Implement ping6 command to ping hosts using IPv6. It works the same way as
an ordinary ping command. There is no ICMP request so it is not possible
to ping our host. This patch adds options in Kconfig and Makefile to
build ping6 command.
Series-changes: 3
- Added structures and functions descriptions
- Added to ping6_receive() return value instead of void
Series-changes: 4
- Fixed structures and functions description style
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The command tftpboot uses IPv4 by default. Add the possibility to use IPv6
instead. If an address in the command is an IPv6 address it will use IPv6
to boot or if there is a suffix -ipv6 in the end of the command it also
force using IPv6. All other tftpboot features and parameters are left
the same.
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Add net_ip6_handler (an IPv6 packet handler) into net_loop. Add
neighbor discovery mechanism into network init process. That is the
main step to run IPv6 in u-boot. Now u-boot is capable to use NDP and
handle IPv6 packets.
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Functions that were exposed in "net: ipv6: Add IPv6 basic primitives"
had only empty implementations and were exposed as API for futher
patches. This patch add implementation of these functions. Main
functions are: net_ip6_handler() - IPv6 packet handler for incoming
packets; net_send_udp_packet6() - make up and send an UDP packet;
csum_ipv6_magic() - compute checksum of IPv6 "psuedo-header" per RFC2460
section 8.1; ip6_addr_in_subnet() - check if an address is in our
subnet. Other functions are auxiliary.
Series-changes: 3
- Added comments
- Fixed style problems
- Fixed return codes instead of -1
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Implement basic of NDP. It doesn't include such things as Router
Solicitation, Router Advertisement and Redirect. It just has Neighbor
Solicitation and Neighbor Advertisement. Only these two features are used
in u-boot IPv6. Implementation of some NDP functions uses API that was
exposed in "net: ipv6: Add IPv6 basic primitives".
Also this patch inlcudes update in Makefile to build NDP.
Series-changes: 3
- Added structures and functions descriptions
- Fixed style problems
Series-changes: 4
- Fixed structures and functions description style
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Add options to Makefile and Kconfig file to build IPv6
Series-changes: 3
- Added help for IPv6 support
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This patch is a collection of basic primitives that are prerequisite for
further IPv6 implementation.
There are structures definition such as IPv6 header, UDP header
(for TFTP), ICMPv6 header. There are auxiliary defines such as protocol
codes, padding, struct size and etc. Also here are functions prototypes
and its empty implementation that will be used as API for further patches.
Here are variables declaration such as IPv6 address of our host,
gateway, ipv6 server.
Series-changes: 3
- Added functions and structures descriptions
- Removed enums ND_OPT_*. It will be moved into further patches
- Substituted -1 for error codes
Series-changes: 4
- Changed functions and structures description style
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Mitrofanov <v.v.mitrofanov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The symbol CONFIG_NET_DEVICES does not exist.
The correct name is CONFIG_NETDEVICES.
Fixes: 77b5c4a5b1 ("efi_loader: Let networking support depend on NETDEVICES")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
This commit adds a simple wget command that can download files
from http server.
The command syntax is
wget ${loadaddr} <path of the file from server>
Signed-off-by: Duncan Hare <DuncanCHare@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying-Chun Liu (PaulLiu) <paul.liu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Currently file transfers are done using tftp or NFS both
over udp. This requires a request to be sent from client
(u-boot) to the boot server.
The current standard is TCP with selective acknowledgment.
Signed-off-by: Duncan Hare <DH@Synoia.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan Hare <DuncanCHare@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Ying-Chun Liu (PaulLiu) <paul.liu@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Gmeiner <christian.gmeiner@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
With a suitable sequence of malicious packets, it's currently possible
to get a hole descriptor to contain arbitrary attacker-controlled
contents, and then with one more packet to use that as an arbitrary
write vector.
While one could possibly change the algorithm so we instead loop over
all holes, and in each hole puts as much of the current fragment as
belongs there (taking care to carefully update the hole list as
appropriate), it's not worth the complexity: In real, non-malicious
scenarios, one never gets overlapping fragments, and certainly not
fragments that would be supersets of one another.
So instead opt for this simple protection: Simply don't allow the
eventual memcpy() to write beyond the last_byte of the current hole.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
U-Boot does not support IP fragmentation on TX (and unless
CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG is set, neither on RX). So the blocks we send must
fit in a single ethernet packet.
Currently, if tftpblocksize is set to something like 5000 and I
tftpput a large enough file, U-Boot crashes because we overflow
net_tx_packet (which only has room for 1500 bytes plus change).
Similarly, if tftpblocksize is set to something larger than what we
can actually receive (e.g. 50000, with NET_MAXDEFRAG being 16384), any
tftp get just hangs because we never receive any packets.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Nothing inside this block depends on NET_TFTP_VARS to be set to parse
correctly. Switch to C if() in preparation for adding code before
this (to avoid a declaration-after-statement warning).
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
[trini: Update to cover CONFIG_TFTP_PORT case as well]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
For some reason, the ip_len field in a reassembled IP datagram is set
to just the size of the payload, but it should be set to the value it
would have had if the datagram had never been fragmented in the first
place, i.e. size of payload plus size of IP header.
That latter value is currently returned correctly via the "len"
variable. And before entering net_defragment(), len does have the
value ntohs(ip->ip_len), so if we're not dealing with a
fragment (so net_defragment leaves *len alone), that relationship of
course also holds after the net_defragment() call.
The only use I can find of ip->ip_len after the net_defragment call is
the ntohs(ip->udp_len) > ntohs(ip->ip_len) sanity check - none of the
functions that are passed the "ip" pointer themselves inspect ->ip_len
but instead use the passed len.
But that sanity check is a bit odd, since the RHS really should be
"ntohs(ip->ip_len) - 20", i.e. the IP payload size.
Now that we've fixed things so that len == ntohs(ip->ip_len) in all
cases, change that sanity check to use len-20 as the RHS.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
I hit a strange problem with v2022.10: Sometimes my tftp transfer
would seemingly just hang. It only happened for some files. Moreover,
changing tftpblocksize from 65464 to 65460 or 65000 made it work again
for all the files I tried. So I started suspecting it had something to
do with the file sizes and in particular the way the tftp blocks get
fragmented and reassembled.
v2022.01 showed no problems with any of the files or any value of
tftpblocksize.
Looking at what had changed in net.c or tftp.c since January showed
only one remotely interesting thing, b85d130ea0.
So I fired up wireshark on my host to see if somehow one of the
packets would be too small. But no, with both v2022.01 and v2022.10,
the exact same sequence of packets were sent, all but the last of size
1500, and the last being 1280 bytes.
But then it struck me that 1280 is 5*256, so one of the two bytes
on-the-wire is 0 and the other is 5, and when then looking at the code
again the lack of endianness conversion becomes obvious. [ntohs is
both applied to ip->ip_off just above, as well as to ip->ip_len just a
little further down when the "len" is actually computed].
IOWs the current code would falsely reject any packet which happens to
be a multiple of 256 bytes in size, breaking tftp transfers somewhat
randomly, and if it did get one of those "malicious" packets with
ip_len set to, say, 27, it would be seen by this check as being 6912
and hence not rejected.
====
Now, just adding the missing ntohs() would make my initial problem go
away, in that I can now download the file where the last fragment ends
up being 1280 bytes. But there's another bug in the code and/or
analysis: The right-hand side is too strict, in that it is ok for the
last fragment not to have a multiple of 8 bytes as payload - it really
must be ok, because nothing in the IP spec says that IP datagrams must
have a multiple of 8 bytes as payload. And comments in the code also
mention this.
To fix that, replace the comparison with <= IP_HDR_SIZE and add
another check that len is actually a multiple of 8 when the "more
fragments" bit is set - which it necessarily is for the case where
offset8 ends up being 0, since we're only called when
(ip_off & (IP_OFFS | IP_FLAGS_MFRAG)).
====
So, does this fix CVE-2022-30790 for real? It certainly correctly
rejects the POC code which relies on sending a packet of size 27 with
the MFRAG flag set. Can the attack be carried out with a size 27
packet that doesn't set MFRAG (hence must set a non-zero fragment
offset)? I dunno. If we get a packet without MFRAG, we update
h->last_byte in the hole we've found to be start+len, hence we'd enter
one of
if ((h >= thisfrag) && (h->last_byte <= start + len)) {
or
} else if (h->last_byte <= start + len) {
and thus won't reach any of the
/* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
/* fragment sits in the middle: split the hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
IOW these division are now guaranteed to be exact, and thus I think
the scenario in CVE-2022-30790 cannot happen anymore.
====
However, there's a big elephant in the room, which has always been
spelled out in the comments, and which makes me believe that one can
still cause mayhem even with packets whose payloads are all 8-byte
aligned:
This code doesn't deal with a fragment that overlaps with two
different holes (thus being a superset of a previously-received
fragment).
Suppose each character below represents 8 bytes, with D being already
received data, H being a hole descriptor (struct hole), h being
non-populated chunks, and P representing where the payload of a just
received packet should go:
DDDHhhhhDDDDHhhhDDDD
PPPPPPPPP
I'm pretty sure in this case we'd end up with h being the first hole,
enter the simple
} else if (h->last_byte <= start + len) {
/* overlaps with final part of the hole: shorten this hole */
h->last_byte = start;
case, and thus in the memcpy happily overwrite the second H with our
chosen payload. This is probably worth fixing...
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
While the code mostly/only handles UDP packets, it's possible for the
last fragment of a fragmented UDP packet to be smaller than 28 bytes;
it can be as small as 21 bytes (an IP header plus one byte of
payload). So until we've performed the defragmentation step and thus
know whether we're now holding a full packet, we should only check for
the existence of the fields in the ip header, i.e. that there are at
least 20 bytes present.
In practice, we always seem to be handed a "len" of minimum 60 from the
device layer, i.e. minimal ethernet frame length minus FCS, so this is
mostly theoretical.
After we've fetched the header's claimed length and used that to
update the len variable, check that the header itself claims to be the
minimal possible length.
This is probably how CVE-2022-30552 should have been dealt with in the
first place, because net_defragment() is not the only place that wants
to know the size of the IP datagram payload: If we receive a
non-fragmented ICMP packet, we pass "len" to receive_icmp() which in
turn may pass it to ping_receive() which does
compute_ip_checksum(icmph, len - IP_HDR_SIZE)
and due to the signature of compute_ip_checksum(), that would then
lead to accessing ~4G of address space, very likely leading to a
crash.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
There's no reason we should accept an IP packet with a malformed IHL
field. So ensure that it is exactly 5, not just <= 5.
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
CONFIG_NET does not imply that there are actually network devices
available, only CONFIG_NETDEVICES does. Changing to this dependency
obsoletes the check in Kconfig because NETDEVICES means DM_ETH.
Fixes: 0efe1bcf5c ("efi_loader: Add network access support")
Suggested-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Adds an "ncsi" command to manually start NC-SI configuration.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Add the handling of NC-SI ethernet frames, and add a check at the start
of net_loop() to configure NC-SI before starting other network commands.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <sam@mendozajonas.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
eth_get_dev relies on the broken behavior that returns an error but not
the device on which the error happened which gives the caller no
reasonable way to report or handle the error.
In a later patch uclass_first_device_err will be changed to return the
device on error but eth_get_dev stores the returned device pointer
directly in a global state without checking the return value. Unset the
pointer again in the error case.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
There is a number of users that use uclass_first_device to access the
first and (assumed) only device in uclass.
Some check the return value of uclass_first_device and also that a
device was returned which is exactly what uclass_first_device_err does.
Some are not checking that a device was returned and can potentially
crash if no device exists in the uclass. Finally there is one that
returns NULL on error either way.
Convert all of these to use uclass_first_device_err instead, the return
value will be removed from uclass_first_device in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Globally replace all occurances of WATCHDOG_RESET() with schedule(),
which handles the HW_WATCHDOG functionality and the cyclic
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com> [am335x_evm, mx6cuboxi, rpi_3,dra7xx_evm, pine64_plus, am65x_evm, j721e_evm]
to adjust the root path length.
Eg to 256 from Linux Kernel
Signed-off-by: Andre Kalb <andre.kalb@sma.de>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
[trini: Guard extern so that !CONFIG_NET platforms will build]
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
A large number of files include <flash.h> as it used to be how various
SPI flash related functions were found, or for other reasons entirely.
In order to migrate some further CONFIG symbols to Kconfig we need to
not include flash.h in cases where we don't have a NOR flash of some
sort enabled. Furthermore, in cases where we are in common code and it
doesn't make sense to try and further refactor the code itself in to new
files we need to guard this inclusion.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
No platforms enable the functionality to tftp directly to NOR flash, and
this is discouraged by the documentation. Remove this code. Further,
this highlights an oddity of the code. Un-indent the start of this
function.
Cc: Joe Hershberger <joe.hershberger@ni.com>
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Replace discuss with discard, that is what happens with packet with
incorrect checksum. Fix the typo.
