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doc: imx: habv4: Add Secure Boot guide for i.MX6 and i.MX7 non-SPL targets
Add HABv4 documentation for non-SPL targets covering the following topics: - How to sign an securely boot an u-boot-dtb.imx image. - How to extend the root of trust for additional boot images. - Add 3 CSF examples. - Add IVT generation script example. Reviewed-by: Ye Li <ye.li@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Utkarsh Gupta <utkarsh.gupta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Breno Lima <breno.lima@nxp.com>
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[Header]
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Version = 4.2
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Hash Algorithm = sha256
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Engine Configuration = 0
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Certificate Format = X509
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Signature Format = CMS
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Engine = CAAM
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[Install SRK]
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# Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
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File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
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Source index = 0
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[Install CSFK]
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# Key used to authenticate the CSF data
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File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
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[Authenticate CSF]
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[Install Key]
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# Key slot index used to authenticate the key to be installed
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Verification index = 0
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# Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
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Target Index = 2
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# Key to install
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File= "../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
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[Authenticate Data]
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# Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
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Verification index = 2
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# Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
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Blocks = 0x80800000 0x00000000 0x80EEA020 "zImage", \
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0x83800000 0x00000000 0x8380B927 "imx7d-sdb.dtb", \
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0x84000000 0x00000000 0x840425B8 "uTee-7dsdb"
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32
doc/imx/habv4/csf_examples/mx6_mx7/csf_uboot.txt
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32
doc/imx/habv4/csf_examples/mx6_mx7/csf_uboot.txt
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[Header]
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Version = 4.2
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Hash Algorithm = sha256
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Engine Configuration = 0
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Certificate Format = X509
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Signature Format = CMS
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Engine = CAAM
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[Install SRK]
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# Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
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File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
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Source index = 0
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[Install CSFK]
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# Key used to authenticate the CSF data
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File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
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[Authenticate CSF]
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[Install Key]
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# Key slot index used to authenticate the key to be installed
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Verification index = 0
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# Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
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Target Index = 2
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# Key to install
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File= "../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
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[Authenticate Data]
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# Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
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Verification index = 2
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# Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
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Blocks = 0x877ff400 0x00000000 0x0009ec00 "u-boot-dtb.imx"
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[Header]
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Version = 4.2
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Hash Algorithm = sha256
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Engine Configuration = 0
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Certificate Format = X509
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Signature Format = CMS
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Engine = CAAM
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[Install SRK]
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# Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
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File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
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Source index = 0
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[Install NOCAK]
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File = "../crts/SRK1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr_crt.pem"
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[Authenticate CSF]
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[Authenticate Data]
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# Key slot index 0 used to authenticate the image data
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Verification index = 0
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# Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
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Blocks = 0x877ff400 0x00000000 0x0009ec00 "u-boot-dtb.imx"
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402
doc/imx/habv4/guides/mx6_mx7_secure_boot.txt
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doc/imx/habv4/guides/mx6_mx7_secure_boot.txt
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+=======================================================+
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+ i.MX6, i.MX7 U-Boot Secure Boot guide using HABv4 +
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+=======================================================+
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1. HABv4 secure boot process
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-----------------------------
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This document describes a step-by-step procedure on how to sign and securely
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boot an U-Boot image for non-SPL targets. It is assumed that the reader is
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familiar with basic HAB concepts and with the PKI tree generation.
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Details about HAB can be found in the application note AN4581[1] and in the
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introduction_habv4.txt document.
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1.1 Building a u-boot-dtb.imx image supporting secure boot
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-----------------------------------------------------------
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The U-Boot provides support to secure boot configuration and also provide
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access to the HAB APIs exposed by the ROM vector table, the support is
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enabled by selecting the CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT option.
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When built with this configuration, the U-Boot provides extra functions for
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HAB, such as the HAB status logs retrievement through the hab_status command
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and support for extending the root of trust.
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The U-Boot also correctly pads the final image by aligning to the next 0xC00
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address, so the CSF signature data generated by CST can be concatenated to
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image.
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The diagram below illustrate a signed u-boot-dtb.imx image layout:
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------- +-----------------------------+ <-- *start
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^ | Image Vector Table |
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| +-----------------------------+ <-- *boot_data
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| | Boot Data |
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| +-----------------------------+ <-- *dcd
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| | DCD Table |
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| +-----------------------------+
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Signed | | Padding |
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Data | +-----------------------------+ <-- *entry
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| | |
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| | |
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| | u-boot-dtb.bin |
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| | |
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| | |
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| +-----------------------------+
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v | Padding |
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------- +-----------------------------+ <-- *csf
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| |
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| Command Sequence File (CSF) |
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| |
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+-----------------------------+
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| Padding (optional) |
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+-----------------------------+
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1.2 Enabling the secure boot support
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-------------------------------------
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The first step is to generate an U-Boot image supporting the HAB features
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mentioned above, this can be achieved by adding CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT to the
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build configuration:
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- Defconfig:
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CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT=y
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- Kconfig:
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ARM architecture -> Support i.MX HAB features
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1.3 Creating the CSF description file
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--------------------------------------
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The CSF contains all the commands that the HAB executes during the secure
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boot. These commands instruct the HAB on which memory areas of the image
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to authenticate, which keys to install, use and etc.
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CSF examples are available under doc/imx/habv4/csf_examples/ directory.
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A build log containing the "Authenticate Data" parameters is available after
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the U-Boot build, the example below is a log for mx7dsabresd_defconfig target:
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- mkimage build log:
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$ cat u-boot-dtb.imx.log
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Image Type: Freescale IMX Boot Image
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Image Ver: 2 (i.MX53/6/7 compatible)
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Mode: DCD
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Data Size: 667648 Bytes = 652.00 KiB = 0.64 MiB
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Load Address: 877ff420
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Entry Point: 87800000
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HAB Blocks: 0x877ff400 0x00000000 0x0009ec00
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^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
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| | |
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| | ------- (1)
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| |
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| ------------------ (2)
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----------------------------- (3)
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(1) Size of area in file u-boot-dtb.imx to sign.
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This area should include the IVT, the Boot Data the DCD
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and the U-Boot itself.
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(2) Start of area in u-boot-dtb.imx to sign.
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(3) Start of area in RAM to authenticate.
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- In "Authenticate Data" CSF command users can copy and past the output
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addresses:
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Block = 0x877ff400 0x00000000 0x0009ec00 "u-boot-dtb.imx"
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1.4 Signing the U-Boot binary
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------------------------------
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The CST tool is used for singing the U-Boot binary and generating a CSF binary,
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users should input the CSF description file created in the step above and
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should receive a CSF binary, which contains the CSF commands, SRK table,
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signatures and certificates.
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- Create CSF binary file:
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$ ./cst -i csf_uboot.txt -o csf_uboot.bin
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- Append CSF signature to the end of U-Boot image:
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$ cat u-boot-dtb.imx csf_uboot.bin > u-boot-signed.imx
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The u-boot-signed.imx is the signed binary and should be flashed into the boot
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media.
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- Flash signed U-Boot binary:
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$ sudo dd if=u-boot-signed.imx of=/dev/sd<x> bs=1K seek=1 && sync
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1.5 Programming SRK Hash
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-------------------------
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As explained in AN4581[1] and in introduction_habv4.txt document the SRK Hash
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fuse values are generated by the srktool and should be programmed in the
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SoC SRK_HASH[255:0] fuses.
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Be careful when programming these values, as this data is the basis for the
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root of trust. An error in SRK Hash results in a part that does not boot.
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The U-Boot fuse tool can be used for programming eFuses on i.MX SoCs.
