# Cookie Tossing
{% hint style="success" %}
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:
[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: 
[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
Support HackTricks
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
{% endhint %}
### Description
If an attacker can **control a subdomain or the domain of a company or finds an XSS in a subdomain** he will be able to perform this attack.
As it was indicated in the Cookies Hacking section, when a **cookie is set to a domain (specifying it) it will be used in the domain and subdomains.**
{% hint style="danger" %}
Therefore, **an attacker is going to be able to set to the domain and subdomains a specific cookie doing something like** `document.cookie="session=1234; Path=/app/login; domain=.example.com"`
{% endhint %}
This can be dangerous as the attacker may be able to:
* **Fixate the cookie of the victim to the attacker's account** so if the user doesn't notice, **he will perform the actions in the attacker's account** and the attacker may obtain some interesting information (check the history of the searches of the user in the platform, the victim may set his credit card in the account...)
* If the **cookie doesn't change after login**, the attacker may just **fixate a cookie (session-fixation)**, wait until the victim logs in and then **use that cookie to log in as the victim**.
* Sometimes, even if the session cookies changes, the attacker use the previous one and he will receive the new one also.
* If the **cookie is setting some initial value** (like in flask where the **cookie** may **set** the **CSRF token** of the session and this value will be maintained after the victim logs in), the **attacker may set this known value and then abuse it** (in that scenario, the attacker may then make the user perform a CSRF request as he knows the CSRF token).
* Just like setting the value, the attacker could also get an unauthenticated cookie generated by the server, get the CSRF token from it and use it.
### Cookie Order
When a browser receives two cookies with the same name **partially affecting the same scope** (domain, subdomains and path), the **browser will send both values of the cookie** when both are valid for the request.
Depending on who has **the most specific path** or which one is the **oldest one**, the browser will **set the value of the cookie first** and then the value of the other one like in: `Cookie: iduser=MoreSpecificAndOldestCookie; iduser=LessSpecific;`
Most **websites will only use the first value**. Then, if an attacker wants to set a cookie it's better to set it before another one is set or set it with a more specific path.
{% hint style="warning" %}
Moreover, the capability to **set a cookie in a more specific path** is very interesting as you will be able to make the **victim work with his cookie except in the specific path where the malicious cookie set will be sent before**.
{% endhint %}
### Protection Bypass
Possible protection against this attack would be that the **web server won't accept requests with two cookies with the same name but two different values**.
To bypass the scenario where the attacker is setting a cookie after the victim was already given the cookie, the attacker could cause a **cookie overflow** and then, once the **legit cookie is deleted, set the malicious one**.
{% content-ref url="cookie-jar-overflow.md" %}
[cookie-jar-overflow.md](cookie-jar-overflow.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
Another useful **bypass** could be to **URL encode the name of the cookie** as some protections check for 2 cookies with the same name in a request and then the server will decode the names of the cookies.
### Cookie Bomb
A Cookie Tossing attack may also be used to perform a **Cookie Bomb** attack:
{% content-ref url="cookie-bomb.md" %}
[cookie-bomb.md](cookie-bomb.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
### Defense**s**
#### **Use the prefix `__Host` in the cookie name**
* If a cookie name has this prefix, it **will only be accepted** in a Set-Cookie directive if it is marked Secure, was sent from a secure origin, does not include a Domain attribute, and has the Path attribute set to /
* **This prevents subdomains from forcing a cookie to the apex domain since these cookies can be seen as "domain-locked"**
### References
* [**@blueminimal**](https://twitter.com/blueminimal)
* [**https://speakerdeck.com/filedescriptor/the-cookie-monster-in-your-browsers**](https://speakerdeck.com/filedescriptor/the-cookie-monster-in-your-browsers)
* [**https://github.blog/2013-04-09-yummy-cookies-across-domains/**](https://github.blog/2013-04-09-yummy-cookies-across-domains/)
* [**Cookie Crumbles: Unveiling Web Session Integrity Vulnerabilities**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F\_wAzF4a7Xg)
{% hint style="success" %}
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
Support HackTricks
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
{% endhint %}