Fixes: 4b37fd146b ("Convert CONFIG_UDP_CHECKSUM to Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This adds support for reading mac addresses from the "mac-address" nvmem
cell. If there is no (local-)mac-address property, then we will try
reading from an nvmem cell.
For some existing examples of this property, refer to imx8mn.dtsi and
imx8mp.dtsi. Unfortunately, fuse drivers have not yet been converted
to DM.
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
If the DSA master fails to probe for whatever reason, then DSA devices
will continue on as if nothing is wrong. This can cause incorrect
behavior. In particular, on sandbox, dsa_sandbox_probe attempts to
access the master's private data. This is only safe to do if the master
has been probed first. Fix this by probing the master after we look it
up, and bailing out if we get an error.
Fixes: fc054d563b ("net: Introduce DSA class for Ethernet switches")
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Nicolas Bidron and Nicolas Guigo reported the two bugs below:
"
----------BUG 1----------
In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of
`ip->ip_len` (IP packet header's Total Length) higher than `IP_HDR_SIZE`
and strictly lower than `IP_HDR_SIZE+8` will lead to a value for `len`
comprised between `0` and `7`. This will ultimately result in a
truncated division by `8` resulting value of `0` forcing the hole
metadata and fragment to point to the same location. The subsequent
memcopy will overwrite the hole metadata with the fragment data. Through
a second fragment, this can be exploited to write to an arbitrary offset
controlled by that overwritten hole metadata value.
This bug is only exploitable locally as it requires crafting two packets
the first of which would most likely be dropped through routing due to
its unexpectedly low Total Length. However, this bug can potentially be
exploited to root linux based embedded devices locally.
```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
static u16 first_hole, total_len;
struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
offset8 = (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
thisfrag = payload + offset8;
start = offset8 * 8;
len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```
The last line of the previous excerpt from `u-boot/net/net.c` shows how
the attacker can control the value of `len` to be strictly lower than
`8` by issuing a packet with `ip_len` between `21` and `27`
(`IP_HDR_SIZE` has a value of `20`).
Also note that `offset8` here is `0` which leads to `thisfrag = payload`.
```C
} else if (h >= thisfrag) {
/* overlaps with initial part of the hole: move this hole */
newh = thisfrag + (len / 8);
*newh = *h;
h = newh;
if (h->next_hole)
payload[h->next_hole].prev_hole = (h - payload);
if (h->prev_hole)
payload[h->prev_hole].next_hole = (h - payload);
else
first_hole = (h - payload);
} else {
```
Lower down the same function, execution reaches the above code path.
Here, `len / 8` evaluates to `0` leading to `newh = thisfrag`. Also note
that `first_hole` here is `0` since `h` and `payload` point to the same
location.
```C
/* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```
Finally, in the above excerpt the `memcpy` overwrites the hole metadata
since `thisfrag` and `h` both point to the same location. The hole
metadata is effectively overwritten with arbitrary data from the
fragmented IP packet data. If `len` was crafted to be `6`, `last_byte`,
`next_hole`, and `prev_hole` of the `first_hole` can be controlled by
the attacker.
Finally the arbitrary offset write occurs through a second fragment that
only needs to be crafted to write data in the hole pointed to by the
previously controlled hole metadata (`next_hole`) from the first packet.
### Recommendation
Handle cases where `len` is strictly lower than 8 by preventing the
overwrite of the hole metadata during the memcpy of the fragment. This
could be achieved by either:
* Moving the location where the hole metadata is stored when `len` is
lower than `8`.
* Or outright rejecting fragmented IP datagram with a Total Length
(`ip_len`) lower than 28 bytes which is the minimum valid fragmented IP
datagram size (as defined as the minimum fragment of 8 octets in the IP
Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 25).
----------BUG 2----------
In compiled versions of U-Boot that define CONFIG_IP_DEFRAG, a value of
`ip->ip_len` (IP packet header's Total Length) lower than `IP_HDR_SIZE`
will lead to a negative value for `len` which will ultimately result in
a buffer overflow during the subsequent `memcpy` that uses `len` as it's
`count` parameter.
This bug is only exploitable on local ethernet as it requires crafting
an invalid packet to include an unexpected `ip_len` value in the IP UDP
header that's lower than the minimum accepted Total Length of a packet
(21 as defined in the IP Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791)). Such packet
would in all likelihood be dropped while being routed to its final
destination through most routing equipment and as such requires the
attacker to be in a local position in order to be exploited.
```C
static struct ip_udp_hdr *__net_defragment(struct ip_udp_hdr *ip, int *lenp)
{
static uchar pkt_buff[IP_PKTSIZE] __aligned(PKTALIGN);
static u16 first_hole, total_len;
struct hole *payload, *thisfrag, *h, *newh;
struct ip_udp_hdr *localip = (struct ip_udp_hdr *)pkt_buff;
uchar *indata = (uchar *)ip;
int offset8, start, len, done = 0;
u16 ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off);
/* payload starts after IP header, this fragment is in there */
payload = (struct hole *)(pkt_buff + IP_HDR_SIZE);
offset8 = (ip_off & IP_OFFS);
thisfrag = payload + offset8;
start = offset8 * 8;
len = ntohs(ip->ip_len) - IP_HDR_SIZE;
```
The last line of the previous excerpt from `u-boot/net/net.c` shows
where the underflow to a negative `len` value occurs if `ip_len` is set
to a value strictly lower than 20 (`IP_HDR_SIZE` being 20). Also note
that in the above excerpt the `pkt_buff` buffer has a size of
`CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG` which defaults to 16 KB but can range from 1KB to
64 KB depending on configurations.
```C
/* finally copy this fragment and possibly return whole packet */
memcpy((uchar *)thisfrag, indata + IP_HDR_SIZE, len);
```
In the above excerpt the `memcpy` overflows the destination by
attempting to make a copy of nearly 4 gigabytes in a buffer that's
designed to hold `CONFIG_NET_MAXDEFRAG` bytes at most which leads to a DoS.
### Recommendation
Stop processing of the packet if `ip_len` is lower than 21 (as defined
by the minimum length of a data carrying datagram in the IP
Specification Document:
[RFC791](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791) page 34)."
Add a check for ip_len lesser than 28 and stop processing the packet
in this case.
Such a check covers the two reported bugs.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bidron <nicolas.bidron@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
This patch mitigates the vulnerability identified via CVE-2019-14196.
The previous patch was bypassed/ineffective, and now the vulnerability
is identified via CVE-2022-30767. The patch removes the sanity check
introduced to mitigate CVE-2019-14196 since it's ineffective.
filefh3_length is changed to unsigned type integer, preventing negative
numbers from being used during comparison with positive values during
size sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Andrea zi0Black Cappa <zi0Black@protonmail.com>
Add helper to resolve PHY node from it's ofnode via DM MDIO subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
- U-boot's PXE flow supports prefixing your bootfile name with an
IP address to fetch from a server other than the DHCP server,
e.g. `hostIPaddr:bootfilename`:
a93907c43f
- However, this breaks bootfile paths which contain a colon, e.g.
`f0:ad:4e:10:1b:87/7/pxelinux.cfg/default`
- This patch checks whether the `hostIPaddr` prefix is a valid
IP address before overriding the serverIP otherwise the whole
bootfile path is preserved
Signed-off-by: Lyle Franklin <lylejfranklin@gmail.com>
Some globals where not properly initialized causing timeouts
as data packets where not immediately acknowledged.
Fixes: cc6b87ecaa ("net: tftp: Add client support for RFC 7440")
Signed-off-by: Arjan Minzinga Zijlstra <arjan.minzingazijlstra@fox-it.com>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Rename constant PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NONE to PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_NA to make
it compatible with Linux' naming.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Add helpers ofnode_read_phy_mode() and dev_read_phy_mode() to parse the
"phy-mode" / "phy-connection-type" property. Add corresponding UT test.
Use them treewide.
This allows us to inline the phy_get_interface_by_name() into
ofnode_read_phy_mode(), since the former is not used anymore.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@foss.st.com>
Use the new dm_mdio_read/write/reset() wrappers treewide, instead of
always getting and dereferencing MDIO operations structure pointer.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Add wrappers dm_mdio_read(), dm_mdio_write() and dm_mdio_reset() for
DM MDIO's .read(), .write() and .reset() operations.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Add helpers ofnode_get_phy_node() and dev_get_phy_node() and use it in
net/mdio-uclass.c function dm_eth_connect_phy_handle(). Also add
corresponding UT test.
This is useful because other part's of U-Boot may want to get PHY ofnode
without connecting a PHY.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Use the ARRAY_SIZE() macro instead of hardcoding sizes of arrays in
macros.
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
These global variables should both have type
static const char * const
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun@nic.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
This converts the following to Kconfig:
CONFIG_SYS_FAULT_ECHO_LINK_DOWN
Cc: Ramon Fried <rfried.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