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- Dump SRK Hash fuses values in host machine:
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$ hexdump -e '/4 "0x"' -e '/4 "%X""\n"' SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin
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0x20593752
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0x6ACE6962
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0x26E0D06C
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0xFC600661
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0x1240E88F
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0x1209F144
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0x831C8117
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0x1190FD4D
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- Program SRK_HASH[255:0] fuses, using i.MX6 series as example:
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=> fuse prog 3 0 0x20593752
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=> fuse prog 3 1 0x6ACE6962
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=> fuse prog 3 2 0x26E0D06C
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=> fuse prog 3 3 0xFC600661
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=> fuse prog 3 4 0x1240E88F
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=> fuse prog 3 5 0x1209F144
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=> fuse prog 3 6 0x831C8117
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=> fuse prog 3 7 0x1190FD4D
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The table below lists the SRK_HASH bank and word according to the i.MX device:
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| | i.MX6 Series | i.MX7D/S | i.MX7ULP |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[31:00] | bank 3 word 0 | bank 6 word 0 | bank 5 word 0 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[63:32] | bank 3 word 1 | bank 6 word 1 | bank 5 word 1 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[95:64] | bank 3 word 2 | bank 6 word 2 | bank 5 word 2 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[127:96] | bank 3 word 3 | bank 6 word 3 | bank 5 word 3 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[159:128] | bank 3 word 4 | bank 7 word 0 | bank 5 word 4 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[191:160] | bank 3 word 5 | bank 7 word 1 | bank 5 word 5 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[223:192] | bank 3 word 6 | bank 7 word 2 | bank 5 word 6 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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| SRK_HASH[255:224] | bank 3 word 7 | bank 7 word 3 | bank 5 word 7 |
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+-------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
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1.6 Verifying HAB events
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-------------------------
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The next step is to verify that the signature attached to U-Boot is
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successfully processed without errors. HAB generates events when processing
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the commands if it encounters issues.
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The hab_status U-Boot command call the hab_report_event() and hab_status()
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HAB API functions to verify the processor security configuration and status.
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This command displays any events that were generated during the process.
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Prior to closing the device users should ensure no HAB events were found, as
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the example below:
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- Verify HAB events:
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=> hab_status
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Secure boot disabled
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HAB Configuration: 0xf0, HAB State: 0x66
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No HAB Events Found!
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1.7 Closing the device
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-----------------------
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After the device successfully boots a signed image without generating any HAB
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events, it is safe to close the device. This is the last step in the HAB
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process, and is achieved by programming the SEC_CONFIG[1] fuse bit.
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Once the fuse is programmed, the chip does not load an image that has not been
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signed using the correct PKI tree.
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- Program SEC_CONFIG[1] fuse, using i.MX6 series as example:
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=> fuse prog 0 6 0x00000002
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The table below list the SEC_CONFIG[1] bank and word according to the i.MX
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device:
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+--------------+-----------------+------------+
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| Device | Bank and Word | Value |
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+--------------+-----------------+------------+
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| i.MX6 Series | bank 0 word 6 | 0x00000002 |
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+--------------+-----------------+------------+
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| i.MX7D/S | bank 1 word 3 | 0x02000000 |
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+--------------+-----------------+------------+
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| i.MX7ULP | bank 29 word 6 | 0x80000000 |
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+--------------+-----------------+------------+
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1.8 Completely secure the device
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---------------------------------
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Additional fuses can be programmed for completely secure the device, more
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details about these fuses and their possible impact can be found at AN4581[1].
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- Program SRK_LOCK, using i.MX6 series as example:
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=> fuse prog 0 0 0x4000
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- Program DIR_BT_DIS, using i.MX6 series as example:
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=> fuse prog 0 6 0x8
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- Program SJC_DISABLE, using i.MX6 series as example:
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=> fuse prog 0 6 0x100000
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- JTAG_SMODE, using i.MX6 series as example:
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=> fuse prog 0 6 0xC00000
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The table below list the SRK_LOCK, DIR_BT_DIS, SJC_DISABLE, and JTAG_SMODE bank
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and word according to the i.MX device:
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| Device | Bank and Word | Value |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| SRK_LOCK |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| i.MX6 Series | bank 0 word 0 | 0x00004000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7D/S | bank 0 word 0 | 0x00000200 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7ULP | bank 1 word 1 | 0x00000080 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| DIR_BT_DIS |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| i.MX6 Series | bank 0 word 6 | 0x00000008 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7D/S | bank 1 word 3 | 0x08000000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7ULP | bank 1 word 1 | 0x00002000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| SJC_DISABLE |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| i.MX6 Series | bank 0 word 6 | 0x00100000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7D/S | bank 1 word 3 | 0x00200000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7ULP | bank 1 word 1 | 0x00000020 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| JTAG_SMODE |
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+-------------------------------------------+
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| i.MX6 Series | bank 0 word 6 | 0x00C00000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7D/S | bank 1 word 3 | 0x00C00000 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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| i.MX7ULP | bank 1 word 1 | 0x000000C0 |
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+--------------+---------------+------------+
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2. Extending the root of trust
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-------------------------------
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The High Assurance Boot (HAB) code located in the on-chip ROM provides an
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Application Programming Interface (API) making it possible to call back
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into the HAB code for authenticating additional boot images.
