mirror of
https://github.com/AsahiLinux/u-boot
synced 2024-11-10 07:04:28 +00:00
main: Make the execution path a little clearer in main.c
bootdelay_process() never returns in some circumstances, whichs makes the control flow confusing. Change it so that the decision about how to execute the boot command is made in the main_loop() code, so it is easier to follow. Move CLI stuff to cli.c. Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
c1bb2cd0b6
commit
affb215626
5 changed files with 145 additions and 75 deletions
|
@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
|
|||
#define debug_bootkeys(fmt, args...) \
|
||||
debug_cond(DEBUG_BOOTKEYS, fmt, ##args)
|
||||
|
||||
/* Stored value of bootdelay, used by autoboot_command() */
|
||||
static int stored_bootdelay;
|
||||
|
||||
/***************************************************************************
|
||||
* Watch for 'delay' seconds for autoboot stop or autoboot delay string.
|
||||
* returns: 0 - no key string, allow autoboot 1 - got key string, abort
|
||||
|
@ -205,57 +208,9 @@ static int abortboot(int bootdelay)
|
|||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Runs the given boot command securely. Specifically:
|
||||
* - Doesn't run the command with the shell (run_command or parse_string_outer),
|
||||
* since that's a lot of code surface that an attacker might exploit.
|
||||
* Because of this, we don't do any argument parsing--the secure boot command
|
||||
* has to be a full-fledged u-boot command.
|
||||
* - Doesn't check for keypresses before booting, since that could be a
|
||||
* security hole; also disables Ctrl-C.
|
||||
* - Doesn't allow the command to return.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Upon any failures, this function will drop into an infinite loop after
|
||||
* printing the error message to console.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_CONTROL)
|
||||
static void secure_boot_cmd(char *cmd)
|
||||
{
|
||||
cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp;
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cmd) {
|
||||
printf("## Error: Secure boot command not specified\n");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Disable Ctrl-C just in case some command is used that checks it. */
|
||||
disable_ctrlc(1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Find the command directly. */
|
||||
cmdtp = find_cmd(cmd);
|
||||
if (!cmdtp) {
|
||||
printf("## Error: \"%s\" not defined\n", cmd);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Run the command, forcing no flags and faking argc and argv. */
|
||||
rc = (cmdtp->cmd)(cmdtp, 0, 1, &cmd);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Shouldn't ever return from boot command. */
|
||||
printf("## Error: \"%s\" returned (code %d)\n", cmd, rc);
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Not a whole lot to do here. Rebooting won't help much, since we'll
|
||||
* just end up right back here. Just loop.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
hang();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void process_fdt_options(const void *blob)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(CONFIG_OF_CONTROL)
|
||||
ulong addr;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Add an env variable to point to a kernel payload, if available */
|
||||
|
@ -267,14 +222,11 @@ static void process_fdt_options(const void *blob)
|
|||
addr = fdtdec_get_config_int(gd->fdt_blob, "rootdisk-offset", 0);
|
||||
if (addr)
|
||||
setenv_addr("rootaddr", (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE + addr));
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_OF_CONTROL */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void bootdelay_process(void)
|
||||
const char *bootdelay_process(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_OF_CONTROL
|
||||
char *env;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
char *s;
|
||||
int bootdelay;
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOTCOUNT_LIMIT
|
||||
|
@ -318,27 +270,18 @@ void bootdelay_process(void)
|
|||
} else
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_BOOTCOUNT_LIMIT */
|
||||
s = getenv("bootcmd");
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_OF_CONTROL
|
||||
/* Allow the fdt to override the boot command */
|
||||
env = fdtdec_get_config_string(gd->fdt_blob, "bootcmd");
|
||||
if (env)
|
||||
s = env;
|
||||
|
||||
process_fdt_options(gd->fdt_blob);
|
||||
stored_bootdelay = bootdelay;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If the bootsecure option was chosen, use secure_boot_cmd().
|
||||
* Always use 'env' in this case, since bootsecure requres that the
|
||||
* bootcmd was specified in the FDT too.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (fdtdec_get_config_int(gd->fdt_blob, "bootsecure", 0))
|
||||
secure_boot_cmd(env);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_OF_CONTROL */
|
||||
return s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void autoboot_command(const char *s)
|
||||
{
|
||||
debug("### main_loop: bootcmd=\"%s\"\n", s ? s : "<UNDEFINED>");
|
||||
|
||||
if (bootdelay != -1 && s && !abortboot(bootdelay)) {
|
||||
if (stored_bootdelay != -1 && s && !abortboot(stored_bootdelay)) {
|
||||
#if defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_KEYED) && !defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_KEYED_CTRLC)
|
||||
int prev = disable_ctrlc(1); /* disable Control C checking */
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
66
common/cli.c
66
common/cli.c
|
@ -12,8 +12,11 @@
|
|||
#include <common.h>
|
||||
#include <cli.h>
|
||||
#include <cli_hush.h>
|
||||
#include <fdtdec.h>
|
||||
#include <malloc.h>
|
||||
|
||||
DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Run a command using the selected parser.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -105,6 +108,69 @@ int do_run(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
|
|||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_OF_CONTROL
|
||||
bool cli_process_fdt(const char **cmdp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Allow the fdt to override the boot command */
|
||||
char *env = fdtdec_get_config_string(gd->fdt_blob, "bootcmd");
|
||||
if (env)
|
||||
*cmdp = env;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If the bootsecure option was chosen, use secure_boot_cmd().
