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{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %} ## **Basic Information** **Tapjacking** is an attack where a **malicious** **application** is launched and **positions itself on top of a victim application**. Once it visibly obscures the victim app, its user interface is designed in such a way as to trick the user to interact with it, while it is passing the interaction along to the victim app.\ In effect, it is **blinding the user from knowing they are actually performing actions on the victim app**. ### Detection In order to detect apps vulnerable to this attacked you should search for **exported activities** in the android manifest (note that an activity with an intent-filter is automatically exported by default). Once you have found the exported activities, **check if they require any permission**. This is because the **malicious application will need that permission also**. ### Protection #### Android 12 (API 31,32) and higher [**According to this source**](https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/tapjacking-in-android/)**,** tapjacking attacks are automatically prevented by Android from Android 12 (API 31 & 30) and higher. So, even if the application is vulnerable you **won't be able to exploit it**. #### `filterTouchesWhenObscured` If **`android:filterTouchesWhenObscured`** is set to **`true`**, the `View` will not receive touches whenever view's window is obscured by another visible window. #### **`setFilterTouchesWhenObscured`** The attribute **`setFilterTouchesWhenObscured`** set to true can also prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability if the Android version is lower.\ If set to **`true`**, for example, a button can be automatically **disabled if it is obscured**: ```xml ``` ## Exploitation ### Tapjacking-ExportedActivity The most **recent Android application** performing a Tapjacking attack (+ invoking before an exported activity of the attacked application) can be found in: [**https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity**](https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity). Follow the **README instructions to use it**. ### FloatingWindowApp An example project implementing **FloatingWindowApp**, which can be used to put on top of other activities to perform a clickjacking attack, can be found in [**FloatingWindowApp**](https://github.com/aminography/FloatingWindowApp) (a bit old, good luck building the apk). ### Qark {% hint style="danger" %} It looks like this project is now unmaintained and this functionality isn't properly working anymore {% endhint %} You can use [**qark**](https://github.com/linkedin/qark) with the `--exploit-apk` --sdk-path `/Users/username/Library/Android/sdk` parameters to create a malicious application to test for possible **Tapjacking** vulnerabilities.\ The mitigation is relatively simple as the developer may choose not to receive touch events when a view is covered by another. Using the [Android Developer’s Reference](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/view/View#security): > Sometimes it is essential that an application be able to verify that an action is being performed with the full knowledge and consent of the user, such as granting a permission request, making a purchase or clicking on an advertisement. Unfortunately, a malicious application could try to spoof the user into performing these actions, unaware, by concealing the intended purpose of the view. As a remedy, the framework offers a touch filtering mechanism that can be used to improve the security of views that provide access to sensitive functionality. > > To enable touch filtering, call [`setFilterTouchesWhenObscured(boolean)`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/view/View#setFilterTouchesWhenObscured%28boolean%29) or set the android:filterTouchesWhenObscured layout attribute to true. When enabled, the framework will discard touches that are received whenever the view's window is obscured by another visible window. As a result, the view will not receive touches whenever a toast, dialog or other window appears above the view's window.