mirror of
https://github.com/AsahiLinux/u-boot
synced 2024-11-29 08:01:08 +00:00
Merge branch '2020-10-12-assorted-encryption-changes'
- Fix verified boot on BE targets - Add support for multiple required keys in verified boots - Add support for Initialization Vectors in AES keys in FIT images - Assorted fixes in the RSA code
This commit is contained in:
commit
55fca74a5b
11 changed files with 190 additions and 36 deletions
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@ -94,9 +94,11 @@ static int fit_image_setup_decrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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return -1;
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}
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info->iv = fdt_getprop(fit, cipher_noffset, "iv", NULL);
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info->ivname = fdt_getprop(fit, cipher_noffset, "iv-name-hint", NULL);
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if (!info->ivname) {
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printf("Can't get IV name\n");
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if (!info->iv && !info->ivname) {
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printf("Can't get IV or IV name\n");
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return -1;
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}
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@ -120,8 +122,12 @@ static int fit_image_setup_decrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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* Search the cipher node in the u-boot fdt
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* the path should be: /cipher/key-<algo>-<key>-<iv>
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*/
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snprintf(node_path, sizeof(node_path), "/%s/key-%s-%s-%s",
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FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME, algo_name, info->keyname, info->ivname);
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if (info->ivname)
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snprintf(node_path, sizeof(node_path), "/%s/key-%s-%s-%s",
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FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME, algo_name, info->keyname, info->ivname);
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else
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snprintf(node_path, sizeof(node_path), "/%s/key-%s-%s",
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FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME, algo_name, info->keyname);
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noffset = fdt_path_offset(fdt, node_path);
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if (noffset < 0) {
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@ -137,10 +143,12 @@ static int fit_image_setup_decrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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}
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/* read iv */
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info->iv = fdt_getprop(fdt, noffset, "iv", NULL);
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if (!info->iv) {
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printf("Can't get IV in cipher node '%s'\n", node_path);
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return -1;
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info->iv = fdt_getprop(fdt, noffset, "iv", NULL);
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if (!info->iv) {
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printf("Can't get IV in cipher node '%s'\n", node_path);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
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{
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int noffset;
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int sig_node;
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int verified = 0;
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int reqd_sigs = 0;
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bool reqd_policy_all = true;
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const char *reqd_mode;
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/* Work out what we need to verify */
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sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
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@ -425,6 +429,14 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
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return 0;
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}
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/* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */
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reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, sig_node, "required-mode", NULL);
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if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any"))
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reqd_policy_all = false;
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debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__,
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reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any");
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fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
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const char *required;
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int ret;
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@ -433,15 +445,29 @@ int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
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NULL);
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if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
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continue;
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reqd_sigs++;
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ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit, conf_noffset, sig_blob,
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noffset);
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if (ret) {
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printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
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fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
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return ret;
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if (reqd_policy_all) {
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printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
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fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
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return ret;
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}
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} else {
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verified++;
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if (!reqd_policy_all)
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break;
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}
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}
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if (reqd_sigs && !verified) {
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printf("Failed to verify 'any' of the required signature(s)\n");
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return -EPERM;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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@ -386,6 +386,20 @@ that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys.
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This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used.
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For Signed Configurations, the default verification behavior can be changed by
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the following optional property in /signature node in U-Boot's control FDT.
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- required-mode: Valid values are "any" to allow verified boot to succeed if
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the selected configuration is signed by any of the 'required' keys, and "all"
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to allow verified boot to succeed if the selected configuration is signed by
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all of the 'required' keys.