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The U-Boot supports this feature and can be used to authenticate the Linux
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Kernel Image.
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The process of signing an additional image is similar to the U-Boot.
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The diagram below illustrate the zImage layout:
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------- +-----------------------------+ <-- *load_address
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^ | |
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| | |
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| | |
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| | |
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| | zImage |
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Signed | | |
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Data | | |
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| | |
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| +-----------------------------+
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| | Padding Next Boundary |
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| +-----------------------------+ <-- *ivt
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v | Image Vector Table |
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------- +-----------------------------+ <-- *csf
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| |
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| Command Sequence File (CSF) |
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| |
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+-----------------------------+
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| Padding (optional) |
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+-----------------------------+
|
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2.1 Padding the image
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----------------------
|
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The zImage must be padded to the next boundary address (0x1000), for instance
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if the image size is 0x649920 it must be padded to 0x64A000.
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The tool objcopy can be used for padding the image.
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- Pad the zImage:
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$ objcopy -I binary -O binary --pad-to 0x64A000 --gap-fill=0x00 \
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zImage zImage_pad.bin
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2.2 Generating Image Vector Table
|
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----------------------------------
|
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The HAB code requires an Image Vector Table (IVT) for determining the image
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length and the CSF location. Since zImage does not include an IVT this has
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to be manually created and appended to the end of the padded zImage, the
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script genIVT.pl in script_examples directory can be used as reference.
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- Generate IVT:
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$ genIVT.pl
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Note: The load Address may change depending on the device.
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- Append the ivt.bin at the end of the padded zImage:
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$ cat zImage_pad.bin ivt.bin > zImage_pad_ivt.bin
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|
||||
2.3 Signing the image
|
||||
----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
A CSF file has to be created to sign the image. HAB does not allow to change
|
||||
the SRK once the first image is authenticated, so the same SRK key used in
|
||||
U-Boot must be used when extending the root of trust.
|
||||
|
||||
CSF examples are available in ../csf_examples/additional_images/
|
||||
directory.
|
||||
|
||||
- Create CSF binary file:
|
||||
|
||||
$ ./cst --i csf_additional_images.txt --o csf_zImage.bin
|
||||
|
||||
- Attach the CSF binary to the end of the image:
|
||||
|
||||
$ cat zImage_pad_ivt.bin csf_zImage.bin > zImage_signed.bin
|
||||
|
||||
2.4 Verifying HAB events
|
||||
-------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The U-Boot includes the hab_auth_img command which can be used for
|
||||
authenticating and troubleshooting the signed image, zImage must be
|
||||
loaded at the load address specified in the IVT.
|
||||
|
||||
- Authenticate additional image:
|
||||
|
||||
=> hab_auth_img <Load Address> <Image Size> <IVT Offset>
|
||||
|
||||
If no HAB events were found the zImage is successfully signed.
|
||||
|
||||
References:
|
||||
[1] AN4581: "Secure Boot on i.MX 50, i.MX 53, i.MX 6 and i.MX 7 Series using
|
||||
HABv4" - Rev 2.
|
12
doc/imx/habv4/script_examples/genIVT.pl
Normal file
12
doc/imx/habv4/script_examples/genIVT.pl
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|||
#! /usr/bin/perl -w
|
||||
use strict;
|
||||
open(my $out, '>:raw', 'ivt.bin') or die "Unable to open: $!";
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x412000D1); # Signature
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x80800000); # Load Address (*load_address)
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # Reserved
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # DCD pointer
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # Boot Data
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x80EEA000); # Self Pointer (*ivt)
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x80EEA020); # CSF Pointer (*csf)
|
||||
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # Reserved
|
||||
close($out);
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue