apart from sha256
is detected on dbx.
Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
This adds support for new RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL to
communicate the boot hart ID to bootloader/kernel on RISC-V
UEFI platforms.
The specification of the protocol is hosted at:
https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-uefi
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
The current EFI implementation confuses pointers and addresses. Normally
we can get away with this but in the case of sandbox it causes failures.
Despite the fact that efi_allocate_pages() returns a u64, it is actually
a pointer, not an address. Add special handling to avoid a crash when
running 'bootefi hello'.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Documentation:
* describe printf() format codes
UEFI
* enable more algorithms for UEFI image verification, e.g. SHA256-RSA2048
General
* simplify printing short texts for GUIDs
* provide a unit test for printing GUIDs
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Merge tag 'efi-2022-04-rc1-2' of https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for efi-2022-04-rc1-2
Documentation:
* describe printf() format codes
UEFI
* enable more algorithms for UEFI image verification, e.g. SHA256-RSA2048
General
* simplify printing short texts for GUIDs
* provide a unit test for printing GUIDs
For printing GUIDs with macro EFI_ENTRY use %pUs instead of %pUl to provide
readable debug output.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
If variable dfu_alt_info is not defined duplicate messages are displayed.
=> efidebug boot dump
Scanning disk mmc2.blk...
Scanning disk mmc1.blk...
Scanning disk mmc0.blk...
Found 3 disks
No EFI system partition
"dfu_alt_info" env variable not defined!
Probably dfu_alt_info not defined
"dfu_alt_info" env variable not defined!
Probably dfu_alt_info not defined
Remove the 'Probably dfu_alt_info not defined' message.
Instead write a warning if the variable contains no entities.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
U-Boot, in some occasions, injects a 'kaslr-seed' property on the /chosen
node. That would be problematic in case we want to measure the DTB we
install in the configuration table, since it would change across reboots.
The Linux kernel EFI-stub completely ignores it and only relies on
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL for it's own randomness needs (i.e the randomization
of the physical placement of the kernel). In fact it (blindly) overwrites
the existing seed if the protocol is installed. However it still uses it
for randomizing it's virtual placement.
So let's get rid of it in the presence of the RNG protocol.
It's worth noting that TPMs also provide an RNG. So if we tweak our
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL slightly and install the protocol when a TPM device
is present the 'kaslr-seed' property will always be removed, allowing
us to reliably measure our DTB.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Kettenis <kettenis@openbsd.org>
Currently we allow and explicitly check a single shared page with
StandAloneMM. This is dictated by OP-TEE which runs the application.
However there's no way for us dynamically discover the number of pages we
are allowed to use. Since writing big EFI signature list variable
requires more than a page, OP-TEE has bumped the number of shared pages to
four.
Let's remove our explicit check and allow the request to reach OP-TEE even
if it's bigger than what it supports. There's no need to sanitize the
number of pages internally. OP-TEE will fail if we try to write more
than it's allowed. The error will just trigger later on, during the
StMM access.
While at it add an error message to help users figure out what failed.
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ying-Chun Liu (PaulLiu) <paul.liu@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <apalos@gmail.com>
When the TCG2 protocol is installed in efi_tcg2_register(),
TPM2 device must be present.
tcg2_measure_pe_image() expects that TCP2 protocol is installed
and TPM device is available. If TCG2 Protocol is installed but
TPM device is not found, tcg2_measure_pe_image() returns
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION and efi_load_image() ends with failure.
The same error handling is applied to
efi_tcg2_measure_efi_app_invocation().
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
There are functions that calls tcg2_agile_log_append() outside
of the TCG protocol invocation (e.g tcg2_measure_pe_image).
These functions must to check that TCG2 protocol is installed.
If not, measurement shall be skipped.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
This commit modify efi_tcg2_register() to return the
appropriate error.
With this fix, sandbox will not boot because efi_tcg2_register()
fails due to some missing feature in GetCapabilities.
So disable sandbox if EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL is enabled.
UEFI secure boot variable measurement is not directly related
to TCG2 protocol installation, tcg2_measure_secure_boot_variable()
is moved to the separate function.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Firmwares before U-Boot may be capable of doing tpm measurements
and passing them to U-Boot in the form of eventlog. However there
may be scenarios where the firmwares don't have TPM driver and
are not capable of extending the measurements in the PCRs.
Based on TCG spec, if previous firnware has extended PCR's, PCR0
would not be 0. So, read the PCR0 to determine if the PCR's need
to be extended as eventlog is parsed or not.
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Platforms may have support to measure their initial firmware components
and pass the event log to u-boot. The event log address can be passed
in property tpm_event_log_addr and tpm_event_log_size of the tpm node.
Platforms may choose their own specific mechanism to do so. A weak
function is added to check if even log has been passed to u-boot
from earlier firmware components. If available, the eventlog is parsed
to check for its correctness and further event logs are appended to the
passed log.
Signed-off-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
If we call efi_clear_os_indications() before initializing the memory store
for UEFI variables a NULL pointer dereference occurs.
The error was observed on the sandbox with:
usb start
host bind 0 sandbox.img
load host 0:1 $kernel_addr_r helloworld.efi
bootefi $kernel_addr_r
Here efi_resister_disk() failed due to an error in the BTRFS implementation.
Move the logic to clear EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_FILE_CAPSULE_DELIVERY_SUPPORTED
to the rest of the capsule code.
If CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS=y, we should still clear the flag.
If OsIndications does not exist, we should not create it as it is owned by
the operating system.
Fixes: 149108a3eb ("efi_loader: clear OsIndications")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Our algorithm for creating USB device paths may lead to duplicate device
paths which result in efi_disk_register() failing. Instead we should just
skip devices that cannot be registered as EFI block devices.
Fix a memory leak in efi_disk_add_dev() caused by the duplicate device
path.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
If we look at the path that bootm/booti take when preparing to boot the
OS, we see that as part of (or prior to calling do_bootm_states,
explicitly) the process, bootm_disable_interrupts() is called prior to
announce_and_cleanup() which is where udc_disconnect() /
board_quiesce_devices() / dm_remove_devices_flags() are called from. In
the EFI path, these are called afterwards. In efi_exit_boot_services()
however we have been calling bootm_disable_interrupts() after the above
functions, as part of ensuring that we disable interrupts as required
by the spec. However, bootm_disable_interrupts() is also where we go
and call usb_stop(). While this has been fine before, on the TI J721E
platform this leads us to an exception. This exception seems likely to
be the case that we're trying to stop devices that we have already
disabled clocks for. The most direct way to handle this particular
problem is to make EFI behave like the do_bootm_states() process and
ensure we call bootm_disable_interrupts() prior to ending up in
usb_stop().
Cc: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Due to U-Boot's lazy binding mentality the TPM is probed but not properly
initialized. The user can startup the device from the command line
e.g 'tpm2 startup TPM2_SU_CLEAR'. However we can initialize the TPM during
the TCG protocol installation, which is easier to use overall.
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
As described in the TCG spec [1] in sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 the FinalEvent
table should include events after GetEventLog has been called. This
currently works for us as long as the kernel is the only EFI application
calling that. Specifically we only implement what's described in 7.1.1.
So refactor the code a bit and support EFI application(s) calling
GetEventLog. Events will now be logged in both the EventLog and FinalEvent
table as long as ExitBootServices haven't been invoked.
[1] https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/EFI-Protocol-Specification-rev13-160330final.pdf
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Implement the EFI_EVENT_GROUP_BEFORE_EXIT_BOOT_SERVICES event group
handling.
Add the definition of EFI_EVENT_GROUP_AFTER_READY_TO_BOOT.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Record capsule update result only if the capsule file is
successfully read, because the capsule GUID is not sure when
the file can not be read or the file is not a capsule.
Without this fix, if user puts a dummy (non-capsule) file
under (ESP)EFI/UpdateCapsule, U-Boot causes a synchronous
abort.
This also fixes use-after-free bug of the 'capsule' variable.
Fixes: c74cd8bd08 ("efi_loader: capsule: add capsule_on_disk support")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
log_info() is used for the debug level logging statement
which should use log_debug() instead. Convert it to reduce the
log output.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