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This property can be added to a binary device tree using fdtput as shown in
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below examples::
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fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode any
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fdtput -t s control.dtb /signature required-mode all
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Enabling FIT Verification
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-------------------------
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@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ struct cipher_algo {
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unsigned char **cipher, int *cipher_len);
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int (*add_cipher_data)(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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void *keydest);
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void *keydest, void *fit, int node_noffset);
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int (*decrypt)(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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const void *cipher, size_t cipher_len,
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@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
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int image_aes_encrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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const unsigned char *data, int size,
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unsigned char **cipher, int *cipher_len);
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int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest);
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int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest,
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void *fit, int node_noffset);
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#else
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int image_aes_encrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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const unsigned char *data, int size,
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@ -22,7 +23,8 @@ int image_aes_encrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest)
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int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest,
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void *fit, int node_noffset)
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{
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ int image_aes_encrypt(struct image_cipher_info *info,
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return ret;
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}
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int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest)
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int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest,
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void *fit, int node_noffset)
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{
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int parent, node;
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char name[128];
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@ -97,8 +98,13 @@ int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest)
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goto done;
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/* Either create or overwrite the named key node */
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snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "key-%s-%s-%s",
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info->name, info->keyname, info->ivname);
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if (info->ivname)
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snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "key-%s-%s-%s",
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info->name, info->keyname, info->ivname);
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else
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snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "key-%s-%s",
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info->name, info->keyname);
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node = fdt_subnode_offset(keydest, parent, name);
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if (node == -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
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node = fdt_add_subnode(keydest, parent, name);
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@ -116,9 +122,17 @@ int image_aes_add_cipher_data(struct image_cipher_info *info, void *keydest)
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ret = node;
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}
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if (!ret)
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if (ret)
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goto done;
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if (info->ivname)
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/* Store the IV in the u-boot device tree */
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ret = fdt_setprop(keydest, node, "iv",
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info->iv, info->cipher->iv_len);
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else
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/* Store the IV in the FIT image */
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ret = fdt_setprop(fit, node_noffset, "iv",
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info->iv, info->cipher->iv_len);
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if (!ret)
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ret = fdt_setprop(keydest, node, "key",
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@ -324,8 +324,7 @@ int hsearch_r(struct env_entry item, enum env_action action,
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*/
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unsigned hval2;
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if (htab->table[idx].used == USED_DELETED
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&& !first_deleted)
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if (htab->table[idx].used == USED_DELETED)
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first_deleted = idx;
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ret = _compare_and_overwrite_entry(item, action, retval, htab,
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@ -25,6 +25,14 @@
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#define get_unaligned_be32(a) fdt32_to_cpu(*(uint32_t *)a)
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#define put_unaligned_be32(a, b) (*(uint32_t *)(b) = cpu_to_fdt32(a))
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static inline uint64_t fdt64_to_cpup(const void *p)
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{
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fdt64_t w;
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memcpy(&w, p, sizeof(w));
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return fdt64_to_cpu(w);
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}
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/* Default public exponent for backward compatibility */
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#define RSA_DEFAULT_PUBEXP 65537
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@ -263,8 +271,7 @@ int rsa_mod_exp_sw(const uint8_t *sig, uint32_t sig_len,
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if (!prop->public_exponent)
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key.exponent = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBEXP;
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else
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rsa_convert_big_endian((uint32_t *)&key.exponent,
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prop->public_exponent, 2);
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key.exponent = fdt64_to_cpup(prop->public_exponent);
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if (!key.len || !prop->modulus || !prop->rr) {
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debug("%s: Missing RSA key info", __func__);
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|
|
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@ -439,12 +439,17 @@ static int rsa_verify_with_keynode(struct image_sign_info *info,
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struct key_prop prop;
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int length;
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int ret = 0;
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const char *algo;
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if (node < 0) {
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debug("%s: Skipping invalid node", __func__);
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return -EBADF;
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}
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algo = fdt_getprop(blob, node, "algo", NULL);
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if (strcmp(info->name, algo))
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return -EFAULT;
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prop.num_bits = fdtdec_get_int(blob, node, "rsa,num-bits", 0);
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prop.n0inv = fdtdec_get_int(blob, node, "rsa,n0-inverse", 0);
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@ -540,7 +545,7 @@ int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
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{
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/* Reserve memory for maximum checksum-length */
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uint8_t hash[info->crypto->key_len];
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int ret = -EACCES;
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int ret;
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/*
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* Verify that the checksum-length does not exceed the
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|
|
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@ -126,6 +126,23 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, sign_options, required):
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cons.log.action('%s: Sign images' % sha_algo)
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util.run_and_log(cons, args)
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def sign_fit_norequire(sha_algo, options):
|
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"""Sign the FIT
|
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|
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Signs the FIT and writes the signature into it. It also writes the
|
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public key into the dtb. It does not mark key as 'required' in dtb.
|
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|
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Args:
|
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sha_algo: Either 'sha1' or 'sha256', to select the algorithm to
|
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use.
|
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options: Options to provide to mkimage.
|
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"""
|
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args = [mkimage, '-F', '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb, fit]
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if options:
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args += options.split(' ')
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cons.log.action('%s: Sign images' % sha_algo)
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util.run_and_log(cons, args)
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|
||||
def replace_fit_totalsize(size):
|
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"""Replace FIT header's totalsize with something greater.