|
||||
* Always use 'env' in this case, since bootsecure requres that the
|
||||
* bootcmd was specified in the FDT too.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
return fdtdec_get_config_int(gd->fdt_blob, "bootsecure", 0) != 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Runs the given boot command securely. Specifically:
|
||||
* - Doesn't run the command with the shell (run_command or parse_string_outer),
|
||||
* since that's a lot of code surface that an attacker might exploit.
|
||||
* Because of this, we don't do any argument parsing--the secure boot command
|
||||
* has to be a full-fledged u-boot command.
|
||||
* - Doesn't check for keypresses before booting, since that could be a
|
||||
* security hole; also disables Ctrl-C.
|
||||
* - Doesn't allow the command to return.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Upon any failures, this function will drop into an infinite loop after
|
||||
* printing the error message to console.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void cli_secure_boot_cmd(const char *cmd)
|
||||
{
|
||||
cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp;
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!cmd) {
|
||||
printf("## Error: Secure boot command not specified\n");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Disable Ctrl-C just in case some command is used that checks it. */
|
||||
disable_ctrlc(1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Find the command directly. */
|
||||
cmdtp = find_cmd(cmd);
|
||||
if (!cmdtp) {
|
||||
printf("## Error: \"%s\" not defined\n", cmd);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Run the command, forcing no flags and faking argc and argv. */
|
||||
rc = (cmdtp->cmd)(cmdtp, 0, 1, (char **)&cmd);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Shouldn't ever return from boot command. */
|
||||
printf("## Error: \"%s\" returned (code %d)\n", cmd, rc);
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Not a whole lot to do here. Rebooting won't help much, since we'll
|
||||
* just end up right back here. Just loop.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
hang();
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_OF_CONTROL */
|
||||
|
||||
void cli_loop(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_HUSH_PARSER
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -55,8 +55,11 @@ static void run_preboot_environment_command(void)
|
|||
#endif /* CONFIG_PREBOOT */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We come here after U-Boot is initialised and ready to process commands */
|
||||
void main_loop(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *s;
|
||||
|
||||
bootstage_mark_name(BOOTSTAGE_ID_MAIN_LOOP, "main_loop");
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef CONFIG_SYS_GENERIC_BOARD
|
||||
|
@ -78,10 +81,11 @@ void main_loop(void)
|
|||
update_tftp(0UL);
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_UPDATE_TFTP */
|
||||
|
||||
bootdelay_process();
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Main Loop for Monitor Command Processing
|
||||
*/
|
||||
s = bootdelay_process();
|
||||
if (cli_process_fdt(&s))
|
||||
cli_secure_boot_cmd(s);
|
||||
|
||||
autoboot_command(s);
|
||||
|
||||
cli_loop();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -13,9 +13,33 @@
|
|||
#define __AUTOBOOT_H
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_BOOTDELAY
|
||||
void bootdelay_process(void);
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* bootdelay_process() - process the bootd delay
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Process the boot delay, boot limit, then get the value of either
|
||||
* bootcmd, failbootcmd or altbootcmd depending on the current state.
|
||||
* Return this command so it can be executed.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @return command to executed
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const char *bootdelay_process(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* autoboot_command() - run the autoboot command
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If enabled, run the autoboot command returned from bootdelay_process().
|
||||
* Also do the CONFIG_MENUKEY processing if enabled.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @cmd: Command to run
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void autoboot_command(const char *cmd);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static inline void bootdelay_process(void)
|
||||
static inline const char *bootdelay_process(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline void autoboot_command(const char *s)
|
||||
{
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -100,6 +100,39 @@ int cli_readline_into_buffer(const char *const prompt, char *buffer,
|
|||
*/
|
||||
int cli_simple_parse_line(char *line, char *argv[]);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_OF_CONTROL
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* cli_process_fdt() - process the boot command from the FDT
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If bootcmmd is defined in the /config node of the FDT, we use that
|
||||
* as the boot command. Further, if bootsecure is set to 1 (in the same
|
||||
* node) then we return true, indicating that the command should be executed
|
||||
* as securely as possible, avoiding the CLI parser.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @cmdp: On entry, the command that will be executed if the FDT does
|
||||
* not have a command. Returns the command to execute after
|
||||
* checking the FDT.
|
||||
* @return true to execute securely, else false
|
||||
*/
|
||||
bool cli_process_fdt(const char **cmdp);
|
||||
|
||||
/** cli_secure_boot_cmd() - execute a command as securely as possible
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This avoids using the parser, thus executing the command with the
|
||||
* smallest amount of code. Parameters are not supported.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void cli_secure_boot_cmd(const char *cmd);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static inline bool cli_process_fdt(const char **cmdp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline void cli_secure_boot_cmd(const char *cmd)
|
||||
{
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_OF_CONTROL */
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Go into the command loop
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue