

<details>

<summary><strong>Support HackTricks and get benefits!</strong></summary>

Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!

Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)

Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)

**Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**

**Share your hacking tricks submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks github repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)**.**

</details>


# What Affects

When you run a container as privileged these are the protections you are disabling:

## Mount /dev

In a privileged container, all the **devices can be accessed in `/dev/`**. Therefore you can **escape** by **mounting** the disk of the host.

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Inside default container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm -it alpine sh
ls /dev
console  fd       mqueue   ptmx     random   stderr   stdout   urandom
core     full     null     pts      shm      stdin    tty      zero
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Inside Privileged Container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged -it alpine sh
ls /dev
cachefiles       mapper           port             shm              tty24            tty44            tty7
console          mem              psaux            stderr           tty25            tty45            tty8
core             mqueue           ptmx             stdin            tty26            tty46            tty9
cpu              nbd0             pts              stdout           tty27            tty47            ttyS0
[...]
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

## Read-only kernel file systems

Kernel file systems provide a mechanism for a **process to alter the way the kernel runs.** By default, we **don't want container processes to modify the kernel**, so we mount kernel file systems as read-only within the container.

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Inside default container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm -it alpine sh
mount | grep '(ro'
sysfs on /sys type sysfs (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
cpuset on /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuset)
cpu on /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpu)
cpuacct on /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct type cgroup (ro,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuacct)
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Inside Privileged Container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged -it alpine sh
mount  | grep '(ro'

```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

## Masking over kernel file systems

The **/proc** file system is namespace-aware, and certain writes can be allowed, so we don't mount it read-only. However, specific directories in the /proc file system need to be **protected from writing**, and in some instances, **from reading**. In these cases, the container engines mount **tmpfs** file systems over potentially dangerous directories, preventing processes inside of the container from using them.

{% hint style="info" %}
**tmpfs** is a file system that stores all the files in virtual memory. tmpfs doesn't create any files on your hard drive. So if you unmount a tmpfs file system, all the files residing in it are lost for ever.
{% endhint %}

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Inside default container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm -it alpine sh
mount  | grep /proc.*tmpfs
tmpfs on /proc/acpi type tmpfs (ro,relatime)
tmpfs on /proc/kcore type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
tmpfs on /proc/keys type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,size=65536k,mode=755)
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Inside Privileged Container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged -it alpine sh
mount  | grep /proc.*tmpfs
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

## Linux capabilities

Container engines launch the containers with a **limited number of capabilities** to control what goes on inside of the container by default. **Privileged** ones have **all** the **capabilities** accesible. To learn about capabilities read:

{% content-ref url="../linux-capabilities.md" %}
[linux-capabilities.md](../linux-capabilities.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Inside default container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm -it alpine sh
apk add -U libcap; capsh --print
[...]
Current: cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_chroot,cap_mknod,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap=eip
Bounding set =cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_chroot,cap_mknod,cap_audit_write,cap_setfcap
[...]
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Inside Privileged Container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged -it alpine sh
apk add -U libcap; capsh --print
[...]
Current: =eip cap_perfmon,cap_bpf,cap_checkpoint_restore-eip
Bounding set =cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_dac_read_search,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_linux_immutable,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_broadcast,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_ipc_lock,cap_ipc_owner,cap_sys_module,cap_sys_rawio,cap_sys_chroot,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_pacct,cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_boot,cap_sys_nice,cap_sys_resource,cap_sys_time,cap_sys_tty_config,cap_mknod,cap_lease,cap_audit_write,cap_audit_control,cap_setfcap,cap_mac_override,cap_mac_admin,cap_syslog,cap_wake_alarm,cap_block_suspend,cap_audit_read
[...]
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

You can manipulate the capabilities available to a container without running in `--privileged` mode by using the `--cap-add` and `--cap-drop` flags.

## Seccomp

**Seccomp** is useful to **limit** the **syscalls** a container can call. A default seccomp profile is enabled by default when running docker containers, but in privileged mode it is disabled. Learn more about Seccomp here:

{% content-ref url="seccomp.md" %}
[seccomp.md](seccomp.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Inside default container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm -it alpine sh
grep Seccomp /proc/1/status
Seccomp:	2
Seccomp_filters:	1
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Inside Privileged Container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged -it alpine sh
grep Seccomp /proc/1/status
Seccomp:	0
Seccomp_filters:	0
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

```bash
# You can manually disable seccomp in docker with
--security-opt seccomp=unconfined
```

Also, note that when Docker (or other CRIs) are used in a **Kubernetes** cluster, the **seccomp filter is disabled by default**

## AppArmor

**AppArmor** is a kernel enhancement to confine **containers** to a **limited** set of **resources** with **per-program profiles**. When you run with the `--privileged` flag, this protection is disabled.

{% content-ref url="apparmor.md" %}
[apparmor.md](apparmor.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}

```bash
# You can manually disable seccomp in docker with
--security-opt apparmor=unconfined
```

## SELinux

When you run with the `--privileged` flag, **SELinux labels are disabled**, and the container runs with the **label that the container engine was executed with**. This label is usually `unconfined` and has **full access to the labels that the container engine does**. In rootless mode, the container runs with `container_runtime_t`. In root mode, it runs with `spc_t`.

{% content-ref url="../selinux.md" %}
[selinux.md](../selinux.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}

```bash
# You can manually disable selinux in docker with
--security-opt label:disable
```

# What Doesn't Affect

## Namespaces

Namespaces are **NOT affected** by the `--privileged` flag. Even though they don't have the security constraints enabled, they **do not see all of the processes on the system or the host network, for example**. Users can disable individual namespaces by using the **`--pid=host`, `--net=host`, `--ipc=host`, `--uts=host`** container engines flags.

{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Inside default privileged container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged -it alpine sh
ps -ef
PID   USER     TIME  COMMAND
    1 root      0:00 sh
   18 root      0:00 ps -ef
```
{% endtab %}

{% tab title="Inside --pid=host Container" %}
```bash
# docker run --rm --privileged --pid=host -it alpine sh
ps -ef
PID   USER     TIME  COMMAND
    1 root      0:03 /sbin/init
    2 root      0:00 [kthreadd]
    3 root      0:00 [rcu_gp]ount | grep /proc.*tmpfs
[...]
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}

## User namespace

Container engines do **NOT use user namespace by default**. However, rootless containers always use it to mount file systems and use more than a single UID. In the rootless case, user namespace can not be disabled; it is required to run rootless containers. User namespaces prevent certain privileges and add considerable security.

# References

* [https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/privileged-flag-container-engines](https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/privileged-flag-container-engines)


<details>

<summary><strong>Support HackTricks and get benefits!</strong></summary>

Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!

Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)

Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)

**Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**

**Share your hacking tricks submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks github repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)**.**

</details>