|
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|
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|
@ -279,15 +296,40 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console, sha_algo, padding, sign_options, required):
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# Build the FIT with dev key (keys NOT required). This adds the
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||||
# signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, NOT marked 'required'.
|
||||
make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding))
|
||||
sign_fit(sha_algo, sign_options)
|
||||
sign_fit_norequire(sha_algo, sign_options)
|
||||
|
||||
# So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
|
||||
# Only the prod key is set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has
|
||||
# a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT).
|
||||
# a dev signature only (sign_fit_norequire() overwrites the FIT).
|
||||
# Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should not be accepted by
|
||||
# U-Boot because the prod key is required.
|
||||
run_bootm(sha_algo, 'required key', '', False)
|
||||
|
||||
# Build the FIT with dev key (keys required) and sign it. This puts the
|
||||
# signature into sandbox-u-boot.dtb, marked 'required'.
|
||||
make_fit('sign-configs-%s%s.its' % (sha_algo, padding))
|
||||
sign_fit(sha_algo, sign_options)
|
||||
|
||||
# Set the required-mode policy to "any".
|
||||
# So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
|
||||
# Both the dev and prod key are set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has
|
||||
# a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT).
|
||||
# Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should be accepted by
|
||||
# U-Boot because the dev key is required and policy is "any" required key.
|
||||
util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtput -t s %s /signature required-mode any' %
|
||||
(dtb))
|
||||
run_bootm(sha_algo, 'multi required key', 'dev+', True)
|
||||
|
||||
# Set the required-mode policy to "all".
|
||||
# So now sandbox-u-boot.dtb two signatures, for the prod and dev keys.
|
||||
# Both the dev and prod key are set as 'required'. But FIT we just built has
|
||||
# a dev signature only (sign_fit() overwrites the FIT).
|
||||
# Try to boot the FIT with dev key. This FIT should not be accepted by
|
||||
# U-Boot because the prod key is required and policy is "all" required key
|
||||
util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtput -t s %s /signature required-mode all' %
|
||||
(dtb))
|
||||
run_bootm(sha_algo, 'multi required key', '', False)
|
||||
|
||||
cons = u_boot_console
|
||||
tmpdir = cons.config.result_dir + '/'
|
||||
datadir = cons.config.source_dir + '/test/py/tests/vboot/'
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -320,6 +320,36 @@ err:
|
|||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int get_random_data(void *data, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *tmp = data;
|
||||
struct timespec date;
|
||||
int i, ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tmp) {
|
||||
printf("%s: pointer data is NULL\n", __func__);
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &date);
|
||||
if (ret < 0) {
|
||||
printf("%s: clock_gettime has failed (err=%d, str=%s)\n",
|
||||
__func__, ret, strerror(ret));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
srand(date.tv_nsec);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
|
||||
*tmp = rand() & 0xff;
|
||||
tmp++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int fit_image_setup_cipher(struct image_cipher_info *info,
|
||||
const char *keydir, void *fit,
|
||||
const char *image_name, int image_noffset,
|
||||
|
@ -345,13 +375,13 @@ static int fit_image_setup_cipher(struct image_cipher_info *info,
|
|||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Read the IV name */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Read the IV name
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If this property is not provided then mkimage will generate
|
||||
* a random IV and store it in the FIT image
|
||||
*/
|
||||
info->ivname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "iv-name-hint", NULL);
|
||||
if (!info->ivname) {
|
||||
printf("Can't get iv name for cipher in image '%s'\n",
|
||||
image_name);
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
info->fit = fit;
|
||||
info->node_noffset = noffset;
|
||||
|
@ -377,17 +407,23 @@ static int fit_image_setup_cipher(struct image_cipher_info *info,
|
|||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Read the IV in the file */
|
||||
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s%s",
|
||||
info->keydir, info->ivname, ".bin");
|
||||
info->iv = malloc(info->cipher->iv_len);
|
||||
if (!info->iv) {
|
||||
printf("Can't allocate memory for iv\n");
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = fit_image_read_data(filename, (unsigned char *)info->iv,
|
||||
info->cipher->iv_len);
|
||||
|
||||
if (info->ivname) {
|
||||
/* Read the IV in the file */
|
||||
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s%s",
|
||||
info->keydir, info->ivname, ".bin");
|
||||
ret = fit_image_read_data(filename, (unsigned char *)info->iv,
|
||||
info->cipher->iv_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Generate an ramdom IV */
|
||||
ret = get_random_data((void *)info->iv, info->cipher->iv_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
|
@ -453,9 +489,10 @@ fit_image_process_cipher(const char *keydir, void *keydest, void *fit,
|
|||
* Write the public key into the supplied FDT file; this might fail
|
||||
* several times, since we try signing with successively increasing
|
||||
* size values
|
||||
* And, if needed, write the iv in the FIT file
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (keydest) {
|
||||
ret = info.cipher->add_cipher_data(&info, keydest);
|
||||
ret = info.cipher->add_cipher_data(&info, keydest, fit, node_noffset);
|
||||
if (ret) {
|
||||
printf("Failed to add verification data for cipher '%s' in image '%s'\n",
|
||||
info.keyname, image_name);
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue