# Proxy / WAF Protections Bypass
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{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %} ## Bypass Nginx ACL Rules with Pathname Manipulation Techniques [from this research](https://rafa.hashnode.dev/exploiting-http-parsers-inconsistencies). Nginx rule example: ```plaintext location = /admin { deny all; } location = /admin/ { deny all; } ``` In order to prevent bypasses Nginx performs path normalization before checking it. However, if the backend server performs a different normalization (removing characters that nginx doesn't remove) it might be possible to bypass this defense. ### **NodeJS - Express** | Nginx Version | **Node.js Bypass Characters** | | ------------- | ----------------------------- | | 1.22.0 | `\xA0` | | 1.21.6 | `\xA0` | | 1.20.2 | `\xA0`, `\x09`, `\x0C` | | 1.18.0 | `\xA0`, `\x09`, `\x0C` | | 1.16.1 | `\xA0`, `\x09`, `\x0C` | ### **Flask** | Nginx Version | **Flask Bypass Characters** | | ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | | 1.22.0 | `\x85`, `\xA0` | | 1.21.6 | `\x85`, `\xA0` | | 1.20.2 | `\x85`, `\xA0`, `\x1F`, `\x1E`, `\x1D`, `\x1C`, `\x0C`, `\x0B` | | 1.18.0 | `\x85`, `\xA0`, `\x1F`, `\x1E`, `\x1D`, `\x1C`, `\x0C`, `\x0B` | | 1.16.1 | `\x85`, `\xA0`, `\x1F`, `\x1E`, `\x1D`, `\x1C`, `\x0C`, `\x0B` | ### **Spring Boot** | Nginx Version | **Spring Boot Bypass Characters** | | ------------- | --------------------------------- | | 1.22.0 | `;` | | 1.21.6 | `;` | | 1.20.2 | `\x09`, `;` | | 1.18.0 | `\x09`, `;` | | 1.16.1 | `\x09`, `;` | ### **PHP-FPM** Nginx FPM configuration: ```plaintext location = /admin.php { deny all; } location ~ \.php$ { include snippets/fastcgi-php.conf; fastcgi_pass unix:/run/php/php8.1-fpm.sock; } ``` Nginx is configured to block access to `/admin.php` but it's possible to bypass this by accessing `/admin.php/index.php`. ### How to prevent ```plaintext location ~* ^/admin { deny all; } ``` ## Bypass Mod Security Rules ### Path Confusion [**In this post**](https://blog.sicuranext.com/modsecurity-path-confusion-bugs-bypass/) is explained that ModSecurity v3 (until 3.0.12), **improperly implemented the `REQUEST_FILENAME`** variable which was supposed to contain the accessed path (until the start of the parameters). This is because it performed an URL decode to get the path.\ Therefore, a request like `http://example.com/foo%3f';alert(1);foo=` in mod security will suppose that the path is just `/foo` because `%3f` is transformed into `?` ending the URL path, but actually the path that a server will receive will be `/foo%3f';alert(1);foo=`. The variables `REQUEST_BASENAME` and `PATH_INFO` were also affected by this bug. Something similar ocurred in version 2 of Mod Security that allowed to bypass a protection that prevented user accessing files with specific extensions related to backup files (such as `.bak`) simply by sending the dot URL encoded in `%2e`, for example: `https://example.com/backup%2ebak`. ## Bypass AWS WAF ACL ### Malformed Header [This research](https://rafa.hashnode.dev/exploiting-http-parsers-inconsistencies) mentions that it was possible to bypass AWS WAF rules applied over HTTP headers by sending a "malformed" header that wasn't properly parsed by AWS but it was by the backend server. For example, sending the following request with a SQL injection in the header X-Query: ```http GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: target.com\r\n X-Query: Value\r\n \t' or '1'='1' -- \r\n Connection: close\r\n \r\n ``` It was possible to bypass AWS WAF because it wouldn't understand that the next line is part of the value of the header while the NODEJS server did (this was fixed). ## References * [https://rafa.hashnode.dev/exploiting-http-parsers-inconsistencies](https://rafa.hashnode.dev/exploiting-http-parsers-inconsistencies) * [https://blog.sicuranext.com/modsecurity-path-confusion-bugs-bypass/](https://blog.sicuranext.com/modsecurity-path-confusion-bugs-bypass/)
{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %}
Learn AWS hacking from zero to hero with htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)! Other ways to support HackTricks: * If you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks** or **download HackTricks in PDF** Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)! * Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com) * Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family) * **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.** * **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.